This E-Special Issue collects together 11 articles from the archives of Theory, Culture & Society. These articles all articulate and debate the contribution of what some have described as either ‘complex complexity’ or ‘general complexity’. In contrast to reductionist or restricted attempts to understand complexity, the articles collected here move away from the tendency to assume mastery of complexity by expounding a set of universal and simple laws. Rather, the position of general complexity is that we cannot grasp the complexity (...) of the world in its complexity, and therefore depend upon models which are always incomplete, provisional and contingent. Yet, these models make knowledge and action possible, and it is therefore the contribution of general complexity to provide the means through which we can ethically and pragmatically engage with complexity in the hope of realizing alternative, perhaps better, worlds. (shrink)

The modern state produces distinctive possibilities and pathologies for human value and autonomy. The modern state is the iron cage making novel crimes against humanity possible. The state also reg...

In this article I explore the possibilities of experimentation as a non-foundational praxis for introducing novel ways of being into existence. Beginning with a discussion, following Bataille, of the excess of any thought, I argue that any action in the world is necessarily uncertain. Using the insights of Derridean deconstruction combined with Badiousian truth procedure I argue that experimentation offers a means for acting from this uncertain position. Experimentation takes advantage of the play and uncertainty of our understanding of the (...) world as a means of moving towards more progressive political positions. Normal 0 false false false EN-IE X-NONE X-NONE /* Style Definitions */ table.MsoNormalTable {mso-style-name:"Table Normal"; mso-tstyle-rowband-size:0; mso-tstyle-colband-size:0; mso-style-noshow:yes; mso-style-priority:99; mso-style-parent:""; mso-padding-alt:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt; mso-para-margin-top:0cm; mso-para-margin-right:0cm; mso-para-margin-bottom:10.0pt; mso-para-margin-left:0cm; line-height:115%; mso-pagination:widow-orphan; font-size:11.0pt; font-family:"Calibri","sans-serif"; mso-ascii-font-family:Calibri; mso-ascii-theme-font:minor-latin; mso-hansi-font-family:Calibri; mso-hansi-theme-font:minor-latin; mso-bidi-font-family:"Times New Roman"; mso-bidi-theme-font:minor-bidi; mso-fareast-language:EN-US;}. (shrink)

Humiliation, as dealt with under different legal jurisdictions, poses a question about how these systems perceive and respond to humiliation. Are the laws' definitions, approach, and punishment appropriately determined? And if there are challenges to implementation, what are they?

In this latest work by one of our leading political and legal philosophers, Allen Buchanan outlines a novel framework for assessing the system of international human rights law—the system that he takes to be the heart of modern human rights practice. Buchanan does not offer a full justification for the current system, but rather aims “to make a strong prima facie case that the existing system as a whole has what it takes to warrant our support of it on moral (...) grounds, even if some aspects of it are defective and should be the object of serious efforts at improvement”. (shrink)

In this article I argue that the fundamental axiological claim of the New Natural Law Theory, according to which human life has an intrinsically valuable, cannot be defended within the framework assumed by the New Natural Law Theory itself, and further, that such a claim turns out to be false relative to a wider eudaimonistic framework that the Natural Law theorist is committed to accept. I do this this by adopting a dialectical standpoint which excludes any assumptions that could be (...) denied by the New Natural Law theorist, except for the axiological claim, and show that the New Natural Law theorist cannot argue for the axiological claim's plausibility, and moreover, that in such a setting the New Natural Law theorist is compelled to replace the axiological claim by the claim that human life is instrumentally valuable. La afirmación axiológica fundamental de la Nueva Ley Natural según la cual la vida humana tiene un valor intrínseco, no puede ser defendida dentro del marco teórico asumido por dicha teoría, y resulta ser falsa en un marco eudemonista más amplio, que debe ser aceptado por el teórico de la ley natural. Se asume una posición dialéctica que excluye cualquier suposición que pueda ser negada por el teórico de la NLN, con excepción de la afirmación axiológica, y se demuestra que él no puede mostrar la plausibilidad de la afirmación axiológica; más aún, que se ve forzado a reemplazar la afirmación axiológica por la aceptación de que la vida humana tiene un valor instrumental. (shrink)

There has been growing interest in, and scholarly attention to, issues and questions that arise within the subject matter domain we may call "human rights theory". See, in particular, Amartya Sen, "Elements of a Theory of Human Rights," 32 Philosophy & Public Affairs 315 (2004); James W. Nickel, Making Sense of Human Rights (rev. ed. 2006); Michael J. Perry, Toward a Theory of Human Rights: Religion, Law, Courts (2007); James Griffin, On Human Rights (2008); Nicholas Wolterstorff, Justice: Rights and Wrongs (...) (2008). This essay - a version of which will appear in a multi-authored collection of essays to be published by Oxford University Press in 2009 - is intended as a contribution to human rights theory. These are the principal questions, or sets of questions, I address in the essay:1. What is the morality of human rights - by which I mean the morality that, according to the International Bill of Human Rights, is the principal warrant for the law of human rights?2. How does the morality of human rights warrant the law of human rights?3. Some human-rights-claims are legal claims, but some are moral claims, and some are both. What does a human-rights-claim of the legal sort mean? A human-rights-claim of the moral sort? And when does it make sense to think of a right that only some human beings have - children, for example - as a human right?4. Is there a plausible secular ground for the morality of human rights?5. At the end of the proverbial day, what difference does it make - why should we care - if there is no plausible secular ground for the morality of human rights?Comments and questions welcome. (shrink)

Is the virtue of the good citizen the same as the virtue of the good man? Aristotle addresses this in Politics 3.4. His answer is twofold. On the one hand, (the account for Difference) they are not the same both because what the citizen’s virtue is depends on the constitution, on what preserves it, and on the role the citizen plays in it, and because the good citizens in the best constitution cannot all be good men, whereas the good man’s (...) virtue is uniform. On the other hand, (the account for Identity) the two virtues are identical in the good men in the best constitution, in which all are good citizens, each possessing the ability for ruling and for being ruled. This nuanced answer can be seen as Aristotle’s synthesis of a Periclean view (contribution to state blots out personal wrongs) and a Socratic view (no good citizen is without justice). Its nuances reflect the extent to which Aristotle’s conceptions of good citizenship and the best constitution accommodate deviations of what is probable from the human ideal set out in his ethical writings. In the present chapter, I will first address three puzzles regarding the nuances of Aristotle’s answer. Second, I will consider one question about its implication: Does Aristotle’s account for Difference turn out to entail something ultra-Periclean: that no one can simultaneously be a good man and a good citizen in any constitution other than the best? I shall argue the negative. (shrink)

Much mainstream legal comment on human rights law presents an unhelpfully crude picture of disagreement concerning the significance that should be attached to human rights in particular cultural co...

Consistent with Article 38 of the Statute of International Court of Justice, the primary sources of international human rights law can be identified as treaty, custom, and general principles of law derived from national legal systems. Treaty provisions in human rights law are often textually fairly open‐ended and hence will need to be read in the light of institutionalized practices of interpretation, such as the jurisprudence by regional human rights courts and international human rights treaty bodies. Despite the universal acceptance (...) of human rights treaties and the recognition of human rights as norms of customary international law, human rights violations do occur in all parts of the world and are often systematic. Major shortcomings of the international monitoring mechanisms for human rights treaties are their underresourcing, lack of visibility, and ineffectiveness. Even if human rights treaties have become universally accepted, compliance control remains underdeveloped. (shrink)

This analysis examines the ‘girls only’ policy for publicly funded human papillomavirus (HPV) vaccination programmes. Current funding policy in most Canadian provinces covers ‘girls only’ with the goal of reducing mortality and morbidity rates of HPV‐related cervical cancer. Recent studies indicate increasing rates of other HPV‐related cancers among cisgender men and women. The HPV vaccine is proving effective against some of these cancers. Statistics on HPV vaccine uptake among individuals with different gender expressions are scarce. Critics argue that a ‘girls (...) only’ HPV vaccine policy is inequitable. We add to this critique by reflecting on the gender binary embedded in such policies and produced through epidemiological studies that attend differentially to females, reinforcing exclusionary practices that leave out those who form their gender identities across the spectrum. We then draw on deontological (duties‐based) and utilitarian (utility‐based) frameworks to show that these gendered policies are also unethical. These challenges to the assumptions underlying ‘girls only’ immunization programmes have implications for nurses and the healthcare system. If we are to advance equitable and ethical health outcomes, we entreat nurses as a collective to mobilize the public to lobby federal, provincial and territorial governments to fund more inclusive HPV vaccination policies. (shrink)

The paper argues for attaching a significant role to the dignity of offenders as a limitation on the scope of substantive criminal law. Three different aspects of human dignity are discussed. Human dignity is closely connected with the principle of culpability. Respecting the dignity of offenders requires that we assign criminal liability according to the actual attitudes of the offenders towards the interests protected by the offence. The doctrine of natural and probable consequence of complicity, which allows us to assign (...) liability for mens rea offenses to a negligent offender, violates the dignity of the offender; it treats the incautious offender as if she had willfully expressed disrespect towards the protected interest. The human dignity core of privacy is invaded by criminalizing the private possession of child pornography. By extending the prohibition of the creation, sale and distribution of child pornography to the private possession of pornography, the State attempts to control the way the individual expresses an essential part of the self—his sexual fantasies—within himself. Dignity demands that our actions convey an attitude of respect towards human beings. The expressive meaning of disrespect is culture-dependent. The historical association with totalitarian regimes explains our reluctance to impose a legal duty to report past crime: the individual who is legally required to turn a suspect into the police is viewed as an “informant.”. (shrink)

We continuously talk about autonomous technologies. But how can words qualifying technologies be the very same words chosen by Kant to define what is essentially human, i.e. being autonomous? The article focuses on a possible answer by reflecting upon both etymological and philosophical issues, as well as upon the case of autonomous vehicles. Most interestingly, on the one hand, we have the notion of “autonomy”, meaning that there is a “law” that is “self-given”, and, on the other hand, we have (...) the notion of “automation”, meaning that there is something “offhand” that is “self-given”. Yet, we are experiencing a kind of twofold shift: on the one hand, the shift from defining technologies in terms of automation to defining technologies in terms of autonomy and, on the other hand, the shift from defining humans in terms of autonomy to defining humans in terms of automation. From a philosophical perspective, the shift may mean that we are trying to escape precisely from what autonomy founds, i.e. individual responsibility of humans that, in the Western culture, have been defined for millennia as rational and moral decision-makers, even when their decisions have been the toughest. More precisely, the shift may mean that we are using technologies, and in particular emerging algorithmic technologies, as scapegoats that bear responsibility for us by making decisions for us. Moreover, if we consider the kind of emerging algorithmic technologies that increasingly surround us, starting from autonomous vehicles, then we may argue that we also seem to create a kind of technological divine that, by being always with us through its immanent omnipresence, omniscience, omnipotence and inscrutability, can always be our technological scapegoat freeing us from the most unbearable burden of individual responsibility resulting from individual autonomy. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Kennedy Institute of Ethics Journal 14.1 (2004) 47-54 [Access article in PDF] Ethical Guidelines for Human Embryonic Stem Cell Research*(A Recommended Manuscript) Adopted on 16 October 2001Revised on 20 August 2002 Ethics Committee of the Chinese National Human Genome Center at Shanghai, Shanghai 201203 Human embryonic stem cell (ES) research is a great project in the frontier of biomedical science for the twenty-first century. Be- cause the research involves (...) the use of human embryos, it triggers serious debate on ethical issues. Opponents consider the embryo to be an early form of human life that should be respected and not destroyed. However, the majority of scientists support embryonic stem cell research, believing that it offers good prospects for the treatment of diseases that have remained incurable until now and so will benefit humankind. The Ethics Committee of the Department of Ethical, Legal, and Social Implications of the Chinese National Human Genome Center at Shanghai seriously discussed the ethical debate initiated by embryonic stem cell research. We concluded that we should support the scientists of our country in actively carrying out human embryonic stem cell research for the noble cause of "medicine being a beneficent art." For the healthy and orderly development of human embryonic stem cell research in our country, we put forward the following recommended Ethical Guidelines for Human Embryonic Stem Cell Research as a reference for leaders, administrative departments, and related scientists. Preface Article 1. Human embryonic stem cells are the primitive cells that play the main role in the growth and development of a human body. These [End Page 47] primitive cells have the potential for infinite proliferation, self-renewal, and multi-directional differentiation. If scientists can discover the mechanism of differentiation of human embryonic stem cells, it will be possible to induce differentiation of human embryonic stem cells to form various types of human cells for clinical cell therapy. If human embryonic stem cell research can be integrated with modern biomedical engineering techniques, it also will be possible to make repair and replacement of human tissues and organs a reality. Article 2. There are two ways to classify human embryonic stem cells. One way is to classify them according to their potential for differentiation. There could be three kinds of stem cells: totipotent stem cells, pluripotent stem cells, and unipotent stem cells.A totipotent stem cell has the potential to develop into a whole individual. It can differentiate into the more than 200 cell types in the whole body, construct any tissue or organ of the body, and finally develop into a whole individual. The fertilized egg and the cleavage cells at the very early stage of embryonic development are totipotent stem cells.A pluripotent stem cell has the potential to differentiate into many cell types derived from the three embryonic layers. However, it has lost the capacity to develop into a complete organism.A unipotent stem cell is derived from the further differentiation of the pluripotent stem cell. It can differentiate only into one cell type such as a hematopoietic stem cell, neural stem cell, and others.The other way is to classify human stem cells according to their source. There could be two kinds of human stem cells: embryonic stem cells and tissue stem cells (also called adult stem cells). The former involves experimentation with embryos, which has serious ethical implications. Ethical issues associated with the latter are mainly expressed in the various opinions regarding the allocation of health resources. Article 3. Human embryonic stem cells are the group of cells called the blastocyst inner cell mass during the early stage of embryonic development. They are the main source of totipotent stem cells, and hence the focal and hot point in stem cell research. Studies on the clinical application of embryonic stem cells probably will involve use of the somatic cell nucleus transfer (SCNT) technique, which destroys the early human embryo. At present, the ethical and moral debate is very serious in human embryonic stem cell research regarding whether the research will develop... (shrink)

BackgroundHuman genome editing technologies offer much potential benefit. However, central to any conversation relating to the application of such technologies are certain ethical, legal, and social difficulties around their application. The recent misuse, or inappropriate use, by certain Chinese actors of the application of genome editing technologies has been, of late, well noted and described. Consequently, caution is expressed by various policy experts, scientists, bioethicists, and members of the public with regard to the appropriate use of human germline genome editing (...) and its possible future effect on future generations.Main textAs concerns about the applications of heritable genome editing have grown, so too have the questions around what is to be done to curtail ‘rogue actors’. This paper explores various ways in which to regulate genomic editing that are socially beneficial, while being cognisant of legal and ethical principles and rights values. This is done by evolving regulatory frameworks across jurisdictions in an attempt to raise issues, address common principles, and set responsible standards for stewardship of the novel technology.ConclusionsIt is suggested that robust and concrete regulatory measures be introduced that are culturally and contextually sensitive, inclusive, appropriate, and trustworthy – and are based on public empowerment and human rights objectives. Doing so will ensure that we are perfectly positioned to harness and promote the benefits that novel technologies have to offer, while safeguarding public health and curtailing the ambitions of rogue actors. This it is acknowledged is no easy task, so, as a point of departure, this paper sets out a path forward by means of certain, practical recommendations – by constructing genome editing regulation in a manner that both fulfils the desire to better progress human health and that can withstand legal and ethical scrutiny.The following observations and recommendations are made: Firstly, that a solution of effective, legitimate governance should consist of a combination of national and supranational legislative regulation or ‘hard’ law, in combination with ‘soft’ ethics, firmly anchored in and underpinned by human rights values. Second, that efforts to support legal and ethical solutions should be rigorous, practical, and robust, contribute to a reaffirmation of human rights in a contextually sensitive manner, and be transnational in reach. Lastly, that greater harmonisation across jurisdictions and increased public engagement be sought. This it is proposed will address the question of how to implement a normative framework which in turn can prevent future rogue actors. (shrink)

Human rights are often taken for granted, but "What is the basis of human rights?" This is no easy answer, De Xiao Weiqi, in his 2004 book of this difficult the problem. He considered the following four main theories: First, the external theory: the root cause of human rights outside the law, such as human rights divine theory; Second, the intrinsic theory: the root cause of human rights within the law - law positivism ; three, rationalist approaches: human rights is (...) based on rational intuition ; Fourth, experience-based approaches: human rights from human experience, especially experience the experience of injustice. He made ​​the first three theories are severely criticized, and to promote a fourth to experience-based approaches. This paper points out that although the experience of Germany and Xiao Weiqi theory have many advantages, but it is evidence of human rights legislation are vague and inconsistent standards of the Department, and its invention on human rights can not provide more solid foundation. In fact, these issues are perceived more or less de Xiao Weiqi, he repeatedly pointed out that the need for external to the human rights legal standards, I think the divine rights theory is to provide a basis for human rights may be one of the world. De Xiao Weiqi theory of divine criticism of human rights have a good reminder, but I think it still can not rule out the Christ-centered Christian contemporary human rights theory. Human rights are often taken for granted but in fact the origin or foundation of human rights is not an easy question. Alan Dershowitz tries to tackle this thorny issue in his 2004 book: Rights from Wrongs: A Secular Theory of the Origins of Rights. He mainly considers four theories: 1) externalism, eg, the divine source of human rights theory; 2) Internalism, eg, legal positivism; 3) Rationalism, eg, the claim that human rights are founded upon rational intuitions; 4) Experiential approach, ie, human rights are derived from our historical experience of serious wrongs or injustice. He severely criticizes the first three theories, and defends the fourth. In this article, I will point out that despite quite a few merits of Dershowitz's theory; his criteria for the validation of human rights are vague or even inconsistent. His general stance of constructivism towards moral and human rights claims, moreover, are unable to provide solid foundations for human rights. In fact Dershowitz is to some extent aware of these problems, and he feels that human rights do need an objective external source, if only it is possible. I think the theistic worldview is indeed able to provide this objective external source. Dershowitz has raised a lot of good questions for the divine source theory but I argue that in the end they cannot exclude the possibility of a contemporary Christocentric theory of human rights. (shrink)

Humean Laws for Human Agents presents cutting-edge research by leading experts on the Humean account of laws, chance, possibility, and necessity. A central question in metaphysics and philosophy of science is: What are laws of nature? Humeans hold that laws are not sui generis metaphysical entities but merely particularly effective summaries of what actually happens. The most discussed recent work on Humeanism emphasizes the laws' usefulness for limited agents and uses pragmatic considerations to address fundamental and long-standing problems. The current (...) volume develops and critically examines pragmatic Humean accounts, with innovative new work on the epistemology of laws and chance, the problem of induction, counterfactuals, special science laws, and a Humean account of essence. Taken together, the papers provide a roadmap for developing pragmatic Humeanism and connate views, setting the agenda for future research. (shrink)

The year is 2100. Geena is the proud new owner of Emit, a state-of-the-art robot. She has just unwrapped him, the packaging strewn across the dining room floor. Emit is designed to replicate the outward behaviour of a human being down to the last detail . Emit responds to questions in much the same way humans do. Ask him how he feels and he will say he has had a tough day, has a slight headache, is sorry he broke that (...) vase, and so on. Geena flips the switch at the back of Emit's neck to ‘on’. Emit springs to life. (shrink)

Greetings, and may this letter find you at peace and in prosperity! Forgive my writing to you out of the blue. Though you and I have never met, we are not strangers. We are, in a certain sense, the closest of kin. I am one of your possible futures.

This paper explores the difficulties of implementing international human rights standards in post conflict states, particularly in Islamic States, using Afghanistan as a case study. The paper will submit that imposing international human rights law with a ‘top down' approach is ineffective, using the example of the western-style Afghan constitution which contains many human rights protections, such as freedom of religion, that cannot be realized in contemporary Afghan society. It will be argued that a more transparent, consultative and long-term approach (...) to human rights implementation should be taken in post conflict situations, if ‘human rights' is to be more than a catch phrase for membership of the international community. (shrink)

Biologists are faced two questions which are new in their fields. How far to go in genetical research? How should new findings be applied?Theoretically, the answers are not so difficult to find. Research should not be halted or even slowed down. On which basis should we limit knowledge, it would even be on topics such as cancer, AIDS, ageing,…, a crime against humanity not to develop research. Also theoretically, findings would be applied for the good of humanity and for a (...) better health. But, negative consequences can, however, be expected if applications of research, and research itself, serves interests of private companies or of individuals. We cannot deny the advantages of the HGP which are considerable indeed in discovering, isolating, describing, sequencing genes, using in genie therapy,…, developing a better predictive medicine.But rules, and probably laws, will have to be developed to protect the confidentiality of genetical information, the risk being present that insurance companies or employers would use it to discriminate the individuals. People can not be defined only by their genomes. Individuals or populations cannot be stigmatised or ostracised by their genes. (shrink)

In this paper I distinguish between three conceptions of human rights and thus three human rights agendas. Each is compatible with the others, but distinguishing each from the others has important theoretical and practical advantages. The first conception concerns those human rights tied to natural duties binding all persons to one another independent of and prior to any institutional context and the violation of which would “shock the conscience” of any morally competent person. The second concerns the institutional conditions necessary (...) and sufficient for particularist legal and political obligations to take on prima facie moral force so that the members of different polities face one another in an asymmetric moral relationship, with each side having a rightful claim to political self-determination. The third concerns those human rights arising exclusively as a matter of positive international law out of the voluntary undertakings of legitimate polities within the international order. Each of these different conceptions is tied to a different human rights agenda. The second is tied to the struggle to realize recognitional norms of legitimacy within the international order. The third is tied to the ongoing effort to incorporate into positive international law through voluntary initiative an ever expanding moral consensus between legitimate polities. The first is tied to the emerging practice of humanitarian intervention and system of international criminal liability. Thus, while all human rights share certain features – they’re universal, and so on – human rights differ in important ways. Attending to these differences would likely improve both the theory and practice of human rights. (shrink)

Background: China’s ethics committees alone are unable to meet the growing need for human participant protection. Several scandals in recent years indicate weaknesses in the protection of human participants in China. Objectives: The aim of the study is to summarize the status and problems of human research protection program in China and to explore its establishment proposals at national and hospital levels. Research design: To conduct literature retrieval, Chinese National Knowledge Infrastructure, Chinese Biomedical Document Database, and English databases Web of (...) Science and PubMed were searched; laws, guidelines, and regulations were also searched on web by Google and Chinese search engine Baidu. Ethical considerations: No data were collected from human participants, and ethical review was not required. Findings: There are problems for China’s Human Research Protection Program, such as weak relevant legal systems, insufficient administrative supervision, and incompetent ethics committee capacities. To fully protect human participants, China should promote the development of Human Research Protection Program, which can formulate ethics-related laws, improve regulations for the protection of the safety and rights of human participants, strengthen supervision, and enforce compensation for human participants. Owing to the frequency with which human participants are recruited in hospitals in China, hospitals can utilize existing ethics committees and establish data and safety monitoring committees, quality control, fund and contract management, and conflict of interest management offices. Discussion: As a growing program, it remains necessary to learn from the experience of developed countries with high ethics standards and reformulate them to fit China’s conditions to explore potential future development. The program will also be an experience for other developing countries. Conclusion: Human Research Protection Program can strengthen communication and coordination among various hospital departments to effectively protect the rights and welfare of human participants. (shrink)

The traditional philosophical questions around human freedom are to do with how to square freedom for human organisms with increasingly scientific understandings of the universe itself. At the beginning of Western philosophical consciousness, Plato, unlike later philosophers eligible of the label rationalist, maintained that there are obstacles to free and rational agency, owing in no small measure to pressures exerted by the human psyche from what later were referred to as biological drives and drives for social status. In subsequent eras, (...) these obstacles came under the heading of “weakness of will”—a conception shared widely in popular and traditional culture. Today the realities of addiction, social stresses, forces of habit, culture, social position, and group identity, together with psychological findings about cognitive biases, have come to dominate the landscape of empirically-based obstacles to agency. Can the image of the human being under the microscope of contemporary science, including cognitive and social science, be reconciled with the “manifest image” of human beings as sources of their individual behaviors (and held responsible accordingly), particularly if the scientific image is best construed in terms of governance by laws of nature? (The phrases manifest image and scientific image were coined by the twentieth-century American philosopher Wilfrid Sellars, see Sellars 1962.) How is it possible to square the idea of laws of nature with the manifest image in which humans exercise free agency as they play their various parts in the drama that is life? Does the manifest image thus square better with a theistic image of the world, as both seventeenth-century French philosopher René Descartes and eighteenth-century German philosopher Immanuel Kant seem to have thought, and by contrast the scientific image square better with atheism? A deterministic universe, such as was proposed during the Enlightenment, was early on thought to pose a threat to the idea of human freedom. (It does not pose the same threat to the idea of a sovereign creator, however, because the notion of a creator of the universe already puts the entity who qualifies for the office outside the regime of those laws, ahead of them both in time and in ontological status.) One traditional answer to the threat has been the notion of compatibilism— which simply asserts that freedom and determinism are not incompatible. The devil, of course, has been in the details of explaining how this can be so, and many schools of thought on the matter exist. It is worthwhile noting that there are enormously compelling reasons, from the quantum regime so well described by quantum theory, to reject determinism: the laws governing the universe are simply not fully deterministic. This, of course, vitiates the need to confront the threat as originally posed. However, the trouble, if one follows along this line of thought, is to make sense of the nature of freedom in a world governed partly by deterministic laws and partly by nondeterministic ones that admit of an element of chance. Is such a world itself any more compatible with the idea of human freedom? In this section we grapple with the question of human freedom, what it could mean, and whether it is best accepted in the context of a form of theism. We find that theism has no more resources for addressing these difficulties than atheism does. (shrink)

Backlashing is a perennial challenge for human rights. Its manifestation in various forms including the repudiation of human rights standards or resistance to being evaluated by them has made the phenomena central to the discourses on human rights. The backlash or reversal of progress, a strong negative reaction, and counter reactions have been witnessed in various settings across the world. An analysis of the phenomena what can be called the backlash analysis is done in light of specific rights like LGBT (...) rights, women’s sexual and reproductive freedom, rights of immigrants and ethnic and religious minorities. The analysis also covers the behaviour of institutions and movements. The backlashers have been identified as state institutions, a group of states, movements and non-state actors. With growing attention on the subject, it is of great value to ascertain whether there a way to comprehensively understand it? (shrink)

This paper explores the possibility for a means of bringing about novelty which does not rely on kairological philosophies based on an event. In contrast to both common sense and contemporary philosophical understandings of the term where for novelty to arise there must be some break in the repetition of the structure, this paper argues that it is possible for novelty to come about through small-scale experimentation. This is done by relying on the philosophical notion of ‘economy’ in order to (...) understand how we think about the world. In this regard, our thinking about the world depends upon acknowledging certain possibilities at the expense of others. History can then be seen as the distribution of emphasis which allows for these past possibilities and the future potentiality they may hold. Novelty, defined here as a rereading of history, is precisely the disruption of these possibilities and a challenge to the memory of the system. The conclusion to this paper argues that experimentation is an important means by which we can bring novelty into the world. (shrink)

In an article in this journal, Katherine Drabiak argues that green lighting genome editing of human embryos is contrary to “fundamental human rights law.” According to the author, genome editing of human embryos violates what we should recognize as a fundamental human right to inherit a genome without deliberate manipulation. In this reply article, we assess Drabiak's legal analysis and show methodological and substantive flaws. Methodologically, her analysis omits the key international legal instruments that form the so‐called International Bill of (...) Rights and thus fails to provide a full and accurate account of the fundamental international human rights standards. Substantively, Drabiak invokes, as a basis for prohibiting gene editing of human embryos, a legal standard (the rights and integrity of the future child) that is unknown to international law. Contrary to Drabiak's account, genome editing of human embryos is not prohibited under international law. Indeed, the right to health and the right to benefit from scientific progress may be interpreted as the basis of a legal duty to provide equality of access to germline gene editing, once determined it is beneficial and safe to use. (shrink)

An exposition of human dignity as the foundation of moral order. From this starting point, the author derives the most important precepts of natural law from human dignity in a systematic way. Using the principle of human dignity, the author then develops natural law precepts to guide human behavior in various areas of life corresponding to the natural inclinations: life issues, sexual issues, political issues, and the contemplative life.

International human rights law allows states to derogate some of their human rights obligations in times of public emergency. This essay attempts a normative assessment of the practice of derogation. We discuss, specifically, whether derogation is compatible with the logics and morality of rights. We notice that a major inconsistency between rights and derogation derives from the unilateral character of derogation: derogating parties are assigned a power-right to annul their own rights-based obligations. This contrasts with the idea, central to rights, (...) that rights-based obligations are owed to the right-holder. Only through consent of right-holders, we argue, can duties owed to them be modified or annulled. But whether the current practice of derogation is interpretable as a form of consent to rights infringement is highly disputable. (shrink)

For the past half-century, issues relating to the ethical conduct of human research have focused largely on the domain of medical, and more recently social–psychological research. The modern regime of applied ethics, emerging as it has from the Nuremberg trials and certain other historical antecedents, applies the key principles of: autonomy, respect for persons, beneficence, non-maleficence, and justice to human beings who enter trials of experimental drugs and devices :168–175, 2001). Institutions such as Institutional Review Boards and Ethics Committees oversee (...) most governmentally-funded medical research around the world, in more than a hundred nations that are signers of the Declaration of Helsinki. Increasingly, research outside of medicine has been recognized to pose potential risks to human subjects of experiments. Ethics committees now operate in the US, Canada, the U.K. and Australia to oversee all governmental-funded research, and in other jurisdictions, the range of research covered by such committees is expanding. Social science, anthropology, and other fields are falling under more clear directives to conduct a formal ethical review for basic research involving human participants. The legal and institutional response for protecting human subjects in the course of developing non-medical technologies, engineering, and design is currently vague, but some universities are establishing ethics committees to oversee their human subjects research even where the experiments involved are non-medical and not technically covered by the Declaration of Helsinki. In The Netherlands, as in most of Europe, Asia, Latin America, or Africa, no laws mandate an ethical review of non-medical research. Yet, nearly 2 years ago we launched a pilot ethics committee at our technical university and began soliciting our colleagues to submit their studies for review. In the past year, we have become officially recognized as a human subjects ethics committee for our university and we are beginning the process of requiring all studies using human subjects to apply for our approval. In this article, we consider some of the special problems relating to protecting human participants in a technology context, and discuss some of our experiences and insights about reviewing human subjects research at a technical university, concluding: that not less than in medical studies, human participants used in technology research benefit from ethical committees’ reviews, practical requirements for publications, grants, and avoiding legal liability are also served by such committees, and ethics committees in such contexts have many similarities to, but certain other special foci than medical ethics committees. We believe that this experience, and these observations, are helpful for those seeking to establish such committees in technology research contexts, and for framing the particular issues that may arise in such contexts for the benefit of researchers, and nascent committees seeking to establish their own procedures. (shrink)

Human rights law proclaims that all persons are the same, and have the same rights. Yet this revolutionary claim, which has overturned political regimes and confounded conventions, has itself been criticised. The criticisms have often come from a non-legal disciplinary background - anthropology, philosophy, sociology or others. Sceptics, postmodernists, feminists, cultural relativists and multiculturalists argue that this universalist view is too simple, or even invidious and oppressive and should be rejected. This chapter explores the universalist pretensions of human rights, the (...) criticisms of this universalism, the legal modification of the simple universalist claim and finally discusses a proposal to resolve some of the tensions between these views. (shrink)

Natural law is probably the most misrepresented and, therefore, unfairly dismissed ethical theory. If current academic ethics were a battlefield, it would be littered with the felled strawmen alleg...

Some tradition historical perspectives on Psalm 83 Psalm 83 forms a poetical unit and is the well constructed poem of an artist. It could be divided into two stanzas which contains a cry for help (2), lament (3-9) and several petitions (10-19). This work reflects different tradition historical allusions. The use of prophetic language is immanent, while the faces of the prophets Isaiah, Jeremiah and Ezekiel are elusively present. Two episodes from the history of the Judges (Judges 4-5; 7-8) are (...) utilised to expose its independent function in this psalm. The occurence of a well known Canaanite tradition is further obvious, while the question into the psalm's apocalyptic relationships is negatively assessed. Single motives like the upliftment of the head (3) and the shepherd/flock image (13) fulfil a definite Junction within the psalm’s context. The poet clearly applied historical traditions, motives and images to express an independent function within its context. (shrink)

This article illustrates the practical usefulness of transdisciplinary work for practical theology by showing how input from an occupational therapist informed my understanding and interpretation of the story of Hannetjie, who had been sexually abused as a child. This forms part of a narrative practical theological research project into the spirituality of female adult survivors of childhood sexual abuse. Transdisciplinary work is useful to practical theologians, as it opens possibilities for learning about matters pastors have to face, but may not (...) have knowledge about. A short retelling of Hannetjie’s story is given to provide information about the context of the research. Next, the transdisciplinary process that was followed is mentioned, and the questions that the transdisciplinary team had to respond to are discussed. Following that, I focus more specifically on the occupational therapist’s answers, and the knowledge gained from her contribution, as an example of how a co-researcher from a divergent discipline can inform a theological study. In this case, knowledge was shared about sensory integration and how the brain processes traumatic stimuli, such as sexual abuse. Lastly, the interrelationship between Hannetjie’s body stories, mind stories and spirit stories is discussed to show how the learning received from occupational therapy affected my thinking about Hannetjie’s stories and the relationships between them. Thus, it is concluded that transdisciplinary work has great value for practical theology, especially in the pastor’s daily work with people who are struggling with difficult stories, because we cannot listen to people’s spirit stories in isolation. They are inextricably intertwined with all our stories about ourselves. (shrink)

Using the accounts of Gewirth and Griffin as examples, the article criticises accounts of human rights as those are understood in human rights practices, which regard them as rights all human beings have in virtue of their humanity. Instead it suggests that (with Rawls) human rights set the limits to the sovereignty of the state, but criticises Rawls conflation of sovereignty with legitimate authority. The resulting conception takes human rights, like other rights, to be contingent on social conditions, and in (...) particular on the nature of the international system. (shrink)

Using the accounts of Gewirth and Griffin as examples, the article criticises accounts of human rights as those are understood in human rights practices, which regard them as rights all human beings have in virtue of their humanity. Instead it suggests that (with Rawls) human rights set the limits to the sovereignty of the state, but criticises Rawls conflation of sovereignty with legitimate authority. The resulting conception takes human rights, like other rights, to be contingent on social conditions, and in (...) particular on the nature of the international system. (shrink)

This introduction explains the reasons behind this Special issue and discuss the organization and content of it. The difficulty of a genuine dialogue and understanding between economics, law and humanities, seems to be due not only to the fragmentation of reflections on man, but to a real ‘conflict of anthropologies’. What kind of conceptions of man and human values are presupposed by and / or privileged by economics, law, economic approaches to law and social sciences? How and when do these (...) conceptions come into conflict within and between disciplines? How do these conceptions of man and his values influence the conceptions of economics, law and institutions, and vice versa, how do these last conceptions influence the former? What are the normative, regulatory and practical implications of assuming an anthropological and / or axiological perspective instead of another? This Special issue aims at exploring the possibility of finding a common ground for discussion between economics, law and humanities, through the analysis and comparison of both the conceptions of man, human action and values assumed by economics, law and humanities, and their normative implications. The contributions to this Special issue and its organization are outlined at the end of this introduction. (shrink)

In my view, the moral case for giving animals legal protection is strong. This is so whether or not we think of animals as having moral rights, such as a right to be cared for, or at least a right not to be harmed, because even if animals do not have moral rights, humans have moral duties toward animals, such as a general duty not to harm animals, say, by performing experiments on them, or raising them for food, or having (...) them perform tricks to amuse tourists. The question I wish to consider in this article, however, is not what moral rights animals have, or even what our moral duties to animals are, but whether we have reason to think of animal law not only as imposing legal duties on humans, but also as conferring legal rights on animals. This is not a moral question, but a question about how to conceptualize legal positions, and the arguments in favor of or against competing conceptualizations should be of a theoretical nature. Although the focus of legal scholars is only rarely on conceptual questions, such questions are nevertheless important. For having a reasonably thought-out view of the structure, content, and applicability of relevant legal concepts will be conducive to clear legal thinking, and clear legal thinking in turn is conducive not only to correct legal thinking, but also to efficiency. I shall argue that while there are good moral reasons to impose legal duties on humans regarding the treatment of animals, there are good theoretical reasons not to think of animals as legal right-holders, because doing so would either be pointless, on the interest-theory analysis, or else incoherent, on the will-theory analysis. On route to this conclusion, I shall also argue that in the field of law, the method of explication is in many cases, including the elucidation of the concept of a legal right, preferable to conceptual analysis, strictly conceived; that we should think of legal rights as complexes of Hohfeld-elements and distinguish accordingly between claim-rights, liberty-rights, power-rights, and immunity-rights; that when discussing animal rights we should focus on claim-rights; and, finally, that an explication of the concept of a legal right along the lines of the will-theory of legal rights is preferable to an explication along the lines of the interest-theory. (shrink)

How can respect for cultural and religious differences be reconciled with the conviction that everyone has basic human rights that must be secured? Should liberal states require that non-liberal states secure human rights, and can they do so without being intolerant and oppressive? Is there a human right to democracy, and should a liberal hold that all states must become modern liberal democracies and may be pressured to reform their traditional practices and institutions? Do human rights include only the classical (...) liberal civil and political rights, and no economic rights? ;In this dissertation I defend a conception of human rights derived from John Rawls's Political Liberalism, which comprises both Justice as Fairness, the view he presented in A Theory of Justice , and the Law of Peoples, the view he presented in The Law of Peoples . According to this conception, human rights are binding on all societies, and cannot be rejected as peculiarly liberal or politically parochial. Outlaw states that violate them are to be condemned and may in grave cases be subjected to sanctions or intervention. Moreover, human rights include not only basic civil and political rights but also basic economic rights. However, while there may be a human right to live under a procedurally democratic government, it would not be a basic right but a derivative one. ;The conception of human rights that I here defend is a rational reconstruction of Rawls's view. In Chapters 1--3 I argue against the most natural interpretation of The Law of Peoples, defend a different interpretation, and expose and bridge a logical gap in that text. I then develop new responses to objections by Charles Beitz and Thomas Pogge, who hold that liberals who endorse Justice as Fairness must reject the Law of Peoples as insufficiently egalitarian. I also respond to the additional objection that the set of human rights cannot include economic rights. As I show, endorsing Justice as Fairness requires endorsing the Law of Peoples, and public reason can reconcile respect for cultural and religious differences with the conviction that everyone has basic human rights that must be secured. (shrink)

The aim of this study was to determine the opinions of private medical practitioners in Bloemfontein, South Africa, regarding euthanasia of terminally ill patients. This descriptive study was performed amongst a simple random sample of 100 of 230 private medical practitioners in Bloemfontein. Information was obtained through anonymous self-administered questionnaires. Written informed consent was obtained. 68 of the doctors selected completed the questionnaire. Only three refused participation because they were opposed to euthanasia. Respondents were mainly male (74.2%), married (91.9%) and (...) Afrikaans-speaking (91.9%). More were specialists (53.2%) than general practitioners (46.8%). A smaller percentage (35.5%) would never consider euthanasia for themselves compared to for their patients (46.8%). The decision should be made by the patient (50%), the patient’s doctor with two colleagues (46.8%), close family (45.2%) or a special committee of specialists in ethics and medicine (37.1%). The majority (46.9%) indicated that euthanasia should be performed by an independent doctor trained in euthanasia, followed by the patient’s doctor (30.7%). Notification should mainly be given to a special committee (49.9%). Only 9.8% felt that no notification was necessary. There was strong opposition to prescribing of medication to let the patient die. Withdrawal of essential medical treatment to speed up death was the most acceptable method. Although the responding group was fairly homogeneous, responses varied widely, indicating the complexity of opinions. (shrink)