The purpose of the article was to determine the relationship between the organizational culture and the institutional management of the "Enrique López Albújar" Educational Institution, Piura. Work is worked under a quantitative approach, descriptive and correlational scope, 40 teachers participated as a sample. Among the results, it was found that there is no significant relationship between organizational culture and institutional management, which did not allow validating the research hypothesis; However, a significant relationship between norms and customs with institutional management was (...) found; which concludes in compliance with the norms and good customs based on values. (shrink)

La presente investigación surge de abordar los comportamientos sociales y su influencia en la convivencia ciudadana. Para ello, se realizó una comprensión desde las perspectivas: cultura, norma, familia, escuela y pedagogía, transversalizado por la Ley 1801 de 2016, Código de Convivencia y Seguridad Ciudadana.El objetivo es analizar desde núcleos como la familia, la escuela y la norma, el proceso del comportamiento social y su incidencia en la convivencia ciudadana, desde la responsabilidad individual y colectiva, se utilizó la metodología de estudio (...) cualitativo documental.Obteniendo resultados poco alentadores por el aumento de los comportamientos contrarios a la convivencia de la sociedad colombiana. (shrink)

La didáctica se ejecuta con estudiantes policiales de la Escuela de Suboficiales y Nivel Ejecutivo Gonzalo Jiménez de Quesada, los cuales multiplicaran a los estudiantes rurales del municipio de Sibaté.El propósito del proyecto fue diseñar una estrategia didáctico pedagógica que permita fortalecer las Habilidades Comunicativas implementando la lectoescritura, en los estudiantes policiales y a la vez a los estudiantes de las Instituciones Educativas Rurales de Sibaté Cundinamarca. Metodológicamente, el proyecto se realizó mediante el enfoque cualitativo de carácter etnográfico. En conclusión, (...) se motivó la implementación de varias actividades de lectura y escritura, con extensión a estudiantes del sector Rural. (shrink)

This article evaluated the effects of an interpersonal skills program based on artistic expressions to reduce intimate partner violence in college students. The research was of explanatory type, quasi-experimental design and used the Dating Abuse questionnaire (adapted by Osorio, 2014), the Interpersonal Skills questionnaire with reliability of 0.81 having as results in the entry test in terms of violence a mean of 88. 16 and after the program was applied it decreased to 81.2, in interpersonal skills the mean of 46.6 (...) increased to 53.3 with large effect size according to Cohen's d 7.889 CI95% (6.246-9.532), statistically significant differences were found in terms of violence. (shrink)

A partir del análisis de dos publicaciones de Jane Addams sobre el empleo doméstico (como una “industria atrasada” que requiere “ajuste”), en este artículo abordamos la producción teórica de científicas sociales de finales del XIX y principios del XX sobre las relaciones laborales desde una perspectiva de género y, en particular, sobre el “problema de las sirvientas.” A través de ello, exponemos la particular filosofía y epistemología de Addams y su defensa de una “ética social” por encima del “imperativo familiar.” (...) Las tesis de Addams son comparadas con las de otras teóricas sociales de la época que introdujeron “lo político, lo económico y lo social” en el hogar: las contribuciones de Jessie Taft desde el interaccionismo simbólico sobre la necesaria conciencia social de las mujeres como motor de cambio ante el conflicto subjetivo entre aspiraciones y oportunidades; los análisis sexo-económicos de Charlotte Perkins Gilman o las condiciones de la “democracia en el hogar” de Lucy Salmon. Terminamos con el cuerpo de conocimiento generado a finales del XIX sobre la “cuestión del servicio doméstico,” particularmente a partir del texto clásico de referencia, Domestic service de Salmon (1897), e investigaciones posteriores sobre las empleadas domésticas negras. Concluimos, con ello, con las limitaciones del “punto de vista feminista” cuando no estaba atravesado por la conciencia de clase y de opresión racial. (shrink)

Lucy Allais presents an original interpretation of Kant's transcendental idealism. She argues that his distinction between things in themselves and things as they appear to us has both epistemological and metaphysical components. Kant is committed to a genuine idealism about things as they appear to us, but this is not a phenomenalist idealism. He is committed to the claim that there is an aspect of reality that grounds mind-dependent spatio-temporal objects, and which we cannot cognize, but he does not (...) assert the existence of distinct non-spatio-temporal objects. On Allais's account, we cannot understand Kant's idealism without a clear account of his notion of intuition and of the role of intuition in cognition: she understands Kantian intuitions as representations that give us acquaintance with the objects of thought. This enables us to make sense of Kant's central argument for his idealism in the Transcendental Aesthetic, and to see why he takes the complete idealist position to be established there. (shrink)

How is it that we think and refer in the first-person way? For most philosophers in the analytic tradition, the problem is essentially this: how two apparently conflicting kinds of properties can be reconciled and united as properties of the same entity. What is special about the first person has to be reconciled with what is ordinary about it. The range of responses reduces to four basic options. The orthodox view is optimistic: there really is a way of reconciling these (...) apparently contradictory properties as contained within the same thing. The heretical views are pessimistic and content to be so: there is no such way, and that is because there is simply nothing to reconcile – because there is really nothing special about what is in question; or there is really nothing ordinary about it; or there is really nothing …. (shrink)

Unethical pro-organizational behavior (UPB) is unethical behavior driven by an intention to assist an organization. This study is one of the first attempts to examine the consequences of UPB. We argue that such types of behaviors can induce failure in self-regulation and thereby give rise to counterproductive work behavior (CWB). Based on self-regulation theory, we theorize that the breakdown in three fundamental mechanisms (i.e., moral standards, monitoring, and discipline) explains the link between UPB and CWB. Moreover, moral identity internalization can (...) temper these breakdown processes such that employees with higher levels of moral identity internalization are less likely to experience moral disengagement, workplace entitlement, or self-control depleting after enacting UPB, and therefore, will engage in less CWB. We conducted a 7-day experience sampling study of 95 financial service employees in a Chinese bank to test our theoretical model. The results indicated that transgressions committed with the intention of helping the organization would ultimately harm the organization, especially for those with lower moral identity internalization. Theoretical and practical implications are discussed. (shrink)

Ce texte a déjà paru dans B. Lindorfer & D. Naguschewski, Hegel. Zur Sprache. Beiträge zur europäischen Sprachreflexion, Tübingen, Gunter Narr Verlag, 2002. Nous remercions Lucie Bourassa ainsi que les éditeurs de nous avoir autorisé à le reproduire ici. On a maintes fois relevé des affinités entre la poétique de Mallarmé et la philosophie de Hegel. Le poète a vraisemblablement lu des textes du philosophe, il a du moins pris connaissance de quelques-unes de ses propositions grâce à son ami - (...) Linguistique et théorie du langage – Nouvel article. (shrink)

Large amounts of personal data are generated through young people’s engagements with mobile media, with these data increasingly used by advertisers, content developers and other third parties to profile, predict and position individuals. This has prompted growing concerns over the ability of mobile media users to develop informed stances towards how and why their data is being used, i.e. to build ‘conscious’ and/or ‘resistant’ forms of ‘data agency’. This paper explores ways of developing the critical consciousness and resistant practices of (...) young mobile media users towards personal data. Drawing on research with 27 young people, the paper describes efforts to make representations of third party use of personal data openly available as a basis from which to develop data-savvy tactics and strategies. The results of these interventions – while only partially successful – offer valuable insights into the technical, social and cultural issues that shape young people’s engagement with personal data. The paper concludes by considering how concerns over data agency might be better aligned with the realities of young people’s mobile media use. (shrink)

The only reference to the Athenian general Lamachus in the Platonic corpus is atLaches197c6 where Nicias compares Laches to him. In response to Laches' criticism that Nicias is embellishing himself with his words (κοσμεῖ τῷ λόγῳ,La.197c3), and trying to deny that those agreed to be courageous are indeed courageous, Nicias says:Οὔκουν σέ γε, ὦ Λάχης, ἀλλὰ θάρρει‧ φημὶ γάρ σε εἶναι σοφόν, καὶ Λάμαχόν γε, εἴπερ ἐστὲ ἀνδρεῖοι, καὶ ἄλλους γε συχνοὺς Ἀθηναίων. (La.197c6–8).

The purpose of this dissertation is to identify some of the most pressing problems in the dominant contemporary approach to research ethics, and to devise an alternative approach that avoids these problems. I contend that the fundamental ethical values invoked in human research are often appealed to in contradictory or ambiguous ways, or in ways that do not adequately capture or do not show an adequate understanding of the specific ethical concerns of human research. One significant problem in this domain (...) is that values for ethical research are often unreflectively imported from medical therapy, producing ill-suited guidelines that cannot capture the different ethical situations that arise in the context of research. Furthermore, ethical guidelines in this area are often not developed with a sufficient understanding of the deep philosophical issues that they invoke. I suggest that we can address these problems through examining the fundamental ethical concerns of research on a philosophical level. This method will reveal severe problems with the approach to two of the ethical values underlying research; beneficence and respect for autonomy (or respect for persons). Once the nature of these problems has been revealed, and with reference to ethical problems that typically arise in the domain of research, I construct a coherent philosophical foundation for research ethics, which both avoids these deep-seated problems and better captures the ethical issues that arise in the domain of human research. I argue that we need to radically depart from the values of beneficence and autonomy/respect for persons as they are currently understood in the guidelines. We need an idea of beneficence that is clearly distinct from that which is used in the therapeutic medical context from which this notion is currently drawn. I also contend that we need to move away from autonomy as a central value in research ethics. I posit an alternative choice-based approach to informed consent which is concerned both with respecting agents’ freedom of choice, and also with their wellbeing, as providing a good means of protecting and promoting the interests of the individual research subject. Although these two imperatives are often thought to clash on a fundamental level, I will show that, in research ethics, they can be reconciled with minimal conflict. Though this represents a departure from the ethics of medical therapy, this approach is far more suited to the context of research. This theoretical basis for informed consent can help to clarify the ethical problems that are specific to this domain and provide us with relevant ethical guidance in research ethics. (shrink)

A new therapeutic strategy could break the stalemate in the war on cancer by targeting not all cancerous cells but the small fraction that lie at the root of cancers. Lucie Laplane offers a comprehensive analysis of cancer stem cell theory, based on an original interdisciplinary approach that combines biology, biomedical history, and philosophy.

Craig Callender claims that ‘time is the great informer’, meaning that the directions in which our ‘best’ physical theories inform are temporal. This is intended to be a metaphysical claim, and as such expresses a relationship between the physical world and information-gathering systems such as ourselves. This article gives two counterexamples to this claim, illustrating the fact that time and informative strength doubly dissociate, so the claim cannot be about physical theories in general. The first is a case where physical (...) theories inform in directions that we have no reason to regard as temporal. The second is a case where our best physical theories fail to inform in directions that we have independent (pre-theoretic) reasons to regard as temporal. Taking these two cases into account suggests that the connection Callender makes between time and informativeness is perspectival. The second case demonstrates that although scientists often seek information in temporal directions, the behaviour of the physical world can present serious difficulties for finding it. In response, this article proposes a perspectival reading of Callender’s claim, according to which the connection between time and informative strength has more to do with the aims and objectives of science than the workings of the physical world. (shrink)

Seen as contributing to human enhancement, implanted technologies have recently been receiving a lot of attention. However, reflections on these technologies have taken the shape of rather speculative ethical judgments on “hyped” technological devices. On the other hand, while science and technology studies and philosophy of technology have a long tradition of analyzing how technological artifacts and tools transform and configure our lives, they tend to focus on use configurations rather than the intimate relations brought about by implanted technologies. Even (...) the cyborg has lost some of its hermeneutic power as it has been detached from its material grounds, becoming a discursive entity. In this article, I reclaim the importance of materiality and explore how people live with spinal cord stimulation, which is a type of neuromodulation technology. Implanted in bodies and seemingly out of sight, this technology does not cease to matter. Embodiment and incorporation are crucial for people to live well with SCS. Embodying the neuromodulation technology entails groping processes in which gestures are central and an increased intimacy with one’s bodily materiality. Incorporating it is highly relational and entangled with the bodies of loved and distant ones, humans and nonhumans. (shrink)

Despite its long history of investigating sociality, phenomenology has, to date, said little about online sociality. The phenomenological tradition typically claims that empathy is the fundamental way in which we experience others and their experiences. While empathy is discussed almost exclusively in the context of face-to-face interaction, I claim that we can empathetically perceive others and their experiences in certain online situations. Drawing upon the phenomenological distinction between the physical, objective body and the expressive, lived body, I: (i) highlight that (...) empathy involves perceiving the other’s expressive, lived body, (ii) show that the lived body is not tied to the physical body and that empathy can take place outside of face-to-face interactions, and (iii) argue that the lived body can enter online space and is empathetically available to others there. I explore two ways in which the other’s lived body enters online space and can be empathetically perceived: first, in cases where our face-to-face encounter is technologically-mediated over video link and, second, by showing how the other’s texts, as speech, can form part of the other’s lived body. Investigating empathy online not only furthers our understanding of online encounters but also leads to a refined conception of empathy more generally. (shrink)

Anscombe thought that practical knowledge – a person’s knowledge of what she is intentionally doing – displays formal differences to ordinary empirical, or ‘speculative’, knowledge. I suggest these differences rest on the fact that practical knowledge involves intention analogously to how speculative knowledge involves belief. But this claim conflicts with the standard conception of knowledge, according to which knowledge is an inherently belief-involving phenomenon. Building on John Hyman’s account of knowledge as the ability to use a fact as a reason, (...) I develop an alternative, two-tier, epistemology which allows that knowledge might really come in a belief-involving and an intention-involving form. (shrink)

In this paper, we introduce the Japanese philosopher Tetsurō Watsuji’s phenomenology of aidagara (“betweenness”) and use his analysis in the contemporary context of online space. We argue that Watsuji develops a prescient analysis anticipating modern technologically-mediated forms of expression and engagement. More precisely, we show that instead of adopting a traditional phenomenological focus on face-to-face interaction, Watsuji argues that communication technologies — which now include Internet-enabled technologies and spaces — are expressive vehicles enabling new forms of emotional expression, shared experiences, (...) and modes of betweenness that would be otherwise inaccessible. Using Watsuji’s phenomenological analysis, we argue that the Internet is not simply a sophisticated form of communication technology that expresses our subjective spatiality (although it is), but that it actually gives rise to new forms of subjective spatiality itself. We conclude with an exploration of how certain aspects of our online interconnections are hidden from lay users in ways that have significant political and ethical implications. (shrink)

How could the initial, drastic decisions to implement “lockdowns” to control the spread of COVID-19 infections be justifiable, when they were made on the basis of such uncertain evidence? We defend the imposition of lockdowns in some countries by first, and focusing on the UK, looking at the evidence that undergirded the decision, second, arguing that this provided us with sufficient grounds to restrict liberty given the circumstances, and third, defending the use of poorly-empirically-constrained epidemiological models as tools that can (...) legitimately guide public policy. (shrink)

In a recent article, Ethan Bradley and Mark Navin (2021) argue that vaccine refusal is not akin to free riding. Here, I defend one connection between vaccine refusal and free riding and suggest that, when viewed in conjunction with their other arguments, this might constitute a reason to mandate Covid-19 vaccination.

This article is concerned with a discussion of the plausibility of the claim that GM technology has the potential to provide the hungry with sufficient food for subsistence. Following a brief outline of the potential applications of GM in this context, a history of the green revolution and its impact will be discussed in relation to the current developing world agriculture situation. Following a contemporary analysis of malnutrition, the claim that GM technology has the potential to provide the hungry with (...) sufficient nourishment will be discussed within the domain of moral philosophy to determine whether there exists a moral obligation to pursue this end if and only if the technology proves to be relatively safe and effective. By using Peter Singer’s duty of moral rescue, I argue that we have a moral duty to assist the third world through the distribution of such GM plants. I conclude the paper by demonstrating that my argument can be supported by applying a version of the Precautionary Principle on the grounds that doing nothing might be worse for the current situation. (shrink)

Environmental issues involve a wide range of actors often brought together in processes of collaborative environmental governance. Nonetheless, such actors frequently disagree on the definition of these issues. Even sharing an environmental concern does not preclude disagreements. This paper takes the concept of ecological embeddedness—so far analyzed in a single community—to explore differences of views among actors involved in collaborative environmental governance. It does so by pursuing a qualitative study of French River Basin Committees. Our findings show that Basin Committee (...) members take radically different approaches to ecological matters and therefore put forward opposing diagnoses and prognoses of their shared ecological context. We identify three dimensions of ecological embeddedness that are critical for collaborative governance, namely: ecological engagement; ecological ontology; and ecological knowledge. Our results indicate that different forms of ecological embeddedness can fuel long-lasting disagreements despite members’ shared appreciation of collaboration. This is especially so if the deliberations focus on ‘facts’—with actors pitting their ecological knowledge against one another—without facilitating discussions on ecological engagement and ontology. (shrink)

At the beginning of the COVID-19 pandemic, high hopes were placed on digital contact tracing. Digital contact tracing apps can now be downloaded in many countries, but as further waves of COVID-19 tear through much of the northern hemisphere, these apps are playing a less important role in interrupting chains of infection than anticipated. We argue that one of the reasons for this is that most countries have opted for decentralised apps, which cannot provide a means of rapidly informing users (...) of likely infections while avoiding too many false positive reports. Centralised apps, in contrast, have the potential to do this. But policy making was influenced by public debates about the right app configuration, which have tended to focus heavily on privacy, and are driven by the assumption that decentralised apps are “privacy preserving by design”. We show that both types of apps are in fact vulnerable to privacy breaches, and, drawing on principles from safety engineering and risk analysis, compare the risks of centralised and decentralised systems along two dimensions, namely the probability of possible breaches and their severity. We conclude that a centralised app may in fact minimise overall ethical risk, and contend that we must reassess our approach to digital contact tracing, and should, more generally, be cautious about a myopic focus on privacy when conducting ethical assessments of data technologies. (shrink)

The literature on patient public involvement and engagement (PPIE) in health research has grown significantly in the last decade, with a diverse range of definitions and topologies promulgated. This has led to disputes over what the central functions and purpose of PPIE in health research is, and this in turn makes it difficult to assess and evaluate PPIE in practice. This paper argues that the most important function of PPIE is the attempt to make health research more democratic. Bringing this (...) function to the fore and locating PPIE in the wider context of changes in contemporary forms of democratic engagement provides greater conceptual clarity over what PPIE in research should be trying to achieve. Conceptualizing PPIE as a form of democratization has a number of benefits. First, theories of what are appropriate, normatively justifiable and workable criteria for PPIE practices can be developed, and this can provide tools to address the legitimacy and accountability questions that have troubled the PPIE community. Second, this work can be used to form the basis of a research agenda to investigate how PPIE in health research operates, and how it can facilitate and/or improve democratic processes in health research. (shrink)

During the Covid-19 pandemic we increasingly turned to technology to stay in touch with our family, friends, and colleagues. Even as lockdowns and restrictions ease many are encouraging us to embrace the replacement of face-to-face encounters with technologically mediated ones. Yet, as philosophers of technology have highlighted, technology can transform the situations we find ourselves in. Drawing insights from the phenomenology of sociality, we consider how digitally-enabled forms of communication and sociality impact our experience of one another. In particular, we (...) draw attention to the way in which our embodied experience of one another is altered when we meet in digital spaces, taking as our focus the themes of perceptual access, intercorporeality, shared space, transitional spaces, and self-presentation. In light of the way in which technological mediation alters various dimensions of our social encounters, we argue that digital encounters constitute their own forms of sociality requiring their own phenomenological analysis. We conclude our paper by raising some broader concerns about the very framework of thinking about digitally and non-digitally mediated social encounters simply in terms of replacement. (shrink)

The internet provides us with a multitude of ways of interacting with one another. In discussions about how technological innovations impact and shape our interpersonal interactions, there is a tendency to assume that encountering people online is essentially different to encountering people offline. Yet, individuals report feeling a sense of togetherness with one another online that echoes offline descriptions. I consider how we can understand people’s experiences of being together with others online, at least in certain instances, as arising out (...) of their feeling together as a we. Using Walther’s phenomenological framework of communality, I explore whether the following might take place online: habitual communal experiences and actual we-experiences. While neither of these sketches amount to a full account of how we find ourselves with others online, I suggest that they reveal how insights from the phenomenology of sociality can be used to deepen our understanding of online communality. What is more, I suggest that the strength of this approach is that in some cases it allows us to circumvent tricky questions about embodiment online and, in others, prompts us to ask to what extent a fully-embodied interaction is really required for we-experiences. (shrink)

The notion of respect for autonomy dominates bioethical discussion, though what qualifies precisely as autonomous action is notoriously elusive. In recent decades, the notion of autonomy in medical contexts has often been defined in opposition to the notion of autonomy favoured by theoretical philosophers. Where many contemporary theoretical accounts of autonomy place emphasis on a condition of “authenticity”, the special relation a desire must have to the self, bioethicists often regard such a focus as irrelevant to the concerns of medical (...) ethics, and too stringent for use in practical contexts. I argue, however, that the very condition of authenticity that forms a focus in theoretical philosophy is also essential to autonomy and competence in medical ethics. After tracing the contours of contemporary authenticity-based theories of autonomy, I consider and respond to objections against the incorporation of a notion of authenticity into accounts of autonomy designed for use in medical contexts. By looking at the typical problems that arise when making judgments concerning autonomy or competence in a medical setting, I reveal the need for a condition of authenticity—as a means of protecting choices, particularly high-stakes choices, from being restricted or overridden on the basis of intersubjective disagreement. I then turn to the treatment of false and contestable beliefs, arguing that it is only through reference to authenticity that we can make important distinctions in this domain. Finally, I consider a potential problem with my proposed approach; its ability to deal with anorexic and depressive desires. (shrink)

Anorexia Nervosa (AN) is an eating disorder characterised by self-starvation. Accounts of AN typically frame the disorder in individualistic terms: e.g., genetic predisposition, perceptual disturbances of body size and shape, experiential bodily disturbances. Without disputing the role these factors may play in developing AN, we instead draw attention to the way disordered eating practices in AN are actively supported by others. Specifically, we consider how Pro-Anorexia (ProAna) websites—which provide support and solidarity, tips, motivational content, a sense of community, and understanding (...) to individuals with AN—help drive and maintain AN practices. We use C. Thi Nguyen’s work on epistemic “echo chambers”, along with Maria Lugones’ work on “worlds” and “ease”, to explore the dynamics of these processes. Adopting this broader temporal and intersubjective perspective, we argue, not only helps to further illuminate the experiential character of AN but also has important clinical and therapeutic significance. (shrink)

:Space is not an empirical concept that has been drawn from outer experiences. For in order for certain sensations to be related to something outside me , thus in order for me to represent them as outside and next to one another, thus not merely different but as in different places, the representation of space must already be their ground. Thus the representation of space cannot be obtained from the relations of outer appearance through experience, but this outer experience is (...) itself first possible only through this representation. 1Abstract:Der Raum is kein empirischer Begriff, der von äußeren Erfahrungen abgezogen worden. Denn damit gewisse Empfindungen auf etwas außer mir bezogen werden, imgleichen damit ich sie als außer und neben einander, mithin nicht bloß verschieden, sondern als in verschiedenen Orten vorstellen können, dazu muß die Vorstellung des Raumes schon zum Grunde liegen. (shrink)

At the beginning of the COVID-19 pandemic, high hopes were put on digital contact tracing, using mobile phone apps to record and immediately notify contacts when a user reports as infected. Such apps can now be downloaded in many countries, but as second waves of COVID-19 are raging, these apps are playing a less important role than anticipated. We argue that this is because most countries have opted for app configurations that cannot provide a means of rapidly informing users of (...) likely infections while avoiding too many false positive reports. Mathematical modelling suggests that differently configured apps have the potential to do this. These require, however, that some pseudonymised data be stored on a central server, which privacy advocates have cautioned against. We contend that their influential arguments are subject to two fallacies. First, they have tended to one-sidedly focus on the risks that centralised data storage entails for privacy, while paying insufficient attention to the fact that inefficient contact tracing involves ethical risks too. Second, while the envisioned system does entail risks of breaches, such risks are also present in decentralised systems, which have been falsely presented as ‘privacy preserving by design’. When these points are understood, it becomes clear that we must rethink our approach to digital contact tracing in our fight against COVID-19. There are no data in this work. (shrink)

BackgroundThe Health Research Council of New Zealand is the first major government funding agency to use a lottery to allocate research funding for their Explorer Grant scheme. This is a somewhat controversial approach because, despite the documented problems of peer review, many researchers believe that funding should be allocated solely using peer review, and peer review is used almost ubiquitously by funding agencies around the world. Given the rarity of alternative funding schemes, there is interest in hearing from the first (...) cohort of researchers to ever experience a lottery. Additionally, the Health Research Council of New Zealand wanted to hear from applicants about the acceptability of the randomisation process and anonymity of applicants.MethodsThis paper presents the results of a survey of Health Research Council applicants from 2013 to 2019. The survey asked about the acceptability of using a lottery and if the lottery meant researchers took a different approach to their application.ResultsThe overall response rate was 39%, with 30% from applicants in the years 2013 to 2018, and 68% for those in the year 2019 who were not aware of the funding result. There was agreement that randomisation is an acceptable method for allocating Explorer Grant funds with 63% in favour and 25% against. There was less support for allocating funds randomly for other grant types with only 40% in favour and 37% against. Support for a lottery was higher amongst those that had won funding. Multiple respondents stated that they supported a lottery when ineligible applications had been excluded and outstanding applications funded, so that the remaining applications were truly equal. Most applicants reported that the lottery did not change the time they spent preparing their application.ConclusionsThe Health Research Council’s experience through the Explorer Grant scheme supports further uptake of a modified lottery. (shrink)

The process of elaborating EU legislation includes the activity of translation. Drafting and translation cannot be considered separately but are rather two complementary activities whose aim is the quality of legislation. In order to achieve the required quality of legislation, one guiding principle is consistency of terminology. This study examines the particular case of two terms in German that appeared in the EC Treaty: Entscheidung and Beschluss. The inconsistent use of the two terms was the source of interpretative problems, as (...) observed in Case C-370/07 Commission v Council. A comparison of the contested provisions in the EC Treaty and the provisions in the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union shows that the terminological inconsistency has been corrected. After the examination of this case, we elaborate on the impact of terminological consistency on interpretation as reflected in requests for preliminary rulings. (shrink)

Reading the moral philosophy of Iris Murdoch alongside film enables us to see Murdoch's notions of practical moral good in action. For Murdoch, moral philosophy can be seen as “a more systematic and reflective extension of what ordinary moral agents are continually doing”. Murdoch can help us further by her consideration of the value of a moral fable: does a morally important fable always imply universal rules? And how do we decide whether a fable is morally important? By bringing Murdoch (...) and Margaret together in an exploration of the moral decision making of the film's protagonist and our assessment of her choices, we can learn more about the idea of film as a morally important fable rather than a fable that is purely decorative. (shrink)

El artículo es un comentario a una de las tesis básicas de la introducción a la Crítica del Juicio. La actividad fundamental de la facultad de juzgar es la reflexión mediadora entre lo condicionado (la naturaleza) y lo incondicionado (la libertad). La reflexión no es conocimiento, pero sin ella no es posible el conocimiento. Esta problemática aparece en los conceptos de naturaleza y experiencia; con el concepto de naturaleza la reflexión trascendental tiene que poner la idea de unidad y totalidad (...) de la experiencia para que haya ajuste entre nuestras facultades cognoscitivas y el objeto de conocimiento. Pero dicho acto de la reflexión implica postular un principio de finalidad en la naturaleza, en analogía con el mundo de la libertad. Esta idea de la teleología orienta el pensamiento, la experiencia y la cultura humana que subordina el conocimiento a la moralidad. (shrink)

El propósito de este ensayo es esclarecer el modo en que Heidegger plantea la pregunta por el tiempo en Ser y tiempo y cómo esta pregunta se constituye en el tema central de la obra. A partir de una consideración fenomenológica previa de la relación entre ser y tiempo que da título a la obra, la autora analiza la cita de El Sofista de Platón que sirve de epígrafe a la obra, para hacer ver la aporía que se plantea a (...) la pregunta por cuál sea el asunto mismo de la obra: o el ser o el tiempo. El análisis de la introducción a Ser y tiempo terminará por mostrar que es el sentido del concepto de la temporalidad que se gana en el desarrollo de la obra y no la fragmentariedad de la misma lo que determina que no haya cabida para una pregunta por el ser que exceda los límites de la temporalidad. (shrink)

Sostenemos que la filosofía moral de Schopenhauer es una crítica a la sociedad, que puede ser considerada desde dos perspectivas. Por un lado, desde los fundamentos del pesimismo metafísico donde encuentra apoyo su crítica al Estado, las convenciones y los prejuicios, en suma, de lo que Schopenhauer llama el egoísmo fundamental de la condición humana (1. El concepto schopenhaueriano de filosofía. 2. El carácter crítico de su filosofía moral). Pero, por otra parte, lo que se pudiera llamar su esfuerzo por (...) pensar una conciliación dialéctica entre vita activa et vita contemplativa, donde el sentido ético de su filosofía encuentra una indicación de sus posibilidades en la consideración de la estética (3. El concepto de la compasión. 4. La actualidad de Schopenhauer). (shrink)

Penseur de l'éthique et théoricien du ± face à face?, Levinas n'aborderait la dimension politique que de manière subsidiaire. A considérer le contexte de son œuvre, le rôle fondamental joué par la catastrophe de la Shoah dans son parcours personnel et intellectuel, toute sa réflexion apparait pourtant orientée par la nécessité d'une nouvelle pensée de la communauté humaine à l'épreuve du XXe siècle.00Cette lecture fait l'hypothèse d'une centralité de la question sociale dans la philosophie levinassienne. Ce sont les enjeux collectifs (...) qui imposent la reconsidération de l'approche humaniste du sujet et de l'éthique quelle s'efforce de mener. A ce titre, l'influence de la tradition socialiste pourrait s'y avérer plus importante qu'il n'y parait. En reconstituant le dialogue implicite que Levinas entretient avec Marx tout au long de son œuvre, ses propositions trouvent un écho inattendu au sein des pensées révolutionnaires.00Comment les notions de visage ou d'Autrement qu'être peuvent-elles renouveler nos réflexions sur la justice et le changement social? Au-delà de l'intérêt historique de l'étude, il s'agit de donner à l?œuvre de Levinas une nouvelle pertinence politique, au service d'un champ théorique qui se l'est encore trop peu appropriée. (shrink)

Journal of Philosophy of Education, Volume 56, Issue 1, Page 41-50, February 2022.

Choice is probably one of the most often discussed areas in bioethics, alongside the related concepts of informed consent and autonomy. It is generally, prima facie, portrayed as a good thing. In healthcare, the 2000s saw the UK Prime Minister Tony Blair pursue the ‘Choice Agenda’ where, ‘As capacity expands, so choice will grow. Choice will fundamentally change the balance of power in the NHS.’1 In a consumerist society giving consumers more choice is seen as desirable. However, choice is not (...) a good in itself, giving people more choice in certain situations can be problematic: i.e. consumerism drives economic growth and this has a detrimental effect on the environment; and increasing the range of choices a patient is offered is often not the best way to improve the quality of healthcare provision.2 The assumptions behind the valuing of choice need careful unpacking and this Issue of the Journal of Medical Ethics includes papers that explore choice in a number of areas. This Issue's Editor’s choice is Tom Walker’s ‘The Value of Choice’,3 which puts forward a suggestion for the importance of the symbolic value of choice. There are a number of ways of categorising the value of choice in healthcare. One account sees choice as valuable because it is by choosing that individuals make their life their own. Another account sees choice as valuable for instrumental reasons, people are generally, assuming they are sufficiently informed, the best judge of their own best interests. Walker argues for an additional third reason, the symbolic value of choice, originally proposed by Scanlon. This sees choice as valuable because being given the option to choose, whether or not one takes it up, not the act of choosing is what makes choice valuable. Being offered the option to choose has a …. (shrink)

Ces notes sur Arendt s’inscrivent dans le cadre d’un travail de recherche qui porte sur les manières de voir et leur conditionnement par les fenêtrages. Aussi voudrions-nous mettre à l’épreuve une hypothèse : la pensée du monde commun prend pour modèle un paradigme de la vision dont l’efficacité dépend de la mise en place d’un artifice qui cadre la vue : la fenêtre, si l’on entend par là un dispositif qui permet d’établir une séparation entre le privé et le commun, (...) aussi bien qu’une technique... (shrink)