Bajo el impulso intelectual de Nietzsche, Gracián, Ortega y Unamuno, la obra de Luis Jiménez Moreno, elaborada desde su digna humildad personal, se articula en torno a la convicción según la cual el ejercicio de la filosofía no puede independizarse de la vida cotidiana, del “hombre de carne y hueso”, de la “razón vital”, invitación diaria a la biografía creativa, innovadora, germen constante de cultura, moralidad y convivencia. Por su humilde dignidad y por su obra, a Luis Jiménez Moreno debemos (...) una memoria justa, en la que sigan presentes su espíritu y su virtud.Under the intellectual impulse of Nietzsche, Gracian,Ortega and Unamuno, Profesor Luis Jimenez Moreno’s work is firmly built around his conviction that philosophical practice and thought cannot remain disconnected from daily life, from the man of “flesh and bones”, as we say in Spanish, or from its “vital reason”. This claim, humbly made and dignified by his personal attitude, entails a daily invitation to explore creative and innovative biographical reflexion, fertile source of culture, morality and coexistence. For this dignifying work we owe Prof Luis JimenesMoreno a just remembrance, and hope that his spirit and virtues will remain withus. (shrink)

Bajo el impulso intelectual de Nietzsche, Gracián, Ortega y Unamuno, la obra de Luis Jiménez Moreno, elaborada desde su digna humildad personal, se articula en torno a la convicción según la cual el ejercicio de la filosofía no puede independizarse de la vida cotidiana, del “hombre de carne y hueso”, de la “razón vital”, invitación diaria a la biografía creativa, innovadora, germen constante de cultura, moralidad y convivencia. Por su humilde dignidad y por su obra, a Luis Jiménez Moreno debemos (...) una memoria justa, en la que sigan presentes su espíritu y su virtud. (shrink)

Bajo el impulso intelectual de Nietzsche, Gracián, Ortega y Unamuno, la obra de Luis Jiménez Moreno, elaborada desde su digna humildad personal, se articula en torno a la convicción según la cual el ejercicio de la filosofía no puede independizarse de la vida cotidiana, del “hombre de carne y hueso”, de la “razón vital”, invitación diaria a la biografía creativa, innovadora, germen constante de cultura, moralidad y convivencia. Por su humilde dignidad y por su obra, a Luis Jiménez Moreno debemos (...) una memoria justa, en la que sigan presentes su espíritu y su virtud. (shrink)

Bajo el impulso intelectual de Nietzsche, Gracián, Ortega y Unamuno, la obra de Luis Jiménez Moreno, elaborada desde su digna humildad personal, se articula en torno a la convicción según la cual el ejercicio de la filosofía no puede independizarse de la vida cotidiana, del “hombre de carne y hueso”, de la “razón vital”, invitación diaria a la biografía creativa, innovadora, germen constante de cultura, moralidad y convivencia. Por su humilde dignidad y por su obra, a Luis Jiménez Moreno debemos (...) una memoria justa, en la que sigan presentes su espíritu y su virtud. (shrink)

Bajo el impulso intelectual de Nietzsche, Gracián, Ortega y Unamuno, la obra de Luis Jiménez Moreno, elaborada desde su digna humildad personal, se articula en torno a la convicción según la cual el ejercicio de la filosofía no puede independizarse de la vida cotidiana, del “hombre de carne y hueso”, de la “razón vital”, invitación diaria a la biografía creativa, innovadora, germen constante de cultura, moralidad y convivencia. Por su humilde dignidad y por su obra, a Luis Jiménez Moreno debemos (...) una memoria justa, en la que sigan presentes su espíritu y su virtud. (shrink)

El trabajo presenta las distintas actividades científicas que con motivo del cuarto centenario del fallecimiento de Francisco Suárez se han celebrado y se han organizado durante el año 2017 o el curso académico 2017-18. En las iniciativas presentadas se advierte la vigencia de la reflexión suareciana, no sólo por su relevancia histórica, sino también como un pensamiento con el que poder replantear los retos de nuestra situación contemporánea.

Building Better Beings: A Theory of Moral Responsibility argues that the normative basis of moral responsibility is anchored in the effects of responsibility practices. Further, the capacities required for moral responsibility are socially scaffolded. This article considers criticisms of this account that have been recently raised by John Doris, Victoria McGeer, and Michael Robinson. Robinson argues against Building Better Beings’s rejection of libertarianism about free will, and the account of desert at stake in the theory. considers methodological questions that arise (...) from the account of desert, providing some additional resources for thinking about these issues within the framework of the account. McGeer objects to the particular mode of justification used to motivate the prescriptive aspect of the account. This article presents replies to each of these lines of response. (shrink)

I evaluate the adequacy of the three models of international business ethics that have been recently proposed by Thomas Donald son, Gerard Elfstrom and Richard De George. Using the example of the conduct of the aluminum companies in Jamaica, I argue that these three models fail to address the most important of the ethical issues encountered by multinationals because they focus too narrowly on human rights issues and on utilitarian considerations. In addition I argue that these models also evidence an (...) inadequate understanding of microeconomic theory. I end by proposing that these defects can be remedied by a model of ethics that incorporates a theory of moral rights, a utilitarian-based theory of the market, and a theory of justice. (shrink)

This paper tackles the following puzzle. On the one hand, a growing body of literature suggests that most of our current political disagreements are pernicious and difficult to resolve because they are instances of deep disagreement. On the other hand, there does not seem to be anything inherent to a deep disagreement that necessarily makes it pernicious nor irresolvable. To address this issue, I distinguish two senses in which a disagreement can be deemed “deep”, and show that they are conflated (...) in the literature. In order to separate them, I refer to these two senses as deep disagreement and deep conflict. Contrary to recent literature, I argue that most of our current pernicious political disagreements are so not because they are instances of deep disagreement, but of deep conflict. This way, the problem disappears. (shrink)

This paper outlines one way of thinking about the problem of free will, some general reasons for dissatisfactions with traditional approaches to solving it, and some considerations in favor of pursuing a broadly revisionist solution to it. If you are looking for a student-friendly introduction to revisionist theorizing about free will, this is probably the thing to look at.

Presupposition, vagueness, and oddness can lead to some sentences failing to have a clear truth value. The homogeneity property of plural predication with definite descriptions may also create truth-value gaps: The books are written in Dutch is true if all relevant books are in Dutch, false if none of them are, and neither true nor false if, say, half of the books are written in Dutch. We study the projection property of homogeneity by deploying methods of general interest to identify (...) truth-value gaps. Method A consists in collecting both truth judgments and, independently, falsity judgments. The second method, employed in experiment series B and C, is based on one-shot ternary judgments: completely true vs. completely false vs. neither. After a calibration of these methods, we use them to demonstrate that homogeneity projects out of negation, the scope of universal sentences and the scope of non-monotonic quantifiers such as exactly two, to some extent. We assess our results in light of different theoretical approaches to homogeneity—approaches based on presuppositions, scalar implicatures, and something like supervaluations, respectively. We identify free parameters in these theories and assess various variants of them based on our results. Our experimental paradigms may be of broader significance insofar as they can be applied to other phenomena which result in the failure of a sentence to have a definite truth value. (shrink)

In this paper I criticize libertarianism and skepticism about free will. The criticism of libertarianism takes some steps towards filling in an argument that is often mentioned but seldom developed in any detail, the argument that libertarianism is a scientifically implausible view. I say "take some steps" because I think the considerations I muster (at most) favor a less ambitious relative of that argument. The less ambitious claim I hope to motivate is that there is little reason to believe that (...) extant libertarian accounts satisfy a standard of naturalistic plausibility, even if they do satisfy a standard of naturalistic compatibility. The argument against skepticism about free will tries to show (1) perhaps the most prominent form of skeptical argument against the existence of free will does not work, and (2) there is a good general argument against skepticism about free will. (shrink)

El pensamiento crítico parece ser la piedra de toque de la relevancia de la filosofía, aquello que nos permite mejorar nuestro modo de razonar. El propósito de este artículo es desarrollar una opinión extraordinariamente poco popular que nos parece, sin embargo, obviamente verdadera: El pensamiento crítico no es patrimonio exclusivo de la filosofía; probablemente ni siquiera es la filosofía la disciplina de la que cabe esperarse la contribución más crucial al desarrollo del pensamiento crítico. Sin embargo, la tesis principal de (...) este trabajo no es negativa. Por el contrario, argumentamos aquí que hay ámbitos en los que la filosofía hace contribuciones genuinas y cruciales para el desarrollo del pensamiento crítico. El ejemplo que nosotros exploramos pertenece al ámbito del desacuerdo y del pensamiento conjunto. Para ello, proponemos pasar de una perspectiva exclusivamente individualista del pensamiento crítico a una perspectiva que incluya también la interacción con otros. La filosofía, defendemos, aporta herramientas útiles para pensar con otros, para que nuestros desacuerdos sean fructíferos, “cuidados”. En este sentido, como en otros, la filosofía sí contribuye al desarrollo del pensamiento crítico. El alcance de esta contribución, pensamos, solo puede verse cuando se presta atención a los detalles. (shrink)

Conceptual atomism of this type is incompatible with many other semantic approaches. One of these approaches is justificationist semantics. This book assumes conceptual atomism.

This essay characterizes a version of internal realism. In §1 I will argue that for semantical reasons we should be realists of a strong kind. In §2 I plead for an internalistic setting of realism starting from the thesis that truth is, at least, not a non-epistemic concept. We have to bear the consequences of this in form of a more complicated concept of truth. The ‘internal’ of ‘internal realism’ points to the justification aspect of truth. The ‘realism’ of ‘internal (...) realism’ points to the correspondence aspect. A thesis concerning the irreducibility of the two aspects will be established in §3. (shrink)

En el presente escrito busco esclarecer las dificultades a las que se enfrenta la metafísica de Spinoza, a la luz de su contexto histórico intelectual. En particular, exploro cómo el desarrollo del concepto de grados de perfección en la escolástica tardía ejerce una fuerte influencia en el pensamiento espinosista, hasta el punto de arrojarlo a una serie de dificultades, en las que el horizonte cualitativo de la realidad se confunde con el cuantitativo. De este modo, el proyecto de naturalización de (...) Dios de Spinoza no parece solventar completamente el problema del abismo relacional que hay entre una entidad absolutamente infinita y los compuestos finitos procedentes de ella. (shrink)

A todo el mundo le gusta estar enamorado, el amor alimenta la fantasía de poder ser otro sin dejar de ser el mismo. Devolvemos a la persona amada la imagen exagerada de sus cualidades amplificadas. Sin embargo, nuestra sociedad jalea de puertas para afuera a los enamorados y desconfía de ellos puertas para adentro. Como el resto de humanos, los grandes pensadores vivieron intensamente, para bien o para mal, el amor. Sin embargo, ellos nos han dejado el legado de todas (...) las ideas que tuvieron sobre este sentimiento. ¿Quién no ha sentido amor platónico? ¿Quién no se ha dejado arrastrar por el deseo? ¿Quién no se ha obsesionado con el amado? ¿Cuántas veces nos hemos enamorado de la imagen que nos hacemos de alguien en lugar de la persona real? (shrink)

In this paper, we analyze a way of valuing positively something which rarely has been taking into account in the literature: to value positively something because it could be valued positively by someone else. The main features of that way of valuing something are really very suggesting. Here, we would not have instrumental valuations, nor valuations directly sensitive to intrinsic values either. However, there would be cases in which valuations made in that way would make us able to detect things (...) that can be valued in an inconditional way. When we imagine or conceive what could be value positively, our motivational structures face us with something that is valued without evaluative conditions and, therefore, with something that is a good candidate to have an intrinsic value. (shrink)

Proponents of the philosophy of liberation generally counsel that various forms of liberation in at least the Americas requires that we should fight Eurocentrism and resist the ontology and conceptual framework of Europe. However, most of the work done in this tradition relies heavily on the terminology and theoretical apparatus of various strands of European philosophy. The apparent disconnect between the aims and methods (or if you like, the theory and practice) has given rise to a criticism I call The (...) Eurocentrism Problem. I argue that the Eurocentrism Problem has not received an adequate reply, and that it reflects a number of underlying flaws in the philosophical program of the philosophy of liberation. These problems can largely be avoided if we significantly recast the philosophy of liberation, eliminating its reliance on the conceptual foundations provided by Levinas, Heidegger, and so on. (shrink)

I consider here several versions of finitism or conceptions that try to work around postulating sets of infinite size. Restricting oneself to the so-called potential infinite seems to rest either on temporal readings of infinity (or infinite series) or on anti-realistic background assumptions. Both these motivations may be considered problematic. Quine’s virtual set theory points out where strong assumptions of infinity enter into number theory, but is implicitly committed to infinity anyway. The approaches centring on the indefinitely large and the (...) use of schemata would provide a work-around to circumvent usage of actual infinities if we had a clear understanding of how schemata work and where to draw the conceptual line between the indefinitely large and the infinite. Neither of this seems to be clear enough. Versions of strict finitism in contrast provide a clear picture of a (realistic) finite number theory. One can recapture standard arithmetic without being committed to actual infinities. The major problem of them is their usage of a paraconsistent logic with an accompanying theory of inconsistent objects. If we are, however, already using a paraconsistent approach for other reasons (in semantics, epistemology or set theory), we get finitism for free. This strengthens the case for paraconsistency. (shrink)

We initiate the study of reducts of relational structures up to primitive positive interdefinability: After providing the tools for such a study, we apply these tools in order to obtain a classification of the reducts of the logic of equality. It turns out that there exists a continum of such reducts. Equivalently, expressed in the language of universal algebra, we classify those locally closed clones over a countable domain which contain all permutations of the domain.

Properly speaking, the corporation, considered as an entity distinct from its members, cannot be morally responsible for wrongful corporate acts. Setting aside (in this abstract) acts brought about through negligence or omissions, we may say that moral responsibility for an act attaches to that agent (or agents) in whom the act "originates" in this sense: (1) the agent formed the (mental) intention or plan to bring about that act (possibly with the help of others) and (2) the act was intentionally (...) brought about through bodily movements over which that agent had direct control (i.e. the kind of direct mental control that I have over the body I refer to as "my" body) and through which the agent carried out his (mental) intention or plan. Corporate acts do not thus originate in some corporate entity distinct from its members because the corporation has neither a mind to form intentions nor a body it directly controls: it lacks the proper mind/body unity. Instead, corporate acts originate in individual autonomous human beings who make up the corporation and who intentionally bring about corporate acts through their own bodily movements. Such human individuals, and not "the corporation," are morally responsible for corporate acts. Moreover, to say that an entity is "morally responsible" for a wrongful act is to say that the entity is liable to blame and punishment. But it is not possible to impose blame and punishment on a corporation without inflicting it on corporate members. Thus, to say that a corporation (as an entity distinct from its members) is "morally responsible" for a wrongful corporate act is to imply that a (possibly innocent) corporate member legitimately may be punished for something for which another entity was morally responsible. This violates the moral principles that underlie blame and punishment. To hold that the corporation can be morally responsible for its acts is to adopt a dangerous organicism. (shrink)