Clarifies and systematises the concepts and presuppositions behind the influential new field of assemblage theoryRead and download the preface, by series editor Graham Harman, and the Introduction to Assemblage Theory for free nowManuel DeLanda provides the first detailed overview of the assemblage theory found in germ in Deleuze and Guattari's writings. Through a series of case studies DeLanda shows how the concept can be applied to economic, linguistic and military history as well as to metaphysics, science and mathematics.DeLanda then presents (...) the real power of assemblage theory by advancing it beyond its original formulation allowing for the integration of communities, institutional organisations, cities and urban regions. And he challenges Marxist orthodoxy with a Leftist politics of assemblages.Key FeaturesCritically connects DeLanda with more recent theoretical turns in speculative realismMakes sense of the fragmentary discussions of assemblage theory in the work of Deleuze and GuattariOpens up assemblage theory to sociology, linguistics, military organisations and science so that future researchers can rigorously deploy the concept in their own fields"e. (shrink)

Building Better Beings: A Theory of Moral Responsibility argues that the normative basis of moral responsibility is anchored in the effects of responsibility practices. Further, the capacities required for moral responsibility are socially scaffolded. This article considers criticisms of this account that have been recently raised by John Doris, Victoria McGeer, and Michael Robinson. Robinson argues against Building Better Beings’s rejection of libertarianism about free will, and the account of desert at stake in the theory. considers methodological questions that arise (...) from the account of desert, providing some additional resources for thinking about these issues within the framework of the account. McGeer objects to the particular mode of justification used to motivate the prescriptive aspect of the account. This article presents replies to each of these lines of response. (shrink)

When public opinion gets polarized, the population’s beliefs can experience two different changes: they can become more extreme in their contents or they can be held with greater confidence. These two possibilities point to two different understandings of the rupture that characterizes political polarization: extremism and radicalism. In this article, I show that from the close examination of the best available evidence regarding how we get polarized, it follows that the pernicious type of political polarization has more to do with (...) radicalism than with extremism. Reinforcing the confidence in the core beliefs of the group we identify with makes our beliefs immune to the reasons coming from the other political side. Finally, I also suggest that the rise of political polarization is not necessarily the result of an irrational process. (shrink)

I evaluate the adequacy of the three models of international business ethics that have been recently proposed by Thomas Donald son, Gerard Elfstrom and Richard De George. Using the example of the conduct of the aluminum companies in Jamaica, I argue that these three models fail to address the most important of the ethical issues encountered by multinationals because they focus too narrowly on human rights issues and on utilitarian considerations. In addition I argue that these models also evidence an (...) inadequate understanding of microeconomic theory. I end by proposing that these defects can be remedied by a model of ethics that incorporates a theory of moral rights, a utilitarian-based theory of the market, and a theory of justice. (shrink)

Presupposition, vagueness, and oddness can lead to some sentences failing to have a clear truth value. The homogeneity property of plural predication with definite descriptions may also create truth-value gaps: The books are written in Dutch is true if all relevant books are in Dutch, false if none of them are, and neither true nor false if, say, half of the books are written in Dutch. We study the projection property of homogeneity by deploying methods of general interest to identify (...) truth-value gaps. Method A consists in collecting both truth judgments and, independently, falsity judgments. The second method, employed in experiment series B and C, is based on one-shot ternary judgments: completely true vs. completely false vs. neither. After a calibration of these methods, we use them to demonstrate that homogeneity projects out of negation, the scope of universal sentences and the scope of non-monotonic quantifiers such as exactly two, to some extent. We assess our results in light of different theoretical approaches to homogeneity—approaches based on presuppositions, scalar implicatures, and something like supervaluations, respectively. We identify free parameters in these theories and assess various variants of them based on our results. Our experimental paradigms may be of broader significance insofar as they can be applied to other phenomena which result in the failure of a sentence to have a definite truth value. (shrink)

This paper outlines one way of thinking about the problem of free will, some general reasons for dissatisfactions with traditional approaches to solving it, and some considerations in favor of pursuing a broadly revisionist solution to it. If you are looking for a student-friendly introduction to revisionist theorizing about free will, this is probably the thing to look at.

In this paper I criticize libertarianism and skepticism about free will. The criticism of libertarianism takes some steps towards filling in an argument that is often mentioned but seldom developed in any detail, the argument that libertarianism is a scientifically implausible view. I say "take some steps" because I think the considerations I muster (at most) favor a less ambitious relative of that argument. The less ambitious claim I hope to motivate is that there is little reason to believe that (...) extant libertarian accounts satisfy a standard of naturalistic plausibility, even if they do satisfy a standard of naturalistic compatibility. The argument against skepticism about free will tries to show (1) perhaps the most prominent form of skeptical argument against the existence of free will does not work, and (2) there is a good general argument against skepticism about free will. (shrink)

This paper tackles the following puzzle. On the one hand, a growing body of literature suggests that most of our current political disagreements are pernicious and difficult to resolve because they are instances of deep disagreement. On the other hand, there does not seem to be anything inherent to a deep disagreement that necessarily makes it pernicious nor irresolvable. To address this issue, I distinguish two senses in which a disagreement can be deemed “deep”, and show that they are conflated (...) in the literature. In order to separate them, I refer to these two senses as deep disagreement and deep conflict. Contrary to recent literature, I argue that most of our current pernicious political disagreements are so not because they are instances of deep disagreement, but of deep conflict. This way, the problem disappears. (shrink)

A todo el mundo le gusta estar enamorado, el amor alimenta la fantasía de poder ser otro sin dejar de ser el mismo. Devolvemos a la persona amada la imagen exagerada de sus cualidades amplificadas. Sin embargo, nuestra sociedad jalea de puertas para afuera a los enamorados y desconfía de ellos puertas para adentro. Como el resto de humanos, los grandes pensadores vivieron intensamente, para bien o para mal, el amor. Sin embargo, ellos nos han dejado el legado de todas (...) las ideas que tuvieron sobre este sentimiento. ¿Quién no ha sentido amor platónico? ¿Quién no se ha dejado arrastrar por el deseo? ¿Quién no se ha obsesionado con el amado? ¿Cuántas veces nos hemos enamorado de la imagen que nos hacemos de alguien en lugar de la persona real? (shrink)

Conceptual atomism of this type is incompatible with many other semantic approaches. One of these approaches is justificationist semantics. This book assumes conceptual atomism.

This essay characterizes a version of internal realism. In §1 I will argue that for semantical reasons we should be realists of a strong kind. In §2 I plead for an internalistic setting of realism starting from the thesis that truth is, at least, not a non-epistemic concept. We have to bear the consequences of this in form of a more complicated concept of truth. The ‘internal’ of ‘internal realism’ points to the justification aspect of truth. The ‘realism’ of ‘internal (...) realism’ points to the correspondence aspect. A thesis concerning the irreducibility of the two aspects will be established in §3. (shrink)

En el presente escrito busco esclarecer las dificultades a las que se enfrenta la metafísica de Spinoza, a la luz de su contexto histórico intelectual. En particular, exploro cómo el desarrollo del concepto de grados de perfección en la escolástica tardía ejerce una fuerte influencia en el pensamiento espinosista, hasta el punto de arrojarlo a una serie de dificultades, en las que el horizonte cualitativo de la realidad se confunde con el cuantitativo. De este modo, el proyecto de naturalización de (...) Dios de Spinoza no parece solventar completamente el problema del abismo relacional que hay entre una entidad absolutamente infinita y los compuestos finitos procedentes de ella. (shrink)

El pensamiento crítico parece ser la piedra de toque de la relevancia de la filosofía, aquello que nos permite mejorar nuestro modo de razonar. El propósito de este artículo es desarrollar una opinión extraordinariamente poco popular que nos parece, sin embargo, obviamente verdadera: El pensamiento crítico no es patrimonio exclusivo de la filosofía; probablemente ni siquiera es la filosofía la disciplina de la que cabe esperarse la contribución más crucial al desarrollo del pensamiento crítico. Sin embargo, la tesis principal de (...) este trabajo no es negativa. Por el contrario, argumentamos aquí que hay ámbitos en los que la filosofía hace contribuciones genuinas y cruciales para el desarrollo del pensamiento crítico. El ejemplo que nosotros exploramos pertenece al ámbito del desacuerdo y del pensamiento conjunto. Para ello, proponemos pasar de una perspectiva exclusivamente individualista del pensamiento crítico a una perspectiva que incluya también la interacción con otros. La filosofía, defendemos, aporta herramientas útiles para pensar con otros, para que nuestros desacuerdos sean fructíferos, “cuidados”. En este sentido, como en otros, la filosofía sí contribuye al desarrollo del pensamiento crítico. El alcance de esta contribución, pensamos, solo puede verse cuando se presta atención a los detalles. (shrink)

My goal in this paper is to reconstruct Anthony Collins’ challenge to the authority of orthodox Anglican figures, which arises due to arguments Collins develops in his Vindication of the Divine Attributes (1710) and Discourse on Free-Thinking (1713). In addition to shedding light on a hitherto underappreciated argument by Collins, my reconstruction allows me to propose a solution to the interpretive problem posed by §§16–22 of the fourth dialogue of Berkeley’s Alciphron (1732). While it has been acknowledged that Collins looms (...) large in the background of these sections, Berkeley’s argumentative strategy has remained perplexing to commentators, particularly his references to several Scholastic thinkers. I argue that we can make sense of Berkeley’s strategy and references if we appreciate that these sections are intended to evade Collins’ challenge. (shrink)

For more than 200 years scholars have proceeded on the assumption that there was a controversy (in the sense of an argumentative exchange) between the bishop of Cork and Ross, Peter Browne (c. 1665–1735), and his nowadays more famous contemporary, the bishop of Cloyne, George Berkeley (1685–1753) about what we might call ‘the problem of divine attributes’. This problem concerns one of the most vexing issues for 17th /18th century Irish intellectuals. Simply put, it turns on two interconnected questions, namely (...) (1) an ontological question regarding God’s attributes and (2) a semantical question regarding the proper conception of analogy: -/- (1) Do God’s attributes only differ in degree or also in kind from their human counterparts? -/- (2) Is “analogical attribution” only concerned with the structure or the modus of the attribution? That is, is it a separate mode of speech (apart from the metaphorical and literal) or does it just mean we have to use analogies for our divine attributions? -/- In regard to the first question Berkeley argues the attributes of God and humans only differ in degree but not in kind (Alc. 4.22). Browne, on the other hand, is convinced that human and divine attributes differ in kind: “What Knowledge and Goodness are in the Nature of Man, that some inconceivable but correspondent Perfections are in the Nature of God […] which tho’ totally different in Kind from those Properties in us bearing the same Name” (Procedure, 138). Furthermore, Berkeley rejects the notion that analogical attribution is a separate mode of speech in addition to the literal and the metaphorical. Rather, it is an attribution made in the form of an analogy in which the words can be used literally or metaphorically (Alc. 4.21). By contrast, Browne repeatedly insists analogical attribution is more than just using analogies for attributing something to God. He thinks it is a separate mode of speech that ought to be distinguished from literal and metaphorical language (Procedure, 12, 23–29, 123–46). -/- Hence, there can be no doubt that Browne and Berkeley advance conflicting solutions to the problem of divine attributes. Yet, advancing disagreeing positions is not the same as having a (heated) argumentative exchange, i.e., a controversy. In contrast to the controversy-reading, I will defend the following view: Browne surely felt attacked by Berkeley’s elaborations in Alciphron (1732) and reacted to them in his Divine Analogy (1732/3). However, there was no argumentative exchange because Browne’s Procedure (1728) had virtually no influence on Berkeley when he was writing Alciphron. Furthermore, the available evidence suggests that Berkeley was indifferent to the (elaborate) criticisms of Alciphron found in Browne’s Divine Analogy. Thus, while the two bishops have differing positions and Browne reacted to Berkeley there is no reaction on Berkeley’s part and hence there is no argumentative exchange between the two at all, which is why their differing opinions are best described as such and not as a controversy. (shrink)

This is a short scholarly note about my retrieval an original copy of the Daily Post-Boy issue no. 7024 from September 9th,1732 from a private seller. In this issue we find an anonymous letter addressed to Berkeley which gave rise to him writing the Theory of Vision Vindicated. While Berkeley Berkeley appended a copy of the anonymous critic’s letter to TVV, until now an original copy of The Daily Post-Boy issue had yet to be discovered. -/- I have donated the (...) original copy to the Marsh's Library in Dublin, but you will find a scan of the original document attached to the note. -/- . (shrink)

The article is guided by two main research questions: First, do the Equator Principles (EPs), a voluntary CSR-initiative in the project finance sector, and the recently published working paper of the Thun Group of Banks adequately address the U.N. Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights or do they fall behind the ‘Ruggie framework’? Second, is the demand for human rights due diligence sufficient to classify the EPs as a positive and leverage-based concept of CSR (à la Wettstein and Wood) (...) or is this requirement still a feature of a negative and impact-based concept of CSR? In case it is a negative and impact-based concept of CSR, the question comes up which further steps should be taken by financial institutions to fulfill their positive and leverage-based responsibilities. The article argues that positive and leverage-based responsibilities for multinational companies exist – due to the moral nature of human rights and due to the political authority of multinational companies – and that the current (Ruggie-like) requirements for human rights due diligence are not adequate for a positive and leverage-based concept of CSR. Further measures should be taken by multinational companies – and especially (Equator) banks which possess a high leverage-influence over their clients – to not only ensure the respect for human rights, but also the on-the-ground protection and realization of human rights. (shrink)

Attention to the details of putatively obvious examples of philosophy-as-worldview within Latin America give us reasons to be skeptical about the taxonomy that gives us the category of philosophy-as-worldview. Among the examples that suggest difficulties for this way of thinking about the philosophical enterprise are 19th century Mexican ethnolinguistics, contemporary efforts to reconstruct historical and contemporary Indigenous thought, and 20th century efforts to articulate regional ontologies within Latin America. However, reflection on these cases also point to a different project worth (...) considering, namely, a taxonomy of wisdom- and knowledge-focused practices that might allow a different way of drawing distinctions between kinds of “philosophies”. (shrink)

The paper gives an overview of primate research and the economic-ethical 'lessons' we can derive from it. In particular, it examines the complex, multi-faceted and partially conflicting nature of (non-) human primates. Our closest living relatives, the chimpanzees and bonobos, apparently walk on two legs: a selfish and a groupish leg. Given evolutionary continuity and gradualism between monkeys, apes and humans, human primates seem to be bipolar apes as well. They, too, tend to display a dual structure: there seems to (...) be a pro-social and a self-interested side to our species and a bipolar tension seems to exist between competition and cooperation respectively between self-interest and the common good. We are apparently at the same time Homines oeconomici and Homines culturali. Our inner ape tries to combine self-interested and common good motives. Based on de Waal's Russian doll model, the essay investigates the evolutionary origins of morality and 'eusociality'. With the help of selected case studies stemming from behavioural sciences/economics, the paper illustrates examples of empathy, altruism, reciprocal fairness, pro-social and other-regarding preferences, inequity aversion and altruistic punishment in (non-)human primates. Beside this selfless and groupish side, the paper also reflects on the self-interest and egoistic nature of (non-)human primates and the behavioural and cognitive differences between monkeys, apes and humans. (shrink)

As recent newspaper headlines show the topic of patents/patent laws is still heavily disputed. In this paper I will approach this topic from a theoretical-historical and history of economic thought-perspective. In this regard I will link the patent controversy of the nineteenth century with Walter Eucken's Ordoliberalism – a German version of neoliberalism. My paper is structured as follows: The second chapter provides the reader with a historical introduction. At the heart of this paragraph are the controversy and discourse on (...) patent laws in nineteenth century Europe as well as the pro and contra arguments presented by the anti-patent/free-trade movement respectively by the advocates of patent protection. The focus of my paper is on the struggle for the protection of inventions and innovations in nineteenth century Germany, since Walter Eucken, main representative of the Freiburg School of Law and Economics, picks up the counter-arguments presented in the national debate and in particular by the Kongress deutscher Volkswirthe. The third chapter deals intensively with the question whether patent laws are just 'nonsense upon stilts' from an ordoliberal perspective. Here, Eucken's arguments against the current patent system are elaborated in great detail. The paper ends with a summary of my main findings. Read the Open Peer Discussion on this paper ». (shrink)

The following commentary offers an analysis of subjective truth in Soren Kierkegaard’s Concluding Unscientific Postscript to his Philosophical Fragments. Our intention is to discuss Kierkegaard’s reflections on subjective truth, in order to show that, rather than claiming that the subject’s interiority defines truth, Kierkegaard thought that truth supposes more than the subject itself.

Este artículo analiza el papel de la escritura en la consultoría filosófica desde una perspectiva nietzscheana, proponiendo que esta facilita la expresión y reconfiguración de las interpretaciones del consultante sobre su vida. Se parte de la premisa de la «voluntad de poder» como principio explicativo de la realidad, que impulsa a los individuos a buscar comprensión y transformación. Así, la actividad filosófica se concibe como una constante interpretación, donde la escritura emerge como herramienta crucial de manifestación de estas interpretaciones preexistentes, (...) para luego ser reinterpretadas. Por su parte, la consultoría filosófica se constituye como un espacio propicio para este acto interpretativo, utilizando la escritura como medio. Este proceso permite a los consultantes examinar y reconfigurar sus percepciones e interpretaciones, conduciendo a nuevas comprensiones de sí mismos. En síntesis, el artículo argumenta que la escritura en la consultoría filosófica no solo es un medio de expresión, sino una actividad filosófica que permite el autoconocimiento a través de la reinterpretación constante de la propia vida. (shrink)

The traditional point of view on analyticity implies that truth in virtue only of meaning entails a priori acceptability and vice versa. The argument for this claim is based on the idea that meaning as it concerns truth and meaning as it concerns competence are one and the same thing. In this paper I argue that the extensions of these notions do not coincide. I hold that truth in virtue of meaning— truth for semantic reasons—doesn't imply a priori acceptability, and (...) that a priori reflection based only on knowledge of meaning—in the sense of competence—doesn't necessitate true conclusions.The main consequence of this view concerns conceptual analysis, as it presupposes we have a privileged—incorrigible in the face of empirical evidence—access to non-trivial truths about the world on the basis of mere a priori reflection founded on meaning. If, as I argue, such access is not incorrigible the project of conceptual analysis loses its special epistemological status. (shrink)