Mario Pannunzio is today remembered first of all as director of the weekly «Il Mondo». Before founding and directing this magazine, and dedicating himself above all to politics, Pannunzio had cultivated interests of various kinds, dedicating himself to artistic experiences, directing literary magazines and dealing with cinema. In the cinematographic field he has worked as a critic (in particular for «Omnibus») and as a screenwriter (for some films by Mario Camerini and Duilio Coletti). This article, starting (...) from some documents found in the Mario Pannunzio Archive preserved in the Historical Archives of the Chamber of Deputies, hypothesizes that some articles on the making of films in the Cinecittà studios published by the Milanese newspaper «L’Ambrosiano» during 1938 and signed with the pseudonym Diogene can also be attributed to Pannunzio. Although there is no definitive proof that certifies it with certainty, the examination of the documents in the Archive and the similarities that emerge from the comparison between Diogenes’ articles and the reviews that Pannunzio published in the same period in «Omnibus» make the attribution highly probable. (shrink)

pt. I. Matter: 1. Philosophy as worldview ; 2. Classical matter: bodies and fields ; 3. Quantum matter: weird but real ; 4. General concept of matter: to be is to become ; 5. Emergence and levels ; 6. Naturalism ; 7. Materialism -- pt. II. Mind: 8. The mind-body problem ; 9. Minding matter: the plastic brain ; 10. Mind and society ; 11. Cognition, consciousness, and free will ; 12. Brain and computer: the hardware/software dualism ; 13. Knowledge: (...) genuine and bogus -- pt. III. Appendices: 14. Appendix A: Objects ; 15. Appendix B. Truths. (shrink)

In this paper we will demonstrate that a computational system can meet the criteria for autonomy laid down by classical enactivism. The two criteria that we will focus on are operational closure and structural determinism, and we will show that both can be applied to a basic example of a physically instantiated Turing machine. We will also address the question of precariousness, and briefly suggest that a precarious Turing machine could be designed. Our aim in this paper is to challenge (...) the assumption that computational systems are necessarily heteronomous systems, to try and motivate in enactivism a more nuanced and less rigid conception of computational systems, and to demonstrate to computational theorists that they might find some interesting material within the enactivist tradition, despite its historical hostility towards computationalism. (shrink)

Predictivists use the no miracle argument to argue that “novel” predictions are decisive evidence for theories, while mere accommodation of “old” data cannot confirm to a significant degree. But deductivists claim that since confirmation is a logical theory-data relationship, predicted data cannot confirm more than merely deduced data, and cite historical cases in which known data confirmed theories quite strongly. On the other hand, the advantage of prediction over accommodation is needed by scientific realists to resist Laudan’s criticisms of the (...) no miracle argument. So, if the deductivists are right, the most powerful argument for realism collapses. There seems to be an inescapable contradiction between these prima facie plausible arguments of predictivists and deductivists; but this puzzle can be solved by understanding what exactly counts as novelty, if novel predictions must support the no miracle argument, i.e., if they must be explainable only by the truth of theories. Taking my cues from the use-novelty tradition, I argue that (1) the predicted data must not be used essentially in building the theory or choosing the auxiliary assumptions. This is possible if the theory and its auxiliary assumptions are plausible independently of the predicted data, and I analyze the consequences of this requirement in terms of best explanation of diverse bodies of data. Moreover, the predicted data must be (2) a priori improbable, and (3) heterogeneous to the essentially used data. My proposed notion of novelty, therefore, is not historical, but functional. Hence, deductivists are right that confirmation is independent of time and of historical contingencies such as if the theorist knew a datum, used it, or intended to accommodate it. Predictivists, however, are right that not all consequences confirm equally, and confirmation is not purely a logical theory-data relation, as it crucially involves background epistemic conditions and the notion of best explanation. Conditions (1)–(3) make the difference between prediction and accommodation, and account for the confirming power of theoretical virtues such as non ad-hocness, non-fudging, non-overfitting, independence and consilience. I thus show that functional novelty (a) avoids the deductivist objections to predictivism, (b) is a gradual notion, in accordance with the common intuition that confirmation comes in degrees, and (c) supports the no miracle argument, so vindicating scientific realism. (shrink)

Traditional discussions about the arrow of time in general involve the concept of entropy. In the cosmological context, the direction past-to-future is usually related to the direction of the gradient of the entropy function of the universe. But the definition of the entropy of the universe is a very controversial matter. Moreover, thermodynamics is a phenomenological theory. Geometrical properties of space-time provide a more fundamental and less controversial way of defining an arrow of time for the universe as a whole. (...) We will call the arrow defined only on the basis of the geometrical properties of space-time, independently of any entropic considerations, “the global arrow of time.” In this paper we will argue that: (i) if certain conditions are satisfied, it is possible to define a global arrow of time for the universe as a whole, and (ii) the standard models of contemporary cosmology satisfy these conditions. (shrink)

There are two possible realist defense strategies against the pessimistic meta-induction and Laudan’s meta-modus tollens: the selective strategy, claiming that discarded theories are partially true, and the discontinuity strategy, denying that pessimism about past theories can be extended to current ones. A radical version of discontinuity realism is proposed by Gerald Doppelt: rather than discriminating between true and false components within theories, he holds that superseded theories cannot be shown to be even partially true, while present best theories are demonstrably (...) completely true. I argue that this position, running counter both the cumulativity of science and fallibilism, is untenable; it cannot account for the success of past theories, nor for the failures of current theories, and rather than shutting the door to the pessimistic historical objections it opens it wide. The best strategy, instead, joins the selective idea there was both some truth and some falsity in discarded theories, like in current ones, with the moderate discontinuity idea that the truth rate in present best theories is much greater than in past ones. (shrink)

In this paper, we put forth an analysis of sensitivity which aims to discern individual from merely statistical evidence. We argue that sensitivity is not to be understood as a factive concept, but as a purely epistemic one. Our resulting analysis of epistemic sensitivity gives rise to an account of legal proof on which a defendant is only found liable based on epistemically sensitive evidence.

The autopoietic theory and the enactive approach are two theoretical streams that, in spite of their historical link and conceptual affinities, offer very different views on the nature of living beings. In this paper, we compare these views and evaluate, in an exploratory way, their respective degrees of internal coherence. Focusing the analyses on certain key notions such as autonomy and organizational closure, we argue that while the autopoietic theory manages to elaborate an internally consistent conception of living beings, the (...) enactive approach presents an internal tension regarding its characterization of living beings as intentional systems directed at the environment. (shrink)

Three radical worldviews and research approaches are salient in social studies: individualism, holism, and systemism. Individualism focuses on the composition of social systems, whereas holism focuses on their structure. Neither of them is adequate, one because all individuals are interrelated and two because there are no relations without relata. The only cogent and viable alternative is systemism, according to which everything is either a system or a component of a system, and every system has peculiar (emergent) properties that its components (...) lack. The simplest model of a system, whether concrete or abstract, is the ordered triple composition– environment–structure. Concrete systems, whether physical, biological, or social, are also characterized by their mechanism or modus operandi. This model is more realistic and therefore more useful. A few examples are examined. © 2000 Elsevier Science Inc. All rights reserved. (shrink)

We put forth an account for when to believe causal and evidential conditionals. The basic idea is to embed a causal model in an agent’s belief state. For the evaluation of conditionals seems to be relative to beliefs about both particular facts and causal relations. Unlike other attempts using causal models, we show that ours can account rather well not only for various causal but also evidential conditionals.

According to Zurek, decoherence is a process resulting from the interaction between a quantum system and its environment; this process singles out a preferred set of states, usually called “pointer basis”, that determines which observables will receive definite values. This means that decoherence leads to a sort of selection which precludes all except a small subset of the states in the Hilbert space of the system from behaving in a classical manner: environment-induced-superselection—einselection —is a consequence of the process of decoherence. (...) The aim of this paper is to present a new approach to decoherence, different from the mainstream approach of Zurek and his collaborators. We will argue that this approach offers conceptual advantages over the traditional one when problems of foundations are considered; in particular, from the new perspective, decoherence in closed quantum systems becomes possible and the preferred basis acquires a well founded definition. (shrink)

We propose a semantics for a connexive conditional based on the Lewis-Stalnaker conditional. It is a connexive semantics that is both classical and intuitive.

Building on an illustrative case of a systemic environmental threat and its multi‐stakeholder response, this paper draws attention to the changing political impacts of corporations in the digital age. Political Corporate Social Responsibility (PCSR) theory suggests an expanded sense of politics and corporations, including impacts that may range from voluntary initiatives to overcome governance gaps, to avoiding state regulation via corporate political activity. Considering digitalization as a stimulus, we explore potential responsibilities of corporations toward public goods in contexts with functioning (...) governments. We show that digitalization—in the form of transparency, surveillance, and data‐sharing—offers corporations’ scope for deliberative public participation. The starry sky beetle infestation endangering public and private goods is thereby used to illustrate the possibility of expanding the political role of corporations in the digital sphere. We offer a contribution by conceptualizing data‐deliberation as a Habermasian variation of PCSR, defined as the (a) voluntary disclosure of corporate data and its transparent, open sharing with the public sector (b) along with the cooperation with governmental institutions on data analytics methods for examining large‐scale datasets (c) thereby complying with existing national and international regulations on data protection, in particular with respect to privacy and personal data. (shrink)

This article argues that legal proof should be tantamount to justified belief of guilt. A defendant should be found guilty just in case it is justified to believe that the defendant is guilty. My notion of justified belief implies a threshold view on which justified belief requires high credence, but mere statistical evidence does not give rise to justified belief.

One of the open questions in Bayesian epistemology is how to rationally learn from indicative conditionals (Douven, 2016). Eva et al. (Mind 129(514):461–508, 2020) propose a strategy to resolve this question. They claim that their strategy provides a “uniquely rational response to any given learning scenario”. We show that their updating strategy is neither very general nor always rational. Even worse, we generalize their strategy and show that it still fails. Bad news for the Bayesians.

In this paper, we propose a unified account of conditionals inspired by Frank Ramsey. Most contemporary philosophers agree that Ramsey’s account applies to indicative conditionals only. We observe against this orthodoxy that his account covers subjunctive conditionals as well—including counterfactuals. In light of this observation, we argue that Ramsey’s account of conditionals resembles Robert Stalnaker’s possible worlds semantics supplemented by a model of belief. The resemblance suggests to reinterpret the notion of conditional degree of belief in order to overcome a (...) tension in Ramsey’s account. The result of the reinterpretation is a tenable account of conditionals that covers indicative and subjunctive as well as qualitative and probabilistic conditionals. (shrink)

This paper examines the view of ethical language that Wittgenstein took in later years. It argues that according to this view, ethics falls into place as a part of our natural history, while every sense of the mystical or supernatural that once surrounded it is irrevocably lost. Moreover, Wittgenstein argues that ethical language does not correspond to reality “in the way” in which a physical theory does. I propose an interpretation of this claim that shows how it sets his view (...) apart from a “realist” theory of ethics. The reality of which he speaks is the reality of human life. (shrink)

: Usually, when studying schematism we devote almost exclusive attention to the study of the modifications that the categories suffer when combined with time. Instead, we have focused our attention on the determinations that time receives when combined with the categories. Departing from the definition of the transcendental schemata as “determinations of time”, an attempt is made to establish the various determinations that time receives from each one of the categories, as these perform the determination of time in schematism. The (...) categories of quantity allow us to think of time as a series of homogeneous unities; the categories of quality show each instant of time as a receptacle able to receive the different intensities of the real; the categories of relation establish a rule-dependent order on the flow of time; finally, the categories of modality determine the whole of time forming a collective unity that gathers or embraces each one of the instants of time preserving its specificity. (shrink)

This paper examines a fundamental philosophical difference between two radical postcognitivist theories that are usually assumed to offer the same view of cognition; namely the autopoietic theory and the enactive approach. The ways these two theories understand cognition, it is argued, are not compatible nor incompatible but rather incommensurable. The reason, so it is argued, is that while enactivism, following the traditional stance held by most of the cognitive theories, understands cognitive systems as constituting a natural kind, the autopoietic theory (...) understands them as constituting only a conventional kind. Additionally, the paper shows that AT’s conventionalist stance about cognition, far from being an undesirable or useless position, offers some methodological virtues that might be timely and welcome in the agitated and revolutionary climate of current cognitive science. (shrink)

Traditional medicines -- Modern medicine -- Disease -- Diagnosis -- Drug -- Trial -- Treatment -- Prevention -- Iatroethics -- Science or technology, craft or service?

According to Zurek, decoherence is a process resulting from the interaction between a quantum system and its environment; this process singles out a preferred set of states, usually called “pointer basis”, that determines which observables will receive definite values. This means that decoherence leads to a sort of selection which precludes all except a small subset of the states in the Hilbert space of the system from behaving in a classical manner: environment-induced-superselection—einselection —is a consequence of the process of decoherence. (...) The aim of this paper is to present a new approach to decoherence, different from the mainstream approach of Zurek and his collaborators. We will argue that this approach offers conceptual advantages over the traditional one when problems of foundations are considered; in particular, from the new perspective, decoherence in closed quantum systems becomes possible and the preferred basis acquires a well founded definition. (shrink)

This article reviews the qualitative changes that big data technology introduced to society, particularly changes that affect how individuals control the access, use and retention of their personal data. In particular interest is whether the practice of privacy self-management in this new context could still ensure the informed consent of individuals to the privacy terms of big data companies. It is concluded that that accepting big data companies’ privacy policies falls short of the disclosure and understanding requirements for informed consent. (...) The article argues that the practice of privacy self-management could remain viable if the review, understanding and acceptance of privacy agreements is streamlined, standardized and automated. Technology should be employed to counter the privacy problems created by big data technology. The creation of the privacy exchange authorities is proposed as a solution to the failures of privacy self-management. The PEA are intermediaries that empower individuals to define their own privacy terms and express informed consent in their dealings with data companies. They will create the technological infrastructure for individuals to select their own privacy terms from a list of standard choices, potentially only once. The PEA will further mediate the delivery and authentication of the individual users’ privacy terms to data companies. A logical proof of concept is offered, illustrating the potential steps involved in the creation of the PEA. (shrink)

The question of the animal is one of the most intensely debated in the contemporary philosophical arena. The present article makes the case that Husserl’s phenomenological approach offers a stimulating and open-ended perspective on this discussion. The animal, indeed, is an instance of extreme otherness, which pushes phenomenology to its limits. The paper opens with an outline of the methodological issues raised by the question of the animal. It then examines what the animal—at this point, taken as a whole—and the (...) human being have in common and what Husserl sees as the main differences between them. A critical aspect here is the question of personhood. Finally, Sect. 3 traces Husserl’s progression from a general concept of animality to detailed and nuanced phenomenological descriptions of different animals and their intra- and inter-specific relationships. Husserl understands that the threshold that joins and divides human beings and animals is difficult to pin down, because there is more than one threshold: it is plural. (shrink)

Classical philosophical Daoism as it is expressed in the Dao-De-Jing and the Zhuang-Zi is often interpreted as lacking a capacity for critique and resistance. Since these capacities are taken to be central components of Enlightenment reason and action, it would follow that Daoism is incompatible with Enlightenment. This interpretation is being refuted by way of developing a constructive dialogue between the enlightenment traditions of critical theory and recent philosophy of action from a Daoist perspective. Daoism's normative naturalism does neither rest (...) on a primitivist call for a return to the past, nor does it suggest future-directed activism. By way of reconstructing its descriptive, explanatory and emancipatory dimensions, it is shown that Daoism constitutes an alternative form of critical theory. In contrast to future-directed purposive action or blind rule-following, Daoism's key normative concept of "wu-wei" emphasizes effortless non-calculative responsiveness in the present. Drawing on recent insights in the philosophy of action, a reconstruction of wu-wei allows to conceive of a promising form of emancipatory agency. (shrink)

Artificial Intelligence (AI), especially in its current incarnation of Machine Learning (ML), is an endeavor that is characterized by contingencies of two kinds. Intrinsic contingencies stem from the use of specific computational techniques that seem to decrease the control that human users exert on this technology. Relational contingencies emerge from the interaction of AI with other disciplines and contexts. I conduct an analysis of these contingencies on the backdrop of the visual arts with the aim to shed light on the (...) complex relations between technology and creativity. (shrink)

Different methods are available in clinical ethics consultation. In our experience as ethics consultants, certain individual methods have proven insufficient, and so we use a combination of methods. Based on these considerations, we first critically analyze the pros and cons of two well-known methods in the working field of clinical ethics, namely Beauchamp and Childress’s four-principle approach and Jonsen, Siegler, and Winslade’s four-box method. We then present the circle method, which we have used and refined during several clinical ethics consultations (...) in the hospital setting. (shrink)

Das Buch entwickelt und verteidigt eine Form des ethischen Naturalismus. Es kreist um zwei Fragen, die durch einen Leitgedanken eng verbunden sind. Dieser Leitgedanke lautet, dass das Leben, das wir führen, mit allen seinen ethischen Aspekten als Teil der Natur anzusehen ist. Die erste Frage lautet, wie dieser Leitgedanke näher zu verstehen ist. Die zweite Frage lautet, was aus diesem Leitgedanken, so verstanden, folgt. Wie könnte das ethische Leben im Verlauf der Evolution des Menschen entstanden sein? Welche Folgen hätte das (...) für uns? Die Untersuchung setzt bei Darwins Grundeinsichten an, die sie durch die weitere Entwicklung der Theorie der Evolution durch natürliche Selektion und moderne Hypothesen zur Erklärung der Entstehung des ethischen Lebens bis zum aktuellen Stand der Diskussion verfolgt. Wie sich zeigt, ist eine naturalistische Deutung nicht nur mit ethischem Denken und Handeln vereinbar, sondern trägt auch dazu bei, dessen Strukturen zu erklären. Relativiert werden dagegen die Ansprüche vieler Moraltheorien, die von überzogenen Erwartungen im Hinblick auf die Objektivität oder die Formalisierbarkeit des Ethischen geleitet sind. Den Abschluss bildet eine Fallstudie zur Menschenwürde, die nach der Deutung dieses Buchs zwar naturalistisch umgedeutet werden muss, aber als eine zentrale ethische Idee erhalten bleiben kann. (shrink)

Our account of the problem of the classical limit of quantum mechanics involves two elements. The first one is self-induced decoherence, conceived as a process that depends on the own dynamics of a closed quantum system governed by a Hamiltonian with continuous spectrum; the study of decoherence is addressed by means of a formalism used to give meaning to the van Hove states with diagonal singularities. The second element is macroscopicity represented by the limit $\hbar \rightarrow 0$ : when the (...) macroscopic limit is applied to the Wigner transformation of the diagonal state resulting from decoherence, the description of the quantum system becomes equivalent to the description of an ensemble of classical trajectories on phase space weighted by their corresponding probabilities. (shrink)

We investigate the problem how to lift the non - $\forall \Sigma^b_1(\alpha)$ - conservativity of $T^2_2(\alpha)$ over $S^2_2(\alpha)$ to the expected non - $\forall \Sigma^b_i(\alpha)$ - conservativity of $T^{i+1}_2(\alpha)$ over $S^{i+1}_2(\alpha)$ , for $i > 1$ . We give a non-trivial refinement of the “lifting method” developed in [4,8], and we prove a sufficient condition on a $\forall \Sigma^b_1(f)$ -consequence of $T_2(f)$ to yield the non-conservation result. Further we prove that Ramsey's theorem, a $\forall \Sigma^b_1(\alpha)$ - formula, is not provable (...) in $T^1_2(\alpha)$ , and that $\forall \Sigma^b_j(\alpha)$ - conservativity of $T^{i+1}_2(\alpha)$ over $T^{i}_2(\alpha)$ implies $\forall \Sigma^b_j(\alpha)$ - conservativity of the whole $T_2(\alpha)$ over $T^{i}_2(\alpha)$ , for any $j \geq 2$. (shrink)

Husserl investigated the topic of childhood in a small number of research manuscripts, produced around the 1930s. This essay first presents its rationale for addressing the issue – which was essentially to examine more closely the phenomenon of Einfühlung in the context of his inquiry into intersubjectivity – and illustrates the method of Rückfrage that guided his research. It then offers a reading of Husserl’s phenomenological descriptions of childhood and the related conceptual distinctions, organizing them under the following headings: a. (...) second childhood (das wirkliche Kind); b. Urkindheit, or primal childhood which, in turn is subdivided into: b1. first childhood outside the womb and b2. intrauterine life; c. procreation or generation (Zeugung), from the UrIch to the VorIch. Throughout this reverse reconstruction, a particular focus is given to the importance of the notion of Paarung (coupling or pairing) at all levels of the ego's constitution. The self-constitution of the ego (Ich) always implies a relationship – which differs as a function of the child's specific stage of development – with all that is alien to the ego (Ichfremdes), right back to the unattainable, yet constitutive alterity of birth. (shrink)

The scale is the most famous emblem of the law, including intellectual property (IP). Because IP rights impose social costs on the public by limiting access to protected work, the law can be justified only to the extent that, on balance, it encourages enough creation and dissemination of new works to offset those costs. The scale is thus a potent rhetorical trope of fairness and objectivity, but also an instrument the law thinks with – one that is constantly invoked to (...) justify or to question the extent of available IP protection. The balancing act that underlies the legitimacy of IP is, however, literally impossible to perform. Because we are unable to measure the benefits that IP has for inventors or the costs it has for the public, the scale has nothing to weigh. It conveys a clear sense that IP law can be balanced, but in fact propagates only a visible simulacrum of balance – one that is as empty as it is powerful. (shrink)

In the present paper we propose to approach the Spinoza`s methodological project from a philosophical and historical perspective broad enough to adequately understand the reasons that led him to adopt geometric method to expose his philosophy. Even if the topic has been widely discussed by Spinoza´s commentators in the four centuries since the Ethics was published, we believe that the approaches are either inadequate or suffer from some fragmentation, in the sense that they address this or that aspect, but don`t (...) put together all pieces that make up the puzzle. Likewise, we consider that a full understanding of such application of geometric method transcends the mere question of whether it was successful or not in terms of logical rigor. So that, the fundamental task in the present work is unite various aspects that help us understand Spinoza`s methodological choice in a synoptic vision, in which both historical and systematic aspects can be included. To this end, we start from a hypothesis which allow us glimpse a certain unity behind the reasons that lead Spinoza to choose the geometric method, namely: our philosopher tries to reach an ideal of science, which combines some conceptual elements of Aristotelian tradition with others from Cartesian philosophy. (shrink)

L'autore parte dall'analisi dei problemi etici espressi nei linguaggi della poesia, della tragedia e della storiografia, per passare poi alla lettura delle maggiori opere del pensiero antico, fornendo di ognuna puntuali introduzioni. Un'attenzione particolare, alla fine di ogni capitolo, è dedicata all'eredità moderna e al significato attuale dei problemi dell'etica antica, proponendo in modo esplicito un collegamento fra ricostruzione storica e discussione teorica contemporanea.

Here we prove the existence of sheaf cohomology theory in arbitrary o-minimal structures.

The purpose of this paper is to analyse the nature of bureaucratization within public research bodies and its relationship to scientific performance, focusing on an Italian case-study. The main finding is that the bureaucratization of the research sector has two dimensions: public research labs have academic bureaucratization since researchers spend an increasing part of their time in administrative matters (i.e., preparing grant applications, managing grants/projects, and so on); whereas universities mainly have administrative bureaucratization generated by the increase over time of (...) administrative staff in comparison with researchers and faculty. In addition, I show that research units with higher bureaucratization have lower scientific performance. (shrink)

How do we react to uncomfortable futures? By developing the notion of chronopolitics, this article presents two ways that we typically react to future challenges in the present. At the core of the chronopolitics of prevention, we find a striving for normalization and conservation of the present vis-à-vis dangerous futures. In contrast, the chronopolitics of preemption are geared towards a reformation, if not even a revolution of the present. Two case studies in the field of science and technology policy illustrate (...) the difference between prevention and preemption. The debate on human embryonic stem cells illuminates prevention. The debate on nanotechnology clarifies preemption. (shrink)

Quantum electrodynamics presents intrinsic limitations in the description of physical processes that make it impossible to recover from it the type of description we have in classical electrodynamics. Hence one cannot consider classical electrodynamics as reducing to quantum electrodynamics and being recovered from it by some sort of limiting procedure. Quantum electrodynamics has to be seen not as a more fundamental theory, but as an upgrade of classical electrodynamics, which permits an extension of classical theory to the description of phenomena (...) that, while being related to the conceptual framework of the classical theory, cannot be addressed from the classical theory. (shrink)

Recently, Michael Wheeler has argued that despite its sometimes revolutionary rhetoric, the so called 4E cognitive movement, even in the guise of ‘radical’ enactivism, cannot achieve a full revolution in cognitive science. A full revolution would require the rejection of two essential tenets of traditional cognitive science, namely internalism and representationalism. Whilst REC might secure antirepresentationalism, it cannot do the same, so Wheeler argues, with externalism. In this paper, expanding on Wheeler’s analysis, we argue that what compromises REC’s externalism is (...) the persistence of cognitively relevant asymmetries between its purported cognitive systems and the environment. Complementarily, we argue that an antirepresentationalist ancestor of enactivism, the autopoietic theory of cognition, is able to deliver and secure externalism, thus offering the explosive combination that Wheeler claims us needed for a revolution in cognitive science. (shrink)

The Bible recounts that in Eden, Adam gives names to all the animals. But those names are not only representations of the animals’ nature, rather they shape and constitute it. The naming by Adam contains in itself the divide between the human and non-human. Then, there is the Fall: Adam falls and forgets Being. Though he may still remember the names he gave to the animals in Eden, he is no longer sure about their meaning. Adam will have to try (...) to remember his own intentions. Through this effort he can also become aware of how he thinks, who he is, and what was the natural order he knew before the Fall. Medieval bestiaries tell us this story. Bestiaries are works of word play populated by animal figures. They depend on back-and-forth anthropomorphization, or circular metaphor. Animal figures are portrayed as both a mirror of human nature and a window on it. Bestiaries served as means for the moral education of human beings and, at the same time, a way to criticize the current state of humanity, including political and ethical habits. Within the moral irony of medieval bestiaries we can find the origin of the invented nature that modernity will try, subsequently, to insert into natural rights discourse through the teleological oxymoron of their naturalized and naturalizing counter-factuality. I will propose a historical-semiotic journey through the ironic representations of the human-beasts from the ancient world to contemporaneity. The proposal resulting from this cultural excursion is that the words included in the many national and international Rights declarations operate much like the names Adam gave to the animals and still more as they were re-read in medieval bestiaries, both textual and musical. So, can the words of Rights still serve as musical scores, open to an infinite play of re-signification? If we were able to overcome the modern culture/nature and human being/animal dualisms, we could cast, today as in the past, a zoological gaze on human rights by means of contemporary bestiaries and, in this way, perhaps find the gist of rights’ names and our ever regained and ever lost again humanity. (shrink)