Ranging from miniaturized biological robots to organoids, multi-cellular engineered living systems (M-CELS) pose complex ethical and societal challenges. Some of these challenges, such as how to best distribute risks and benefits, are likely to arise in the development of any new technology. Other challenges arise specifically because of the particular characteristics of M-CELS. For example, as an engineered living system becomes increasingly complex, it may provoke societal debate about its moral considerability, perhaps necessitating protection from harm or recognition of positive (...) moral and legal rights, particularly if derived from cells of human origin. The use of emergence-based principles in M-CELS development may also create unique challenges, making the technology difficult to fully control or predict in the laboratory as well as in applied medical or environmental settings. In response to these challenges, we argue that the M-CELS community has an obligation to systematically address the ethical and societal aspects of research and to seek input from and accountability to a broad range of stakeholders and publics. As a newly developing field, M-CELS has a significant opportunity to integrate ethically responsible norms and standards into its research and development practices from the start. With the aim of seizing this opportunity, we identify two general kinds of salient ethical issues arising from M-CELS research, and then present a set of commitments to and strategies for addressing these issues. If adopted, these commitments and strategies would help define M-CELS as not only an innovative field, but also as a model for responsible research and engineering. (shrink)

Ethical issues arise for nurses involved in all phases of clinical trials regardless of whether they are caregivers, research nurses, trial co-ordinators or principal investigators. Potential problem areas centre on nurses’ moral obligation related to methodological issues as well as the notions of beneficence/non-maleficence and autonomy. These ethical concerns can be highly upsetting to nurses if they are not addressed, so it is imperative that they are discussed fully prior to the initiation of a trial. Failure to resolve these issues (...) can place both the conduct and the results of research in jeopardy. (shrink)

"... some very serious critiques of French existential phenomenology and post-structuralism... the contributors offer some refreshingly new insights into some tried and 'true' philosophical texts and more recent works of literary theory." -- Philosophy and Literature "By bridging the gap between 'analytic' and 'continental' philosophy, the authors of The Thinking Muse: Feminism and the Modern French Philosophy largely overcome the cultural polarity between 'male thinker' and 'female muse'." -- Ethics "These engaging essays by American Feminists bring toether feminist philosophy, existential (...) phenomenology, and recent currents in French poststructuralist thought. The editors provide an excellent introductory overview, making this an ideal book for courses in feminist theory and philosophy and modern French thought." -- Philosopher's Index "The concerns raised in this volume are substantial.... a solid addition to the canon of American feminist philosophy." -- Philosophy and Literature "... a forum for feminist appropriations of existential and post-structuralist philosophy." -- Canadian Philosophical Reviews Marking a radical shift in the traditional philosophical separation between muse (female) and thinker (male), The Thinking Muse revises the scope and methods of philosophical reflection. These engaging essays by American feminists bring together feminist philosophy, existential phenomenology, and recent currents in French poststructuralist thought. (shrink)

MACDONALD SE, NEWBURN‐COOK CV, ALLEN M and REUTTER L.Nursing Inquiry2013;20: 30–41 Embracing the population health framework in nursing researchIndividuals’ health outcomes are influenced not only by their knowledge and behavior, but also by complex social, political and economic forces. Attention to these multi‐level factors is necessary to accurately and comprehensively understand and intervene to improve human health. The population health framework is a valuable conceptual framework to guide nurse researchers in identifying and targeting the broad range of determinants of (...) health. However, attention to the intermediate processes linking multi‐level factors and use of appropriate multi‐level theory and research methodology is critical to utilizing the framework effectively. Nurse researchers are well equipped to undertake such investigations but need to consider a number of political, societal, professional and organizational barriers to do so. By fully embracing the population health framework, nurse researchers have the opportunity to explore the multi‐level influences on health and to develop, implement and evaluate interventions that target immediate needs, more distal factors and the intermediate processes that connect them. (shrink)

In this paper, I examine Iris Marion Young's conception of power, arguing that it is incomplete in at least two ways. First, Young tends to equate the term power with the narrower notions of ‘oppression’ and ‘domination.’ Thus, Young lacks a satisfactory analysis of individual and collective empowerment. Second, as Young herself admits, it is not obvious that her analysis of power can be useful in the context of thinking about transnational justice. I conclude by considering one way in (...) which Young's analysis of power needs to be extended or perhaps modified in order to do justice to questions of transnational justice. (shrink)

Der kürzlich verstorbene US-amerikanische Soziologe Robert K. Merton war der prominenteste und einflußreichste Anomie-Theoretiker nach Emile Durkheim. Seine Typologie der Arten individueller Anpassung an anomische gesellschaftliche Situationen bietet heute noch eine wertvolle Grundlage zur Analyse von Gesellschaften. Dieser Beitrag konzentriert sich auf einen dieser Anpassungstypen, den Ritualismus, der Merton zufolge beinhaltet, daß einerseits die kulturellen Ziele, allen voran das des wirtschaftlichen Wohlstands, heruntergeschraubt oder aufgegeben und andererseits die institutionellen Normen zur Erreichung dieser Ziele beinahe zwanghaft befolgt werden. Diese Definition (...) überdenkend versucht der vorliegende Beitrag herauszuarbeiten, daß innerhalb des Systems der Anpassungsformen das Herunterschrauben der kulturellen Ziele nicht das Hauptcharakteristikum ritualistischen, sondern konformen Verhaltens darstellt. Ritualisten haben den Prozeß des Herunterschraubens vielmehr bereits beendet, indem sie jegliche kulturellen Ziele aufgegeben haben, bis auf den einen Wert an sich, nämlich die institutionellen Regeln einzuhalten.Ritualistische Anpassung ist aus Merton`s Sicht für die Soziologie abweichenden Verhaltens, ganz zu schweigen von den Kriminalwissenschaften, nicht von Interesse. Im Gegensatz zu dieser Einschätzung versucht dieser Artikel die verschiedenen soziologischen und sogar kriminologischen Implikationen ritualistischen Verhaltens darzustellen, mit dem Ergebnis, daß Ritualismus sehr wohl ein soziales Problem darstellt. Der Ritualist unterwirft sich nicht nur selbst den institutionellen Normen, sondern fühlt sich auch dazu berufen, andere ständig an die Einhaltung der Regeln zu gemahnen und sie zu überwachen. Deshalb gibt es viele typisch ritualistische Formen abweichenden Verhaltens, wie Denunziation, erzieherischer Tadel oder Mobbing, die sogar in kriminelles Verhalten wie falsche Verdächtigung, Nötigung oder Beleidigung kulminieren können.Am schillerndsten ist die Rolle des Ritualisten in der Kriminalpolitik, nicht zuletzt heute in der Bundesrepublik. Repression jeglicher Art ist seine Antwort auf Regelverstöße und die Kriminalpolitik macht zunehmend Zugeständnisse an ritualistische Forderungen nach härterer und schnellerer Bestrafung oder umfassender Überwachung des öffentlichen Raumes. Ritualisten dominieren den sozialen Diskurs und die allgemeine Wahrnehmung von Kriminalität nicht nur, weil sie wichtige Nutzer und damit Zielgruppe gewisser Massenmedien sind und gerne Leserbriefe schreiben. Sie sind so dominant, weil ihre Art der Anpassung bei zunehmender wirtschaftlicher Krise die Konformität der Wirtschaftswunderzeit zurückgedrängt hat und heute die am weitesten verbreitete in der deutschen Gesellschaft ist. Daher ist auch die schon seit Jahrzehnten zu beobachtende Verschiebung der theoretischen Strafzweckbegründung hin zur Positiven Generalprävention alles andere als ein Zufall. The recently deceased US-sociologist Robert K. Merton has been the most prominent and influential anomie theorist since Emile Durkheim. His typology of modes of adaptation to anomic social situations still constitutes a valuable basis for analyzing society. This contribution focuses on one of these types of adaptation, ritualism, which according to Merton, involves the scaling down or abandoning of the cultural goals, above all economic wealth, on the one hand and to abide almost compulsively by institutional norms to attain these goals on the other. In reconsidering this definition, this contribution attempts to elaborate that within the system of adaptive modes scaling down does not describe the main characteristic of ritualistic behaviour, but first of all characterizes conformity. Ritualists, on the contrary, have already completed the process of scaling down by finally abandoning any cultural goal except the one end-in-itself, that is to comply with the institutional rules.Ritualistic adaptation, in Merton`s view, is of no interest to the sociology of deviant behaviour, not to mention criminal sciences. In contrast to this evaluation this contribution tries to delineate the various sociological and even criminological implications of ritualistic behaviour, leading to the conclusion that Ritualism does indeed present a social problem. The ritualist does not only surrender himself to the institutional means but feels competent to constantly reminding others of abiding by the institutional norms and supervising them. Hence there are many typically ritualistic forms of deviant behaviour like denunciation, disciplinary reproof or mobbing that may even culminate in criminal behaviour like false suspicion, duress or insult.Most ambiguous is the ritualist`s part in criminal policy, not at least in contemporary Germany. Repression of any kind is his answer to breaches of the rules and criminal policy more and more concedes to ritualistic demands for more severe and rapid punishment or extensive supervision of public facilities. Ritualists dominate the social discourse and general perception of criminality, not only because they are important users and therefore the target group of certain mass media, and like to write letters to the editor. They do dominate because in times of increasing economic crisis their mode of adaptation has forced back the conformity of the German economic miracle era and is now the most common one in contemporary German society. Thus, the shift in the theoretical justification of punishment towards a theory of positive general prevention, noticeable for decades, is anything but accidental. (shrink)

The logics of the modal operators and of the quantifiers show striking analogies. The analogies are so extensive that, when a special class of entities (possible worlds) is postulated, natural and non-arbitrary translation procedures can be defined from the language with the modal operators into a purely quantificational one, under which the necessity and possibility operators translate into universal and existential quantifiers. In view of this I would be willing to classify the modal operators as ‘disguised’ quantifiers, and I think (...) that wholehearted acceptance of modal language should be considered to carry ontological commitment to something like possible worldsConsidered as two languages for describing the same subject matter, modal and purely quantificational languages show interesting differences. The operator variables of the purely quantificational languages give them more power than the modal languages, but at least some of the functions performed by the apparatus of operator variables are also performed, in a more primitive and less versatile way, by actuality operators in modal languages.A final note. Quine has written much on the inter-relations of quantifiers, identity, and the concept of existence. These, he holds, form a tightly knit conceptual system which has been evolved to a high point of perfection, but which might conceivably change yet further.29 He has also dropped hints about the possibility of a simpler, primitive or defective version of the system, in which the quantifiers are not backed up in their accustomed way by the concept of identity. He has dubbed the resulting concept a ‘pre-individuative’ concept of existence, or a concept of ‘entity without identity.’ What would a pre-individuative concept of existence be like? Quine has sometimes suggested that one might be embodied in the use of mass nouns, but the identity concept is used in connection with stuff as well as with things: “is that the same coffee that was in the cup last night?” I would submit that modality provides a better case. In view of the comparative weakness of modal languages, compared to the explicitly quantificational ones Quine takes as canonical, there is surely a sense in which the concept of existence embodied in that disguised existential quantifier, the possibility operator, is a defective one. And as we have seen, one of the differences between modal operators and explicit quantifiers is that modal operators cannot be joined with the identity predicate in the way quantifiers with operator variables can. Surely, then, there is a sense in which ordinary speech, as opposed to the metaphysical theorizing of a Leibniz or a David Lewis, conceives of possible worlds as entities without identity. (shrink)

The integration of artificial intelligence (AI), particularly large language models (LLMs) like OpenAI’s ChatGPT, into clinical research could significantly enhance the informed consent process. This paper critically examines the ethical implications of employing LLMs to facilitate consent in clinical research. LLMs could offer considerable benefits, such as improving participant understanding and engagement, broadening participants’ access to the relevant information for informed consent and increasing the efficiency of consent procedures. However, these theoretical advantages are accompanied by ethical risks, including the potential (...) for misinformation, coercion and challenges in accountability. Given the complex nature of consent in clinical research, which involves both written documentation (in the form of participant information sheets and informed consent forms) and in-person conversations with a researcher, the use of LLMs raises significant concerns about the adequacy of existing regulatory frameworks. Institutional Review Boards (IRBs) will need to consider substantial reforms to accommodate the integration of LLM-based consent processes. We explore five potential models for LLM implementation, ranging from supplementary roles to complete replacements of current consent processes, and offer recommendations for researchers and IRBs to navigate the ethical landscape. Thus, we aim to provide practical recommendations to facilitate the ethical introduction of LLM-based consent in research settings by considering factors such as participant understanding, information accuracy, human oversight and types of LLM applications in clinical research consent. (shrink)

This paper interrogates the concept of luck in cancer diagnosis. I argue that while it might have some utility for individuals, at the clinical and research level, the concept impedes important prevention efforts and misdirects sources of blame in a cancer diagnosis. Such use, in fact, has the possibility of harming already vulnerable efforts at ameliorating social determinants of health and should therefore be eliminated from research and clinical contexts.

This essay builds on recent work by Susan Haack to suggest that Oliver Wendell Holmes Jr.’s conception of the common law was influenced by Darwinian evolution and classical pragmatism. This is no small claim: perceptions of what the common law is and does within the constitutional framework of the United States continue to be heavily debated. Holmes’s paradigm for the common law both revised and extended the models set forth by Sir Edward Coke, Thomas Hobbes, Sir Matthew Hale, and Sir (...) William Blackstone. Adding additional substance to Haack’s argument by pointing out passages in Holmes’s opinions and in his only book, The Common Law, that corroborate her claims about the particular features of Holmes’s pragmatism, this essay concludes by suggesting that, because of his connections with the classical pragmatists and his reverence for Emerson, Holmes is the best place to begin answering the famous question formulated by Stanley Cavell: “What’s the Use in Calling Emerson a Pragmatist?”. (shrink)

Wright, Ken Review of: Taking god to school: The end of Australia's egalitarian education?, by Marion Maddox, Allen and Unwin, Sydney, 2014, pp. xxiii + 248, $29.99.

Argues that the pursuit of power is the main force shaping human relations, suggests that isolation is the price for escape from this condition, and reassesses human nature from the perspectives of history and biology.

In his reading of Kant’s moral philosophy and its grounding in freedom of the will, Allison is best know for giving an exclusively “practical” reading to doctrines about noumenal agency, so that they are taken to have none of the outlandish metaphysical implications often thought to be associated with the Kantian conception of freedom. The central feature of Allison’s interpretation is that Kant operates with a theory of agency in which, from the agent’s standpoint, reasons do not act as causes, (...) but operate only insofar as they are taken up by the agent into principles or “maxims.” According to this “Incorporation Thesis,” sensuous impulses or desires are not causes of an action. So there is no reason to regard the motive of duty as a “noumenal” cause competing with sensuous or “phenomenal” causes. Instead, Kant’s “two standpoints theory” is to be understood as distinguishing the action as viewed from the agent’s practical standpoint from causal conceptions governing the theoretical standpoint. (shrink)

If, as Axel Honneth has recently argued, critical theory needs psychoanalysis for meta-normative and explanatory reasons, this does not settle the question of which version of psychoanalysis critical theorists should embrace. In this paper, I argue against Honneth's favoured version – an intersubjectivist interpretation of Winnicott's object-relations theory – and in favour of an alternative based on the drive-theoretical work of Melanie Klein. Klein's work, I argue, provides critical theorists with a more realistic conception of the person and a richer (...) explanatory account of human aggression and destructiveness than does Honneth's intersubjectivist view. As such, it better serves the ends for which Honneth claims that critical theory should turn to psychoanalysis in the first place. (shrink)

We argue that the proper context for understanding Collingwood’s The Principles of Art is his claim that it has bearing “upon the condition of art in England in 1937”. We thus argue that he formulated a philosophical argument that underpins avant-garde dramatic poetry and theatrical practices (Eliot, Auden and the Group Theatre), taking his interpretation of Spinoza’s Ethics 5 prop. 3 to be the book’s central thesis: it is through art that one knows, against the ‘corruption of consciousness’, what emotions (...) one feels and recognizes them as one’s own. Collingwood further believed that this could only be achieved through collaboration between the artist and the community, validating new theatrical practices involving interaction with the audience. We analyse these views in the context of England in 1937: in an era marked by the rise of Fascism and Nazism, Collingwood believed that art thus conceived could help restoring emotional support for the defense of liberal democracies. We conclude with an exploration of parallels with and divergences from the Spinozist idea of ‘mobilizing affects’ in contemporary ‘left populism’ (Mouffe). (shrink)

In this paper, I examine the transmission of some ideas of the pragmatist tradition to Wittgenstein, in his ‘middle period,’ through the intermediary of F. P. Ramsey, with whom he had numerous fruitful discussions at Cambridge in 1929. I argue more specifically that one must first come to terms with Ramsey’s own views in 1929, and explain how they differ from views expressed in earlier papers from 1925-27, so a large part of this paper is devoted to this task. One (...) is then in a better position to understand the impact of Ramsey’s astute critique of Wittgenstein’s Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus in conjunction with his pragmatism, and explain how it may have set into motion the ‘later’ Wittgenstein. I then argue that Ramsey introduced his notion of ‘variable hypothetical’ as a rule, not a proposition, on pragmatist grounds and that Wittgenstein picked this up in 1929, along with a more ‘dynamic’ view of meaning than the ‘static’ view of the Tractatus, and that this explains in part Wittgenstein’s turn to his ‘later philosophy.’. (shrink)

Application of egalitarian and prioritarian accounts of health resource allocation in low‐income countries have both been criticized for implying distribution outcomes that allow decreasing/undermining health gains and for tolerating unacceptable standards of health care and health status that result from such allocation schemes. Insufficient health care and severe deprivation of health resources are difficult to accept even when justified by aggregative efficiency or legitimized by fair deliberative process in pursuing equality and priority oriented outcomes. I affirm the sufficientarian argument that, (...) given extreme scarcity of public health resources in low‐income countries, neither health status equality between populations nor priority for the worse off is normatively adequate. Nevertheless, the threshold norm alone need not be the sole consideration when a country's total health budget is extremely scarce. Threshold considerations are necessary in developing a theory of fair distribution of health resources that is sensitive to the lexically prior norm of sufficiency. Based on the intuition that shares must not be taken away from those who barely achieve a minimal level of health, I argue that assessments based on standards of minimal physical/mental health must be developed to evaluate the sufficiency of the total resources of health systems in low‐income countries prior to pursuing equality, priority, and efficiency based resource allocation. I also begin to examine how threshold sensitive health resource assessment could be used in the Philippines. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:464 Feminist Studies 44, no. 2. © 2018 by Feminist Studies, Inc. Claire Raymond and Sarah Corse A Distorting Mirror: Educational Trajectory After College Sexual Assault This article focuses on the broad and specific impacts of college sexual assault on student-survivors’ academic performance, academic trajectory, and their sense of self in relation to the university community. We frame this study with, and relate our findings to, the historic and (...) theoretical literatures that provide the context for this essay, including the large and burgeoning literature on the sexual assault of women college students and recent studies analyzing the role of fraternities in sexual assault, students’ fears and perceptions about college assault, bystander intervention training, and survivors’ grade-point averages after assault.1 Our study also builds on the history of feminist resistance to rape, feminist writings about rape, and campus activism against rape, with the 1. Cortney Franklin, Leana Allen Bouffard, and Travis C. Pratt, “Sexual Assault on the College Campus: Fraternity Affiliation, Male Peer Support, and Low Self-Control,” Criminal Justice and Behavior 39, no. 11 (2012): 1457– 80; Christine A. Gidycz, John R. McNamara, and Katie M. Edwards, “Women ’s Risk Perception and Sexual Victimization: A Review of the Literature,” Aggression and Violent Behavior 11, no. 5 (2006): 441–56; Jennifer Katz and Jessica Moore, “Bystander Education Training for Campus Sexual Assault Prevention: An Initial Meta-Analysis,” Violence and Victims 28, no. 6 (2013): 1054–67; Douglas W. Pryor and Marion R. Hughes, “Fear of Rape among College Women: A Social Psychological Analysis,” Violence and Victims 28, no. 3 (2013): 443–65; Carol E. Jordan, Jessica L. Combs, and Gregory T. Smith, “An Exploration of Sexual Victimization and Academic Performance among College Women,” Trauma, Violence, & Abuse 15, no. 3 (2014): 191–200. Claire Raymond and Sarah Corse 465 goal of shedding light on one aspect of the problem. Groundbreaking (and in some cases controversial) works analyzing the cultures of rape, such as Susan Brownmiller’s Against Our Will and Peggy Sanday’s “The Socio-Cultural Context of Rape” (in which Sanday creates the concept of the rape-producing culture—a concept that is central to our argument in this essay), found immediate reception with feminist activists of the 1970s and early 1980s.2 Mary Koss’s work regarding the scope of rape in college settings is also foundational to our study of campus rape.3 Susan Estrich, Catharine MacKinnon, and other feminist theorists in the mid-1980s developed critical apparatuses to shift the understanding of rape, providing a feminist framework wherein rape is interpreted as violence committed against a woman—in opposition to the patriarchal argument that rape is caused by a woman’s actions or is the product of her distortion of events after the fact.4 Angela Davis and bell hooks were deeply influential in framing understandings of the racial and racist aspects of feminist discussions of rape, while legal scholar Sarah Deer has more recently broadened understandings of the racialized discourse of rape, and Lisa Wade has written on twenty-first century hookup culture and the ways that this social landscape promulgates rates of maleon -female rape that are significantly higher on college campuses than in the general population.5 2. Peggy Reeves Sanday, “The Socio-Cultural Context of Rape: A Cross-Cultural Study,” Journal of Social Issues 37, no. 4 (1981): 5–27; Susan Brownmiller, Against Our Will: Men, Women and Rape (New York: Penguin Books, 1976). 3. Mary P. Koss, Christine A. Gidycz, and Nadine Wisniewski, “The Scope of Rape: Incidence and Prevalence of Sexual Aggression and Victimization in a National Sample of Higher Education Students,” Journal of Consulting and Clinical Psychology 55, no. 2 (1987): 162–70. 4. Susan Estrich, Real Rape: How the Legal System Victimizes Women Who Say No (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1988); Duncan Chappell, Robley Geis, and Gilbert Geis, eds., Forcible Rape: The Crime, the Victim and the Offender (New York: Columbia University Press, 1977). 5. Angela Davis, “Rape, Racism, and the Myth of the Black Rapist,” in her Women, Race, and Class (New York: Vintage Books, 1983), 172–201; bell hooks, Feminist Theory: From Margin to Center (Boston: South End Press, 1984); Sarah Deer, The Beginning and End... (shrink)

Exclusive moral concern for human beings is often thought to be the ideological source of many contemporary environmental problems. So the development of a non-anthropocentric theory of intrinsic moral value, according to which at least some parts of the non-human world are morally considerable for their own sake, is often thought to be a defining characteristic of a satisfying environmental ethic. This chapter unpacks three distinct forms of anthropocentrism, outlines three versions of ethical nonanthropocentrism, and sketches some of the debate (...) between anthropocentrists and nonanthropocentrists before concluding that a virtue-theoretic approach to human natural goodness exemplifies one form of anthropocentrism that may continue to play a vital role in developing an environmental ethic suitable to the Anthropocene. (shrink)

In this article I offer a defence of the use of deceptive placebos—inert treatments like sugar pills or saline injections—in clinical practice. In particular, I will defend what I call the ideal placebo case—where a doctor or nurse has good reason to believe that a deceptive placebo offers a patient’s best, or only, chance of some therapeutic benefit. Taking a Kantian approach to the question of clinical placebo use, I examine the Kantian prohibition on deception as interference with the will (...) of a rational agent, and argue that deception to promote the placebo effect can be carried out in a way that does not interfere with the patient’s will in the way prohibited by Kant. The deception involved in a placebo treatment is not carried out to interfere with or obstruct the function of the will, but merely to make possible a means to the patient’s ends that that would otherwise be unavailable. I will therefore argue that deception carried out in order to promote a therapeutic placebo effect can be done in a way that is consistent with respect for a patient’s autonomy, and may be a rare case of deception that is compatible with a Kantian ethical approach. (shrink)