Epistemic deontology is the view that the concept of epistemic justification is deontological: a justified belief is, by definition, an epistemically permissible belief. I defend this view against the argument from doxastic involuntarism, according to which our doxastic attitudes are not under our voluntary control, and thus are not proper objects for deontological evaluation. I argue that, in order to assess this argument, we must distinguish between a compatibilist and a libertarian construal of the concept of voluntary control. If we (...) endorse a compatibilist construal, it turns out that we enjoy voluntary control over our doxastic attitudes after all. If, on the other hand, we endorse a libertarian construal, the result is that, for our doxastic attitudes to be suitable objects of deontological evaluation, they need not be under our voluntary control. (shrink)

Studying consciousness requires contrasting conscious and unconscious perception. While many studies have reported unconscious perceptual effects, recent work has questioned whether such effects are genuinely unconscious, or whether they are due to weak conscious perception. Some philosophers and psychologists have reacted by denying that there is such a thing as unconscious perception, or by holding that unconscious perception has been previously overestimated. This article has two parts. In the first part, I argue that the most significant attack on unconscious perception (...) commits the criterion content fallacy: the fallacy of interpreting evidence that observers were conscious of something as evidence that they were conscious of the task-relevant features of the stimuli. In the second part, I contend that the criterion content fallacy is prevalent in consciousness research. For this reason, I hold that if unconscious perception exists, scientists studying consciousness could routinely underestimate it. I conclude with methodological recommendations for moving the debate forward. (shrink)

Conditional structures lie at the heart of the sciences, humanities, and everyday reasoning. It is hence not surprising that conditional logics – logics specifically designed to account for natural language conditionals – are an active and interdisciplinary area. The present book gives a formal and a philosophical account of indicative and counterfactual conditionals in terms of Chellas-Segerberg semantics. For that purpose a range of topics are discussed such as Bennett’s arguments against truth value based semantics for indicative conditionals.

The early twentieth-century American neo-realists’ approach to consciousness is historically reconstructed and critically discussed. With reference to the relevant works of Ralph Barton Perry, William Pepperrell Montague, and Edwin B. Holt, it is argued that Montague and Holt, in particular, struggled with the problem of error and disagreed strongly on their solutions to it. Finally, a line is drawn to related discussions in contemporary philosophy of mind.

Defined narrowly, epistemology is the study of knowledge and justified belief. As the study of knowledge, epistemology is concerned with the following questions: What are the necessary and sufficient conditions of knowledge? What are its sources? What is its structure, and what are its limits? As the study of justified belief, epistemology aims to answer questions such as: How we are to understand the concept of justification? What makes justified beliefs justified? Is justification internal or external to one's own mind? (...) Understood more broadly, epistemology is about issues having to do with the creation and dissemination of knowledge in particular areas of inquiry. This article will provide a systematic overview of the problems that the questions above raise and focus in some depth on issues relating to the structure and the limits of knowledge and justification. (shrink)

This volume gathers eleven new and three previously unpublished essays that take on questions of epistemic justification, responsibility, and virtue. It contains the best recent work in this area by major figures such as Ernest Sosa, Robert Audi, Alvin Goldman, and Susan Haak.

I argue that scientific realism, insofar as it is only committed to those scientific posits of which we have causal knowledge, is immune to Kyle Stanford’s argument from unconceived alternatives. This causal strategy is shown not to repeat the shortcomings of previous realist responses to Stanford’s argument. Furthermore, I show that the notion of causal knowledge underlying it can be made sufficiently precise by means of conceptual tools recently introduced into the debate on scientific realism. Finally, I apply this strategy (...) to the case of Jean Perrin’s experimental work on the atomic hypothesis, disputing Stanford’s claim that the problem of unconceived alternatives invalidates a realist interpretation of this historical episode. 1 Stanford’s Argument from Unconceived Alternatives2 Previous Attempts to Undermine the Problem of Unconceived Alternatives2.1 The plausibility of unconceived alternatives2.2 The distinctness of unconceived alternatives2.3 The induction from past to present3 Causal Knowledge as a Criterion for the Realist3.1 How Chakravartty’s proposal differs from earlier causal strategies3.2 Causal realism and the detection/auxiliary distinction4 Causal Realism, Unconceived Alternatives, and the Atomic Hypothesis4.1 Perrin and the philosophers: some initial observations4.2 Roush and Stanford on Perrin4.3 From Brownian motion to the reality of atoms4.4 What we know about atoms5 Conclusion. (shrink)

This book endeavors to fill the conceptual gap in theorizing about embodied cognition. The theories of mind and cognition which one could generally call "situated" or "embodied cognition" have gained much attention in the recent decades. However, it has been mostly phenomenology, which has served as a philosophical background for their research program. The main goal of this book is to bring the philosophy of classical American pragmatism firmly into play. Although pragmatism has been arguably the first intellectual current which (...) systematically built its theories of knowledge, mind and valuation upon the model of a bodily interaction between an organism and its environment, as the editors and authors argue, it has not been given sufficient attention in the debate and, consequently, its conceptual resources for enriching the embodied mind project are far from being exhausted. In this book, the authors propose concrete subject-areas in which the philosophy of pragmatism can be of help when dealing with particular problems the philosophy of the embodied mind nowadays faces - a prominent example being the inevitable tension between bodily situatedness and the potential universality of symbolic meaning. (shrink)

Any intermediate propositional logic can be extended to a calculus with epsilon- and tau-operators and critical formulas. For classical logic, this results in Hilbert’s $\varepsilon $ -calculus. The first and second $\varepsilon $ -theorems for classical logic establish conservativity of the $\varepsilon $ -calculus over its classical base logic. It is well known that the second $\varepsilon $ -theorem fails for the intuitionistic $\varepsilon $ -calculus, as prenexation is impossible. The paper investigates the effect of adding critical $\varepsilon $ - (...) and $\tau $ -formulas and using the translation of quantifiers into $\varepsilon $ - and $\tau $ -terms to intermediate logics. It is shown that conservativity over the propositional base logic also holds for such intermediate ${\varepsilon \tau }$ -calculi. The “extended” first $\varepsilon $ -theorem holds if the base logic is finite-valued Gödel–Dummett logic, and fails otherwise, but holds for certain provable formulas in infinite-valued Gödel logic. The second $\varepsilon $ -theorem also holds for finite-valued first-order Gödel logics. The methods used to prove the extended first $\varepsilon $ -theorem for infinite-valued Gödel logic suggest applications to theories of arithmetic. (shrink)

This article presents results from the national survey conducted in 2018 for the project Research Integrity in Norway. A total of 31,206 questionnaires were sent out to Norwegian researchers by e-mail, and 7291 responses were obtained. In this paper, we analyse the survey data to determine attitudes towards and the prevalence of fabrication, falsification and plagiarism and contrast this with attitudes towards and the prevalence of the more questionable research practices surveyed. Our results show a relatively low percentage of self-reported (...) FFPs, while the number of researchers who report having committed one of the QRPs during the last three years reached a troublesome 40%. The article also presents a ranking of the perceived severity of FFP and QRPs among Norwegian researchers. Overall, there is a widespread normative consensus, where FFP is considered more troublesome than QRPs. (shrink)

Analytic philosophy in the United States emerged parallel to the demise of idealism. During the second half of the nineteenth century, Josiah Royce had contributed importantly to the predominance of idealist systems and corresponding academic groups. With the rise of pragmatism and new realism, the situation changed dramatically: the idealist movement lost momentum and realism began to dominate the discourse. The present paper argues that the critiques of idealism put forward by the realists during the first two decades of the (...) twentieth century were instrumental to the emergence of analytic philosophy in the United States. As I will explain, Ralph Barton Perry (1876–1957) was the key figure in the underinvestigated genesis of this movement. (shrink)

Roy Wood Sellars (1880–1973) is often reduced to his role as father of Wilfrid Sellars. This is unfair because during the 1920s, ‘30s, and ‘40s, Roy Wood was one of the leading figures of the then prevailing American realist movement. In the present paper, I will focus on one particular facet of R. W. Sellars’ philosophical approach: his continual examination of Albert Einstein’s special theory of relativity. I shall primarily reconstruct his discussion of Einstein’s theory, as it can be found (...) in his seminal The Philosophy of Physical Realism (1932). In contrast to authors such as Bertrand Russell or Émile Meyerson, Sellars refused to interpret special relativity in a realist vein. In his view, it should be seen as an “ars mensurandi” and thus being interpreted purely operationally. As with Einstein himself, the concept of simultaneity was his paradigm case in point. However, Sellars opined that besides the physical (mensurational) concepts of time and simultaneity there also exists an ontological understanding of these notions. “Real” time and “absolute” simultaneity are, according to Sellars, the indispensable non-relativistic counterparts to Einstein’s respective relativistic conceptions. They are to be interpreted realistically since they prove, Sellars maintains, to be explanatory regarding events in Einstein-Minkowski’s world. In the course of the paper, I shall compare this view with the one defended by Henri Bergson. Furthermore, Sellars’ later approach from the 1940s and ‘50s will be briefly considered and critically discussed by confronting it with more recent attempts at ontologically ‘grounding’ special relativistic kinematics. (shrink)

All conceptions of equal opportunity draw on some distinction between morally justified and unjustified inequalities. We discuss how this distinction varies across a range of philosophical positions. We find that these positions often advance equality of opportunity in tandem with distributive principles based on merit, desert, consequentialist criteria or individuals' responsibility for outcomes. The result of this amalgam of principles is a festering controversy that unnecessarily diminishes the widespread acceptability of opportunity concerns. We therefore propose to restore the conceptual separation (...) of opportunity principles concerning unjustified inequalities from distributive principles concerning justifiable inequalities. On this view, equal opportunity implies that that morally irrelevant factors should engender no differences in individuals' attainment, while remaining silent on inequalities due to morally relevant factors. We examine this idea by introducing the principle of ‘opportunity dominance' and explore in a simple application to what extent this principle may help us arbitrate between opposing distributive principles. We also compare this principle to the selection rules developed by John Roemer and Dirk Van de Gaer. (shrink)

Traditionally, the manufacturer/operator of a machine is held (morally and legally) responsible for the consequences of its operation. Autonomous, learning machines, based on neural networks, genetic algorithms and agent architectures, create a new situation, where the manufacturer/operator of the machine is in principle not capable of predicting the future machine behaviour any more, and thus cannot be held morally responsible or liable for it. The society must decide between not using this kind of machine any more (which is not a (...) realistic option), or facing a responsibility gap, which cannot be bridged by traditional concepts of responsibility ascription. (shrink)

In the context of the recent proliferation of nationalisms and enemy figures, this paper agrees with the desirability of retaining some of the explanatory and motivational potential of an agonistic account of politics, but gives reasons not to accept too much of Carl Schmitt's account of citizenship. The claim as to the necessarily antagonistic exclusion of concrete others can be supported neither on its own terms nor on Derridian grounds, as Chantal Mouffe, in particular, attempts to do. I then indicate (...) that différance may nonetheless account for strong (but not necessary) tendencies toward exclusion as well as for the intrinsic contradictions of liberal universalism. (shrink)

I distinguish between Old Contextualism, New Contextualism, and the Multiple Concepts Theory. I argue that Old Contextualism cannot handle the following three problems: (i) the disquotational paradox, (ii) upward pressure resistance, (iii) inability to avoid the acceptance of skeptical conclusions. New Contextualism, in contrast, can avoid these problems. However, since New Contextualism appears to be a semanticized mirror image of MCT, it remains unclear whether it is in fact a genuine version of contextualism.

The biggest research programme within business ethics is arguably Corporate Social Responsibility and all its related streams (Corporate Citizenship, Social Justice, etc.) While there seems to be widespread agreement that business ethics is situated between the amoral or even immoral view of Milton Friedman as explicated in his 1970 New York Times paper, and the moral view expounded by R. Edward Freeman, this essay challenges that view. Friedman, maybe owed to his flamboyant writing style and crude and purely rhetorical oversimplifications (...) has been misinterpreted to advocate for managers to be completely amoral maximisers of profitability. This misinterpretation has become common wisdom, despite him clearly stating that the law and the moral standards of surrounding society must limit profit-seeking behaviour. Freeman's stakeholder theory, on the other hand, is seen as being on the other end of the continuum, arguing for selflessness—another misinterpretation, as I argue with Ed Freeman's help. Instead, I suggest that both Friedman and Freeman represent the virtuous mean of the business ethics continuum and not its extremes because they both base their theories on the idea of the free and socially embedded individual. The two vicious ends of the continuum are inhabited by the unreal, atomised, completely a-social and selfish individual on the one end, and by the equally unreal collectivised self-less individual on the other. The mainstream in business ethics has declared the collective and selfless end to be the ideal that must guide practice and research. The selfish and the selfless strawmen have prevented a proper debate in business ethics for too long. (shrink)

Rationality and reason are often used as synonyms, although they are very different concepts. In this article we argue that rationality is the concept of reason that has been stripped of its human elements. Ancient and medieval philosophers such as Aristotle and Aquinas stressed that the concept of reason is composed of sensitive, discursive, and moral elements. Post-Enlightenment thinkers instead, building on the works of René Descartes and Isaac Newton, took these out and claimed that rationality must be based on (...) an external logic devoid of value-concepts such as perfection, harmony, meaning and aim (Koyré in From the closed world to the infinite universe, The Johns Hopkins University Press, Baltimore, 1957). The purpose of this essay is to highlight this shift in Western thought and its consequences for management theories. While explaining the ancient concept of reason in contrast with modern rationalism (Klein in: Williamson RB, Zuckerman E (eds) Jacob Klein—lectures and essays, St. John’s College Press, Annapolis, 1985), we aim at raising awareness of the differences between building a research programme (especially in business sciences like economics and management) on rationality or on reason. (shrink)

I would like to know who of mycontemporaries should be more competent inKantian philosophy than me.(Schopenhauer in a letter to Rosenkranz and Schubert, 18371)In this paper the attempt is made to show how Schopenhauer's critique of Kant leads from initial disagreements to a fundamental modification, even a new formation, of the Kantian concepts of understanding, reason, imagination, perception, idea and thing-in-itself. The starting point and the core of his critique is the demand for the appreciation of intuitive knowledge which is (...) apart from and independent of reason. The intuitive knowledge goes back to images and its highest form is aesthetic contemplation. Without a participation of concepts it is sufficient to explain objective reality. Particularly on the basis of Schopenhauer's critical examination of Kant's schematism it can be shown that his alternative conception of an image-based objectivity of experience is to be taken seriously, even if the way he presents it sometimes gives the impression of a mere misunderstanding of Kant's theory of cognition. (shrink)

Human rights arguments have been successful before several domestic courts across Europe in imposing more ambitious action in cutting greenhouse gas emissions upon governments. Yet, the integration of climate justice concerns in those judicial decisions have been insufficiently studied. This paper seeks to contribute to such endeavor by analyzing the cases of Urgenda v. The Netherlands, Klimaatzaak v. Belgium and Neuebauer v. Germany against the climate justice framework. In Part One we set out our analytical framework. A climate justice approach (...) acknowledges that climate mitigation, like the effects of climate change itself, is distributional in nature. In particular, climate justice highlights the unequal distribution of burdens and benefits across three dimensions: international (justice between states); intergenerational (justice between generations); and intragenerational (justice between social groups along socio-economic, racial and gender determinants). In Part Two, we offer a close reading of three key rights-based mitigation decisions to evaluate how judges have accounted for the various dimensions of climate justice. Detailing the contrasted approaches of climate justice in those decisions, we also point to a common reluctance to engage in intragenerational justice reflected in the failure to fashion rights-based obligations which take into account the inequalities across communities and social groups. (shrink)

Although metaphysics as a discipline can hardly be separated from Aristotle and his works, the questions it raises were certainly known to authors even before the reception of Aristotle in the thirteenth century. Even without the explicit use of this term the twelfth century manifested a strong interest in metaphysical questions under the guise of «natural philosophy» or «divine science», leading M.-D. Chenu to coin the expression of a twelfth century «éveil métaphysique». In their commentaries on Boethius and under the (...) influence of Neoplatonism, twelfth century authors not only anticipate essential elements of thirteenth century metaphysics, they also make an original contribution to the history of metaphysics by attempting to integrate the theory of first principles, philosophical theology and ontology. This volume presents and examines the contributions of the twelfth century to metaphysics made by selected Jewish, Christian and Muslim authors of the Iberian Peninsula and Francia. -/- Contributors include Matthias Lutz-Bachmann (Frankfurt am Main), Andreas Speer (Würzburg), Charles Burnett (London), Alexander Fidora (Frankfurt am Main), Thomas Ricklin (Neuchâtel), Yossef Schwartz (Jerusalem), Josep Udina (Barcelona), Jack C. Marler (St. Louis/USA), Gillian R. Evans (Cambridge), Andreas Niederberger (Frankfurt am Main) and Françoise Hudry (Paris). (shrink)

The article examines Adorno’s conviction that a critique of concepts inevitably entails a critique of society. Some commentators, notably Cook, read Adorno’s idea of the seamless transition from conceptual to social critique as dependent on the use of normative concepts. According to this ‘Marxist’ reading, a critique of unfaithful concepts provokes a persuasive and constructive critique of society for failing to fulfil concepts. This line of argument creates problems. Adorno’s inquiries into society’s resistance to decipherment imply that the progression from (...) conceptual to social critique via normative concepts leads to advocating misguided, potentially dangerous social standards. In response to this dilemma, the article proposes an alternative interpretation of the transition from conceptual to social critique. The focus shifts from normative concepts to Adorno’s examinations of society as a condition of false consciousness and suffering. From this perspective, conceptual critique entails a convincing — albeit no longer constructive — critique of society. (shrink)

For about the last ten years, a steadily growing stream of publications is feeding a fascinating international debate on the development of an Eco-Marxism. In this paper, the attempts to “ecologize” Marxism are critically discussed, starting with John Bellamy Foster’s path-breaking reconstruction of Marx’s conceptof “metabolic rift” and the Marxian analysis of the privatization of the commons. Although Marx’s understanding of the limits of nature is only partial, authors such as Paul Burkett have convincingly shown a reconstructed Eco-Marxism follows the (...) fundamental tenets of ecological economics. This approach can also fruitfully inform the development of an ecosocialist political project. (shrink)

The text introduces the concept behind the Proceedings of the 2018 ZiF Workshop “Studying Migration Policies at the Interface between Empirical Research and Normative Analysis”. It explains why there is a need to study migration policies across disciplines, includes a short note on the current literature, and provides a look back at the workshop. DOI:10.17879/15199624685 .

Die meisten Ethik- und Philosophie-Lehrpläne sehen vor, dass Schüler/innen die Grundlagen der Moralphilosophie kennen und verstehen. Im vorliegenden Beitrag nennen und erläutern wir einige Probleme, die der Erreichung dieses Ziels entgegenstehen. Eines dieser Probleme – die Vermischung unterschiedlicher Fragen – illustrieren wir an einer konkreten Lehreinheit. Anschließend skizzieren wir schädliche Folgen dieses Problems und deuten mögliche Wege zu seiner Beseitigung an.

Background Teamwork in emergency medical services is a very important factor in efforts to improve patient safety. The potential differences of staff gender on communication, patient safety, and teamwork were omitted. The aim of this study is to evaluate these inadequately examined areas. Methods A descriptive and anonymous study was conducted with an online questionnaire targeting emergency physicians and paramedics. The participants were asked about teamwork, communication, patient safety and handling of errors. Results Seven hundred fourteen prehospital professionals from all (...) over Germany participated. A total of 65.7% of the women harmed a patient (men 72.9%), and 52.6% were ashamed when mistakes were made (men 31.7%). 19.0% of the female participants considered their communication skills to be very good, compared to 81% of the men. More women than men did not want to appear incompetent (28.4%, 15.5%) and therefore did not speak openly about mistakes. Both genders saw the character of their colleagues as a reason for poor team communication (women 89.4%, men 84.9.%). Under high stress, communication decreased (women 35.9%, men 31.0%) and expression became inaccurate (women 18.7%, men 20.1%). Conclusions Team communication problems and teamwork in rescue services are independent of gender. Women seem to have more difficulty with open communication about mistakes because they seem to be subject to higher expectations. Work organization should be adapted to women’s needs to enable more effective error management. We conclude that it is necessary to promote a positive error and communication culture to increase patient safety. (shrink)

It is well-established that policy aiming to change individual consumption patterns for environmental or other ethical reasons faces a trade-off between effectiveness and public acceptance. The more ambitious a policy intervention is, the higher the likelihood of reactionary backlash; the higher the intervention’s public acceptance, the less bite it is likely to have. This paper proposes a package of interventions aiming for a substantial reduction of animal product consumption while circumventing the diagnosed trade-off. It couples stringent industry regulation, which lowers (...) output and raises prices, with a targeted universal income at a level which would allow typical households to maintain their animal product consumption even at the post-regulation price level. The change of opportunity costs of animal products, however, would induce a shift of consumption away from animal products while enhancing – rather than diminishing – consumer freedom and welfare. The policy package, which is further designed to cohere with traditional value orderings rather than relying exclusively on progressive concerns, is politically ambitious, but psychologically pragmatic. It constitutes an attempt to socialize the endeavour of bringing consumption patterns in line with ethical demands by empowering, rather than sanctioning, individuals, and relevant groups. (shrink)

Whether deconstruction is relevant to environmental philosophy, and if so, in what ways and with what transformations, has been subject to considerable debate in recent years. I will begin by discussing some reservations regarding deconstruction’s relevance to environmental thought, and argue that they stem from an older misreading of Derrida’s work in particular as hostile to the natural sciences, and as a cultural textualism of relevance only to the interiority of a traditional canon, but unable to reach the materiality of (...) the outside environment. This attempt at refutation will permit a better understanding of the deconstructive argument for what has been called an ‘originary environmentality’ of life. On this basis, I seek to argue that deconstruction tends to be most promising to environmental questions when it shows responses to the call, not primarily for a new ethics, but for far-ranging analyses of our conception of politics. The reason for this lies in the overall deconstructive goal of exposing political and legal sovereignty, including its modern democratic understanding, to what I will elaborate as contextual or environmental finitude. (shrink)

Religionen sind auf vielfaltige, oft widerspruchliche Weise in offentliche Diskurse und politische Prozesse zuruckgekehrt. Sie spielen heute fast in allen Regionen und auch auf globaler Ebene eine wichtige Rolle. Andererseits sind religiose Fundamentalismen oder die politische Instrumentalisierung von Religionen in Konflikten bedrohliche Phanomene, die sich weltweit ausbreiten. So ambivalent wie die Religionen ist auch die Moderne. Die klassische, westliche Moderne mit ihrer Orientierung an selbstverantwortlicher Gestaltung der Welt, Demokratie und Menschenrechten ist fragwurdig geworden: Desorientierung und globale soziale, okonomische wie okologische (...) Ungleichgewichte gehen mit ihr einher. In der Suche nach dem eigenen Pfad der Moderne entstehen vielfaltige Gegenbewegungen. Die Beitrage thematisieren dieses ambivalente Verhaltnis von Religion und der umstrittenen Moderne. (shrink)

Philons Biographie Abrahams ist eine Werbeschrift fur das Judentum. Sie entstand vermutlich als literarisches Begleitprojekt zu Philons politischer Mission in Rom: In Alexandria waren Ausschreitungen gegen die judische Bevolkerung erfolgt, die Philon bei Kaiser Caligula zur Sprache bringen sollte. Der vorliegende Band fuhrt in diesen zeitgeschichtlichen Kontext ein und bietet den mit Anmerkungen versehenen Text der Schrift samt einer Neuubersetzung. Erlauternde Essays aus unterschiedlichen Fachperspektiven wurdigen Philon als Biograph und als Philosoph, ergrunden sein Tugendverstandnis und sein Frauenbild und beleuchten sein (...) Schriftverstandnis aus der Perspektive des antiken Orakelwesens. Abgerundet wird der Band durch einen Ausblick auf die Rezeption Abrahams im Islam, bei der sich bemerkenswerte Parallelen zu Philons allegorischen Auslegungen wiederfinden lassen. (shrink)

Der Band geht den zahlreichen Verbindungslinien von Erziehung und Philosophie in Geschichte und Gegenwart nach. Neben exemplarischen Auseinandersetzungen mit einzelnen Denker: innen von Seneca über Locke und Rousseau bis hin zu Jaspers und Foucault stehen grundlegende Aspekte möglicher Überschneidungen und Kontinuitäten zwischen Erziehungsphilosophie, philosophischer Pädagogik, Anthropologie und anderen Teil- oder Fachdisziplinen im Mittelpunkt der Beiträge. Ergänzt wird der Band durch tentative Ausblicke auf die Zukunft der Erziehungsphilosophie unter den sich verändernden Vorzeichen globaler Herausforderungen.

In the context of current environmental crises, which threaten to seriously harm living conditions for future generations, liberal-capitalist democracies have been accused of inherent short-termism, that is, of favouring the currently living at the expense of mid- to long-term sustainability. I will review some of the reasons for this short-termism as well as proposals as to how best to represent future people in today’s democratic decision-making. I will then present some ideas of my own as to how to reconceive the (...) idea of democracy and the responsibilities of citizenship in the face of increasing obligations to sustain both the environment and democratic institutions for future people. I argue that taking turns between governing and governed is a key dimension of democracy, and that it implies in-principle consent to others governing after my turn, including future generations. Thus, future people must be better represented than they generally are today, in particular when democratic institutions find themselves squeezed between an overburdened environment in which they are embedded, and a fast-paced and short-termist globalizing economy. (shrink)

This paper proposes a concept of justice for future people that is mindful of Indigenous critiques of the so-called »Anthropocene«. I first review these critiques, which suggest that motivating pro-futural care by dreading an impending climate crisis tends to betray a privileged, often settler-colonial perspective. The beneficiaries of colonialism now have the »luxury« of viewing the environmental crisis as one that lies mostly in the future, while many Indigenous communities have been living with such a crisis for a long time. (...) I then review various Indigenous accounts of intergenerational relations, in which I find the wide-spread claim that present generations owe to descendants because they received gifts from ancestors as well as the land. I elaborate this view as what I call asymmetrical reciprocity among generations. The final section argues that this view can help to demarginalize the future: above all, by disallowing a linear view of time according to which a focus on the future permits the neglect of the past. Hence, climate ethics and intergenerational justice must face the history of colonialism. (shrink)