ZusammenfassungDerzeit gibt es in Österreich kein in allen Bundesländern einheitlich etabliertes Betreuungsmodell eines „Heimarztes“ für Pflegeheime. Im Bundesland Wien werden seit mehr als 100 Jahren chronisch Kranke und hochgradig pflegebedürftige Menschen in den städtischen Pflegeeinrichtungen und in einigen Institutionen geistlicher Träger rund um die Uhr von angestellten geriatrisch versierten ÄrztInnen betreut. Die Rechtsform dieser Häuser entspricht prinzipiell der einer „Pflegeanstalt für Chronisch Kranke“ nach dem Österreichischen Krankenanstaltengesetz. Aber auch andere Träger in Wien und Niederösterreich beschäftigen angestellte ÄrztInnen an Bettenstationen von (...) Pflege- und Wohnheimen. Der Bedarf nach einer kontinuierlichen, fachlich spezialisierten ärztlichen Betreuung ergibt sich vor allem aus der Notwendigkeit der Therapie psychiatrischer Erkrankungen im hohen Alter mit Psychopharmaka, der komplexen Multimorbidität und Polypharmazie, sowie aus dem Bedarf nach rehabilitativen Maßnahmen bzw. palliativer Begleitung am Lebensende. Mit dieser Aufgabenstellung sind geriatrisch nicht adäquat ausgebildete bzw. nicht in den Pflegeheimen integrierte ÄrztInnen häufig überfordert. Die Konsequenzen davon sind häufige Spitalseinweisungen bzw. suboptimale ärztliche Betreuung. Als notwendige Maßnahmen zur Qualitätssicherung in geriatrischen Pflegeeinrichtungen ist daher bundesweit die Implementierung von qualifizierten HeimärztInnen nach niederländischem Vorbild zu fordern. (shrink)

Oft wird nur jenes anerkannt, was "wissenschaftlich beweisbar" ist. Ein solches Vorurteil vergisst, dass es auch andere Wirklichkeiten gibt. Ist unsere Welt ein Blick durch ein Kaleidoskop? Wie kann es sein, dass man eine mehr oder minder große Auswahl panoramenhafter Wirklichkeiten vor sich hat? Ist es möglich, solche Wirklichkeiten zu verlassen und in andere überzuwechseln? Anhand konkreter Beispiele wird dieser Wirklichkeits-Pluralismus beleuchtet. Das erste Beispiel, ein astronomisches, zeigt in aller Ausführlichkeit, auf welche Weise Wirklichkeit entstehen kann. Dann ist von anderen (...) naturwissenschaftlichen Wirklichkeiten die Rede, vom Licht und von der Farbe sowie von einer fremden heilkundlichen Wirklichkeit. Ein zentrales Anliegen von Gerhard Fasching ist ein Denken, welches in einen Wirklichkeitspluralismus mündet. Unser monokulturelles Wirklichkeitsverständnis hat nämlich schon viele Wirklichkeiten unserer eigenen Kultur und fremder Kulturen missachtet und dadurch verloren. Unser humanistisches Weltbild benötigt also ein breiteres Fundament. Das Buch findet zu einem überraschenden Ergebnis: Man selbst gehört nicht zur Wirklichkeit, sondern man steht stets außerhalb jeder Wirklichkeit. GERHARD FASCHING. Geb. 1933 in Wien, Univ.-Prof. Dipl.-Ing. Dr. techn., 1966 Habilitation, seit 1970 Ordinarius an der Technischen Universität Wien, Österreich. Er hält Vorlesungen über Aufbau und Eigenschaften der Materie und über Fragen der Erkenntnistheorie. HANS-PETER DÜRR. Em. Univ.-Prof., Direktor em. am Max-Planck-Institut für Physik, München, Deutschland. Träger des Alternativen Nobelpreises. (shrink)

Background Big data and AI applications now play a major role in many health contexts. Much research has already been conducted on ethical and social challenges associated with these technologies. Likewise, there are already some studies that investigate empirically which values and attitudes play a role in connection with their design and implementation. What is still in its infancy, however, is the comparative investigation of the perspectives of different stakeholders. Methods To explore this issue in a multi-faceted manner, we conducted (...) semi-structured interviews as well as focus group discussions with patients and clinicians. These empirical methods were used to gather interviewee’s views on the opportunities and challenges of medical AI and other data-intensive applications. Results Different clinician and patient groups are exposed to medical AI to differing degrees. Interviewees expect and demand that the purposes of data processing accord with patient preferences, and that data are put to effective use to generate social value. One central result is the shared tendency of clinicians and patients to maintain individualistic ascriptions of responsibility for clinical outcomes. Conclusions Medical AI and the proliferation of data with import for health-related inferences shape and partially reconfigure stakeholder expectations of how these technologies relate to the decision-making of human agents. Intuitions about individual responsibility for clinical outcomes could eventually be disrupted by the increasing sophistication of data-intensive and AI-driven clinical tools. Besides individual responsibility, systemic governance will be key to promote alignment with stakeholder expectations in AI-driven and data-intensive health settings. (shrink)

The book presents the first comprehensive survey of limits of the intentional control of action from an interdisciplinary perspective. It brings together leading scholars from philosophy, psychology, and the law to elucidate this theoretically and practically important topic from a variety of theoretical and disciplinary approaches. It provides reflections on conceptual foundations as well as a wealth of empirical data and will be a valuable resource for students and researchers alike. Among the authors: Clancy Blair, Todd S. Braver, Michael W. (...) Cole, Anika Fäsche, Maayan Davidov, Peter Gollwitzer, Kai Robin Grzyb, Tobias Heikamp, Gabriele Oettingen, Rachel McKinnon, Nachschon Meiran, Hans Christian Röhl, Michael Schmitz, John R. Searle, Gottfried Seebaß, Gisela Trommsdorff, Felix Thiede, J. Lukas Thürmer, Frank Wieber. (shrink)

Many spiritual traditions employ certain mental techniques (meditation) which consist in inhibiting mental activity whilst nonetheless remaining fully conscious, which is supposed to lead to a realisation of one’s own true nature prior to habitual self-substantialisation. In this paper I propose that this practice can be understood as a special means of becoming aware of consciousness itself as such. To explain this claim I conduct some phenomenologically oriented considerations about the nature of consciousness qua presence and the problem of self-presence (...) of this presence. (shrink)

The central thesis of the philosophy of Advaita Vedānta is the doctrine of the identity of brahman and ātman. Brahman is essentially sat, being as such in the sense of the dimension of existence in which all worldly goings-on take place. The ātman is conceived as the “seer,” i.e., as the pure subject qua the to-whom of any experiential givenness; and this subject, in turn, is understood not as some entity that performs the seeing but as nothing but the very (...) seeing itself, i.e., as consciousness in the sense of the abiding presence-realm in which permanently changing experiential contents come to givenness. The Advaitic thesis is that this presence-realm—the seeing that takes place “in us”—is ultimately nothing other than the universal being-dimension—brahman—itself, modified by the mental contents of an innerworldly individual. This paper attempts to vindicate this doctrine by a series of reflections on the nature of the I and of reality as such. It argues that Advaita Vedānta can be viewed as a version of cosmopsychism in its idealist version which does not view consciousness as one of the features of the cosmos as a whole, but as its exclusive intrinsic nature, i.e., as the very essence of being as such. (shrink)

For Advaita Vedānta, consciousness is to be distinguished from all contents of consciousness that might be introspectively detectable: It is precisely consciousness of whatever contents it is conscious of and not itself one of these contents. Its only nature is, Advaita holds, prakāśa ; in itself it is devoid of any content or structure and can never become an object. This paper elaborates on this kind of understanding of consciousness in order to next explain why it might be fruitful for (...) developing a clear understanding of the nature of the so-called problem of consciousness. Today’s philosophy of mind tends to conceive of consciousness in terms of qualia, thereby taking it as a special kind of object. This renders the antimaterialist claim of the distinctness of consciousness from all physical features vulnerable to the materialist reply that the difference in question might be a merely epistemological matter, i.e., a matter of different modes of givenness without difference in what is thus given. This move, however – this paper argues –, is impossible without resulting in circularity or infinite regress with regard to consciousness in the sense of givenness itself. (shrink)

In this paper I discuss the nature of the “I” (or “self”) and whether it is presupposed by the very existence of conscious experiences (as that which “has” them) or whether it is, instead, in some way constituted by them. I argue for the former view and try to show that the very nature of experience implies a non-constituted synchronic and diachronic transcendence of the experiencing “I” with regard to its experiences, an “I” which defies any objective characterization. Finally I (...) suggest that the self, though irreducible to inter-experiential relations, is not a “separately existing entity”, but should be conceived of as a dimension , namely the dimension of first-personal manifestation of the experiences. (shrink)

I have a clear idea of what it means that I have experiences in the past or future, and it does not seem to mean that experiences take place that possess certain content-characteristics, but simply and irreducibly thatIexperience them – i.e. that they are, at the time of their occurrence, experientially presentto me–, whatever their contents may be. So the central question regarding personal identity is: What is this “I”to whomthe experiences are present, and what is the nature of its (...) identity across changing experiences? Following Zahavi, I suggest that the subject is not to be conceived as a merely postulated trans-experiential entity but has its very being in experiential presence itself. Yet the question is how to conceive of this presence. When we understand it as a property or quality of the experiences (as Zahavi seems to do), the problem is that every experience that has ever been experienced possesses this property, and so it cannot account for what it means that some experiences are experiencedby meand not some other subject. In contrast, I suggest (following Klawonn’s “I-dimension” theory) understanding experiential presence not as a property of the experiences but as a dimension which is able to comprise many experiences and to abide as identical through their change – an idea that can also be found in some formulations of Zahavi’s, but which he does not distinguish with the necessary clarity from the quality account. (shrink)

Though others have surveyed the different methods in comparative religious ethics, relatively little attention has been given to different approaches to pedagogy. The field of comparative religious ethics has now reached a level of maturity so that there are a variety of ways such courses can be taught. In this review I consider the approaches to comparative religious ethics found in four recent texts by Jacob Neusner, Darrell Fasching and Dell deChant, Regina Wolfe and Christine Gudorf, and Sumner Twiss (...) and Bruce Grelle. In the essay I note the strengths and weaknesses of each text, with special attention given to how the texts might work in the classroom. I then argue that the different texts reflect different understandings of the goal of teaching comparative religious ethics, and I make these goals explicit in order to help teachers decide how they might approach the teaching in this growing field. (shrink)

This volume powerfully examines divides and mistrust between urban communities and police. The essays challenge readers to contemplate how eroding trust developed, the concerns and challenges facing divided communities, and possible pathways forward considering whose lives matter.

This popular textbook has been thoroughly revised and updated to reflect recent global developments, whilst retaining its unique and compelling narrative-style approach. Using ancient stories from diverse religions, it explores a broad range of important and complex moral issues, resulting in a truly reader-friendly and comparative introduction to religious ethics. A thoroughly revised and expanded new edition of this popular textbook, yet retains the unique narrative-style approach which has proved so successful with students Considers the ways in which ancient stories (...) from diverse religions, such as the Bhagavad Gita and the lives of Jesus and Buddha, have provided ethical orientation in the modern world Updated to reflect recent discussions on globalization and its influence on cross-cultural and comparative ethics, economic dimensions to ethics, Gandhian traditions, and global ethics in an age of terrorism Expands coverage of Asian religions, quest narratives, the religious and philosophical approach to ethics in the West, and considers Chinese influences on Thich Nhat Hanh's Zen Buddhism, and Augustine's Confessions Accompanied by an instructor's manual which shows how to use the book in conjunction with contemporary films. (shrink)

The text places special emphasis on the ethical co-operation that emerged between religious traditions during the civil right-Vietnam war era.

In his contribution to this special issue, Almaas is keen to distinguish the individual streams of consciousness from 'pure awareness'. Since the existence of the former is presumably quite uncontroversial in present-day philosophy, I wish to concentrate on the latter, in particular on Almaas's claim that pure awareness is non-individual and ultimately it is 'the true owner of all experiences of all streams'. In my contribution, I wish to make plausible, by a philosophical reflection on the puzzling nature of the (...) I, that the ultimate subject of experience is indeed not the individual but 'the pure ego of the universe'. (shrink)

We consider an extension of Gödel logic by a unary operator that enables the addition of non-negative reals to truth-values. Although its propositional fragment has a simple proof system, first-order validity is Π2-hard. We explain the close connection to Scarpellini’s result on Π2-hardness of Łukasiewicz’s logic.

Confronts the Janus-faced myth of technology as both the object of dread and the source of hope, which leads both to the demonic final solution and to the merciful, healing sacrifice.

This book critically examines nine pre-service teacher candidates, and the author’s experience, to explore the ways in which white educators manifest understandings of white racial identity and professional choice through oral narratives. Ultimately the text proposes a new, non-developmental model for thinking about white racial identity.

This volume provides a concentrated and powerful dialog about the nexus between schools, prisons, and the free-market economy where youth are on fast tracks from schools to prisons.

This paper discusses the nature of consciousness’ intrinsic intentionality from a transcendental-phenomenological viewpoint. In recent philosophy of mind the essentially intentional character of consciousness has become obscured because the latter is predominantly understood in terms of “qualia” or the “what-it-is-like-ness” of mental states and it is hard to see why such subjective “feels”, of all things, could bestow states with objective reference. As the paper attempts to demonstrate, this is an inadequate understanding of consciousness, which should instead be defined in (...) terms of presence. Consciousness essentially takes place as presence-of, i.e., consists in something coming to appearance. This presence-of is not only a fundamental, irreducible phenomenon, but also in a radical sense un-naturalisable. Naturalism only knows “nature”, as the world of objects, and the question of intentionality then seems to be how certain inner-worldly objects can be “representations” of other inner-worldly objects. In fact, no object is ever intrinsically “about” anything. This is exclusively the nature of subjectivity qua consciousness, which is not an object alongside other objects but rather exists as the manifestation of objects. (shrink)

Racial Battle Fatigue is described as the physical and psychological toll taken due to constant and unceasing discrimination, microagressions, and stereotype threat. This edited volume looks at RBF from the perspectives of graduate students, middle level academics, and chief diversity officers at major institutions of learning.

Witnessed Gödel logics are based on the interpretation of () by minimum instead of supremum . Witnessed Gödel logics appear for many practical purposes more suited than usual Gödel logics as the occurrence of proper infima/suprema is practically irrelevant. In this note we characterize witnessed Gödel logics with absoluteness operator w.r.t. witnessed Gödel logics using a uniform translation.

Recent decades have witnessed tremendous progress in artificial intelligence and in the development of autonomous systems that rely on artificial intelligence. Critics, however, have pointed to the difficulty of allocating responsibility for the actions of an autonomous system, especially when the autonomous system causes harm or damage. The highly autonomous behavior of such systems, for which neither the programmer, the manufacturer, nor the operator seems to be responsible, has been suspected to generate responsibility gaps. This has been the cause of (...) much concern. In this article, I propose a more optimistic view on artificial intelligence, raising two challenges for responsibility gap pessimists. First, proponents of responsibility gaps must say more about when responsibility gaps occur. Once we accept a difficult-to-reject plausibility constraint on the emergence of such gaps, it becomes apparent that the situations in which responsibility gaps occur are unclear. Second, assuming that responsibility gaps occur, more must be said about why we should be concerned about such gaps in the first place. I proceed by defusing what I take to be the two most important concerns about responsibility gaps, one relating to the consequences of responsibility gaps and the other relating to violations of jus in bello. (shrink)

Science depends on judgments of the bearing of evidence on theory. Scientists must judge whether an observation or the result of an experiment supports, disconfirms, or is simply irrelevant to a given hypothesis. Similarly, scientists may judge that, given all the available evidence, a hypothesis ought to be accepted as correct or nearly so, rejected as false, or neither. Occasionally, these evidential judgments can be make on deductive grounds. If an experimental result strictly contradicts a hypothesis, then the truth of (...) the evidence deductively entails the falsity of the hypothesis. In the great majority of cases, however, the connection between evidence and hypothesis is nondemonstrative or inductive. In particular, this is so whenever a general hypothesis is inferred to be correct on the basis of the available data, since the truth of the data will not deductively entail the truth of the hypothesis. It always remains possible that the hypothesis is false even though the data are correct. (shrink)

It is argued that it is not sufficient to consider only the sentences included in the explanans and explanandum when determining whether they constitute an explanation, but these sentences must always be evaluated relative to a knowledge situation. The central criterion on an explanation is that the explanans in a non-trivial way increases the belief value of the explanandum, where the belief value of a sentence is determined from the given knowledge situation. The outlined theory of explanations is applied to (...) some well-known examples and is also compared to other theories of explanation. (shrink)

In der 1970 gegründeten Reihe erscheinen Arbeiten, die philosophiehistorische Studien mit einem systematischen Ansatz oder systematische Studien mit philosophiehistorischen Rekonstruktionen verbinden. Neben deutschsprachigen werden auch englischsprachige Monographien veröffentlicht. Gründungsherausgeber sind: Erhard Scheibe (Herausgeber bis 1991), Günther Patzig (bis 1999) und Wolfgang Wieland (bis 2003). Von 1990 bis 2007 wurde die Reihe von Jürgen Mittelstraß mitherausgegeben.

Michael Hand's recent paper, ‘Religious Upbringing Reconsidered', re-opens a debate that was flourishing over a decade ago in this journal and, long before that, in the works of others. In this response I examine Hand's claims that earlier contributions to the debate passed over the central problem and that he can solve that problem. I endeavour to show that several of Hand's arguments, such as those dealing with indoctrination, as well as his claims may be flawed, that the relevance of (...) his inquiries is open to question, but that his hidden and, apparently, unacknowledged agenda should not remain hidden or passed over. (shrink)

This essay examines Adorno's notoriously puzzling concept of metaphysical experience with special attention to Adorno's remarks on the concept in his 1965 lecture‐course, “Metaphysics: Concepts and Problems.” The essay argues that the concept of metaphysical experience is best understood in the light of Adorno's philosophical critique of metaphysics in the traditional sense. It was Adorno's view that in the age of modern catastrophe, the category of traditional metaphysics (as theorized chiefly by Aristotle, Plato, and Empedocles) could no longer retain its (...) validity, and the notion of “experience” itself was withering away. Adorno concluded that metaphysics in the modern era would have to be reconceived as a category of loss that reflected the damage that had been done to human life. “Metaphysical experience” attached itself especially to special places or childhood memories, even while such privileged experiences also reflected the disappointment and imperfection that marks all experiences today. (shrink)

Guido Melchior’s important and rich book (Melchior _Knowing and Checking. __An Epistemological Investigation_ 2019 ) draws our attention to the much neglected topic of checking. There are many new leads to follow. Here, I will pick a few that seem to me to allow the most room for discussion and disagreement: the alleged modal profile of checking (Sect. 1), the contrastive aspects of checking (Sect. 2), and the relation of checking to closure (Sect. 3). I will end with two smaller (...) points worth bringing up here (Sect. 4). (shrink)

In recent years there has been a robust but inconclusive debate over the existence and nature of indeterminacy in the world as described by quantum mechanics. I suggest that the inconclusive nature of the debate stems from starting from a metaphysical theory of indeterminacy. I propose instead framing the issue as a Carnapian explication project: start with the informal notion of indeterminacy used by physicists, and consider how best to make that concept precise. I defend a precisification based on von (...) Neumann’s interpretation of quantum states, and consider the nature of the indeterminacy that results. (shrink)

The understanding of conditioned co‐arising is central to Buddhist practice and development. This chapter presents the principle of conditionality, which can be applied to all processes, events, and things, physical or mental, in the universe. Besides explaining the origin of dukkha, the conditioned co‐arising formula also explains karma, rebirth, and the functioning of personality, all without the need to invoke a permanent self. Buddhism sees the basic root of the pain and stress of life as spiritual ignorance, rather than sin. (...) The between‐lives period has three phases: inclining to a further rebirth, seeking it here and there, and falling from one's previous identity into a new rebirth. In the Mahāyāna movement, various uses were made of the conditioned co‐arising. As a general point on conditioned co‐arising, it should be noted that it presents a “middle” way of understanding that echoes the Buddhist path as a “middle way” of practice. (shrink)

In what is portrayed as Buddha's first sermon, the Dhamma‐cakka‐ppavatana Sutta (DCPS), the Buddha highlighted four key aspects or dimensions of existence to which one needs to become attuned so as to become deeply spiritually transformed and end dukkha. Though the DCPS emphasizes dukkha, this is in fact only one of three related characteristics or “marks” of the five khandhas. These “three marks” of all conditioned phenomena are that they are impermanent, painful, and non‐Self. Buddhism emphasizes that change and impermanence (...) are fundamental features of everything. The Four True Realities for the Spiritually Ennobled and statements which point to these realities, such as “This is dukkha,” form the structural framework for all higher teachings of early Buddhism. (shrink)

Spirituality and spiritual well-being are connected with many areas of human life. Thus, especially in secular countries, there is a need for reliable validated instruments for measuring spirituality. The Spiritual Well-Being Scale is among the world’s most often used tools; therefore, the aim of this study was its psychometrical evaluation in the secular environment of the Czech Republic on a nationally representative sample (n = 1797, mean age: 45.9 ± 17.67; 48.6% men). A non-parametric comparison of different sociodemographic groups showed (...) a higher disposition for experiencing spirituality among women, older people, and divorced persons. Based on confirmatory factor analysis, negatively worded items were excluded using a polychoric correlation matrix. The new version of the scale consisting of 11 items had good internal consistency (Cronbach’s α = 0.85; McDonald’s ωt = 0.91). The two-factor model of this shortened version, with factors corresponding to the Religious and the Existential subscales of the Spiritual Well-Being Scale, shows a satisfactory fit with the data, where the loadings of all items ranged from medium to high. Thus, this study offered a new version of the tool, convenient for measuring spiritual well-being in secular conditions. (shrink)

This chapter is intended to provide the reader with a brief biographical overview of Adorno's life and thought, with an emphasis on the key turning points in his career. It discusses his childhood, his education in Frankfurt, his musical studies, his emigration first to Oxford and then to the United States, his return to Germany after the Second World War, his tenure as professor at the Goethe Universität Frankfurt and his prominence as a public intellectual, and his confrontation with students. (...) Together with biographical details the chapter also offers a simple overview of Adorno's major concerns as a philosopher. (shrink)