This article highlights the limitations of typicality accounts of thermodynamic behavior so as to promote an alternative line of research: understanding and accounting for the success of the techniques and equations physicists use to model the behavior of systems that begin away from equilibrium. This article also takes steps in this promising direction. It examines a technique commonly used to model the behavior of an important kind of system: a Brownian particle that has been introduced to an isolated fluid at (...) equilibrium. It also accounts for the success of the model, by identifying and grounding the technique’s key assumptions. (shrink)

Scientific models are frequently discussed in philosophy of science. A great deal of the discussion is centred on approximation, idealisation, and on how these models achieve their representational function. Despite the importance, distinct nature, and high presence of toy models, they have received little attention from philosophers. This paper hopes to remedy this situation. It aims to elevate the status of toy models: by distinguishing them from approximations and idealisations, by highlighting and elaborating on several ways the Kac ring, a (...) simple statistical mechanical model, is used as a toy model, and by explaining why toy models can be used to successfully carry out important work without performing a representational function. (shrink)

I highlight that the aim of using statistical mechanics to underpin irreversible processes is, strictly speaking, ambiguous. Traditionally, however, the task of underpinning irreversible processes has been thought to be synonymous with underpinning the Second Law of thermodynamics. I claim that contributors to the foundational discussion are best interpreted as aiming to provide a microphysical justification of the Minus First Law, despite the ways their aims are often stated. I suggest that contributors should aim at accounting for both the Minus (...) First Law and Second Law. (shrink)

A new layer of complexity, constituted of networks of information token recurrence, has been identified in socio-technical systems such as the Wikipedia online community and the Zooniverse citizen science platform. The identification of this complexity reveals that our current understanding of the actual structure of those systems, and consequently the structure of the entire World Wide Web, is incomplete, which raises novel questions for data science research but also from the perspective of social epistemology. Here we establish the principled foundations (...) and practical advantages of analyzing information diffusion within and across Web systems with Transcendental Information Cascades, and outline resulting directions for future study in the area of socio-technical systems. We also suggest that Transcendental Information Cascades may be applicable to any kind of time-evolving system that can be observed using digital technologies, and that the structures found in such systems comprise properties common to all naturally occurring complex systems. (shrink)

Motivated by the significant amount of successful collaborative problem solving activity on the Web, we ask: Can the accumulated information propagation behavior on the Web be conceived as a giant machine, and reasoned about accordingly? In this paper we elaborate a thesis about the computational capability embodied in information sharing activities that happen on the Web, which we term socio-technical computation, reflecting not only explicitly conditional activities but also the organic potential residing in information on the Web.

This paper suggests that some climate denialism is bullshit. Those who spread it do not display a proper concern for the truth. This paper also shows that this bullshit is harmful in some significant ways. It undermines the epistemic demands imposed on us by what we care about, by the social roles we occupy, and by morality. It is also harmful because it corrodes epistemic trust.

This thesis makes the issue of reconciling the existence of thermodynamically irreversible processes with underlying reversible dynamics clear, so as to help explain what philosophers mean when they say that an aim of nonequilibrium statistical mechanics is to underpin aspects of thermodynamics. Many of the leading attempts to reconcile the existence of thermodynamically irreversible processes with underlying reversible dynamics proceed by way of discussions that attempt to underpin the following qualitative facts: (i) that isolated macroscopic systems that begin away from (...) equilibrium spontaneously approach equilibrium, and (ii) that they remain in equilibrium for incredibly long periods of time. These attempts standardly appeal to phase space considerations and notions of typicality. This thesis considers and evaluates leading typicality accounts, and, in particular, highlights their limitations. Importantly, these accounts do not underpin a large and important set of facts. They do not, for example, underpin facts about the rates in which systems approach equilibrium, or facts about the kinds of states they pass through on their way to equilibrium, or facts about fluctuation phenomena. To remedy these and other shortfalls, this thesis promotes an alternative, and arguably more important, line of research: understanding and accounting for the success of the techniques and equations physicists use to model the behaviour of systems that begin away from equilibrium. Accounting for their success would help underpin not just the qualitative facts the literature has focused on, but also many of the important quantitative facts that typicality accounts cannot. This thesis also takes steps in this promising direction. It outlines and examines a technique commonly used to model the behaviour of an interesting and important kind of system: a Brownian particle that's been introduced to an isolated homogeneous fluid at equilibrium. As this thesis highlights, the technique returns a wealth of quantitative and qualitative information. This thesis also attempts to account for the success of the model and technique, by identifying and grounding the technique's key assumptions. (shrink)

This article highlights and discusses the Ehrenfests’ use of toy models to explore irreversibility in statistical mechanics. In particular, we explore their urn and P–Q models and highlight that, while the former was primarily used to provide a simple counter-example to Zermelo’s objection to Boltzmann’s statistical mechanical underpinning of the Second Law of Thermodynamics, the latter was intended to highlight the role and importance of the Stoßzahlansatz as a cause of the tendency of systems to exhibit entropy increase. We also (...) explain the sense in which these models are toy models and why agents can use them, as the Ehrenfests’ did, to carry out this important work, despite the fact that they do not represent any real system. (shrink)

We report three studies in which we applied a value dictionary to narratives. Our objective was to test a theory-driven value dictionary for extracting valuable information from autobiographical and narrative texts. In Studies 1 and 2, participants wrote short autobiographical narratives and in Study 3, participants wrote narratives based on ambiguous stimuli. Participants in all three studies also completed the Portrait Value Questionnaire as a self-report measure of values. Overall, our results demonstrate that it is possible to extract value-relevant information (...) from these narratives. Extracted values from autobiographical narratives showed average correlations of 0.07 and 0.12 with self-reports compared to an average correlation of 0.01 for the extracted values from implicit motive tasks. The correlations with self-reports were in line with previous validation studies. The most salient values in narratives diverged somewhat, with a stronger emphasis on achievement values compared to self-reports, probably due to the nature of salient episodes within one's life that require demonstrating success according to social standards. Benevolence values were consistently most important in both self-ratings and text-based scoring. The value structure emerging from narratives diverged from the theoretically predicted structure, yet broad personally vs. socially focused value dimensions were qualitatively discernible. We highlight opportunities and challenges for future value research using autobiographical stories. (shrink)

Next SectionBackground Scientific papers are retracted for many reasons including fraud (data fabrication or falsification) or error (plagiarism, scientific mistake, ethical problems). Growing attention to fraud in the lay press suggests that the incidence of fraud is increasing. Methods The reasons for retracting 742 English language research papers retracted from the PubMed database between 2000 and 2010 were evaluated. Reasons for retraction were initially dichotomised as fraud or error and then analysed to determine specific reasons for retraction. Results Error was (...) more common than fraud (73.5% of papers were retracted for error (or an undisclosed reason) vs 26.6% retracted for fraud). Eight reasons for retraction were identified; the most common reason was scientific mistake in 234 papers (31.5%), but 134 papers (18.1%) were retracted for ambiguous reasons. Fabrication (including data plagiarism) was more common than text plagiarism. Total papers retracted per year have increased sharply over the decade (r=0.96; p<0.001), as have retractions specifically for fraud (r=0.89; p<0.001). Journals now reach farther back in time to retract, both for fraud (r=0.87; p<0.001) and for scientific mistakes (r=0.95; p<0.001). Journals often fail to alert the naïve reader; 31.8% of retracted papers were not noted as retracted in any way. Conclusions Levels of misconduct appear to be higher than in the past. This may reflect either a real increase in the incidence of fraud or a greater effort on the part of journals to police the literature. However, research bias is rarely cited as a reason for retraction. (shrink)

We discuss five kinds of representations of rationales and provide a formal account of how they can alter disputation. The formal model of disputation is derived from recent work in argument. The five kinds of rationales are compilation rationales, which can be represented without assuming domain-knowledge (such as utilities) beyond that normally required for argument. The principal thesis is that such rationales can be analyzed in a framework of argument not too different from what AI already has. The result is (...) a formal understanding of rationales, a partial taxonomy, and a foundation for computer programs that represent and reason with rationales.The five kinds of rationales are as follows: (c)ompression and (s)pecialization, which yield rules, and (d)isputation, which yields a decision. These are modeled as potentially changing the focus of the dispute. Then there are (f)it, a rationale for rules, and (r)esolution, a rationale for decisions. These cannot be modeled as simply; they force disputation to a meta-level, at least temporarily. (shrink)

The death of Imre Lakatos on February 2, 1974 was a personal and philosophical loss to the worldwide circle of his friends, colleagues and students. This volume reflects the range of his interests in mathematics, logic, politics and especially in the history and methodology of the sciences. Indeed, Lakatos was a man in search of rationality in all of its forms. He thought he had found it in the historical development of scientific knowledge, yet he also saw rationality endangered everywhere. (...) To honor Lakatos is to honor his sharp and aggressive criticism as well as his humane warmth and his quick wit. He was a person to love and to struggle with. PAUL K. FEYERABEND ROBERT S. COHEN MARX W. WARTOFSKY TABLE OF CONTENTS Preface VII JOHN WORRALL / Imre Lakatos : Philosopher of Mathematics and Philosopher of Science JOSEPH AGASSI / The Lakatosian Revolution 9 23 D. M. ARMSTRONG / Immediate Perception w. W. BAR TLEY, III/On Imre Lakatos 37 WILLIAM BERKSON / Lakatos One and Lakatos Two: An Appreciation 39 I. B. COHEN / William Whewell and the Concept of Scientific Revolution 55 L. JONATHAN COHEN / How Can One Testimony Corroborate Another? 65 R. S. COHEN / Constraints on Science 79 GENE D'AMOUR/ Research Programs, Rationality, and Ethics 87 YEHUDA ELKANA / Introduction: Culture, Cultural System and Science 99 PA UL K. (shrink)

In Sinners in the Presence of a Loving God, R. Zachary Manis examines in detail the several facets of the problem of hell, considers the reasons why the usual responses to the problem are unsatisfying, and suggests how an adequate solution to the problem can be constructed.

This paper is an extended exploration of Mead's phrase the emergence of the novel. I describe and characterize emergent systems-complex dynamical systems that display behavior that cannot be predicted from a full and complete description of the component units of the system. Emergence has become an influential concept in contemporary cognitive science [A. Clark Being there, Cambridge: MIT Press], complexity theory [W. Bechtel & R.C. Richardson Discovering complexity, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press], artificial life [R.A. Brooks & P. Maes Artificial (...) life IV, Cambridge: MIT Press; C.G. Langton Artificial life III, Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley; C.G. Langton et al. Artificial life II, Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley), and robotics [S. Forrest Emergent computation, Cambridge: MIT Press]. I propose that novelty is a necessary property of emergent systems, and I'll explore a specific kind of emergent system: an improvisational theater ensemble. This is an example of emergence in a small social group, which I call collaborative emergence to emphasize several important contrasts with other complex systems that manifest emergence, such as connectionist networks and Alife simulations. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:What Emotional Responding Is to Blame It Might Not Be to ResponsibilityR. J. R. Blair (bio)Keywordsblame, responsibility, emotional responses, psychopathyIn this interesting paper, Levy argues that by failing the moral/conventional distinction task (Blair 1995), individuals with psychopathy show a fundamental inability to categorize moral harms and as such their moral responsibility for their actions is reduced. He argues that, although we might still wish to incarcerate such individuals to (...) prevent them inflicting further harm on others, we should be less enthusiastic to blame them for their actions.In many respects, I agree with much of Levy's treatise. I certainly do not regard ascriptions of blame as useful in my own work with this population. I believe that our goal should be to fully understand the nature of their emotional deficit to be able to treat it similarly to other researchers who work to treat other emotional disorders. To me, Levy's argument appears sound.However, I offer three considerations and raise questions within these considerations that might further the debate. First, not all rules involve care-based emotional responses to victims. As Levy notes, this is the origin of the moral/conventional distinction. The problem here is that we do consider someone responsible if they break a conventional transgression. The student talking in class is generally considered blameworthy for this action as long as they knew that the rule of not talking during the lesson applied to that classroom. Yet, there is no victim and no care-based emotional response. Here, the only thing necessary to ascribe blame and responsibility is that the individual knew that a rule exists. Given this holds for conventional transgressions, why must we necessarily make a special case, with respect to responsibility, for moral transgressions?I believe that Levy is fully aware of this concern. He specifically makes reference to moral responsibility and writes that:the kind and degree of wrongness, and therefore blame, which attaches to infringements of the rules [against double parking or line-jumping] is very different, and usually much less significant, than the kind and degree attaching to moral wrongs. For psychopaths, all offences are merely conventional, and therefore—from their point of view—none of them are all that serious.(2007, p. 132)But the danger here is that issues of blame and responsibility may become highly relativistic and hinge on the strength of the emotional reaction. This is a problem because, although we might judge someone as more blameworthy if he intentionally [End Page 149] runs over five people rather than one, do we really consider that there is a distinction in moral responsibility between these two cases? If not, might not responsibility relate to factual knowledge of the existence of the rule against the transgression rather than the emotional response to the transgression?Second, there is considerable debate regarding whether psychopathy represents a taxon or a continuum (e.g., Vasey et al. 2005; Edens et al. 2006). Assuming it does represent a continuum, then we have an additional concern. How little of an emotional response to the transgression reduces one's moral responsibility and blame? Is it only the very reduced (although usually not absent) levels of emotional response that are shown by individuals with psychopathy? Or should we consider moral responsibility and blame proportional to the level of the emotional response? If this latter option is adopted, then what should we do about individuals who show heightened emotional responses, for example, patients with specific anxiety disorders (Rauch, Shin, and Wright 2003)? There are already some data that inhibited children (a developmental precursor to some anxiety disorders; Kagan and Snidman 1999) show heightened conscience development (Asendorpf and Nunner-Winkler 1992). If such children commit moral transgressions, should we regard them as more morally responsible and more blameworthy than regular folks?Third, the issue of intention received little attention in this paper. I have been considered to show a similar lack of attention to intention in the past (Nichols 2002) and, moreover, in some respects the issue was of limited concern given Levy's main goals. However, I mention it because so much of whether we consider someone responsible for their actions and... (shrink)

Using H. Whitney's algebra of physical quantities and his definition of a similarity transformation, a family of similar systems (R. L. Causey [3] and [4]) is any maximal collection of subsets of a Cartesian product of dimensions for which every pair of subsets is related by a similarity transformation. We show that such families are characterized by dimensionally invariant laws (in Whitney's sense, [10], not Causey's). Dimensional constants play a crucial role in the formulation of such laws. They are represented (...) as a function g, known as a system measure, from the family into a certain Cartesian product of dimensions and having the property gφ =φ g for every similarity φ . The dimensions involved in g are related to the family by means of certain stability groups of similarities. A one-to-one system measure is a proportional representing function, which plays an analogous role in Causey's theory, but not conversely. The present results simplify and clarify those of Causey. (shrink)

The old question whether or no the doctrine of ‘intermediate mathematical objects’ ascribed to Plato by Aristotle is to be found in the Divided Line of Republic vi, has been recently raised again in a careful and lucid discussion by Mr. W. F. R. Hardie. I may clear the ground by saying at once that I agree with that part of Mr. Hardie's chapter which deals with those criticisms of the traditional view that have been put forward by Prof. Ferguson (...) and the late Prof. Stocks; nevertheless I do not believe that the objects of the third segment are intermediate between Forms and Sensibles: I propose to argue that they, like the objects of the highest segment, are Forms. (shrink)

Background Developing a framework that illustrates causal relationships and an in-depth comprehension of contextual elements is essential for steering the development of ethical interventions to enhance nurses’ ethical decision-making. Research aim To examine the relationship between cultural competence, professional nursing values, and moral sensitivities of surgical nurses with a mediation analysis and structural equation model. Research design This study is descriptive and correlational. Participants and research context: This study was conducted with a total of 201 surgical nurses from two university (...) hospitals in Konya, Türkiye. Data were gathered face-to-face between June and October 2023 with the Moral Sensitivity Questionnaire (MSQ), Nurses Professional Values Scale-Revised (NPVS-R), and Nurse Cultural Competence Scale (NCCS). Ethical considerations Ethical approval from Necmettin Erbakan University Ethics Committee was obtained (Number: 2023/419). Results In this study, the mean scores for the surgical nurses were as follows: 89.3 ± 19.33 on the MSQ, 113.1 ± 20.74 on the NPVS-R, and 72.06 ± 18.61 on the NCCS. Nurses’ cultural competence level significantly affected their professional nursing values (β = 0.192; p =.007; R2 = 0.04), and their professional nursing values, in turn, had a significant effect on their moral sensitivities (β = −0.363; p <.001; R2 = 0.16). However, it was determined that the direct effect of nurses’ cultural competence level on their moral sensitivity was not statistically significant. In contrast, the indirect effect of nurses’ cultural competence level on their moral sensitivity, mediated by their professional nursing values was seen to be statistically significant (B = −0.070; p =.008). Conclusions This study showed that there is a significant positive relationship between the professional nursing values and cultural competence levels of surgical nurses and that as professional nursing values increase, their moral sensitivity also rises. Sensitivity with higher professional nursing values. Additionally, it was found that nurses’ professional values served as a mediating factor between their levels of cultural competence and moral sensitivity. Therefore, it is crucial to enhance the cultural competence, professional nursing values, and moral sensitivity of nursing students and registered surgical nurses and to improve their reasoning and decision-making skills in ethical dilemmas. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Hume Studies Volume XXI, Number 2, November 1995, pp. 275-287 Virtue, Commerce, and Self-Love R. G. FREY Can economic activity be virtuous? Can the pursuit of commerce and profits be moral? Both Hume and Adam Smith are agreed that Britain will live or die as a trading nation, and trade requires the harvesting or production of goods with which to trade. This in turn requires that people be motivated (...) to harvest or to produce these goods, and neither Hume nor Smith give any evidence of believing that people are motivated by a general love of mankind, an extensive sympathy, or a broadly-encompassing benevolence to produce them. Indeed, quite the opposite appears to be the case: both writers think the pursuit of luxury, wealth, and the general riches of life have much more to do with the harvesting and production of goods for trade than does any widespread, general concern for the well-being of others. And this fact leads straightforwardly to the question I want to consider, namely, whether this kind of what I shall call economic motivation is compatible with moral motivation.1 In Smith, our question can be seen as leading to what is sometimes called the "Adam Smith problem" (which on another occasion I should want to argue is a pseudo-problem). The Theory of Moral Sentiments gives an account of moral motivation in which sympathy and/or benevolence plays an integral role, whereas in The Wealth of Nations self-love is very much to the fore. No remark in Smith is better-known than his statement of this latter position: R. G. Frey is at the Department of Philosophy, Bowling Green State University, 305 Shatzel Hall, Bowling Green OH 43403-0222 USA. e-mail: rfrey@andy.bgsu.edu 276 R. G. Frey It is not from the benevolence of the butcher, the brewer, or the baker, that we expect our dinner, but from their regard to their own interest. We address ourselves, not to their humanity but to their self-love, and never talk to them of our own necessities but of their advantages.2 Now it has sometimes been suggested that the way to solve this problem is to keep economics and ethics separate, to try to confine economic activity to a domain about which, in essence, we do not ask ethical questions. But to most of us this clearly will not do; the whole point is that we do want to ask ethical questions about economic activity. That is, in pursuing their trades, it must be possible for the butcher, brewer, and baker to be acting morally; otherwise, commerce and virtue will be incompatible, and in enjoining us to take up and to pursue the former vigorously Hume and Smith would be advocating immorality. Again, neither writer gives any evidence of taking himself to be advocating any such thing. It must be possible, then, for motivation by selflove to be moral, if a vibrant, prosperous nation is to result from and to propagate further commerce and trade. If the cost of morality is penury and a life of dreadful unhappiness, then while such a life may recommend itself to one consumed with the monkish virtues, it is far from clear that it would recommend itself to the rest of us. I am interested here in Hume and in one possible way of construing his remarks on self-love in An Enquiry Concerning the Principles of Morals.3 But first a few words on Mandeville are necessary, since it is he who sets the terms of the debate over the compatibility of moral and economic motivation. In The Fable of the Bees,4 Mandeville praises vice (or the pursuit of selfinterest ) in the cause of national prosperity and castigates virtue as threatening to undermine prosperity. Employing an egoistic account of man's passions and motivation, he argues that individual pursuit of self-interest or vice produces public benefits. Pride, avarice, and the pursuit of enjoyment, luxury, and the fine things of life create economic activity, jobs, and economic and social opportunities, and these in turn benefit society. His point is that growth of (i) mutually beneficial economic activity, (ii) increases in general... (shrink)

It is immensely difficult to give a philosophically adequate account of mental imagery. Peter F.R. Haynes, pp. 709–19) objects to the standard accounts, and offers one of his own which avoids the standard difficulties. Unfortunately it in turn seems to lapse into incoherence.Haynes rejects Cartesian accounts which would make images private objects in non-physical space. He also rejects current alternative views: both Rylean or behaviourist ones; and also intentionally complex ones, which assert that the relevant terms change their meaning. He (...) thinks that J. J. C. Smart's “topic neutral” approach may supply “the basis for a correct, intentionally simple, intuitively satisfying account of mental imagery”. But an adequate account must also be neutral, as Smart's is not, between different theories of mind. In addition to avoiding these difficulties an adequate theory has certain other desiderata; in particular Haynes places valuable emphasis on the need to explain the fact that we can sometimes mistake images for real perceptions or, more real perceptions for images. (shrink)

For more than thirty years the writings and influence of one man in particular have dominated and directed the field of modern business ethics. We are indebted to two of his fellow‐Americans for this portrait of Richard T. De George. R. Edward Freeman is the Elis and Signe Olsson Professor of Business Administration and Director of the Olsson Center for Ethics at The Darden School, University of Virginia, Charlottesville, VA 22906‐6550; and Martin Calkins, SJ, is a Research Assistant in the (...) Olsson Center and a doctoral student in business ethics at the Darden School. (shrink)

A Brief Description of Neoplatonism R. Baine Harris Old Dominion University There are essentially three ways in which Neoplatonism may be considered to be ...

You would be hard-pressed to find someone who categorically opposes protecting the environment, yet most people would agree that the environmentalist movement has been ineffectual and even misguided. Some argue that its agenda is misplaced, oppressive, and misanthropic—a precursor to intrusive government, regulatory bungles, and economic stagnation. Others point out that its alarmist rhetoric and preservationist solutions are outdated and insufficient to the task of galvanizing support for true reform. In this impassioned and judicious work, R. Bruce Hull argues that (...) environmentalism will never achieve its goals unless it sheds its fundamentalist logic. The movement is too bound up in polarizing ideologies that pit humans against nature, conservation against development, and government regulation against economic growth. Only when we acknowledge the infinite perspectives on how people should relate to nature will we forge solutions that are respectful to both humanity and the environment. Infinite Nature explores some of these myriad perspectives, from the scientific understandings proffered by anthropology, evolution, and ecology, to the promise of environmental responsibility offered by technology and economics, to the designs of nature envisioned in philosophy, law, and religion. Along the way, Hull maintains that the idea of nature is social: in order to reach the common ground where sustainable and thriving communities are possible, we must accept that many natures can and do exist. Incisive, heartfelt, and brimming with practical solutions, Infinite Nature brings a much-needed and refreshing voice to the table of environmental reform. (shrink)

Thomas Hill Green was one of the most influential English thinkers of his time, and he made significant contributions to the development of political liberalism. Much of his career was spent at Balliol College, Oxford: having begun as a student of Jowett, he later acted effectively as his second-in-command at the college. Interested for his whole career in social questions, Green supported the temperance movement, the extension of the franchise, and the admission of women to university education. He became Whyte's (...) professor of moral philosophy at Oxford in 1878, and his lectures had a lasting influence on a generation of students. Much of Volume 1, edited by Green's pupil R. L. Nettleship and published in 1885, consists of Green's work on David Hume. In his essay, 'Introductions to Hume's Treatise of Human Nature', Green gives a detailed critique of Hume's metaphysical thought. (shrink)

It has come to be expected that collections issued by the Royal Institute of Philosophy will contain work that has quality or is otherwise interesting. This volume runs true to form and presents plenty of both. It gives the proceedings of the conference arranged by the Institute at Exeter in 1973, consisting of five symposia together with Chairman's remarks of about eight pages or so for each symposium, and in three cases postscripts by the first speaker. The contributors and topics (...) are: R. F. Dearden and Elizabeth Telfer on ‘Autonomy as an Educational Ideal’ with R. M. Hare as Chairman; R. K. Elliott and Glenn Langford on ‘Education and the Development of the Understanding’ with Paul Hirst as Chairman; David Cooper and Timothy O'Hagan on ‘Quality and Equality in Education’ with R. F. Atkinson as Chairman; Mary Warnock and Richard Norman on ‘The Neutral Teacher’ with Alan Montefiore as Chairman; Stuart Brown and A. Phillips Griffiths on ‘Academic Freedom’ with R. S. Peters as Chairman. (shrink)

Interpretive Political Science is the second of two volumes featuring a selection of key writings by R.A.W. Rhodes. Volume II looks forward and explores the 'interpretive turn' and its implications for the craft of political science, especially public administration, and draws together articles from 2005 onwards on the theme of 'the interpretive turn' in political science. Part I provides a summary statement of the interpretive approach, and Part II develops the theme of blurring genres and discusses a variety of research (...) methods common in the humanities, including: ethnographic fieldwork, life history, and focus groups. Part III demonstrates how the genres of thought and presentation found in the humanities can be used in political science. It presents four examples of such blurring 'at work' with studies of: applied anthropology and civil service reform; women's studies and government departments; and storytelling and local knowledge. The book concludes with a summary of what is edifying about an interpretive approach, and why this approach matters, and revisits some of the more common criticisms before indulging in plausible conjectures about the future of interpretivism. The author seeks new and interesting ways to explore governance, high politics, public policies, and the study of public administration in general. (shrink)

Though nominalism is a major presupposition in academia and western society, R. Scott Smith shows that nominalism undermines all knowledge whatsoever. In light of the many clear examples of knowledge that we do have, nominalism should be replaced by a realist view of properties.

For most of the church's history, people have seen Christian ethics as normative and universally applicable. Recently, however, this view has been lost, thanks to naturalism and relativism. R. Scott Smith argues that Christians need to overcome Kant's fact-value dichotomy and recover the possibility of genuine moral and theological knowledge.

The Primacy of God, the notion of justice toward God is seldom considered and often foreign. Far more discussed is how God might either undermine or motivate social justice. The Primacy of God by R. Jared Staudt offers an important intervention. With the aid of St. Thomas Aquinas, Staudt argues that it is vital for both contemporary society and contemporary Catholic theology to return to the traditional view of God as the one to whom all human and social action must (...) be ordered and to recover the virtue of religion as the virtue which orders all other virtues to God. Not only does Staudt helpfully remind readers of the ancient philosophical and biblical notion of worship as a dictate of the natural law, he also illuminates the way in which Christian liturgy, as an enactment of Christ's high priesthood, is the great fulfillment of natural and biblical worship. Accordingly, Staudt secures religion as essential for the virtue of love. This brings Staudt to criticize modern theologians like Karl Barth, who claimed that religion is inherently idolatrous, as well as Karl Rahner, who claimed that love of neighbor is the highest moral act. Staudt also considers the question of religious truth in light of the plurality of religions, soliciting the assistance of Hans Urs von Balthasar and Joseph Ratzinger, as well as the way in which religion relates to the development of culture, engaging the great Catholic social historian Christopher Dawson. The Primacy of God is a much-needed work that ought to set the agenda for Catholic theology in the twenty-first century. (shrink)

A defence of the idea that there are sui generis duties of love: duties, that is, that we owe to people in virtue of standing in loving relationships with them. I contrast this non‐reductionist position with the widespread reductionist view that our duties to those we love all derive from more generic moral principles. The paper mounts a cumulative argument in favour of the non‐reductionist position, adducing a variety of considerations that together speak strongly in favour of adopting it. The (...) concluding section connects this debate with larger issues in moral theory concerning the general idea of obligation. (shrink)

The import of this long and careful study is primarily negative: the author attempts to show that the various theories which contemporary analysts have held against the a priori are not tenable; he leaves us not with still another proposal but with the conviction that this philosophical ground is still fertile.--R. P.

A new translation which is eminently readable and extremely accurate. Much of the awkwardness and unnecessary obscurity of the Ogden translation has been eliminated. The comprehensive index which combines both English and German expressions is designed to meet the special problems involved in understanding the Tractatus. Unfortunately Russell's introduction to the 1922 edition is reproduced without any indication of the controversy concerning Russell's interpretation, or subsequent interpretations of the Tractatus.--R. J. B.

We argue that thoughts are structures of concepts, and that concepts should be individuated by their origins, rather than in terms of their semantic or epistemic properties. Many features of cognition turn on the vehicles of content, thoughts, rather than on the nature of the contents they express. Originalism makes concepts available to explain, with no threat of circularity, puzzling cases concerning thought. In this paper, we mention Hesperus/Phosphorus puzzles, the Evans-Perry example of the ship seen through different windows, and (...) Mates cases, and we believe that there are many additional applications. (shrink)

The essays collected in this volume to honor Ernest Nagel reflect his wide interest in all topics relating philosophy to the natural and social sciences. The essays, written by distinguished philosophers and scientists form a mixed bag, but most of them are very good. The first part, "Science and Inquiry" begins with notes taken by Patrick Suppes of Nagel's lectures on Dewey's logic delivered in 1947. It follows with essays on knowledge by Stuart Hampshire, on intensions and the law of (...) inverse variation by R. M. Martin, and four essays on problems of induction and confirmation which contribute markedly to this well-worn field. The eleven essays of the second part, "Structure of Science" range from discussions of physics and ontology, mechanism and evolution to essays on functionalism in anthropology and ethics and legal theory. In between there are very good essays by C. Hempel on reduction, S. Morgenbesser on the realist-instrumentalist controversy, essays on the identity thesis, extensive measurement, causation and action, philosophy of language, and the differences between the natural and social sciences. Part three contains six essays on the role of values in various settings, e.g., ethical theory, the social sciences, legal theory and existentialism. The fourth and final part contains a variety of historical studies: Clagett on the quadrature of lunes in medieval science, I. Bernard Cohen on Newton, A. Koslow on the law of inertia, Charles Parsons on Kant's philosophy of arithmetic, Philip Wiener on a Soviet view of Peirce's pragmatism and S. Diamond on John D. Rockefeller and the historians.--R. H. K. (shrink)

Since the publication of Edmund Gettier's challenge to the traditional epistemological doctrine of knowledge as justified true belief, Roberts and Wood claim that epistemologists lapsed into despondency and are currently open to novel approaches. One such approach is virtue epistemology, which can be divided into virtues as proper functions or epistemic character traits. The authors propose a notion of regulative epistemology, as opposed to a strict analytic epistemology, based on intellectual virtues that function not as rules or even as skills (...) but as habits of the heart. To that end, they divide the task of clarifying and expounding their notion in the book's two parts.In the first part, Roberts and Wood examine various components that constitute their notion of regulative epistemology. The first are the epistemic goods or goals that drive the epistemic process. What is needed, claim Roberts and Wood, is an enriched notion of these goods rather than the restricted notion of justified true belief. Epistemic agents are more than calculating devices in that …. (shrink)

A sampler of Russell's writings from 1963 to 1959 which provides representative selections from his multifarious writings. The book is designed more for the general reader than for the scholar interested in piecing together the complex mosaic of the man and his work. There is a preface by Bertrand Russell. Handsomely printed, the total effect shows once again how unique and many-sided is this twentieth-century intellectual explorer.--R. J. B.

A study of the conditions necessary for the freedom of man's action, this work concludes that the source of meaningfulness lies in man's relation to God, and in man's search for His will.--A. R.

A fairly routine work of Thomist scholarship which argues that, though both Aquinas and Aristotle regard prudence as a virtue, Aristotle cannot and Aquinas must analyze the vice of imprudence. The difference is found to depend on Aquinas' stress on the liberty of the will.--A. R.

The author demonstrates how the problem of free will as inherited by Descartes from scholastic philosophy is translated into secular terms. This monograph reviews some of the significant bibliography on the subject, particularly the studies of Octave, Hamelin, E. Gilson, A. Espinas, and H. Gouhier.--A. R.

This book attempts to place the problems of logic, epistemology, science, history, and ethics on a new scientific basis.--A. R.

This book consists of three parts: a general theory of descriptive ethics, a general theory of ethical discourse, and an application of II to the ethical discourse of the Navaho Indians, based on the writer's own field studies. The work is careful, clear, thorough, and detailed, and the inclusion of field notes is helpful in understanding and evaluating Ladd's reconstructions. There are questions of detail where one might cavil, but the book is an important contribution to the relatively unexplored area (...) where philosophy and the social sciences overlap. --A. R. A. (shrink)

Fifty two scholars from the east and west have contributed essays to this volume presented to T. M. P. Mahadevan, head of the Department of Philosophy, University of Madras on his fiftieth birthday. Although the range of papers is broad, collectively they present an overview of the diverse currents in traditional and contemporary Indian philosophy. A bibliography of Mahadevan's writings is also included.—R. J. B.

Miller has undertaken the difficult task of providing a new translation of Hegel's Wissenschaft der Logik sometimes referred to as Hegel's "Greater Logic." Part of the reason for the neglect of Hegel has been the unavailability of good translations. The "first generation" of Hegel translators heroically sought to create an English idiom for Hegel's terminology, but their results left much to be desired in accuracy, readability and intelligibility. Although this is a conservative translation which follows the conventions established by English (...) Hegelians nevertheless the translation is a big improvement over the earlier one by Johnston and Struthers. Since the passing of the English Hegelians, Hegel's Logic has been largely ignored by Anglo-Saxon philosophers. And for those who think that logic really is or ought to be what is found in contemporary symbolic or mathematical logic, Hegel's book will seem old-fashioned and outdated. Yet this book has exerted an enormous influence on both those who have seriously attacked it and those who have devotedly followed it--a group that includes Kierkegaard, Sartre, Heidegger, and the English idealists. The publication of this massive translation not only has historical value for making Hegel's thought more accessible, but it is still a rich source for the philosopher interested in Thought and Being.--R. J. B. (shrink)

As seen by Professor Capek, Bergson’s views about the nature of matter were either misunderstood or ignored in the decades following their publication at the turn of the century. The explanation for this attitude of both Bergson’s opponents and his disciples lies in the fact that, at that time, although there were rumblings under the foundations of classical physics, "hardly anybody could then guess even remotely the extent of the coming scientific revolution." One of the main stumbling blocks for Bergson’s (...) readers was the non-pictorial character of his ‘model’ of matter, which was conceived as consisting of imageless events. In Bergson and Modern Physics, Capek attempts to remove this stumbling block and to evaluate the relation between Bergson’s thought and modern physics as it stands today. The book consists of three parts: Bergson’s biological theory of knowledge, his theory of duration, and his theory of the physical world and its relations to contemporary physics. Three appendices deal with Russell’s complex relation to Bergson, with the much discussed relation of microphysical indeterminancy to freedom, and with Bergson’s views on entropy and modern cosmogony, respectively. The book is indexed and carries extensive references to the scientific and philosophical literature. With this book Capek provides a competent exposition and historical perspective of Bergson’s philosophy and its relation to modern physics.—D. R. P. (shrink)

The title essay of this volume is a study of Wilhelm Jensen's Gradiva: a Pompeiian Fancy, the text of which is printed as an appendix. Three other very brief essays by Freud on related topics are included. In his introduction, Philip Rieff shows that Freud "looked not for evidence but for meaning" and this helps us to understand how a fictional character could as legitimately serve his purposes as an actual case history.--D. R.