Several authors have recently argued against intellectualism, the view that one’s epistemic position with respect to p depends exclusively on one’s truth-relevant factors with respect to p. In this paper, I first examine two prominent arguments for the anti-intellectualist position and find both of them wanting. More precisely, I argue that these arguments, by themselves, are underdetermined between intellectualism and anti-intellectualism. I then manifest the intuitive plausibility of intellectualism by examining the ordinary conversational pattern of challenging a claim.

According to the no-miracle argument, scientific realism is the only view that does not render the predictive success of scientific theories miraculous. Against the no-miracle argument, selectionists argue that the predictive success of scientific theories is a product of them being subject to a selection process that weeds out predictively unsuccessful theories. Against selectionism, I argue that the selectionist explanation is not an alternative to the realist one. More precisely, I draw on a standard framework in behavioral biology, known as (...) “Tinbergen’s four questions,” and argue that selectionism and realism are aimed at answering different questions and that they are complementary to each other, instead. (shrink)

Counterfactuals are inherently ambiguous in the sense that the same counterfactual may be true under one mode of counterfactualization but false under the other. Many have regarded the ambiguity of counterfactuals as consisting in the distinction between forward-tracking and backtracking counterfactuals. This is incorrect since the ambiguity persists even in cases not involving backtracking counterfactualization. In this paper, I argue that causal modeling semantics has the resources enough for accounting for the ambiguity of counterfactuals. Specifically, we need to distinguish two (...) types of causal manipulation, which I call “intervention” and “extrapolation” respectively. To intervene in a causal model M is to change M’s structural equations in some specific ways, while to extrapolate M is to change the value assignment of M’s variables in some specific ways. I argue that intervention and extrapolation offer a natural explanation for the ambiguity of counterfactuals. (shrink)

Luck egalitarianism provides one powerful way of defending global egalitarianism. The basic luck egalitarian idea that persons ought not to be disadvantaged compared to others on account of his or her bad luck seems to extend naturally to the global arena, where random factors such as persons’ place of birth and the natural distribution of the world’s resources do affect differentially their life chances. Yet luck egalitarianism as an ideal, as well as its global application, has come under severe criticisms (...) in recent debate. My aim in this article is to restore plausibility to the luck egalitarian idea, and to suggest how it could then provide a plausible grounding for global egalitarianism. To do this, I will propose a more modest but also more defensible conception of luck egalitarianism that can also strengthen the case for global distributive justice. (shrink)

Kant divides moral duties into duties of virtue and duties of justice. Duties of virtue are imperfect duties, the fulfillment of which is left to agent discretion and so cannot be externally demanded of one. Duties of justice, while perfect, seem to be restricted to negative duties (of nondeception and noncoercion). It may seem then that Kant's moral philosophy cannot meet the demands of global justice. I argue, however, that Kantian justice when applied to the social and historical realities of (...) the world can generate positive duties to promote and provide for the well being of others. (shrink)

This chapter contains section titled: Decent Peoples The Idea of Toleration The Cosmopolitan Critique Intervention and Cosmopolitanism Acknowledgments Notes.

Kok-Chor Tan argues that cosmopolitan liberalism can serve as a means to implement the ideal of moral universalism, if one sufficiently distinguishes non-toleration from intervention and moral universalism from dogmatism. In a further move, Tan claims that such an understanding of cosmopolitan liberalism can work to mutually regulate the behavior of states in the global arena. Tan’s co-panelists engage different aspects of his vision. Steve Coutinho underscores that changes within cultures do not typically result from a dialogue across cultures but (...) from within individual cultures. Instead of propping up universal morality on the ideal of cosmopolitan liberalism, we should, Coutinho proposes, work toward finding values that have been implemented to create practical circumstances that resemble those found in liberal cultures. Putting the spotlight on the historical context of liberal cosmopolitanism, Zachary Penman argues that to engage in a global dialogue, the onus is on cosmopolitan liberals to shift the geography of reasoning from imperiality to decoloniality. Equally, their decolonial partners in this dialogue should throw into light the normative content of their decolonial practical reason to facilitate the shift. Saranindranath Tagore encourages Tan to think about a more expanded account of autonomy that is set on a more explicit cosmopolitan register. To this end, he suggests that a cosmopolitan sensibility be fostered through education. Sympathetic to Tan’s larger project of a liberal cosmopolitanism that subscribes to epistemic modesty, Inés Valdez brings into focus structures of epistemic dogmatism that currently allow for political and economic control and exploitation of other peoples and their resources. Tan’s response considers how his own defense of liberal cosmopolitanism as well as his interlocutors’ responses relate to the broader project of decolonizing philosophy. (shrink)

This paper aims to read together Julietta Singh’s Unthinking Mastery and Suzanne Césaire’s The Great Camouflage in order to uncover the narrative spaces in Césaire’s work that can be fruitful for unthinking mastery. I identify four connected themes in Césaire’s work. Surrealism, rejection of doudou-ism and the natural disaster explicitly reject the construction of the Caribbean as one exoticized place and mechanisms of categorization. The only stable identity of the Caribbean is its instability. The figure of the plant-human adds to (...) this and transcends the human/non-human dichotomy in a way that dismantles this central dichotomy altogether. (shrink)

It is widely accepted that our initial intuitions regarding knowledge attributions in stakes-shifting cases (e.g., Cohen’s Airport) are best explained by standards variantism, the view that the standards for knowledge may vary with contexts in an epistemically interesting way. Against standards variantism, I argue that no prominent account of the standards for knowledge can explain our intuitions regarding stakes-shifting cases. I argue that the only way to preserve our initial intuitions regarding such cases is to endorse position variantism, the view (...) that one’s epistemic position may vary with contexts in an epistemically interesting way. Some had argued that epistemic position is incompatible with intellectualism. In reply, I point out that position variantism and intellectualism are compatible, if one’s truth-relevant factors with respect to p can vary with contexts in an epistemically interesting way. (shrink)

In this paper, I will expand upon Giorgio Agamben’s argument in his defining work Homo Sacer where he accused Immanuel Kant for introducing the state of exception to modernity. According to Agamben, Kant managed to do this by introducing the form of law as “being in force without signifying.” In this line, I will argue that ‘the ban’ is indeed inherent within Kantian morality and all subjects under the law stand in “pure relation of abandonment” vis-a-vis the law. In order (...) to show this, I will focus on Kant’s views on masturbation in the context of his disdainful views about the body and sex and how through these views he formulated ‘duties to oneself’ in a way that condemns the masturbator to ‘bare life.’. (shrink)

To resolve the lottery paradox, the “no-justification account” proposes that one is not justified in believing that one's lottery ticket is a loser. The no-justification account commits to what I call “the Harman-style skepticism”. In reply, proponents of the no-justification account typically downplay the Harman-style skepticism. In this paper, I argue that the no-justification reply to the Harman-style skepticism is untenable. Moreover, I argue that the no-justification account is epistemically ad hoc. My arguments are based on a rather surprising finding (...) that the no-justification account implies that people living in Taiwan typically suffer from the Harman-style skepticism. (shrink)

Recent literature has seen a surging interest in the modal principle involved in the Gettier-style thought experiments. According to the necessitation thesis, the modal principle underlying the Gettier-style thought experiments takes the form of a principle of necessitation. It is widely agreed that the necessitation thesis is seriously threatened by the problem of deviant realizations. Based on the Gricean pragmatic theory of communication, I defend the necessitation thesis against the problem of deviant realizations. The present account bears some significant similarities (...) to Pierre Saint-Germier’s account. After comparing and contrasting these two accounts, I argue that the differences between them actually speak in favor of the present account over Saint-Germier’s one. (shrink)

How should liberal societies respond to nonliberal ones? In this paper I examine John Rawls’s conception of international toleration against what is sometimes called a cosmopolitan one. Rawls holds that a just international order should recognize certain nonliberal societies, to which he refers as decent peoples, as equal members in good standing in a just society of peoples. It would be a violation of liberalism’s own principle of toleration to deny the international legitimacy of decent peoples who, among other things, (...) affirm human rights and accept peaceful coexistence with other societies. According to the cosmopolitan idea of international toleration, on the contrary, only societies that are liberal in character meet the criteria for toleration. I suggest that, against the Rawlsian conception of international toleration, the cosmopolitan idea is more consistent with the fundamentals of liberal political morality. I then clarify the ways in which cosmopolitan toleration is not worryingly interventionist even as it is not altogether toothless; and I end with some reflections on why cosmopolitism is not morally imperialistic. (shrink)

Reasons evidentialism is the view that normative reasons can be analyzed in terms of evidence about oughts (i.e., propositions concerning whether or not S ought to phi). In this paper, I defend a new reason-evidentialist account according to which normative reasons are evidence against propositions of the form S ought not to phi. The arguments for my view have two strands. First of all, I argue that my view can account for three difficulty cases, cases where (i) a fact is (...) both a reason for S to phi and a reason for S not to phi, (ii) a fact is both evidence for the proposition that S ought to phi and evidence for the proposition that S ought not to phi, and (iii) the subject is genuinely torn, as far as reasons are concerned, between phi-ing and not phi-ing. Second, I argue that my view can account for what a reason against S phi-ing is. (shrink)

The stakes-shifting cases suggest that pragmatic factors such as stakes play an important role in determining our intuitive judgments of whether or not S knows that p. This seems to be in conflict with intellectualism, according to which pragmatic factors in general should not be taken into account, when considering whether or not S knows that p. This paper develops a theory of judgments of knowledge status that reconciles intellectualism with our intuitive judgments regarding the stakes-shifting cases. I argue that (...) pragmatic factors affect only our epistemic perspectives, i.e., the ways in which we evaluate S’s epistemic position. Therefore, pragmatic factors only have an indirect impact on our judgments of knowledge status. (shrink)

The skeptical puzzle consists of three independently plausible yet jointly inconsistent claims: (A) S knows a certain ordinary proposition op; (B) S does not know the denial of a certain skeptical hypothesis sh; and (C) S knows that op only if S knows that not- sh. The variantist solution (to the skeptical puzzle) claims that (A) and not-(B) are true in the ordinary context, but false in the skeptical one. Epistemic contextualism has offered a standards-variantist solution, which is the most (...) prominent variantist solution on the market. In this paper, I argue that the standards-variantist solution in general (and the contextualist solution in particular) is epistemically uninteresting. Proponents of the variantist solution should opt for the position-variantist solution instead. I will discuss some important implications of my findings. (shrink)

Michael Blake argues that states are the primary sites of justice for persons and that the function of international justice is to ensure that states interact with each other in ways that preserve the capacity of each to realize justice for their own members. This paper will argue that justice among states requires more of states than that they preserve and maintain each other's capacity as primary sites of justice. Justice among states will require some justification, as well, of the (...) claims of states over resources and territory within their borders. Such a justification, I suggest, must presume a global institutional order, and this will introduce the problem of coercion in the international domain. International coercion will have implications for Blake's understanding of international economic justice since it is premised on the claim that the domestic context is coercive in a way that the international arena is not. (shrink)

Some cases show that counterfactual conditionals (‘counterfactuals’ for short) are inherently ambiguous, equivocating between forward-tracking and backtracking counterfactu- als. Elsewhere, I have proposed a causal modeling semantics, which takes this phenomenon to be generated by two kinds of causal manipulations. (Lee 2015; Lee 2016) In an important paper (Hiddleston 2005), Eric Hiddleston offers a different causal modeling semantics, which he claims to be able to explain away the inherent ambiguity of counterfactuals. In this paper, I discuss these two semantic treatments (...) and argue that my (bifurcated) semantics is theoretically more promising than Hiddleston’s (unified) semantics. (shrink)

In some discussions on global distributive justice, it is argued that the factthat the state exercises coercive authority over its own citizens explains whythe state has egalitarian distributive obligations to its own but not to otherindividuals in the world at large. Two recent works make the case that the globalorder is indeed coercive in a morally significant way for generating certainglobal distributive obligations. Nicole Hassoun argues that the coercivecharacter of the global order gives rise to global duties of humanitarian aid.Laura (...) Valentini argues that the existence of global coercion triggers globaldistributive duties more demanding than mere humanitarianism, but notnecessarily as demanding as cosmopolitan egalitarian duties. This reviewessay suggests that Hassoun’s and Valentini’s depictions of the global orderas coercive entitle them to the stronger conclusion that there are globalegalitarian duties. (shrink)

Serious incident investigations—often conducted by means of Root Cause Analysis methodologies—are increasingly seen as platforms to learn from multiple perspectives and experiences: professionals, patients and their families alike. Underlying this principle of inclusiveness is the idea that healthcare staff and service users hold unique and valuable knowledge that can inform learning, as well as the notion that learning is a social process that involves people actively reflecting on shared knowledge. Despite initiatives to facilitate inclusiveness, research shows that embracing and learning (...) from diverse perspectives is difficult. Using the concept of ‘epistemic injustice’, pointing at practices of someone’s knowledge being unjustly disqualified or devalued, we analyze the way incident investigations are organized and executed with the aim to understand why it is difficult to embrace and learn from the multiple perspectives voiced in incident investigations. We draw from 73 semi-structured interviews with healthcare leaders, managers, healthcare professionals, incident investigators and inspectors, document analyses and ethnographic observations. Our analysis identified several structures in the incident investigation process, that can promote or hinder an actor’s epistemic contribution in the process of incident investigations. Rather than repeat calls to ‘involve more’ and ‘listen better’, we encourage policy makers to be mindful of and address the structures that can cause epistemic injustice. This can improve the outcome of incident investigations and can help to do justice to the lived experiences of the involved actors in the aftermath of a serious incident. (shrink)

In his stimulating and provocative collection of essays, Globalization and Justice, Kai Nielsen (2003b) defends a cosmopolitan account of global justice. On the cosmopolitan view, as Nielsen understands it, individuals are entitled to equal consideration regardless of citizenship or nationality and global institutions should be arranged in such a way that each person's interest is given equal consideration. Nielsen's defense of cosmopolitan justice in this collection will be of no surprise to readers familiar with his socialist egalitarian commitments. Indeed, the (...) internationalism underlying socialism, Nielsen would argue, naturally entails the cosmopolitan account of justice (e.g., chs. 5 and 6). (shrink)

In his stimulating and provocative collection of essays, Globalization and Justice, Kai Nielsen defends a cosmopolitan account of global justice. On the cosmopolitan view, as Nielsen understands it, individuals are entitled to equal consideration regardless of citizenship or nationality and global institutions should be arranged in such a way that each person's interest is given equal consideration. Nielsen's defense of cosmopolitan justice in this collection will be of no surprise to readers familiar with his socialist egalitarian commitments. Indeed, the internationalism (...) underlying socialism, Nielsen would argue, naturally entails the cosmopolitan account of justice. (shrink)

The disk that rotates in an inertial frame in special relativity has long been analysed by assuming a Lorentz contraction of its peripheral elements in that frame, which has produced widely varying views in the literature. We show that this assumption is unnecessary for a disk that corresponds to the simplest form of rotation in special relativity. After constructing such a disk and showing that observers at rest on it do not constitute a true rotating frame, we choose a “master” (...) observer and calculate a set of disk coordinates and spacetime metric pertinent to that observer. We use this formalism to resolve the “circular twin paradox”, then calculate the speed of light sent around the periphery as measured by the master observer, to show that this speed is a function of sent-direction and disk angle traversed. This result is consistent with the Sagnac Effect, but constitutes a finer analysis of that effect, which is normally expressed using an average speed for a full trip of the periphery. We also use the formalism to give a resolution of “Selleri’s paradox”. (shrink)

Recent investigations into the relationship between the questions on the Metaphysics authored by Marsilius of Inghen, on the one hand, and John Buridan, on the other, have revealed interesting doctrinal contrasts between them. The present article extends these investigations by examining the metaphysical question of whether we have a natural capacity for knowing God. Even though Marsilius followed Buridan’s reasoning to a great extent, he disagreed with his main point: that our intellect has the natural capacity for abstracting an absolute, (...) simple, essential concept of God from his effects. The disagreement is rooted in their differing conceptions of what an absolute concept of God entails, viz. Buridan’s strictly philosophical conception vis-à-vis Marsilius’ more theological conception. (shrink)

Counterfactuals are inherently ambiguous in the sense that the same counterfactual may be true under one mode of counterfactualization but false under the other. Many have regarded the ambiguity of counterfactuals as consisting in the distinction between forward-tracking and backtracking counterfactuals. This is incorrect since the ambiguity persists even in cases not involving backtracking counterfactualization. In this paper, I argue that causal modeling semantics has the resources enough for accounting for the ambiguity of counterfactuals. Specifically, we need to distinguish two (...) types of causal manipulation, which I call “intervention” and “extrapolation” respectively. To intervene in a causal model M is to change M’s structural equations in some specific ways, while to extrapolate M is to change the value assignment of M’s variables in some specific ways. I argue that intervention and extrapolation offer a natural explanation for the ambiguity of counterfactuals. (shrink)

How should a liberal state respond to a nonliberal state that is however a decent society? By “decent,” I mean, adopting John Rawls’s terminology, that the so described state is nonaggressive and recognizes the independence and equality of other states and that it also honors basic human rights. Should a liberal state tolerate such a nonliberal state? We can identify two possible conceptions of global toleration in this regard. One conception holds that liberal states ought to tolerate nonliberal states; the (...) second holds that liberal states ought not to tolerate nonliberal states. For convenience, I will call these the “internationalist” and “cosmopolitan” conceptions of global toleration, respectively. In this discussion, I attempt to analyze this dispute over global liberal toleration more basically in terms of two different views of liberalism and of the value of liberal toleration, which we may label “toleration-liberalism” and “autonomy-liberalism”. These different understandings of liberal toleration tend towards one or the other ideal of liberal global toleration. Then, in support of the cosmopolitan ideal, I will note certain advantages of autonomy-liberalism over toleration-liberalism. (shrink)

Like Thomas Hobbes, the ancient Chinese philosopher Xunzi imagines a human state of nature that is chaotic and violent, akin to Hobbes’s state of war of everyone against everyone. Like Hobbes, Xunzi pins this miserable human natural condition on the egoistical nature of people. And like Hobbes, Xunzi justifies the establishment of political authority because it brings order and peace among people. But while Hobbes takes the establishment and enforcement of positive laws by an all-powerful political authority to be sufficient (...) for keeping the state of nature at bay, Xunzi believes that positive laws alone are inadequate. Laws must be accompanied by a reformation of human nature if a well-ordered society is to be achieved and sustained. In contrast to Hobbes, then, Xunzi thinks that a well-ordered political society must have both good laws and good people. This is where the Confucian ideal of rituals comes in. Rituals have the important function of making people better in spite of their original bad nature that laws alone do not. Recalling the place of rituals in Xunzi’s ideal of a well-ordered society draws our attention to a crucial difference between Xunzi’s and Hobbes’s political philosophies. While Hobbes thinks that a peaceful political society among egotistical individuals is achievable so long as it is possible to secure the right incentive structure for them to cooperate, Xunzi thinks a stable civil order must take on the task of improving human nature. More basically, Xunzi and Hobbes see the aims of political society differently. For Hobbes, the chief purpose of politics is the peaceful co-existence of people in spite of their egoistical nature. For Xunzi, the central aim of politics is not just peaceful co-existence among individuals but their moral self-improvement and cultivation, their transformation from egoistical to social beings. (shrink)

Since his Realizing Rawls a decade and a half ago, Thomas Pogge has established himself as one of the most important and influential writers on the subject of global justice in contemporary philosophy. World Poverty and Human Rights is a valuable collection of some of his essays written during 1990–2001. These essays cover various central topics of global justice—from fundamental philosophical ones, such as the concept of justice and human rights and the universalistic nature of moral reasoning, to the more (...) concrete questions of global institutional reforms. The specific topics addressed include human rights, nationalism, state sovereignty and cosmopolitanism, global democratic deficit, and Pogge’s original proposal for a global resource dividend that will provide a global development fund through taxing natural resource extraction. An unfortunate omission here is the absence of Pogge’s essay-length commentary on John Rawls’s The Law of Peoples. Although there are extensive discussions of Rawls in the book, including this essay would have helped the reader better situate Pogge’s account of global justice against Rawls’s well-known theory. (shrink)

This contribution investigates whether Hegel’s critique of social contract theory is still applicable to contemporary contract theory proposed by, e. g., Rawls and Nozick. At first sight, they seem to have overcome the problems identified by Hegel because Rawls and Nozick appropriate the social contract as something essentially rational and normative. I argue, however, that for Hegel, their appeal to rational argumentation is not compatible with the concreteness of human individuals. A revised reading of the master/ bondsman-relation, emphasizing the role (...) of the “fear of death”, shows the limited scope of contemporary contract theory. (shrink)

In _Objektiver und absoluter Geist_ nach Hegel Oehl and Kok offer an extensive selection of papers by established Hegel scholars exploring the wide spectrum of Hegel’s philosophy of spirit from the viewpoint of the distinction between objective and absolute spirit.

Firms’ real estate choices significantly affect their sustainability, due to real estate’s impact on the natural environment. This paper investigates the ecological responsiveness of firms in specific industries by analyzing the decisions these firms make in occupying office space. We analyze the decisions of more than 11,000 tenants to choose office space in green buildings or in, otherwise comparable, conventional buildings nearby. Controlling for building quality and location, we find that corporations in the oil and banking industries, as well as (...) non-profit organizations, are among the most prominent green tenants. Furthermore, measures of an industry’s human capital intensity are positively related to the propensity to lease green office space. These empirical findings confirm the theoretical framework on economic advantage and institutional pressure as important determinants for the ecological responsiveness of firms. (shrink)

In this paper, we study the impact of CEO and board gender diversity on the risk management decisions of 179 U.S. Real Estate Investment Trusts (REITs) during the 2001–2018 period. Using a bottom-up analysis on the properties in REIT portfolios, we find significant risk reduction associated with gender-diverse REIT leadership. We document that REITs with a woman CEO, in combination with more women on the board, display less active trading and a longer hold period for assets. In addition, REITs with (...) more gender-diverse leadership are more geographically focused, which for REITs is considered a lower risk investment strategy. Finally, REITs with more gender-diverse leadership are more actively investing in environmentally sustainable real estate. We conclude that gender diversity in real estate firms carries real-life implications for U.S. cities, given their key role as developers, owners, and operators of the built world. (shrink)

_Der „innere Gerichtshof“ der Vernunft_ explores Kant’s theory of conscience and its historical reception in German Idealism in the context of practical philosophy and the philosophy of religion.

The use of coercion is morally problematic and requires an ongoing critical reflection. We wondered if not knowing or being uncertain whether coercion is morally right or justified (i.e. experiencing moral dou...

Are countries especially entitled, if not obliged, to prioritize the interests or well-being of their own citizens during a global crisis, such as a global pandemic? We call this partiality for compatriots in times of crisis “crisis nationalism”. Vaccine nationalism is one vivid example of crisis nationalism during the COVID-19 pandemic; so is the case of the US government’s purchasing a 3-month supply of the global stock of the antiviral Remdesivir for domestic use. Is crisis nationalism justifiable at all, and, (...) if it is, what are its limits? We examine some plausible arguments for national partiality, and conclude that these arguments support crisis nationalism only within strict limits. The different arguments for partiality, as we will note, arrive at these limits for different reasons. But more generally, so we argue, any defensible crisis nationalism must not entail the violation of human rights or the worsening of people’s deprivation. Moreover, we propose that good faith crisis nationalism ought to be sensitive to the potential moral costs of national partiality during a global crisis and must take extra care to control or offset these costs. Thus, crisis nationalism in the form of vaccine nationalism or the hoarding of global supplies of therapeutics during a global pandemic exceeds the bounds of acceptable partiality. (shrink)

In this article, we propose the Fair Priority Model for COVID-19 vaccine distribution, and emphasize three fundamental values we believe should be considered when distributing a COVID-19 vaccine among countries: Benefiting people and limiting harm, prioritizing the disadvantaged, and equal moral concern for all individuals. The Priority Model addresses these values by focusing on mitigating three types of harms caused by COVID-19: death and permanent organ damage, indirect health consequences, such as health care system strain and stress, as well as (...) economic destruction. It proposes proceeding in three phases: the first addresses premature death, the second long-term health issues and economic harms, and the third aims to contain viral transmission fully and restore pre-pandemic activity. -/- To those who may deem an ethical framework irrelevant because of the belief that many countries will pursue "vaccine nationalism," we argue such a framework still has broad relevance. Reasonable national partiality would permit countries to focus on vaccine distribution within their borders up until the rate of transmission is below 1, at which point there would not be sufficient vaccine-preventable harm to justify retaining a vaccine. When a government reaches the limit of national partiality, it should release vaccines for other countries. -/- We also argue against two other recent proposals. Distributing a vaccine proportional to a country's population mistakenly assumes that equality requires treating differently situated countries identically. Prioritizing countries according to the number of front-line health care workers, the proportion of the population over 65, and the number of people with comorbidities within each country may exacerbate disadvantage and end up giving the vaccine in large part to wealthy nations. (shrink)

All parties involved in researching, developing, manufacturing, and distributing COVID-19 vaccines need guidance on their ethical obligations. We focus on pharmaceutical companies' obligations because their capacities to research, develop, manufacture, and distribute vaccines make them uniquely placed for stemming the pandemic. We argue that an ethical approach to COVID-19 vaccine production and distribution should satisfy four uncontroversial principles: optimising vaccine production, including development, testing, and manufacturing; fair distribution; sustainability; and accountability. All parties' obligations should be coordinated and mutually consistent. For (...) instance, companies should not be obligated to provide host countries with additional booster shots at the expense of fulfilling bilateral contracts with countries in which there are surges. Finally, any satisfactory approach should include mechanisms for assurance that all parties are honouring their obligations. This assurance enables countries, pharmaceutical companies, global organisations, and others to verify compliance with the chosen approach and protect ethically compliant stakeholders from being unfairly exploited by unethical behaviour of others. (shrink)

COVID-19 vaccines are likely to be scarce for years to come. Many countries, from India to the U.K., have demonstrated vaccine nationalism. What are the ethical limits to this vaccine nationalism? Neither extreme nationalism nor extreme cosmopolitanism is ethically justifiable. Instead, we propose the fair priority for residents framework, in which governments can retain COVID-19 vaccine doses for their residents only to the extent that they are needed to maintain a noncrisis level of mortality while they are implementing reasonable public (...) health interventions. Practically, a noncrisis level of mortality is that experienced during a bad influenza season, which society considers an acceptable background risk. Governments take action to limit mortality from influenza, but there is no emergency that includes severe lockdowns. This “flu-risk standard” is a nonarbitrary and generally accepted heuristic. Mortality above the flu-risk standard justifies greater governmental interventions, including retaining vaccines for a country's own citizens over global need. The precise level of vaccination needed to meet the flu-risk standard will depend upon empirical factors related to the pandemic. This links the ethical principles to the scientific data emerging from the emergency. Thus, the FPR framework recognizes that governments should prioritize procuring vaccines for their country when doing so is necessary to reduce mortality to noncrisis flu-like levels. But after that, a government is obligated to do its part to share vaccines to reduce risks of mortality for people in other countries. We consider and reject objections to the FPR framework based on a country: having developed a vaccine, raising taxes to pay for vaccine research and purchase, wanting to eliminate economic and social burdens, and being ineffective in combating COVID-19 through public health interventions. (shrink)

The chapters in this volume deal with timely issues regarding democracy in theory and in practice in today's globalized world. Authored by leading political philosophers of our time, they appear here for the first time. The essays challenge and defend assumptions about the role of democracy as a viable political and legal institution in response to globalization, keeping in focus the role of rights at the normative foundations of democracy in a pluralistic world.

This festschrift collects a number of insightful essays by a group of accomplished Christian scholars, all of who have either worked with or studied under Hendrik Hart during his 35-year tenure as Senior Member in Systematic Philosophy at the Institute for Christian Studies, Toronto, Canada.

This contribution offers a detailed presentation of the commentaries on Porphyry’s Isagoge and Aristotle’s De anima by Walter of Wervia. Walter wrote his commentaries between 1445 and 1472 at the University of Paris. Both works bear witness to the influence of John Duns Scotus and Scotism on Parisian Masters of Arts.

ExtractPolitical liberals very often appeal to a so-called division of moral labour that separates the regulation of institutions from that of personal conduct. Probably the most famous statement of this idea is found in these remarks from John Rawls: The principles of justice for institutions must not be confused with the principles which apply to individuals and their actions in particular circumstances. These two kinds of principles apply to different subjects and must be discussed separately., p. 47) Kok-Chor Tan's excellent (...) new book renews and extends the case for accepting some version of Rawls's view, which Tan calls the ‘institutional focus’ in distributive justice. If Tan is right, then the liberal focus on institutions is not only defensible in its own right, but also helps support further elements of egalitarian theorizing, including some that Rawlsians often reject. In particular, Tan believes that a focus on institutions helps secure a more plausible ‘luck egalitarian’ approach to distributive justice, and that it also supports a version of cosmopolitanism about global justice.Send article to KindleTo send this article to your Kindle, first ensure no-reply@cambridge.org is added to your Approved Personal Document E-mail List under your Personal Document Settings on the Manage Your Content and Devices page of your Amazon account. Then enter the ‘name’ part of your Kindle email address below. Find out more about sending to your Kindle. Find out more about sending to your Kindle. Note you can select to send to either the @free.kindle.com or @kindle.com variations. ‘@free.kindle.com’ emails are free but can only be sent to your device when it is connected to wi-fi. ‘@kindle.com’ emails can be delivered even when you are not connected to wi-fi, but note that service fees apply. Find out more about the Kindle Personal Document Service.Kok-Chor Tan, Justice, Institutions, and Luck: The Site, Ground, and Scope of Equality, pp. ix + 208.Volume 25, Issue 1DANIEL HALLIDAY DOI: https://doi.org/10.1017/S0953820812000520Your Kindle email address Please provide your Kindle email.@free.kindle.com@kindle.com Available formats PDF Please select a format to send. By using this service, you agree that you will only keep articles for personal use, and will not openly distribute them via Dropbox, Google Drive or other file sharing services. Please confirm that you accept the terms of use. Cancel Send ×Send article to Dropbox To send this article to your Dropbox account, please select one or more formats and confirm that you agree to abide by our usage policies. If this is the first time you use this feature, you will be asked to authorise Cambridge Core to connect with your account. Find out more about sending content to Dropbox. Kok-Chor Tan, Justice, Institutions, and Luck: The Site, Ground, and Scope of Equality, pp. ix + 208.Volume 25, Issue 1DANIEL HALLIDAY DOI: https://doi.org/10.1017/S0953820812000520Available formats PDF Please select a format to send. By using this service, you agree that you will only keep articles for personal use, and will not openly distribute them via Dropbox, Google Drive or other file sharing services. Please confirm that you accept the terms of use. Cancel Send ×Send article to Google Drive To send this article to your Google Drive account, please select one or more formats and confirm that you agree to abide by our usage policies. If this is the first time you use this feature, you will be asked to authorise Cambridge Core to connect with your account. Find out more about sending content to Google Drive. Kok-Chor Tan, Justice, Institutions, and Luck: The Site, Ground, and Scope of Equality, pp. ix + 208.Volume 25, Issue 1DANIEL HALLIDAY DOI: https://doi.org/10.1017/S0953820812000520Available formats PDF Please select a format to send. By using this service, you agree that you will only keep articles for personal use, and will not openly distribute them via Dropbox, Google Drive or other file sharing services. Please confirm that you accept the terms of use. Cancel Send ×Export citation Request permission. (shrink)