Moderate skepticism about de se thought accepts that there is a kind of mental state which is about the thinker and is psychologically indispensable for intentional action, but rejects the claim that this kind employs an indexical way of referring. Morgan (2021) has proposed an explanatory argument meant to show that the psychological kind does employ an indexical way of referring to the thinker, on the basis of the special connection between these thoughts and the use of the first-person pronoun (...) (‘I’ in English), which does have an indexical semantics. This paper offers a clear motivation for the moderately skeptical position, shows that Morgan’s argument is based on a mistaken analysis of that special connection, and proposes a more viable alternative. However, on this alternative, the relationship between the psychological role of de se thoughts and the first person in language means Morgan’s explanatory argument cannot go through. (shrink)

This volume brings historians of science and social historians together to consider the role of "little tools"--such as tables, reports, questionnaires, dossiers, index cards--in establishing academic and bureaucratic claims to authority and objectivity. From at least the eighteenth century onward, our science and society have been planned, surveyed, examined, and judged according to particular techniques of collecting and storing knowledge. Recently, the seemingly self-evident nature of these mundane epistemic and administrative tools, as well as the prose in which they are (...) cast, has demanded historical examination. The essays gathered here, arranged in chronological order by subject from the late seventeenth to the late twentieth century, involve close readings of primary texts and analyses of academic and bureaucratic practices as parts of material culture. The first few essays, on the early modern period, largely point to the existence of a "juridico-theological" framework for establishing authority. Later essays demonstrate the eclipse of the role of authority per se in the modern period and the emergence of the notion of "objectivity." Most of the essays here concern the German cultural space as among the best exemplars of the academic and bureaucratic practices described above. The introduction to the volume, however, is framed at a general level the closing essays also extend the analyses beyond Germany to broader considerations on authority and objectivity in historical practice. The volume will interest scholars of European history and German studies as well as historians of science. Peter Becker is Professor of Central European History, European University Institute. William Clark is Lecturer in History and Philosophy of Science, Cambridge University. (shrink)

We agree with Grossmann that fear often builds cooperative relationships. Yet he neglects much extant literature. Prior researchers have discussed how fear (and other emotions) build cooperative relationships, have questioned whether fear per se evolved to serve this purpose, and have emphasized that human cooperation takes many forms. Grossmann's theory would benefit from a wider consideration of this work.

C. i., p. 2, 12 dicit Peliae regi se eo uelle ire si uires sociique non deessent. Pelias … Argum … iussit … nauim aedificaret.Considering the next sentence read perhaps n a u e s for uires.C. ii., p. 3, 25. Graeci aduentare nauibus. mittit ad portam.M reads nauibus uti. May this conceal e t i t a ? cf. p. II , 2. For change of tense cf. opening lines of C. iii.

O trabalho tem como objeto o exame da questão da omissão legislativa dos entes federativos quanto aos reajustes anuais dos servidores públicos e as suas consequências quanto à aplicação do artigo 37, X da Constituição brasileira de 1988, bem como o cabimento ou não de responsabilização civil desses entes da federação face à referida omissão. A pesquisa é eminentemente documental, estribando-se na doutrina, legislação e jurisprudência pátria, possuindo como marco teórico os ensinamentos sobre a Regra da Indexação do Prof. Washington (...) Peluso Albino de Souza, introdutor do Direito Econômico no Brasil. (shrink)

Social robots serve people as tutors, caretakers, receptionists, companions, and other social agents. People know that the robots are mechanical artifacts, yet they interact with them as if they were actual agents. How is this possible? The proposal here is that people construe social robots not as social agentsper se, but asdepictionsof social agents. They interpret them much as they interpret ventriloquist dummies, hand puppets, virtual assistants, and other interactive depictions of people and animals. Depictions as a class consist of (...) three physical scenes with part-by-part mappings between them: (a) a base scene (the raw physical artifact), (b) the depiction proper (the artifact construed as a depiction), and (c) the scene depicted (the scene people are to imagine). With social robots, evidence shows people form the same three scenes plus mappings: They perceive the raw machinery of a robot, construe it as a depiction of a character, and, using the depiction as a guide, engage in the pretense that they are interacting with the character depicted. With social robots, people also recognize three classes of agents – the characters depicted, the intended recipients of the depictions (those who view or interact with the robots), and the authorities responsible for the robots (the designers, makers, and owners). Construing social robots as depictions, we argue, accounts for many phenomena not covered by alternative models. (shrink)

Ethics and mathematics have long invited comparisons. On the one hand, both ethical and mathematical propositions can appear to be knowable a priori, if knowable at all. On the other hand, mathematical propositions seem to admit of proof, and to enter into empirical scientific theories, in a way that ethical propositions do not. In this article, I discuss apparent similarities and differences between ethical (i.e., moral) and mathematical knowledge, realistically construed -- i.e., construed as independent of human mind and languages. (...) I argue that some are are merely apparent, while others are of little consequence. There is a difference between the cases. But it is not an epistemological difference per se. The difference, surprisingly, is that ethical knowledge, if it is practical, cannot fail to be objective in a way that mathematical knowledge can. One upshot of the discussion is radicalization of Moore’s Open Question Argument. Another is that the concepts of realism and objectivity, which are widely identified, are actually in tension. (shrink)

In the Transcendental Aesthetic (TA), Kant is typically held to make negative assertations about “things in themselves,” namely that they are not spatial or temporal. These negative assertions stand behind the “neglected alternative” problem for Kant’s transcendental idealism. According to this problem, Kant may be entitled to assert that spatio-temporality is a subjective element of our cognition, but he cannot rule out that it may also be a feature of the objective world. In this paper, I show in a new (...) way how Kant’s view (focusing on his conclusions about space) is not subject to this objection, by showing that he does not make the denial about mind-independent reality that he is typically held to make. The argument develops consequences of a new reading of Kant’s expression “an sich selbst” (‘in itself’; ‘in themselves’). I argue that “an sich selbst” or “per se” has a special, judgment-level role, so that this expression does not form new noun-terms adjectivally. It follows that the conceptual unit of Kant’s “Conclusions” in the TA is simply “things” (Dinge), since “things in themselves” is not a nominal expression; Kant adopts the Wolffian ontological use of “thing” as the basic kind-term for any existent. The arguments that things per se are not in space are arguments that space cannot be a necessary property or relations of things as a kind. I show that this does not involve the positive claim about mind-independent reality that inspires the neglected alternative objection. (shrink)

Desde la antigüedad hasta hoy, la tradición vitruviana ha dominado los modos en que se ha entendido el oficio de la arquitectura y la figura del arquitecto en Occidente. Esta tradición hace de la arquitectura una práctica necesariamente relacionada con la edificación. Sin embargo, en los tiempos en que Vitruvio escribía su De Architectura, diferentes nociones sobre el oficio permeaban tanto en escritos dramáticos y filosóficos como en el sentido común de la época. En Cicerón y Eurípides, pero sobre todo (...) en Plauto, encontramos arquitecturas cuyos objetivos se alejaban del arte y se acercaban a la política, y arquitectos con habilidades que tenían menos que ver con la técnica, y más con la prudencia. Con ayuda del pensamiento aristotélico, veremos que estas figuras no eran meros caprichos dramatúrgicos ni moralistas, sino que poseían un fundamento epistemológico y práctico, que encontraba en la arquitectura un modo de pen- sar y de actuar más allá de la proyección y construcción de edificios. (shrink)

Opponents of women's education assumed that women were less naturally gifted than men, that education was inappropriate for Christian women, or that it was irrational to educate women because they could not fulfil the civil and ecclesiastical offices for which education was the required preparation. Van Schurman argued against all three assumptions in her Dissertatio . She presented her arguments as syllogisms, which she based on the authority of the Bible, on the Christian churches' understanding of human nature, and on (...) the necessity of knowledge to acquire virtues and to avoid falling into heresy. Van Schurman concluded that education was appropriate for women, in general, for exactly the same reasons as it was appropriate for men. Les opposants à une éducation des femmes considéraient qu'elles étaient naturellement moins douées que les hommes, que l'éducation était quelque chose d'inapproprié pour les femmes chrétiennes, ou qu'il était irrationnel d'éduquer les femmes car elles ne remplissent aucune charges civile ou ecclé siastique, charges pour lesquelles l'éducation constituait une préparation requise. Van Schurman discute ces trois assertions dans sa Dissertatio . Elle présente ses arguments comme des syllogismes, qu'elle fonde sur l'autorité de la Bible, sur la compréhension de la nature humaine par les églises chrétiennes, et sur la nécessité de la connaissance pour acquérir de la vertu et pour éviter de tomber dans l'hérésie. Van Schurman conclut qu'il est approprié que les femmes en général soient éduquées, tout comme cela est approprié pour les hommes. (shrink)

Alle Formen von Leben entstanden aus der primitiven Zelle, betrachtet eher als eine Art denn als ein Individuum, welches die Fähigkeit für ununterbrochene Selbst-Teilung besass. Fortgesetzte Vermehrung der Zellen mag eins von drei verschiedenen Verfahren folgen: 1. Die zwei Zellen von jeder Teilung hervorgehend, mögen sich vollständig von einander trennen; diese Linie der Entwicklung der primitiven Zelle rief die Protozoa hervor. 2. Während die Zellen sich teilen, mögen sie mehr oder weniger unregelmässig zusammen hängen. Diese Linie rief die Porifera hervor. (...) 3. Die sich teilenden Zellen mögen regelmässig zusammenhängen, eine Blastula und eine Gastrula bildend. Die Gastrula ist fähig eine unbestimmte Anzahl von Variationen hervorzubringen, und durch diese Variationen in der Gastrula entstanden alle Tier-Typen ausser der Protozoa und der Porifera.Diese Linien der Entwicklung von der einzelnen Zelle stellen alle die physischen und geometrischen entfaltungsfähigen Möglichkeiten, denkbar im Falle von Zellen, dar, die die Kraft besitzen sich durch Selbst-Teilung zu vermehren. Da diese entfaltungsfähigen Linien einfach mechanische Antworten auf die geometrischen und physischen Eigentümlichkeiten sind, eigen der Vermehrung der sich selbst teilenden Zellen, so gibt es keine Rechtfertigung für die Annahme einer bestimmten Ordnung in ihrem Vorkommen. Es ist logischer anzunehmen, dass die primitive Zelle gleich nach ihrem Erscheinen sich nach jeder möglichen Richtung gleichzeitig entwickelte, kurz, dass alle die Haupttypen des Tierlebens gleichzeitig erschienen.Es gibt keinen Beweis gegen diese Annahme, welche in Übereinstimmung mit dem geologischen Hintergrund des Lebens ist, wie wir es verstehen; mit der Fossilien-Urkunde, wie illustriert durch Fossilien von genau vergleichbaren Umgebungen; und mit der angenommenen Nötigkeit für ein System von Kontrolle und Ausgleich zwischen den verschiedenen Typen von Leben.Toutes les formes de la vie proviennent d'une cellule primitive unique, considérée comme espèce plutôt que comme individu, possédant le pouvoir de se multiplier par bi-partition répétée. La propagation continue de cellules peut avoir lieu de trois façons différentes: 1. Les deux cellules, après la division, peuvent se séparer complètement l'une de l'autre; cette forme de propagation de la cellule primitive a donné lieu aux Protozoaires. 2. Les cellules, en se divisant, peuvent rester liées plus ou moins irrégulièrement; cette forme de propagation caractérise les Porifères . 3. Les cellules, en se divisant, peuvent rester liées selon un arrangement régulier, en formant une blastula et une gastrula; la gastrula peut être formée selon un infinité de modalités, et c'est à ces différences de la formation de la gastrula que sont dues toutes les espèces animales exceptés les Protozoaires et les spongiées.Ces formes de propagation de la cellule unique représentent la somme des possibilités d'arrangement permises par les lois de la géométrie et de la physique. Du moment que ces procédés de propagation sont soumis à un arrangement mécanique gouverné par des lois physiques et géométriques, il n'y a pas lieu d'admettre qu'il y ait, dans leur succession, d'ordre déterminé. Il est plus logique de supposer qu'aussitôt parue la cellule primitive se soit propager simutanément dans toutes les directions concevables, en d'autres mots que toutes les phyla animales se soient différenciées au même moment.Aucune preuve ne démont cette hypothèse qui, d'ailleurs, concorde avec les prémises géologiques de la vie telles que nous les comprenons, avec les vestiges fossilisés de couches géologiques strictément comparable, et avec la théorie qui admet l'établissement de l'équilibre entre les différentes espèces animales au moyen d'un contrôle et de limitations mutuelles. (shrink)

Este artículo profundiza en los debates históricos y actuales en Canadá sobre la historia nacional y la enseñanza de la historia en el complicado escenario de trece jurisdicciones educativas de Canadá. En este trabajo se analizan los debates sobre los contenidos en la enseñanza de la historia y en los libros de texto, así como los enfoques en la escuela. Se analizan las formas en que un enfoque de pensamiento histórico está consolidándose en todo el país en el período actual, (...) con una mayor atención a la investigación en la enseñanza de la historia y su difusión y su mayor presencia en los planes provinciales. Se considera el papel del gobierno federal en estos cambios, las organizaciones privadas sin fines de lucro, y los proyectos financiados por el gobierno nacional, tales como el Historical Thinking Project y The History Education Network. (shrink)

La présence des Éléates, plus précisément de Mélissos et surtout de Parménide, au début de la Physique d’Aristote est un sujet d’une difficulté que Clarke (C. dorénavant) met en lumière dans cet ouvrage. Le livre ne se contente pourtant pas de faire une étude purement aristotélicienne, mais il vise également à contribuer aux études parménidiennes. C. propose en effet d’éclaircir les arguments fournis contre l’éléatisme en Physique I.2-3, lesquels lui permettent de dégager les thèses qu’Aristo...

Uma das principais discussões na correspondência Leibniz-Clarke tem que ver com o melhor modo de conceber a liberdade da vontade. A relação entre a vontade e os motivos é semelhante à que se verifica entre a balança e os pesos? A vontade tem a capacidade de contrariar a inclinação mais forte? A noção de motivos que inclinam sem necessitar basta para defender a liberdade? Estas e outras perguntas constituem o campo de batalha em que duas diferentes perspectivas acerca da liberdade (...) humana e divina se enfrentam. O nosso artigo foca a posição de Leibniz a respeito deste tema, tal como se desenha nas cartas tro­cadas com Clarke. Nele, sublinhamos as preocupações fundamentais de Leibniz na tarefa de conceptualização da vontade livre, oferecemos um brevíssimo resumo da sua argumentação e partilhamos algumas dificuldades relativas à interpretação das teses apresentadas pelo filósofo alemão. (shrink)

RésuméDans cet article, je réponds à Clark Wolf, Elizabeth Edenberg et Helga Varden. Partageant des sympathies pour le libéralisme opposé à l'oppression et pour la théorie du contrat social, ils me recommandent avec insistance de développer ma théorie dans des directions nouvelles — respectivement comme une forme de justice pour tous les sujets, avec une justification politique libérale, et suivant la conception kantienne de « droit privé ». Je réponds en expliquant que l'inclusivité est incorporée dans l'idée même du (...) schéma des relations de soin (« arrow of care map ») que je mets de l'avant, comme elle est inscrite dans la variété des théories contractuelles que je soutiens. De plus, j'insiste sur le fait que le libéralisme qui rejette l'oppression ne doit pas formuler ses arguments seulement dans les termes de la politique libérale. (shrink)

In this essay, we focus primarily on Moore’s “Proof of an External World” and Kant’s “Refutation of Idealism.” We are not exactly commenting on Clarke’s “The Legacy of Skepticism,” interpreting it, although what we do involves us in (some of) that. Instead of directly commenting on it, we do things with Legacy; we read Moore’s Proof and Kant’s Refutation with Clarke in mind. And by way of doing this, we bring onto the stage a post-Legacy Moore, and a post-Legacy Kant. (...) We do not claim to present Moore and Kant per se (to use Clarke’s term); we do not portray Moore and Kant as they are independently of “The Legacy of Skepticism.” We propose instead Moore and Kant as we read them after Legacy, i.e., in light of the pure/plain distinction. (shrink)

Este volumen, breve pero rico en ideas, en la serie de Cambridge Elements in the Philosophy of Mathematics presenta una visión general del enfoque que su autor ha desarrollado en una serie de trabajos (incluyendo su libro Morality and Mathematics, 2020, del que extrae material que presenta aquí) respecto de una amplia serie de problemas que incluyen, más allá de la filosofía de la matemática, al realismo normativo, modal y lógico. A partir de una discusión acerca de las condiciones que (...) tienen que satisfacerse para que tengamos conocimiento matemático, Clarke-Doane propone que los mismos problemas aparecen en estos otros dominios, y sugiere que adoptemos una misma estrategia (o más bien, el mismo tipo de estrategia) en cada caso. Esta solución consiste en adoptar una forma de pluralismo realista: a pesar de que cada uno de estos dominios es objetivo y de que las verdades que caen bajo cada uno no dependen de lo que nadie piense, cada manera de pensar acerca del dominio es correcta desde cierta perspectiva. La propuesta de Clarke-Doane se alinea con las propuestas de Balaguer (1995), Putnam (1980) y Carnap (1950) y, en efecto, Clarke-Doane sugiere que su forma de pluralismo no es sino la postura de Carnap en clave realista. (shrink)

Na correspondência entre Leibniz e Clarke, uma das mais famosas do século XVIII, os dois filósofos discutem tópicos ligados à física, à metafísica e à teologia. A argumentação de Leibniz baseia-se em três princípios bem conhecidos da sua filosofia, o princípio do melhor, o princípio de identidade dos indiscerníveis e o princípio de razão suficiente (PRS). Este último ocupa lugar de destaque, não só porque a maior parte dos tópicos abordados surge de uma discussão acerca do significado do PRS enquanto (...) aplicado às acções de Deus, mas também porque é dele que Leibniz deriva o princípio de identidade dos indiscerníveis, e mostra que o espaço e o tempo não podem ser absolutos. Clarke reconhece a importância do PRS, mas a sua interpretação do princípio difere da de Leibniz, e a sua concepção da reali­dade encontra-se fundada no que considera ser o verdadeiro sentido do PRS. Dada a impor­tância que o PRS tem na correspondência, procuramos pôr em evidência as duas linhas de argumentação que se baseiam nele e identificar os problemas que lhe estão associados. (shrink)

Resumo: O objetivo deste artigo é demonstrar como a teoria da mente estendida, particularmente os argumentos de Andy Clark, pode explicar os processos mentais não como fenômenos restritivos ao cérebro e endossar sua conexão com o corpo e o ambiente. Dessa forma, inicialmente, reconstroem-se as principais perspectivas materialistas que limitaram o self ao crânio; em seguida, aponta-se como o caráter estendido da mente escapa aos seus limites naturais e se mistura “descaradamente” ao mundo. Argumenta-se que artefatos externos desempenham um (...) papel importante na orientação de ações, de modo que mudanças no ambiente podem causar mudanças no comportamento do agente cognitivo, configurando uma dependência constitutiva. Desse modo, a tese da mente estendida desafia tanto o funcionalismo tradicional quanto o externalismo, pois, por um lado, considera os processos cognitivos e os estados mentais como interações relevantes do indivíduo com o ambiente e, por outro, como comportamentos orientados pela intenção. Por meio da integração dos corpos biológicos com artefatos ou ferramentas, sustenta-se uma leitura que dissolve a clássica “lacuna explicativa” das ciências cognitivas. (shrink)

Se realizó un estudio descriptivo para evaluar la influencia de la rehabilitación protésica en la calidad de vida de los pacientes desdentados totales tratados en las clínicas estomatológicas docentes "Ismael Clark Mascaró" y "La Vigía" en Camagüey, desde septiembre del 2009 a septiembre del 2013. El universo estuvo comprendido por 254 pacientes desdentados totales rehabilitados y una muestra de 43, a través de un muestreo probabilístico aleatorio. Se obtuvo un predominio del grupo de 50-69 años y el sexo femenino. (...) Al determinar los problemas mecánicos se apreció que los flancos sobreextendidos, seguido de las inserciones frénicas sin liberar y la presencia de puntos prematuros de contacto, fueron las principales dificultades encontradas en los pacientes portadores de prótesis totales. La rehabilitación influyó en la calidad de vida de estos pacientes. It was carried out a descriptive study with the objective to evaluate the influence of prosthetic rehabilitation in total toothless patients life quality treated in the teaching stomatological clinics ¨Ismael Clark Mascaró" and "La Vigía" in Camagüey, from September 2009 to September 2013, with a universe of study composed by 254 total toothless patients who were rehabilitated. The sample was of 43, through a random probabilistic sampling. There was a predominance of the female group aged from 50-69 years old, followed by the female group aged 70. While determining the mechanical problems it was appreciated that the flanks overextended, followed of phrenic insertions without being sustained and the presence of premature points of contact, and were the main difficulties found in the patient's carrier of total prostheses. Prosthetic rehabilitation influenced in the patients´ quality life. (shrink)

Il concetto di legittimità è al tempo stesso definito e indefinito, chiaro e sfuggente. Da un lato, esso evoca immediatamente e spontaneamente un sentimento di approvazione, perché chiaramente collegato nel linguaggio comune a un giudizio valutativo positivo. Dall’altro lato, se analizzato da vicino, il suo contenuto appare sfuggente, polisemico, controverso. Questo ne fa una categoria potente dal punto di vista politico ed estremamente affascinante da un punto di vista scientifico. Nelle pagine seguenti verranno analizzate le teorie di tre autori che (...) si sono confrontati con questo concetto indagando uno degli ambiti in cui la dicotomia sopra presentata è più evidente: quello internazionale. Si tratta della teoria di Ian Clark sulla legittimità nella società internazionale, della prospettiva interciviltà sul diritto internazionale proposta da Onuma Yasuaki e della riflessione di Antony Anghie sullo sviluppo dei principi fondamentali del diritto internazionale e il loro rapporto con il colonialismo. Come vedremo, si tratta di indagini tra loro fortemente eterogenee, e che non sempre fanno del concetto di legittimità internazionale l’oggetto principale o esplicito delle proprie ricerche. Nel confronto tra queste teorie che proporrò nelle mie pagine, il concetto di legittimità internazionale mostrerà tutta la sua complessità e tutto il suo ambiguo rapporto con elementi valutativi. (shrink)

El objetivo del presente artículo se anida en analizar el debate entre internismo y externismo mental desde las propuestas de la teoría de la mente extendida. Para ello, presentaré las líneas maestras de la propuesta de Clark y Chalmers, para contraponerla, enseguida, con las tesis del internismo y del externismo en sus múltiples variantes. Mi tesis es que la TME sigue siendo internista en la medida en que entiende que la individuación de los estados mentales, en función de su (...) contenido, sigue dependiendo de factores internos o mentales, a pesar de que la cognición se apoye en vehículos materiales extracraneales y del entorno. (shrink)

Se trata de un número monográfico muy interesante, que integra un conjunto de trabajos de prestigiosos profesores universitarios—A. Clark, H. Simon, A. Gomila, J. Toribio, R. Tuomela, M. Liz, P.F. Martínez Freire, F. Broncano, C.J. Moya, P.S. Churchland, P.M. Churchland, A. Burrieza y A. Estany—sobre diversos temas candentes de la Filosofía de las Ciencias Cognitivas: cognición incorporizada, teorías computacionales de la cognición, mecanismos mentales de la intersubjetividad, responsabilidad semántica, intención conjunta y colectiva, relación entre el problema del mundo externo (...) y el problema ontológico de la experiencia subjetiva, la realidad desde la mente, relevancia filosófica de una teoría funcional de las emociones, problemas que plantean las emociones a la posibilidad de responsabilidad moral, neurobiología y conciencia, neurobiología cognitiva de las virtudes morales, tratamiento lógico de la conciencia en Inteligencia Artificial y ventajas epistémicas de la cognición socialmente distribuida. El agrupamiento de los artículos en partes diferenciadas es adecuado y coherente. Me habría gustado mucho seguirlo con orden y analizar sus contenidos con detalle; pero debo limitarme a un examen más general y a considerar simplemente las grandes tendencias o afinidades temáticas que se manifiestan a través de las páginas. Quizás lo más relevante sea la constatación efectiva de un fenómeno que se ha producido en la investigación actual sobre ciencias cognitivas y que señala A. Clark en su escrito: el redescubrimiento del cuerpo y el mundo, la crisis de una visión aislacionista de la cognición, y el surgimiento de un nuevo paradigma de patrones de actividad distribuidos a lo largo de trayectorias de procesamiento temporalmente extendidas mediante redes neuronales recurrentes. Se aprecia aquí que el énfasis se ha trasladado desde la representación simbólica hacia series reiteradas de interacciones agente-entorno. Y eso es lo prime-ro que cabría resaltar: el paulatino abandono del paradigma de representación simbólica y la atención creciente a las interacciones acopladas agente-mundo. (shrink)

Research and engineering in the quantum domain involve long chains of activity involving theory development, hypothesis formation, experimentation, device prototyping, device testing, and many more. At each stage multiple paths become possible, and of the paths pursued, the majority will lead nowhere. Our quantum metascience approach provides a strategy which enables all stakeholders to gain an overview of those developments along these tracks, that are relevant to their specific concerns. It provides a controlled vocabulary, built out of terms that are (...) designed to be maximally comprehensible to all groups of stakeholders and across all the sub-fields of the quantum domain. (shrink)

I examine the following question: Do actions require representations that are intrinsic to the action itself? Recent work by Mark Rowlands, Michael Wheeler, and Andy Clark suggests that actions may require a minimal form of representation. I argue that the various concepts of minimal representation on offer do not apply to action per se and that a non‐representationalist account that focuses on dynamic systems of self‐organizing continuous reciprocal causation at the sub‐personal level is superior. I further recommend a scientific (...) pragmatism regarding the concept of representation. (shrink)

En el presente artículo se investiga acerca de una comprensión “anorgánica” de la ciudad desde la idea de geofilosofía de Deleuze y Guattari, la concepción política de Jacques Rancière, y de la concepción del cuerpo de Zubiri. La fi gura del organismo domina la historia de la metafísica y, por ende, la comprensión arquitectónica y política de la ciudad. Frente a esto pretendemos investigar, en primer lugar, la diferencia entre dos comprensiones y usos del espacio: “espacio liso” y “espacio estriado”, (...) y, en segundo lugar, la diferencia entre “procesos de sujeción” y “producción de subjetividad”. Tales ideas están repensadas desde una concepción del cuerpo que no es orgánica sino eminentemente somática y de actualidad en diferencia. La función de la idea de organismo en arquitectura, persigue la producción de identidades. Frente a ésta, los usos y la ocupación del espacio presentan la posibilidad de una “producción de sí” corporal, sentando la heterogeneidad como forma social de construcción de la ciudad, dislocando aquelorden impuesto homogéneo. Con el fin de proponer una arquitectura de la dislocación, presentamos el trabajo de Gordon Matta Clark, trabajo donde deshacer las formas del organismo implica experimentar con un devenir corporal de la ciudad. (shrink)

El capítulo introduce al debate sobre la naturaleza del espacio entre Leibniz y Clarke/Newton y a la posición que adopta Kant más tarde. En particular, se exponen los dos principales argumentos de Leibniz, basados en los Principios de Razón Suficiente e Identidad de Indiscernibles, en favor del relacionismo así como algunas respuestas de Clarke/Newton. También se presenta el argumento basado en la orientación del espacio que propuso Kant en 1768 para refutar el relacionismo de Leibniz. Se concluye con una breve (...) exposición del idealismo trascendental de Kant en su Primera Crítica. (shrink)

Does the material basis of conscious experience extend beyond the boundaries of the brain and central nervous system? In Clark 2009 I reviewed a number of ‘enactivist’ arguments for such a view and found none of them compelling. Ward (2012) rejects my analysis on the grounds that the enactivist deploys an essentially world-involving concept of experience that transforms the argumentative landscape in a way that makes the enactivist conclusion inescapable. I present an alternative (prediction-and-generative-model-based) account that neatly accommodates all (...) the positive evidence that Ward cites on behalf of this enactivist conception, and that (I argue) makes richer and more satisfying contact with the full sweep of human experience. (shrink)

How do intelligent agents spawn and exploit integrated processing regimes spanning brain, body, and world? The answer may lie in the ability of the biological brain to select actions and policies in the light of counterfactual predictions – predictions about what kinds of futures will result if such-and-such actions are launched. Appeals to the minimization of ‘counterfactual prediction errors’ (the ones that would result under various scenarios) already play a leading role in attempts to apply the basic toolkit of the (...) neurocomputational theory known as ‘predictive processing’ to higher cognitive functions such as policy selection and planning. In this paper, I show that this also leads naturally to the discovery and use of extended processing regimes defined across heterogeneous mixtures of biological and non-biological resource. This solves a long-standing puzzle concerning the ‘recruitment’ of the right non-neural processing resources at the right time. It reveals how (and why) human brains spawn and maintain extended human minds. (shrink)

What is the relation between the material, conventional symbol structures that we encounter in the spoken and written word, and human thought? A common assumption, that structures a wide variety of otherwise competing views, is that the way in which these material, conventional symbol-structures do their work is by being translated into some kind of content-matching inner code. One alternative to this view is the tempting but thoroughly elusive idea that we somehow think in some natural language (such as English). (...) In the present treatment I explore a third option, which I shall call the "complementarity" view of language. According to this third view the actual symbol structures of a given language add cognitive value by complementing (without being replicated by) the more basic modes of operation and representation endemic to the biological brain. The "cognitive bonus" that language brings is, on this model, not to be cashed out either via the ultimately mysterious notion of "thinking in a given natural language" or via some process of exhaustive translation into another inner code. Instead, we should try to think in terms of a kind of coordination dynamics in which the forms and structures of a language qua material symbol system play a key and irreducible role. Understanding language as a complementary cognitive resource is, I argue, an important part of the much larger project (sometimes glossed in terms of the "extended mind") of understanding human cognition as essentially and multiply hybrid: as involving a complex interplay between internal biological resources and external non-biological resources. (shrink)

Arguments for the ‘extended mind’ seem to suggest the possibility of ‘extended knowers’—agents whose specifically epistemic virtues may depend on systems whose boundaries are not those of the brain or the biological organism. Recent discussions of this possibility invoke insights from virtue epistemology, according to which knowledge is the result of the application of some kind of cognitive skill or ability on the part of the agent. In this paper, I argue that there is a fundamental tension in these appeals (...) to cognitive virtue. The tension centers on the presence of a tool or technology as an object of awareness, hence something apt for epistemically virtuous engagement on the part of the agent. I highlight a dilemma: the better something looks as a non-biological element of the machinery of mind, the worse it looks as a potential object of any specifically epistemic skill or ability on the part of the agent. The tension is resolved, I argue, by thinking about sub-personal forms of epistemic hygiene. I examine one such form , and show how it sits neatly with the vision of the extended mind. I end by asking what we can still reasonably expect, given this more complex sub-personal story, by way of agent-level cognitive hygiene. (shrink)

This paper presents a cognitive account of the process of evaluating scientific data. Our account assumes that when individuals evaluate data, they construct a mental model of a data-interpretation package, in which the data and theoretical interpretations of the data are integrated. We propose that individuals attempt to discount data by seeking alternative explanations for events within the mental model; data-interpretation packages are accepted when the individual cannot find alternative accounts for these events. Our analysis indicates that there are many (...) levels at which data-interpretation packages can be accepted or denied. (shrink)

In this paper I will argue that in emergency cases, physician autonomy is soci-etally constrained under Principle VI of the American Medical Association's “Principles of Medical Ethics”1 The issue will be seen to turn on whether the contextual use of “emergency” should be construed narrowly or broadly; I argue for a broadened rendering. Although a societal emergency is not defined here, I recommend that the condition of inner city healthcare presents a paradigm “patient” for such emergency care. I further urge (...) that because societal constraints on physician autonomy are ambiguous and only derived indirectly in the AMA document, further AMA comment on physician autonomy and societal responsibility would advance clarity on the profession's commitment to the public trust. (shrink)

Kevin T. Kelly and Clark Glymour. Inductive Inference from Theory-Laden Data.