Plausibly, only moral agents can bear action-demanding duties. Not all groups are moral agents. This places constraints on which groups can bear action-demanding duties. Moreover, if such duties imply ability then moral agents – of both the individual and group varieties – can only bear duties over actions they are able to perform. I tease out the implications of this for duties over group actions, and argue that groups in many instances cannot bear these duties. This is because only groups (...) with the right kind of structure – groups I call ‘collectives’ – have the agency to bear action-demanding duties. Yet neither can individuals bear these duties, assuming that individuals cannot perform group actions and that duty implies ability. This appears to leave us at a loss when assigning duties to perform some group actions. I argue we can solve this problem by assigning collectivization duties to individuals – duties to form a collective that then incurs a duty over the action. I give criteria for when individuals have collectivization duties and discuss the demands these duties place on their bearers. (shrink)

This paper provides an overview of Group Duties: Their Existence and Their Implications for Individuals.

Which kinds of responsibility can we attribute to which kinds of collective, and why? In contrast, which kinds of collective responsibility can we not attribute—which kinds are ‘gappy’? This study provides a framework for answering these questions. It begins by distinguishing between three kinds of collective and three kinds of responsibility. It then explains how gaps—i.e. cases where we cannot attribute the responsibility we might want to—appear to arise within each type of collective responsibility. It argues some of these gaps (...) do not exist on closer inspection, at least for some collectives and some of the time. (shrink)

In this article, I consider the harms inflicted upon transgender persons through “misgendering,” that is, such deployments of gender terms that diminish transgender persons’ selfrespect, limit the discursive resources at their disposal to define their own gender, and cause them microaggressive psychological harms. Such deployments are morally contestable, that is, they can be challenged on ethical or political grounds. Two characterizations of “woman” proposed in the feminist literature are critiqued from this perspective. When we consider what would happen to transgender (...) women upon the broad implementation of these characterizations within transgender women’s social context, we discover that they suffer from two defects: they either exclude at least some transgender women, or else they implicitly foster hierarchies among women, marginalizing transgender women in particular. In conclusion, I claim that the moral contestability of gender-term deployments acts as a stimulus to regularly consider the provisionality and revisability of our deployments of the term “woman.”. (shrink)

Unconsented pelvic exams under anesthesia are assaults cloaked in defense of healthcare education. Preemptive linguistic qualifiers “presumed” or “implied” attempt to justify such violations with flippancy toward their oxymoronic implications: to suggest a priori that consent can be assumed undermines its otherwise standalone social, ethical, and medico-legal reverence. In this paper I conceptualize “medical sexual assault” and argue that presumed consent for intimate exams exemplifies its definition. By bluntly describing pelvic exams as “penetration,” this work aims to reify the intimate (...) reality of the clinical label “pelvic exam” and to call attention to cisheteronormative and androcentric assumptions involved in its practice. Additionally, this scholarship seeks to create a foundation toward broader work in conceptualizing clinical rape culture. Given recent national survey data indicating a surprising frequency of unconsented intimate exams, detailed language as to their problematics is necessary for ongoing legal and ethical efforts. Explicit consent for intimate exams must be the standard of care for conscious and unconscious patients. (shrink)

Individuals have various kinds of obligations: keep promises, don’t cause harm, return benefits received from injustices, be partial to loved ones, help the needy and so on. How does this work for group agents? There are two questions here. The first is whether groups can bear the same kinds of obligations as individuals. The second is whether groups’ pro tanto obligations plug into what they all-things-considered ought to do to the same degree that individuals’ pro tanto obligations plug into what (...) they all-things-considered ought to do. We argue for parity on both counts. (shrink)

Although the terms mentor and thesis advisor (or research supervisor) are often used interchangeably, the responsibilities associated with these roles are distinct, even when they overlap. Neither are role models necessarily mentors, though mentors are role models: good examples are necessary but not sufficient. Mentorship is both a personal and a professional relationship. It has the potential for raising a number of ethical concerns, including issues of accuracy and reliability of the information conveyed, access, stereotyping and tracking of advisees, and (...) the abuse of power. Nevertheless, mentors can be critically important for professional success and are one of a number of elements that affect the responsible conduct of research. In addition, the community as a whole has a responsibility to mentor junior members. (shrink)

In order for states to fulfil their moral duties, costs must be passed to individual citizens. This paper asks how these costs should be distributed. I advocate the common-sense answer: the distribution of costs should, insofar as possible, track the reasons behind the state’s duty. This answer faces a number of problems, which I attempt to solve.

We examined an account of vicarious shame that explains how people can experience a self-conscious emotion for the behaviour of another person. Two divergent processes have been put forward to explain how another's behaviour links to the self. The group-based emotion account explains vicarious shame in terms of an in-group member threatening one's social identity by behaving shamefully. The empathy account explains vicarious shame in terms of empathic perspective taking; people imagine themselves in another's shameful behaviour. In three studies using (...) autobiographical recall and experimental inductions, we revealed that both processes can explain why vicarious shame arises in different situations, what variation can be observed in the experience of vicarious shame, and how all vicarious shame can be related to a threat to the self. Results are integrated in a functional account of shame. (shrink)

There has been extensive discussion in research ethics literature surrounding the appropriate form of informed consent for biobanking, whether with adapted content, or adapted forms such as broad or tiered consent. These discussions presuppose that it is possible to disclose adequate information at the outset to facilitate an informed choice to donate to a biobank. I will argue that informed consent cannot be achieved because in the biobanking context, we are either consenting to an enterprise that is not research or (...) to future research. Nor is the solution to abandon the idea that informed consent ethically requires the disclosure of a certain minimal amount of information to make an informed choice by misleadingly identifying broad, blanket or even tiered consent as forms of ‘informed’ consent. Rather, we should abandon the idea that informed consent for research can be adapted to the type of endeavor that biobanking is, and understand the goal as to develop alternatives not as alternative forms of informed consent, but rather alternatives to informed consent. (shrink)

Luisa Capetillo has been heralded as the first feminist writer of Puerto Rico. She authored four books and embodied her emancipatory philosophical commitments, but has received scant philosophical attention. In this paper I recover the philosophy of Capetillo as part of a Latin American and Caribbean philosophical tradition centered on radical praxis places sexuality at the centerfold of class politics. At the intersection between gender equity and class emancipation Capetillo advocated for the liberatory possibilities of education, which served as the (...) key to unlearning the social norms that engendered the marginalization of working people and working women. (shrink)

This short article provides an overview of "care ethics" for students who are new to moral theory.

In this paper, I invoke various matterings of felt in order to generate a practice of writing that engenders bodily difference that is affective, moving, and wooly. In attending to ‘how to write as felt,’ as a touching encounter, I consider how human and nonhuman matter composes. This co-mingling that felt performs enacts what Alaimo calls transcorporeality. Connecting felt with theories of touch and transcorporeality becomes a way to open up and re-configure different bodily imaginaries, both human and nonhuman, that (...) are radically immanent and intensive; as an assemblage of forces and flows that open bodies to helices and trans connections :27–58, 2017b). My contribution to this collection on ‘humanity in a posthuman age’ is experimental and performative. Felt is activated not as a metaphor but rather poses questions about what writing does at the interstices between research and creation. (shrink)

More Than a quarter of a century has elapsed since the publication of the Oxyrhynchus papyrus which Lobel identified as a fragment of Sophocles’ Inachus, and though it has revolutionised our knowledge of the play, it has proved an excellent example of the papyrological commonplace that each new discovery creates more problems than it solves. What could with reasonable confidence be inferred about the Inachus from the comparatively numerous ancient quotations and allusions is well summarised in Pearson's introduction: Inachus, Hermes, (...) Argus, and Iris took part in the action, but beyond the fact that the play told of Io's transformation and of blessings bestowed on Argos as a result of Zeus' visitation the development of the plot could only be conjectured. A majority of those who have discussed the play have shared Hemsterhuys' view that it was satyric, and the publication in 1933 of a Tebtunis papyrus preserving part of a dramatic composition dealing with Zeus’ love for Io and strongly suggesting a satyr-play was welcomed by many as confirmation of this conjecture. But the ascription of the Tebtunis fragment to Sophocles is far from certain, and its testimony will not allay the doubts of those who are troubled by the lack of direct evidence for satyrs in the Inachus and by the feeling that the importance of the moral and theological issues raised makes its theme unusually serious for satyric drama. (shrink)

This article draws on the conceptualisation of ‘discursive formation’ to examine the particular configuration of the ‘objects, subjects, concepts and strategies’ which constituted ‘nuclear proliferation’ between 2006 and 2012. While previous studies have mostly explored the discourse of nuclear proliferation through the analysis of newspaper texts, few have considered corpora from different sites or considered the changes, transformations and contradictions that take place when meanings are delocated from one site and relocated in another. Elements of poststructuralist discourse theory, critical linguistics (...) and corpus linguistics are brought together to consider how events were constructed within two corpora: UN Security Council resolutions and newspaper articles published in prominent UK and US broadsheets. WordSmith Tools was used to analyse word frequencies, statistical patterns of keywords, word collocation profiles and concordance patterns. Results indicate that the most salient lexical items refer to actors, strategic actions and technologies. As these constituents of nuclear proliferation are delocated from the political sphere and relocated in the public sphere, three discursive strategies unfold: personalisation, normalisation or exceptionalisation, and reification. (shrink)

This case study explored how a teacher, Mr. Smith, and his students experienced a mandated performance assessment while simultaneously preparing for an end of the year high-stakes, multiple-choice assessment. We employed qualitative research methods to examine how the teacher enacted a mandated performance assessment during a unit on Byzantium and how students described their learning and classroom experiences from the unit. Drawing on Grant's idea of ambitious teaching and learning of history and Ball's work on policy realization, analysis of these (...) data indicated that Mr. Smith interpreted and enacted a performance assessment in ways that differed from how district and state policy makers intended. Despite an assessment that the district designed to promote historical thinking skills, students learned primarily factual knowledge. (shrink)

‘One of Horace's fables remembered or invented. It is not found elsewhere’ . Not elsewhere in classical literature, certainly. But a story illustrating precisely this absurd ignorance of the natural world is attested later, in circumstances which make it highly unlikely that it derives from Horace's brief reference, and I think we may safely assume that he did not invent the tale.

Cicero's discussion of wit in the de oratore includes an entertaining story about Ennius and a certain Nasica : ‘Valde haec ridentur et hercule omnia quae a prudentibus per simulationem subabsurde salseque dicuntur. Ex quo genere est etiam non videri intellegere quod intellegas… ut illud Nasicae, qui cum ad poetam Ennium venisset eique ab ostio quaerenti Ennium ancilla dixisset domi non esse, Nasica sensit illam domini iussu dixisse et ilium intus esse; paucis post diebus cum ad Nasicam venisset Ennius et (...) eum ad ianuam quaereret, exclamat Nasica domi non esse, turn Ennius “quid? ego non cognosco vocem” inquit “tuam?” Hic Nasica “homo es impudens:ego cum te quaererem ancillae tuae credidi te domi non esse, tu mihi non credis ipsi?”’ This anecdote, devitalized by its divorce from a well–known name, finds a place in the Philogelos, a compendium of jokes compiled in late antiquity and ascribed to the otherwise unidentifiable Hierocles and Philagrius, : Δύσκολόν τις ζτει. δ πεκρίνατο Ούκ εμì δε. τοû δ γελσαντος καì επόντοςΨεύδ τς γρ φωνς σου κούω – επεν ῏Ω κθαπμα, ε μέν δολός μου επχες ν ατ πιστεσαι γ δ σοι οφαίνομαι ξιοπιστότερος κείνου εναι. (shrink)

It is hard to avoid the suspicion that the time appointed for the arrival of Lucian's leviathan was intended to bring to the reader's mind Nearchus' account of an alarming encounter with a school of whales in the course of his famous voyage from the Indus to the Persian Gulf ).

Boyer's cognitive model of ownership, based on cooperation and competition, underscores the importance of studying disagreements in ownership. We argue that exploring the factors that can lead to different perceptions and experiences of ownership will uniquely inform our understanding of legal, psychological, and perceived ownership beliefs.

There are good reasons why social psychologists have emphasized the negative side of human reasoning. They are simply following humans' tendency to pay particular attention to unusual occurrences. Attempts to refocus attention onto a wider range of behavior should include the influence of learning on both normative and non-normative behavior.

This is a response to the critial comments by Anne Schwenkenbecher, Olle Blomberg, Bill Wringe and Gunnar Björnsson.

These questions lie at the heart of contemporary feminist theory, and in this collection they are addressed by a group of distinguished international scholars ...

Scholars and policymakers continue to struggle over the meaning of the word “vulnerable” in the context of research ethics. One major reason for the stymied discussions regarding vulnerable populations is that there is no clear distinction between accounts of research vulnerabilities that exist for certain populations and discussions of research vulnerabilities that require special regulations in the context of research ethics policies. I suggest an analytic process by which to ascertain whether particular vulnerable populations should be contenders for additional regulatory (...) protections. I apply this process to two vulnerable populations: the cognitively vulnerable and the economically vulnerable. I conclude that a subset of the cognitively vulnerable require extra protections while the economically vulnerable should be protected by implementing existing regulations more appropriately and rigorously. Unless or until the informed consent process is more adequately implemented and the distributive justice requirement of the Belmont Report is emphasized and operationalized, the economically disadvantaged will remain particularly vulnerable to the harm of exploitation in research. (shrink)

The following pair of claims is standardly endorsed by philosophers working on group agency: (1) groups are capable of irreducible moral agency and, therefore, can be blameworthy; (2) groups are not capable of irreducible moral patiency, and, therefore, lack moral rights. This paper argues that the best case for (1) brings (2) into question. Section 2 paints the standard picture, on which groups’ blameworthiness derives from their functionalist or interpretivist moral agency, while their lack of moral rights derives from their (...) lack of sentience. In Section 3, I add support to a recent argument that this standard picture needs alteration: groups’ blameworthiness requires something akin to sentience, which groups acquire from members. Section 4 discusses rights: if groups acquire sentience from members, as Section 3 argues, then can groups have moral rights? I argue that they can, but that groups have only a limited range of moral rights, whose existence depends on (without being ontologically or justificatorily reducible to) the attitudes and actions of humans. (shrink)

Many roles are situated within organizations. The occupants of these roles often confront a dilemma between (i) the occupancy conditions, performance conditions, and functions of the role, as bestowed upon the role by the organization’s decision-making procedures, and (ii) the occupancy conditions, performance conditions, and function that the role should ideally have. This chapter argues that this dilemma should be resolved in favour of (ii). Yet this does not require forgoing role-based considerations in favour of extra-role considerations. Instead, we should (...) conceptualize organizationally specified roles as being one token of an underlying role-type. The underlying role-type provides the organizational role-token with its fundamental occupancy conditions, performance conditions, and function. When the token is a poor instance of its type, organizational role-occupants have obligations—grounded in the fundamental aspects of the role—to challenge this. These are role obligations that call upon one to alter one’s role obligations. (shrink)

Theorists of democratic multiculturalism have long-defended individuals’ religious exemptions from generally-applicable laws. Examples include Sikhs being exempt from motorcycle helmet laws, or Jews and Muslims being exempt from humane animal slaughter laws. This paper investigates religious exemptions for organisations. Should organisations ever be granted exemptions from generally-applicable laws in democratic societies, where those exemptions are justified by the organisation’s religion? The paper considers four arguments for this, which respectively rely on: the ‘transferring up’ to organisations of individuals’ claims to autonomy (...) or recognition; organisations’ own claims to autonomy or recognition; organisations’ status in the accountability-community; and organisations’ procedural constraints. The paper concludes that only the last argument works—and then, only with caveats. (shrink)

This chapter focuses on the question of who has duties regarding poverty and what those duties demand, from within the perspective of contemporary analytic normative philosophy. The chapter is structured in three sections. Section 1 considers the duties of those living in poverty, which might be either self-regarding or other-regarding duties, and which must be tempered by concerns of overdemandingness. Section 2 considers the duties of affluent individuals. These are imperfect duties grounded in affluent individuals’ relations to the structures that (...) produce poverty: relations of contribution, benefit, and ability to change. Section 3 considers duties of collective agents – including states, for-profits, charities, and civil society groups. The poverty-related duties of these collective agents are sometimes perfect and sometimes imperfect, and include both primary and secondary duties, and both positive and negative duties. (shrink)

Ann Margaret Sharp, American philosopher of education, believed that friends could, in fact, be quite critical of one another. Writing in her essay, “What is a Community of Inquiry,” she states,... but children know that the group has taken on a great significance for them: each one’s happiness means as much to each of them as their own. They truly care for each other as persons, and this care enables them to converse in ways they never have before. They can (...) engage in inquiry without fear of rebuff or humiliation. They can try out ideas that they never would have thought of expressing before just to see what happens.I am grateful to the friends of Sharp who spent time in pursuit of understanding her work and its... (shrink)