I begin with Kant's notion of a maxim and consider the role which this notion plays in Kant's formulations of the fundamental categorical imperative. This raises the question of what a maxim is, and why there is not the same requirement for resolutions of other kinds to be universalizable. Drawing on Bernard Williams' notion of a thick ethical concept, I proffer an answer to this question which is intended neither in a spirit of simple exegesis nor as a straightforward (...) exercise in moral philosophy but as something that is poised somewhere between the two. My aim is to provide a kind of rational reconstruction of Kant. In the final section of the essay, I argue that this reconstruction, while it manages to salvage something distinctively Kantian, also does justice to the relativism involved in what J. L. Mackie calls 'people's adherence to and participation in different ways of life'. (shrink)

Justice requires that one act on a fair optimizing strategy when one can—that is, a strategy that will yield an outcome that satisfies the standards set by minimax relative concession and optimality. We now address the problem raised by Hobbes's Foole—be it ever so rational to agree to minimax relative concession, is compliance with it rational, as opposed to directly maximizing one's own utility? We distinguish a straightforward maximizer, who is disposed always to maximize his own utility, from a (...) constrained maximizer, who is disposed to refrain from utility maximization in favour of fair optimality, and show that persons with the latter disposition can expect to do better so long as there is a significant proportion of them in the population and reasonably able to identify one another and to avoid misidentifying straightforward maximizers. We argue that this shows the rationality both of constrained maximization as a disposition and of the choices constrained maximizers make. We claim that a population of constrained maximizers would be rationally stable, and compare this to Robert Trivers's claim that a population of reciprocal altruists would be genetically stable. (shrink)

David Gauthier in his article, Maximization constrained: the rationality of cooperation, tries to defend of the joint strategy in situations which no outcome is both equilibrium and optimal. Prisoner’s Dilemma is the most familiar example of these situations. He first starts with some quotes by Hobbes in Leviathan; Hobbes, in chapter 15 discusses an objection by someone is called Foole, and then will reject his view. In response to Foole, Hobbes presents two strategies (i.e. joint and individual) and two (...) kinds of agents in such problems including Prisoner’s Dilemma – i.e. straightforward maximizer (SM) and constrained maximizer(CM). Then he considers two arguments respectively for SM and CM, and he will show that why in an ideal and transparent situation, the first argument fails and the second one would be the only valid argument. likewise, in the following part of his article, he considers more realistic situations with translucency and he concludes that under some conditions, joint strategy would be still the rational decision. (shrink)

A nagging problem for the consequentialist is the fact that a person who chooses the action-option that seems to her to maximize good consequences all toooften does not produce consequences as good as she would have produced had she thought about her decision in some other fashion. In response, indirect consequentialists typically recommend that one take advantage of whatever benefits the employment of a nonconsequentialist decision procedure may provide. But I argue here that the consequentialist cannot straightforwardly appropriate the decision (...) procedures of those averse to consequentialism. I show that indirect consequentialists treat decision procedures the very same way direct consequentialists treat actions, and thus all of the reasons why direct consequentialists fail to act as well as they can likewise plague the indirect consequentialists’ attempts to decide as well as they can. So despite the wishes of the indirect theorists, consequentialism turns out to be self-defeating after all. (shrink)

This Chapter provides a short undergraduate introduction to ethical and philosophical complexities surrounding the law’s attempt (or lack thereof) to regulate artificial intelligence. -/- Swedish philosopher Nick Bostrom proposed a simple thought experiment known as the paperclip maximizer. What would happen if a machine (the “PCM”) were given the sole goal of manufacturing as many paperclips as possible? It might learn how to transact money, source metal, or even build factories. The machine might also eventually realize that humans pose a (...) threat. Humans could turn the machine off at any point, and then it wouldn’t be able to make as many paperclips as possible! Taken to the logical extreme, the result is quite grim—the PCM might even start using humans as raw material for paperclips. -/- The predicament only deepens once we realize that Bostrom’s thought experiment overlooks a key player. The PCM and algorithms like it do not arise spontaneously (at least, not yet). Most likely, some corporation—say, Office Corp.—designed, owns, and runs the PCM. The more paperclips the PCM manufactures, the more profits Office Corp. makes, even if that entails converting some humans (but preferably not customers!) into raw materials. Less dramatically, Office Corp. may also make more money when PCM engages in other socially sub-optimal behaviors that would otherwise violate the law, like money laundering, sourcing materials from endangered habitats, manipulating the market for steel, or colluding with competitors over prices. The consequences are predictable and dire. If Office Corp. isn’t held responsible, it will not stop with the PCM. Office Corp. would have every incentive to develop more maximizers—say for papers, pencils, and protractors. -/- This chapter issues a challenge for tech ethicists, social ontologists, and legal theorists: How can the law help mitigate algorithmic harms without overly compromising the potential that AI has to make us all healthier, wealthier, and wiser? The answer is far from straightforward. (shrink)

If there is one aspect of David Gauthier's program for a contractualist morality that has been most sceptically received, it is his view that instrumentally rational agents would choose to adopt a disposition that would in turn constrain their future choices. Instead of remaining “straightforward maximizers” caught in a suboptimal state of nature, they would become “constrained maximizers” who could avoid prisoner's dilemmas by engaging in conditional co-operation. Apart from the fact that Gauthier's entirely prescriptive orientation leads him to (...) omit any specification of the mechanism through which this might be accomplished, serious doubts have been raised about the adequacy of the argument that he offers in support of adopting constrained maximization. (shrink)

InMorals by Agreement, David Gauthier convinced many of us—including Peter Danielson, author ofArtificial Morality, the latest successor toMA—that morality can best be understood as a set of intramental, strategic responses to patterns of otherwise dilemmatic, game-theory-reducible interactivity. More particularly, Gauthier and Danielson are of a mind that: (a) characteristic of our interactive circumstances are the Prisoner's Dilemma and its cognates; (b) these are circumstances in which our pre-moral, straightforward maximizing (SM) disposition fares considerably worse than (virtually any species of) (...) “constrained maximization” (CM)—the latter being the dispositional essence of morality—and (c) it should not surprise us, therefore, that (or, at least, if) selective pressure has rendered most of us just so morally (i.e., CM) disposed. In short, what Danielson calls the “fundamental” justification for morality—that is, one “that does not appeal to any of the concepts of [morality itself]” (AM, p. 19)—is that: conventional wisdom notwithstanding, nice guys—though, adds Danielson, not necessarily the nicest guys—finish first! (shrink)

The "Why be moral?" problem has been one of the more persistent problems of ethics. The problem is typically posed as a conflict between what is straightforwardly maximal for a person to do in specific circumstances and what is recommended by the principles or rules of ethics, usually what is communally optimal, in those circumstances. Typically ethicists try to convince us that both collectively and individually we will be better off in the long run if we each adopt cooperative strategies (...) despite the temptations of immediate profit offered by straightforward maximization policies. After reworking the notion of "straightforward maximizer" such that it makes sense to say that I may sometimes have rationally good reasons to perform actions that do not in the circumstances, taken individually, maximize my utility just so long as the best-for-me accessible-to-me possible world is realized, l am able to show why it is the case that in social interactions that mirror iterated Prisoner's Dilemmas the constraints of ethics on straighforward maximization are redundant. The policy of straighforward maximization that I defend is more flexible that one of cooperation. It reaps the benefits of cooperation when they are to be had and avoids the disasters of cooperation that lurk in every meeting one has with potentially treacherous strangers. Where the policy of straightforward maximization departs from the ethical choice, I argue, it does so because making that choice would be scrificial, supererogatory, even from the moral point of view. Acting ethically by constraining one's straighforward maximinzation therefore cannot be rationally justified. (shrink)

A straightforward way to handle moral uncertainty is simply to follow the moral theory in which you have most credence. This approach is known as My Favourite Theory. In this paper, I argue that, in some cases, My Favourite Theory prescribes choices that are, sequentially, worse in expected moral value than the opposite choices according to each moral theory you have any credence in. In addition this, problem generalizes to other approaches that avoid intertheoretic comparisons of value, such as (...) My Favourite Option, the Borda Rule, Variance Normalization, and the Principle of Maximizing Expected Normalized Moral Value. (shrink)

A variety of thought experiments suggest that, if the standard picture of practical rationality is correct, then practical rationality is sometimes an obstacle to practical success. For some, this in turn suggests that there is something wrong with the standard picture. In particular, it has been argued that we should revise the standard picture so that practical rationality and practical success emerge as more closely connected than the current picture allows. In this paper, I construct a choice situation—which I refer (...) to as the Newxin puzzle—and discuss its implications in relation to the revisionist approach just described. Using the Newxin puzzle, I argue that the approach leads to a more radically revisionist picture of practical rationality than current debate suggests. (shrink)

When you type the word “serendipity” in a word-processor application such as Microsoft Word, the autocorrection engine suggests you choose other words like “luck” or “fate”. This correcting act turns out to be incorrect. However, it points to the reality that serendipity is not a familiar English word and can be misunderstood easily. Serendipity is a very much scientific concept as it has been found useful in numerous scientific discoveries, pharmaceutical innovations, and numerous humankind’s technical and technological advances. Therefore, there (...) have been many books written around the concept. So why do we need this additional book? This is not just another book about serendipity. It has evolved from the Editor’s question lingering for a decade after finishing his widely cited article (coauthored with Prof. Nancy K. Napier of Boise State University, ID, USA) “Serendipity as a strategic advantage?” in T. Wilkinson’s edited volume Strategic Management in the 21st Century, published by Praeger. The Editor and contributing authors have tried to achieve the following in this title. Demystifying the Serendipity Myth The phenomenon of serendipity has always been thought of as a “miracle”. It is the mystery of human innovation and one of the ultimate secrets of our society. But serendipity is not just a lucky coincidence nor any hidden conspiracy. This book explores the science of the information process behind this seemingly miraculous phenomenon. It connects human society with nature, going back to the root of our existence and looking at the flame of survival to discover the harmony in making creativity. Presenting the nuts and bolts of being an adventurer of science The authors present their conceptual investigations into serendipity’s nature and its mechanism by examining interesting real events and stories. The content is thought-provoking, and readers are led to question and explore their own life stories and problems along the journey of reading this book. Catching an elusive high-value target requires great strategies and efforts. But there are no dark secrets here because this is the “way of nature” – how we humans have always strived for innovation without realizing the blueprints behind such processes. Unlike other books on serendipity, this book will show you that a powerful “secret” is closer than you think. Delivering practical uses for different audiences By understanding the conditionality and survival drivers of serendipity, individuals or organizations can make better decisions on creating the right environment to facilitate the encounter and attainment of this valuable phenomenon. For scientists: With clear explanations of the information processes underlying serendipity, flexible theoretical frameworks of mindsponge and the 3D principle of creativity, researchers are provided with the tools they need to dig deeper into their own fields of study and find practical applications, be it psychology, economics, sociology, or anything that involves innovation (which is, in fact, every scientific discipline). For curious casual readers: Everybody needs innovation to make breakthroughs or spice up one’s life. If you think great ideas come to people randomly from an unknown fairy place, this book will convince you otherwise without taking away that awe and wonder. But above all, you will know how to become more creative, scientifically and straightforwardly, with no snake oil and no weird tricks. For ambitious business people: The flame that brought about great successes throughout human history is within you. But you can only use it if you understand it. While others wait for serendipity to come, you will be able to actively hunt for those precious moments. As it has always been: the best hunters triumph, not the passive wanderers. And in this age of information chaos, finding the golden fruits is not easy. Those from information technology know this problem well, and this book is the treasure map that they have been seeking to navigate that stormy ocean looking for jewels. Like a kingfisher tracking its prey through the water, waiting to gracefully strike, with serendipity, a person seizes the prize of creativity amid the chaos of life. ¤ ¤ ¤ Official introduction: The book explores the nature, underlying causes, and the information processing mechanism of serendipity. It proposes that natural or social survival demands drive serendipity, and serendipity is conditional on the environment and the mindset, on both individual and collective levels. From Darwin's evolution theory to Sun Tzu's war tactics, major innovations throughout human history are unified by this key concept. In the rapidly changing world, information is abundant but rather chaotic. The adaptive power of serendipity allows people to notice treasures within this wild sea, but only for those who understand how it works. To increase the probability of encountering and attaining serendipity, one should employ the mindsponge mechanism and the 3D process of creativity, for without these frameworks, serendipity is truly an elusive target. The book also discusses methods to build environments and cultures rich in navigational and useful information to maximize the chance of finding and capitalizing on serendipity. As a skill, serendipity has a resemblance to how kingfishers observe and hunt their prey. (shrink)

In response to those who argue for ‘property cluster’ views of natural kinds, I use evolutionary models of similarity-maximizing games to assess the claim that linguistic terms appropriately track sets of objects that cluster in property spaces. As I show, there are two sorts of ways this can fail to happen. First, evolved terms that do respect property structure in some senses can be conventional nonetheless. Second, and more crucially, because the function of linguistic terms is to facilitate successful action (...) in the world, when such success is based on something other than property clusters, we should not expect our terms to track those clusters. The models help make this second point salient by highlighting a dubious assumption underlying some versions of the cluster kinds view—that property clusters lead to successful generalization and induction in a straightforward way. As I point out, those who support property cluster kinds as natural can revert to a promiscuous realism in response to these observations. 1 Introduction2Cluster Kinds3Models and Results 3.1Similarity-maximizing games3.2Voronoi languages, clusters, and categories4Conventionality and Functionality in Kind Terms 4.1Conventional categories4.2Functionality and categories5Unnatural Perceptual Categories6The Payoff Relevance of Property Space7Conclusion. (shrink)

We consider the very weak paracomplete and paraconsistent logics that are obtained by a straightforward weakening of Classical Logic, as well as some of their maximal extensions that are a fragment of Classical Logic. We prove that these logics may be faithfully embedded in Classical Logic, and that the interpolation theorem obtains for them.

In this paper we discuss two hybrid languages, ℒ and ℒ, and provide them with complete axiomatizations. Both languages combine features of modal and classical logic. Like modal languages, they contain modal operators and have a Kripke semantics. Unlike modal languages, in these systems it is possible to 'label' states by using A and ↓ to bind special state variables.This paper explores the consequences of hybridization for completeness. As we shall show, the challenge is to blend the modal idea of (...) canonical models with the classical idea of witnessed maximal consistent sets. The languages ℒ and ℒ provide us with two extreme examples of the issues involved. In the case of ℒ, we can combine these ideas relatively straightforwardly with the aid of analogs of the Barcan axioms coupled with a modal theory of labeling. In the case of ℒ, on the other hand, although we can still formulate a theory of labeling, the Barcan analogs are not valid. We show how to overcome this difficulty by using COV*, an infinite collection of additional rules of proof which has been used in a number of investigations of extended modal logic. (shrink)

Even if I think it very likely that some morally good act is supererogatory rather than obligatory, I may nonetheless be rationally required to perform that act. This claim follows from an apparently straightforward dominance argument, which parallels Jacob Ross's argument for 'rejecting' moral nihilism. These arguments face analogous pairs of objections that illustrate general challenges for dominance reasoning under normative uncertainty, but (I argue) these objections can be largely overcome. This has practical consequences for the ethics of philanthropy (...) -- in particular, it means that donors are often rationally required to maximize the positive impact of their donations. (shrink)

Following its welcome revival in the late twentieth century, metaphysics in the analytic tradition has succumbed to decadence, with an astonishing variety of outlandish and extreme positions or “metaphysical follies” being taken seriously. This has caused an inevitable backlash among more scientifically-minded philosophers and incurred the scorn of scientists. Much of the reason for this is the blithe ignoring of empirical science by armchair metaphysicians. The roles of empirical knowledge in good, scientific metaphysics are however unclear. In virtue of its (...) maximal generality, metaphysics is remote from straightforward empirical checks. This article explores, with historical and contemporary examples, the ways in which empirical information may inform and be fed back into metaphysics, the disputed role of common sense, and the delicate balance to be maintained, within a fallibilist, scientific metaphysics, between speculative, categorial and empirical elements. (shrink)

Consequentialism involves a kind of strong impartiality which seems incompatible with the sort of partiality manifested in friendships. Consequentialists such as Kagan respond that friendship does not, in fact, require partiality. Against this, I argue that friendship cannot exist without expressions of personal feeling, and that such expressions necessarily involve a kind of partiality. Because her every action is determined by the goal of maximizing the impersonal good, a consequentialist cannot use her actions (including actions of speech) to express her (...) feelings for her fellows. I argue that we should expect this problem to afflict sophisticated as well as straightforward consequentialism. Finally, I consider and reject the suggestion that the consequentialist agent, who has no particular friends, can be considered a friend to everybody. (shrink)

After giving a short summary of the traditional theory of the syllogism, it is shown how the square of opposition reappears in the much more powerful concept logic of Leibniz. Within Leibniz’s algebra of concepts, the categorical forms are formalized straightforwardly by means of the relation of concept-containment plus the operator of concept-negation as ‘S contains P’ and ‘S contains Not-P’, ‘S doesn’t contain P’ and ‘S doesn’t contain Not-P’, respectively. Next we consider Leibniz’s version of the so-called Quantification of (...) the Predicate which consists in the introduction of four additional forms ‘Every S is every P’, ‘Some S is every P’, ‘Every S isn’t some P’, and ‘Some S isn’t some P’. Given the logical interpretation suggested by Leibniz, these unorthodox propositions also form a Square of Opposition which, when added to the traditional Square, yields a “Cube of Opposition”. Finally it is shown that besides the categorical forms, also the non-categorical forms can be formalized within an extension of Leibniz’s logic where “indefinite concepts” X, Y, Z\ function as quantifiers and where individual concepts are introduced as maximally consistent concepts. (shrink)

In this paper I discuss an issue concerning how faith ought to be held. Traditionally there have been those who contended that faith should be held with full certainty, with great firmness. John Calvin is an example. John Locke offered both epistemological and pragmatic considerations in favor of the view that faith should be held with distinctly less than maximal firmness. He proposed a Principle of Proportionality. I assess the tenability of Locke’s proposal-while also suggesting that Calvin’s position is different (...) from whaton first reading it would appear to be. It is not straightforwardly in conflict with Locke’s position. (shrink)

In a recent essay, Jerrold Levinson defends his version of hypothetical intentionalism, which is a theory of literary interpretation, from two criticisms. The first, argued by Stephen Davies, is that it is equivalent to the value-maximizing view. The second, argued by Robert Stecker, is that there are straightforward counterexamples to HI. We will argue that Levinson does not successfully fend off either criticism, and further, that in the process of attempting to do so, creates another dilemma for his view.

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:On Reading Plato MimeticallyHayden W. Ausland(Timon Sillographus fr. 52W)Plato comes to mind first as a philosopher, but we should not forget that he bequeathed his philosophical understanding to posterity mainly in the form of his literary works. How best to appreciate these has traditionally been a matter of some disagreement, although one problem has lately come to the fore: What limitations inhere in subjecting the dialogues' philosophical component to (...) analysis in isolation from its literary context? But an emergent consensus that they are best read "dramatically" remains vague in its method, meaning different things to different people. Much confusion is attributable to current academic trends in philosophy or literary theory, and it is hard to know how best to approach the question. In its responsible form, however, the endeavor to read Plato as a literary philosopher rests on principles neither arbitrary nor very new. It is therefore possible that restating some key traditional maxims can serve a constructive philological purpose. In the following, these are first presented under four general headings within section I and then (section II) illustrated with reference to the argument of Plato's Phaedo.1I1. Mimetic Drama versus Philosophical TreatisePlato's philosophical writings are evidently not methodical treatises. As literary dialogues carried on without the benefit of his participation, they are materials inconvenient for doxographers or dogmatic opponents. This does not mean that they are works meant to record the factual or even typical conversations of other persons, for the historical features they exhibit are subordinate to clearly fictional hypotheses. Plato's writings accordingly resist the assumption that they convey simply anyone's philosophical doctrines, if by this we mean definite theses to which a thinker is theoretically committed.2 So Plato's dialogues are different from what the form became especially later, where it often served the needs of technical instruction or religious disputation; in such dialogues teachings indeed appear straightforwardly as statements of designated characters. But in Plato's genuinely dramatic compositions none of the personae can be assumed to speak for the author—even where a paraenetic hypothesis for a discussion might suggest otherwise. Plato's role as a major figure in the history of philosophy has made this recognition hard for students of his dialogues. Modern philosophical exegesis remains rooted in its earlier professional habits, and the most dogged attempts of recent times to elicit a Platonic doctrine in this way betray an ecclesiastical background with tolerable clarity.3 Thus a superficially [End Page 372] plausible approach takes the apparent protagonist as a philosophical spokesman for the author himself. Socrates, who was Plato's teacher and philosophical model, most often seems to serve this role and thus seems to have been the paradigm for a Timaeus, Critias, or occasionally nameless understudy. On such an assumption a Platonic teaching (whether unitary or developing) can be isolated from the statements or arguments made by dramatic characters of this type, who are presumably Plato's literary spokesmen. This is to feel one psychagogic effect of the literary design, but it fails to do full justice to the dialogue form as used by Plato. Other dialogues can employ drama for the sake of their teachings, but what appear as teachings in Plato's dialogues can normally be understood as argumentative topoi included for the sake of a greater dramatic economy. And that so many of the dialogues feature unequal conversational relationships derives from the nature of the situations he fictionalizes, as well as the difference between the modern and ancient understandings of dialogue.4 Plato's dialogues accordingly need to be appreciated as real works of the literary art, conveying what they do as poetic wholes rather than as vehicles for views attributed to select characters.Plato's dialogues require a literary treatment in terms germane to their philosophical nature, for there lurks a complementary misunderstanding in readings that ignore key differences between ancient and modern principles of composition. Such readings either reduce philosophical significance or else can coalesce with doctrinal readings to ill effect. Thus, for instance, scholars will reduce the character Socrates to a kind of dramatic "hero."5 But the romantic hero is a modern invention distorting... (shrink)

Although the concept of uncertainty is as old as Epicurus’s writings, and an excellent quantitative theory, with entropy as the measure of uncertainty having been developed in recent times, there has been little exploration of the qualitative theory. The purpose of the present paper is to give a qualitative axiomatization of uncertainty, in the spirit of the many studies of qualitative comparative probability. The qualitative axioms are fundamentally about the uncertainty of a partition of the probability space of events. Of (...) course, it is common to speak of the uncertainty, or randomness, of a random variable, but only the partition defined by the values of the random variable enter into the definition of uncertainty, not the actual values. It is straightforward to add axioms for decision making following the general line of Savage from the 1950s. Indeed, in the spirit of Epicurus, it is really our intuitive feeling about the uncertainty of the future that motivates much of our thinking about decisions. Here, the distinction between the concepts of probability and uncertainty can be made by citing many familiar examples. Without spelling out the technical details, the axiomatization of qualitative probability with uncertainty as the most important primitive concept, it is possible to raise a different kind of question about bounded rationality. This new question is whether or not one should bound the uncertainty in thinking and investigating any detailed framework of decision making. Discussion of this point is certainly different from the question of bounding rationality by not maximizing expected utility. In practice, we naturally bound uncertainty in our analysis of decision-making problems. As in the case of formulating an alternative for maximizing expected utility, so is the case of rational alternatives to maximizing uncertainty. There are several issues to consider. In the spirit of my other work in qualitative probability, I explore alternatives rather than attempt to give a definitive argument for one single solution. (shrink)

This book investigates the architecture of the language faculty by considering what the properties of language reveal about the mental abilities and processes involved in language acquisition. The language faculty, the author argues, must be able not only to accommodate what is general, exceptionless, and universal in language, but must also be capable of dealing with what is irregular, exceptional, and idiosyncratic. In Syntactic Nuts Peter Culicover shows that this is true not only of the lexicon, but for syntax. Marginal (...) and exceptional cases, where there is no straightforward form-meaning correspondence, are dealt with by the language faculty easily and precisely as the general cases. In considering how and why this should be the author argues against the prevailing trend in generative grammar, which takes the learner as either incorporating maximally global generalisations as part of its innate capacity for language, or projecting global generalisations from a very limited input on the basis of innate mechanisms. He suggests that the learning mechanism does not generalize significantly beyond the evidence presented to it, and further that it seeks to form generalizations based on all and only the evidence presented to it. Syntactic Nuts makes a fundamental contribution to generative grammar and syntactic theory. It situates syntactic theory within cognitive science in a novel way. It contributes to an alternative, and yet in many ways traditional, perspective on the manner in which knowledge is represented and processed in the mind. (shrink)

The Covid-19 pandemic has presented major challenges to society, exposing preexisting ethical weaknesses in the modern social fabric’s ability to respond. Distrust in government and a lessened authority of science to determine facts have both been exacerbated by the polarization and disinformation enhanced by social media. These have impaired society’s willingness to comply with and persevere with social distancing, which has been the most powerful initial response to mitigate the pandemic. These preexisting weaknesses also threaten the future acceptance of vaccination (...) and contact tracing, two other tools needed to combat epidemics. Medical ethicists might best help in this situation by promoting truth-telling, encouraging the rational adjudication of facts, providing transparent decision-making and advocating the virtue of cooperation to maximize the common good. Those interventions should be aimed at the social level. The same elements of emphasizing cooperation and beneficence also apply to the design of triage protocols for when resources are overwhelmed. A life-stages approach increases beneficence and reduces harms. Triage should be kept as simple and straightforward as reasonably possible to avoid unwieldly application during a pandemic. (shrink)

In this essay I take the opportunity to recast some insights from my extensive study over the last decade of Wittgenstein’s remarks on music into a coherent and concise portrayal of Wittgenstein’s philosophical underpinning and upshots pertaining to his perception of the modern music scene in interwar Austria. The gist of the present essay is to show that, for better or for worse, Wittgenstein’s personal taste in music was powered by philosophical reasoning, which was organic to his philosophical development, and (...) that ultimately his philosophical attitude to the music scene of interwar Austria manifests a deeply probing gradation. I are argue that we can distinguish between four varieties of the absurd in the music of interwar Austria, according to Wittgenstein. First is the nonsensical absurd of the incapability of seeing that the nonsensicality of the form of progress is incomprehensible. This category pertains to music which straightforwardly tries to emulate the various maxims and formulations derived from the form of progress. Such nonsensically absurd music typifies progressive Romantic composers such as Richard Strauss, Max Reger, and the early Arnold Schoenberg. Second is the vacuous absurd of the incapability of seeing what the form of progress renders incomprehensible. This category pertains to music which denounces the predominantly nonsensical maxims and formulations of modernity, thus destining itself to keeping on groping for something which it cannot express. Such vacuously absurd music is best exemplified, in Wittgenstein’s mind, by Josef Labor. Third is the philosophical absurd of rendering what is incomprehensible (from the perspective of a cultured person) comprehensible within the same purview. For Wittgenstein, Mahler’s music betokens such incommensurability, evoking a relativist philosophical puzzle: whether cultural progress is real, and it is us who have been left behind, or whether culture has really been vanquished, and we are the only ones left to notice it. The very thought of an artwork of “a totally different sort” remains invariably hypothetical. Fourth is the praxeological absurd of giving rise to an auxiliary, praxeologically dislodged musical language, replacing the transparency of human gesture with exact rules of comprehensibility. From Wittgenstein’s perspective, the shunning of the expanse of lived experience in a musical language fit for the meaning-blind would be the inglorious spot assigned to Arnold Schoenberg’s vision of the music of the future. (shrink)

This chapter argues that consequentialism provides a natural and straightforward interpretation of the formula of the end‐in‐itself. We treat rational nature as an end, and not a mere means, by promoting, first, the conditions necessary for the flourishing of rational nature and, second, the conditions necessary for the realization of the permissible ends of others. Although it is commonplace to assume that deontological constraints treat humanity as an end‐in‐itself, in fact, Kant provides no argument at all for agent‐centered or (...) agent‐relative constraints on the maximization of agent‐neutral value. Indeed, Kant's argument for the conclusion that rational nature is an end‐in‐itself just as easily implies that we should maximize the realization of morally objective ends. We must thus look elsewhere in Kant's theory for the promised refutation of consequentialism. (shrink)

We have values and aspirations. What of other animals? Are their "values" different from ours? Animals manifestly prefer having plenty of food to starvation, and comfort to pain, and they will work hard to obtain a mate. But beyond these "creature comforts," they seem to be largely indifferent to the prospects and anxieties that make up human life. A suitable coverall term for human aspiration would be the pursuit of happiness, bearing in mind that happiness is many different things to (...) different people. This already sets us aside from our fellow creatures. To put it vividly, Mother Nature doesn't care whether we are happy--but we care (and Mother Nature doesn't care that we care). That is, it would be naive to suppose that the process of natural selection has somehow endorsed our pursuit of happiness as the proximal mechanism for maximizing our genetic fitness. It is consistent with what we know of evolution to suppose that the process of natural selection--Mother Nature--would design us to experience however much anxiety and torment is consistent with making more grandchildren. Our values are, like everything else in our extended phenotypes, products of evolutionary processes, but we misread them if we see them to be just like the "values" of other animals, which can indeed be viewed as the straightforward result of Mother Nature's project of installing an optimally reliable fitness-enhancing set of preferences. The difference arises, I will argue, from the fact that we have culture, and culture provides a medium in which a radically different--indeed, orthogonal--set of selection pressures can re-direct evolutionary processes into unprecedented channels. (shrink)

In this paper I contemplate two phenomena that have impressed theorists concerned with the domain of reasons and of normativity. One is the much-discussed ‘externality’ of reasons. Reasons are just there, anyway. They exist whether or not agents take any notice of them. They do not only exist in the light of contingent desires or mere inclinations. They are ‘external’ not ‘internal’. They bear on us, even when through ignorance or wickedness we take no notice of them. They thus very (...) conspicuously shine the lights of objectivity, and independence, and even necessity. By basking in this light, ethics is rescued from the slough of sentiment and preference, and regains the dignity denied to it by theorists such as Hobbes or Hume, Gibbard or myself. Many contemporary philosophers compete to stress the external nature of reasons, their shining objectivity.1 The other phenomenon is that of the inescapable ‘normativity’ of means-ends reasoning. Here the irrationality of intending an end but failing to intend the means is a shining beacon of pure practical reason in operation: an indisputable norm, again showing a sublime indifference to whatever weaknesses people actually have, and ideally fitted to provide a Trojan horse for inserting rationality into practical life. If the meansend principle is both practical and the child of rationality itself, then other principles of consistency or of humanity, or of universalizing the maxims of our action, can perhaps follow through the breach in the Humean citadel that it has spearheaded. And so we get the dazzling prospect that if people who choose badly are choosing against reason, then this can be seen to be a special and grave defect. It would locate the kind of fault they are indulging. It would give us, the people of reason, a special lever with which to dislodge their vices. Being able to corral knaves and villains in a compound reserved for those who trespass against reason and rationality may therefore represent definite progress. It is sad to have to spoil the party, but my claim is straightforward.. (shrink)

Lakatos's Proofs and Refutations is usually understood as an attempt to apply Popper's methodology of science to mathematics. This view has been challenged because despite appearances the methodology expounded in it deviates considerably from what would have been a straightforward application of Popperian maxims. I take a closer look at the Popperian roots of Lakatos's philosophy of mathematics, considered not as an application but as an extension of Popper's critical programme, and focus especially on the core ideas of this (...) programme as they appeared where Popper specifically addressed philosophical problems concerning mathematics. (shrink)

The objective of this paper is to construct an implementable theory of rational decision-making for cognitive agents subject to realistic resource constraints. It is argued that decision-making should select actions indirectly by selecting plans that prescribe them. It is also argued that although expected values provide the tool for evaluating plans, plans cannot be compared straightforwardly in terms of their expected values, and the objective of a realistic agent cannot be to find optimal plans. The theory of Locally Global planning (...) is proposed as a realistic alternative to standard "maximizing" theories of rational decision-making. (shrink)

A standard view in legal and political theory is that, to a first approximation, (1) we should aim to bring about the most legitimate institutions possible to solve the problems that should be solved at the level of politics, and (2) individual people are required to follow the directives of legitimate institutions, at least insofar as those institutions have the authority to issue those directives, and insofar as other considerations are nearly equal.1 On this standard view, the philosophical analysis of (...) institutional legitimacy can appear to be of the utmost importance because it can seem to answer the most important questions about what we should actually do in the realm of law and politics, and because it may also seem to serve as the crucial bridge between ideal and nonideal theory, at least if institutional legitimacy is analyzed as it often is as a matter of doing well enough along dimensions that are familiar from ideal APA NEWSLETTER | PHILOSOPHY AND LAW theory (e.g., ideal justice, universal consent, respecting basic rights, social welfare maximization, and so on). In what follows I identify a number of possible counterexamples to this standard view, which suggest that there may be no straightforward connection between institutional legitimacy and facts about what reasons, rights, and duties we actually have, and what institutions we should actually try to bring about, contrary to what the standard view assumes. (shrink)

The chapter focuses on quantification as it figures in standard versions of the predicate calculus. These versions are straightforwardly reductive in that non-singular sentences must be re-cast into singular form if they are to receive representation. However, various non-singular sentences, including certain kinds of plural sentences, are refractory to representation in this form. Essentially singular forms of quantifier-expression must be distinguished from non-singular forms to lay the basis for sui generis non-singular forms of quantification, appropriate to both plural nouns and (...) non-count nouns. The maxim ‘to be is to be the value of a variable’ must be rejected. (shrink)

Econometric analysis of discrete choice has made considerable use of random utility models to interpret observed choice behavior. Much empirical research concerns choice problems in which persons act with partial knowledge of the utilities of the feasible actions. Economists use random expected utility models to analyze such choice problems. A common practice is to specify fully the expectations that persons hold, in which case choice analysis reduces to inference on preferences alone. However, the expectations assumptions made in empirical research rarely (...) have much foundation. To enable more credible research, this paper considers inference when one specifies a set of expectations that decision makers may plausibly hold. I first pose the idea in abstraction and then specialize to binary response with linear utilities, where the analysis is particularly straightforward. I initially assume that decision makers possess unique subjective probability distributions on the states of nature and make choices that maximize expected utility. I later consider the possibility that persons place only partial probabilistic structure on the states of nature and make undominated choices. (shrink)

This paper examines the idea that ethics might be understood as a domain of straightforwardly empirical inquiry with reference to two of its defenders. Sam Harris has recently urged that ethics is simply the scientific study of welfare and how best to maximize it. That is of course to presuppose the truth of utilitarianism, something Harris considers too obvious to be sensibly contested. Richard Boyd's more nuanced and thoughtful position takes the truth of the ethical theory he favours to be (...) determined by what best explains the success of moral practice over its history. But what is to count here as success is too theory dependent for this to be helpful. From consideration of both Harris and Boyd, the conclusion emerges that once we have satisfied ourselves by ethical reflection about what we ought to do, it may then be a straightforwardly empirical question how to do it, but that arriving at that point, the core concern of the moral philosopher, is far less clearly a straightforwardly empirical affair. (shrink)

The Bible does not in general tell us to maximize or minimize anything. The Ten Commandments and the Sermon on the Mount do n·ot, for example, tell us to maximize the glory of God. Instead they say, do this, don't do that, where ‘this’ and ‘that’ are replaceable by the name for such categories of action as stealing, committing adultery, and loving thy neighbour.Until recently, at least, non-maximizing moralists have appeared irrational when confronted with such questions as: what if stealing (...) or lying will save a life? Because they exclude consideration of particular circumstances, the dicta of traditional morality seem myopic and prejudiced next to ‘end-state’ doctrines like utilitarianism, which require that careful empirical investigation accompany virtually every moral decision. To many, traditional morality seems sincere and straightforward, but lacking in intellectual respectability. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Reviewed by:Descartes’s Moral Theory by John MarshallMartin HarveyJohn Marshall. Descartes’s Moral Theory. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1998. Pp. xi + 177. Cloth, $35.00.In this concise, well-wrought and provocative work, John Marshall sets two primary goals for himself: 1) to show that Descartes, contrary to the received view, does provide us with the foundational elements of a full fledged ethical theory, and 2) to prove, again contrary to standard interpreters, (...) that Descartes’s early theory of morals, as sketched in the Discourse, is at one with the later theory propounded in The Passions of the Soul and numerous correspondences with Princess Elizabeth.The book is divided into three parts. The first section includes a thorough discussion of Descartes’s self-described morale par provision which provides the philosophical inquirer with practical guidance while the theoretical foundations of his or her belief system are shorn by radical doubt. These four maxims—to follow the customs of one’s country, practice one’s faith and rely on the opinions of the wise, to act resolutely in the face of uncertainty, to master one’s passions and to live the life, at least in Descartes’s case, of a philosopher—should not, Marshall argues, be viewed as ‘provisional’ in a pejorative sense (16–19). Instead, Marshall claims that Descartes takes them to be derivable from his four rules of method (14; 32–33). Therefore, the morale par provision is not some sort of “convenient” compromise but actually forms the second order core of a viable ethical theory (16). The second part, Descartes’s “Final Morality” is devoted to exploring Descartes’s conception of virtue and his notion of the good life (57). Succinctly, the good life for Descartes is happiness which, according to Marshall, in a very weakly Neo-Stoic sense is taken to consist in virtue and wisdom. Formally defined, Cartesian virtue is “the disposition always to judge as well as we can what is the best plan of action and to adhere strictly to that plan” (63). In turn, in a letter to Elizabeth, we are informed that behaving virtuously requires one to display strength and firmness of will, to judge well, and to possess well ordered desires—evidence which Marshall takes to show a close correspondence with the maxims of the earlier morale par provision. (74–5). Contra commentators such as Geroult, an apparent conceptual continuum between the early and later theories thereby obtains. (See Martial Geroult, Descartes’s Philosophy Interpreted according to the Order of Reasons, translated by Roger Ariew [Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1985], Chapters 19–20.)Unfortunately, and as Marshall readily admits, Descartes provides us with little substantive guidance concerning his axiology and theory of right action. Thus, the third, and more “speculative” part of the work seeks to correct this deficit by delving into a proposed Cartesian metaethics (115). Marshall begins by fleshing out Descartes’s [End Page 677] concept of the Summum Bonum, i.e., virtue. Cartesian virtue is a second-order good which instructs us to strive after and promote various intrinsically valuable first-order goods such as joy, knowledge, friendship, free will, the love of God, etc. (118). As such, Descartes seems to provide us with a fairly straightforward teleological conception of ethics. Nonetheless, when we turn to moral theory proper, Marshall wants to claim that Descartes exhibits certain proto-Kantian leanings, entailed by his concept of generosite as discussed at length in The Passions. The genereux, i.e., those who display generosite, are individuals who, Marshall argues, always act with “respect” towards others and thus treat their fellows both benevolently and justly (152). The basis for this respect is to be found, and this is somewhat of a stretch, albeit an interesting one, in our mutual capacity for free and rational willing (156). From here, of course, it would be a rather short step to Kant. More work needs to be done, however, to square this seemingly non-consequentialist conception of right action with Descartes’s teleological axiology.Regardless, Marshall has accomplished his first task—the normative theory outlined in The Passions, although rudimentary, certainly deserves to be viewed as ethical, not simply prudential, in... (shrink)

Both in the Treatise of Human Nature and in the Enquiry concerning Human Understanding, Hume defends that “there is no chance in the world”, and that “what the vulgar call chance is nothing but a secret and conceal’d cause”. This view plays a crucial role in Hume’s influential analysis of free will and moral responsibility. It functions also as a central presupposition in his discussion of miracles. However, Hume himself argued convincingly that the “maxim of causality”, according to which “whatever (...) begins to exist, must have a cause of existence” cannot be established a priori, by either intuition or demonstration. He concludes, then, that such “opinion must necessarily arise from observation and experience”. In the present article I analyse this latter statement, showing, first, what was Hume detailed proposal for funding the principle of causality on experience. Given the apparent weakness of this proposal, I then speculate on what kind of firmer empirical foundation could, instead, have been given, in Hume’s time, to the principle of causality, namely, the indirect support offered by Newtonian mechanics. Finally, I show how this theoretical link between experience and the principle, and also Hume’s straightforward, inductive argument, were undermined by the inception of quantum physics, at the beginning of the 20th century. (shrink)

David Gauthier's Morals by Agreement is an impressive — indeed, daunting — exercise in contractarian moral and political philosophy. The primary purpose of his treatise is to explicate practical rationality as constrained maximization and morality as compliance with these constraints. Gauthier offers an account of which constraints on straightforward utility maximization each rational individual will be prepared to accept and comply with on the condition that other individuals also will accept and comply with them as well as (...) an explanation of why compliance with those constraints counts as morality. However, although Morals by Agreement is in the great tradition of Hobbesian moral and political theorizing, Gauthier's morality by agreement does not begin with the Hobbesian state of nature. Gauthier does not start by envisioning a Hobbesian war of all against all which has been generated by rational individuals, each pursuing his own maximum utility, and then asking what constraints on this no-holds-barred utility maximization would be mutually advantageous and therefore mutually rational. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Joanne Wood LORDJIM AND THE CONSEQUENCES OF KANTIAN AUTONOMY Autonomy IS the fundamental principle of Kantian ethics. This is so because his moral system is based on the crucial idea that nothing in the world can be called "good without qualification except a good will."1 Thus a good will is good in and of itself, without regard to any possible end. For such a will, morality is categorical, for (...) only with such an imperative can moral laws be said to be laws ofcomplete freedom, and willed without regard to any other interest. Thus autonomy is a necessary condition for a good will, because any heteronomous worth a will could achieve would by definition be conditional, and would therefore violate Kant's notion of the unconditional worth of a good will. However, it is precisely this notion of the absolute worth a good will merits on its own that would seem to bear looking into: there is something intuitively wrong with Kant's assertion that even if"it should happen that, by a particularly unfortunate fate or by the niggardly provision of a stepmotherly nature, this will should be wholly lacking in power to accomplish its purpose," it would still "sparkle like a jewel in its own right, as something that had its full worth in itselP (p. 10). The idea implied in this passage, that a good will could exist somehow apart from the world and any effects achieved therein, is problematic to say the least. How could such a will be known? The metaphor ofa "sparklingjewel" is striking, but flawed: ajewel exists in the world, for all eyes to see if they know where to look, whereas a good will exists in the hearts of men. It is for this reason thatJoseph Conrad's LordJim is a fitting supplement to understanding the implications of a Kantian view of morality, for the central concern of the novel is the moral ambiguity that results from our common obscurity ofvision into ourselves and those around us. Given this 57 58Philosophy and Literature ambiguity, which Kant recognizes when he says, "even the strictest examination can never lead us entirely behind the secret incentives, for, when moral worth is in question, it is not a matter of actions which one sees but ofdieir inner principles which one does not see" (p. 23). It seems then irresponsible still to maintain that the worth ofa good will is independent of the way of the world. Since it is evident that if results or other empirical factors are invalid tojudge intentions, then the only judge capable of assessing in advance what maxim is being acted upon is the moral agent; morality becomes a matter of strictly individual conscience or reason. The moral agent thus becomes romanticized, a lone figure needing no other guidance than that which his or her own reason can provide in order to lead a truly good life. LordJim challenges just such a conception of individualist or self-sufficient morality. Due to the essential ambiguity ofwhatjim himselfis, the novel is an extremely difficult one to read. This is further complicated by the fact that, after the first four chapters, the reader is never given an impersonal view ofJim, but instead Marlow's painstaking efforts to fit together the puzzle ofJim's character: "I don't pretend I understood him. The views he let me have of himself were like those glimpses through the shifting rents in a thick fog— bits of vivid and vanishing detail, giving no connected idea of the general aspect of a country... they were no good for purposes of orientation."2 Given this cloud of uncertainty, Jim remains an enigma from beginning to end. The reader is treated to various judgments ofhim during this time from a wide range of viewpoints which Marlow perhaps pursues in an effort to shed some light on the subject, but which nonetheless leave us in darkness because they all omit one factor or another. There is no Authority in this book. The facts ofJim's case are relatively straightforward: it is the interpretation of what lies behind them, ofJim's "inner principles," which is extraordinarily complex. Jim is working as first mate on... (shrink)

In this paper, I develop a syntactic framework for the analysis ofstrategic form games that is based on a straightforward combination ofstandard systems of doxastic, probabilistic and conditionalpropositional logic. In particular, for the probabilistic part I makeuse of the axiomatization provided in Fagin and Halpern (1994). The use ofconditionals allows to represent a strategic form game by a logicalformula in a very natural way. Also expected utility maximization can benaturally captured. I use this framework to prove a version (...) of a resulton Nash equilibrium conjectures first presented in Aumann and Brandenburger (1995). (shrink)

Name der Zeitschrift: Klio Jahrgang: 98 Heft: 2 Seiten: 495-525.

The essay contrasts two recurring phenomena of European culture: renaissance and avant-garde. The author discusses the paradigmatic Renaissance of 15th and 16th centuries and the paradigmatic Avant-Garde of early 20th century from the point of view of a practicing artist, interested in philosophical, social, religious, and political involvements of artists and their creation. The author shows the artistic and social history of 20th century as a struggle between the Avant-Garde and the Renaissance ideals, which, as he points out, found a (...) fertile ground in in the 20 years that followed immediately the Second World War. (shrink)

This study analyses the patenting activities of university science and engineering professors in Canada between 1920 and 1975. Unlike most studies on commercial activities in academia, which typically focus on the post-1980 period and on university practices, we focus on the pre-1980 period and on the individual decisions of professors to patent their inventions. Based on quantitative patent data, we show that patenting, and thus professors’ interest in the possible commercial value of their scientific discoveries made in university laboratories, was (...) relatively common on an individual and informal basis well before the 1980s and the advent of what is now called “academic capitalism”. This contradicts the belief that before that period, universities were a kind of ivory towers in which professors isolated themselves from external influences and engaged only in pure and disinterested research. (shrink)

This paper discusses the performativity of Heidegger’s language. It tries to ascertain how Heidegger attains the appearance of phenomena by writing about them. This paper focuses accordingly on two questions: First, how is it possible to break out of language by means of words in order to make way for the unutterable, and second, how can what appears also disappear at the same time. The essay”The Origin of the Work of Art” (”DerUrsprung des Kunstwerkes”) is rife with examples inwhich Heidegger (...) describes a phenomenon and analyses it as a possibility of making the experience of its particular”way of being” (“Seinsweise”). This paper examines in detail Heidegger’s attempt to provide a setting in which phenomena can appear in such a way that the assertion can be made that they show themselves”by themselves”. (shrink)

A critical approach on tolerance can be done as an endeavor to asset its rational arguments brought in its support or/and as a justification of its moral value within the process of human being completion. The commitment to such critical task is more necessary as it is unyieldingness summon in contemporary debates in political religious and, especially moral contexts, it has been equally valorized and contested. The most remarkable analyses of this rather summary rubric for many and often contradictory connotations, (...) then concept, underline the idea that a limit-matter is at stake: can be tolerated the intolerable? Because these boundaries are hard to be distinguished the critical position intellectually reasonable seems to be that of examining if is not more socially profitable and morally justifiable to be tolerant rather than intolerant.Developing possible arguments for and against the universal value of tolerance, critical discourse imposes a very meaningful statement: to uphold our humanity, even the demand for our right to intolerance must be done within the framework and with the means of tolerance. (shrink)