This monograph is a detailed study, and systematic defence, of the Growing Block Theory of time (GBT), first conceived by C.D. Broad. The book offers a coherent, logically perspicuous and ideologically lean formulation of GBT, defends it against the most notorious objections to be found in the extant philosophical literature, and shows how it can be derived from a more general theory, consistent with relativistic spacetime, on the pre-relativistic assumption of an absolute and total temporal order. -/- The authors devise (...) axiomatizations of GBT and its competitors which, against the backdrop of a shared quantified tense logic, significantly improves the prospects of their comparative assessment. Importantly, neither of these axiomatizations involves commitment to properties of presentness, pastness or futurity. The authors proceed to address, and defuse, a number of objections that have been marshaled against GBT, including the so-called epistemic objection according to which the theory invites skepticism about our temporal location. The challenge posed by relativistic physics is met head-on, by replacing claims about temporal variation by claims about variation across spacetime. -/- The book aims to achieve the greatest possible rigor. The background logic is set out in detail, as are the principles governing the notions of precedence and temporal location. The authors likewise devise a novel spacetime logic suited for the articulation, and comparative assessment, of relativistic theories of time. The book comes with three technical appendices which include soundness and completeness proofs for the systems corresponding to GBT and its competitors, in both their pre-relativistic and relativistic forms. -/- The book is primarily directed at researchers and graduate students working on the philosophy of time or temporal logic, but is of interest to metaphysicians and philosophical logicians more generally. (shrink)

The growth of self-tracking and personal surveillance has given rise to the Quantified Self movement. Members of this movement seek to enhance their personal well-being, productivity, and self-actualization through the tracking and gamification of personal data. The technologies that make this possible can also track and gamify aspects of our interpersonal, romantic relationships. Several authors have begun to challenge the ethical and normative implications of this development. In this article, we build upon this work to provide a detailed ethical analysis (...) of the Quantified Relationship. We identify eight core objections to the QR and subject them to critical scrutiny. We argue that although critics raise legitimate concerns, there are ways in which tracking technologies can be used to support and facilitate good relationships. We thus adopt a stance of cautious openness toward this technology and advocate the development of a research agenda for the positive use of QR technologies. (shrink)

Recent developments in AI and robotics enable people to create _personalised digital duplicates_ – these are artificial, at least partial, recreations or simulations of real people. The advent of such duplicates enables people to overcome their individual scarcity. But this comes at a cost. There is a common view among ethicists and value theorists suggesting that individual scarcity contributes to or heightens the value of a life or parts of a life. In this paper, we address this topic. We make (...) five main points. First, that there is a plausible _prima facie_ case for the scarcity threat: AI may undermine the value of an individual human life by making us less scarce. Second, notwithstanding this prima facie threat, the role of scarcity in individual value is disputable and always exists in tension with the contrasting view that scarcity is a tragedy that limits our value. Third, there are two distinct forms of scarcity – instrumental and intrinsic – and they contribute to value in different ways. Fourth, digital duplication technology may undermine instrumental scarcity, to at least some extent, but the axiological consequences of this are highly variable. Fifth, digital duplication technology does not affect intrinsic scarcity, and may actually heighten it. (shrink)

The emerging consensus in the philosophy of cognition is that cognition is situated, i.e., dependent upon or co-constituted by the body, the environment, and/or the embodied interaction with it. But what about emotions? If the brain alone cannot do much thinking, can the brain alone do some emoting? If not, what else is needed? Do (some) emotions (sometimes) cross an individual's boundary? If so, what kinds of supra-individual systems can be bearers of affective states, and why? And does that make (...) emotions ?embedded? or ?extended? in the sense cognition is said to be embedded and extended? Section 2 shows why it is important to understand in which sense body, environment, and our embodied interaction with the world contribute to our affective life. Section 3 introduces some key concepts of the debate about situated cognition. Section 4 draws attention to an important disanalogy between cognition and emotion with regard to the role of the body. Section 5 shows under which conditions a contribution by the environment results in non-trivial cases of ?embedded? emotions. Section 6 is concerned with affective phenomena that seem to cross the organismic boundaries of an individual, in particular with the idea that emotions are ?extended? or ?distributed.? (shrink)

The development of highly humanoid sex robots is on the technological horizon. If sex robots are integrated into the legal community as “electronic persons”, the issue of sexual consent arises, which is essential for legally and morally permissible sexual relations between human persons. This paper explores whether it is conceivable, possible, and desirable that humanoid robots should be designed such that they are capable of consenting to sex. We consider reasons for giving both “no” and “yes” answers to these three (...) questions by examining the concept of consent in general, as well as critiques of its adequacy in the domain of sexual ethics; the relationship between consent and free will; and the relationship between consent and consciousness. Additionally we canvass the most influential existing literature on the ethics of sex with robots. (shrink)

The growth of self-tracking and personal surveillance has given rise to the Quantified Self movement. Members of this movement seek to enhance their personal well-being, productivity, and self-actualization through the tracking and gamification of personal data. The technologies that make this possible can also track and gamify aspects of our interpersonal, romantic relationships. Several authors have begun to challenge the ethical and normative implications of this development. In this article, we build upon this work to provide a detailed ethical analysis (...) of the Quantified Relationship. We identify eight core objections to the QR and subject them to critical scrutiny. We argue that although critics raise legitimate concerns, there are ways in which tracking technologies can be used to support and facilitate good relationships. We thus adopt a stance of cautious openness toward this technology and advocate the development of a research agenda for the positive use of QR technologies. (shrink)

We introduce a constructive model of selective belief revision in which it is possible to accept only a part of the input information. A selective revision operator ο is defined by the equality K ο α = K * f(α), where * is an AGM revision operator and f a function, typically with the property ⊢ α → f(α). Axiomatic characterizations are provided for three variants of selective revision.

Mark Schroeder’s Reasons First is admirable in its scope and execution, deftly demonstrating the theoretical promise of extending the reasons-first approach from ethics to epistemology. In what follows we explore how (not) to account for the evidence-that relation within the reasons-first program, we explain how factive content views of evidence can be resilient in the face of Schroeder’s criticisms, and we explain how knowledge from falsehood threatens Schroeder’s view of knowledge. Along the way we sketch a reliabilist account of the (...) reasons-for relation (inspired by Alston) and show how it limits the applicability of Schroeder’s arguments. (shrink)

​This book describes argumentative tools and strategies that can be used to guide policy decisions under conditions of great uncertainty. Contributing authors explore methods from philosophical analysis and in particular argumentation analysis, showing how it can be used to systematize discussions about policy issues involving great uncertainty. The first part of the work explores how to deal in a systematic way with decision-making when there may be plural perspectives on the decision problem, along with unknown consequences of what we do. (...) Readers will see how argumentation tools can be used for prioritizing among uncertain dangers, for determining how decisions should be framed, for choosing a suitable time frame for a decision, and for systematically choosing among different decision options. Case studies are presented in the second part of the book, showing argumentation in practice in the areas of climate geoengineering, water governance, synthetic biology, nuclear waste, and financial markets. In one example, argumentation analysis is applied to proposals to solve the climate problem with various technological manipulations of the natural climate system, such as massive dispersion of reflective aerosols into the stratosphere. Even after a thorough investigation of such a proposal, doubt remains as to whether all the potential risks have been identified. In such discussions, conventional risk analysis does not have much to contribute since it presupposes that the risks have been identified, whereas the argumentative approach to uncertainty management can be used to systematize discussions. (shrink)

New technologies and practices, such as drug testing, genetic testing, and electronic surveillance infringe upon the privacy of workers on workplaces. We argue that employees have a prima facie right to privacy, but this right can be overridden by competing moral principles that follow, explicitly or implicitly, from the contract of employment. We propose a set of criteria for when intrusions into an employee''s privacy are justified. Three types of justification are specified, namely those that refer to the employer''s interests, (...) to the interests of the employee her- or himself, and to the interests of third parties such as customers and fellow workers. For each of these three types, sub-criteria are proposed that can be used to determine whether a particular infringement into an employee''s privacy is morally justified or not. (shrink)

The literature on ethics and user attitudes towards AVs discusses user concerns in relation to automation; however, we show that there are additional relevant issues at stake. To assess adolescents’ attitudes regarding the ‘car of the future’ as presented by car manufacturers, we conducted two studies with over 400 participants altogether. We used a mixed methods approach in which we combined qualitative and quantitative methods. In the first study, our respondents appeared to be more concerned about other aspects of AVs (...) than automation. Instead, their most commonly raised concerns were the extensive use of AI, recommender systems, and related issues of autonomy, invasiveness and personal privacy. The second study confirmed that several AV impacts were negatively perceived. The responses were, however, ambivalent. This confirms previous research on AV attitudes. On one hand, the AV features were perceived as useful, while on the other hand, their impacts were negatively assessed. We followed theoretical insights form futures studies and responsible research and innovation, which helped to identify that there are additional user concerns than what has been previously discussed in the literature on public attitudes and ethics of AVs, as well what has been envisioned by car manufactures. (shrink)

Eleven organic and two conventionalSwedish livestock farmers and two initiators(non-farmers who took part in shaping earlyorganic livestock production in Sweden) wereinterviewed, using a semi-structured method.Respondents were selected through purposive andheterogeneous sampling with regard toconversion year, type of production, and sizeof farm. Conversion of the animal husbandrytook place between 1974 and 2000. All but twohad positive attitudes towards organiclivestock production and saw it as a wayforward for Swedish livestock production,although especially the latecomers did notperceive it as the only alternative. There wasa (...) distinct difference in values between thepioneers, who converted their farms early, andthose converting later. Pioneer farmers sharedthe values of the initiators. They expressed amore ecocentric view emphasizing a systemicapproach, and displayed a more holisticapproach to questions, interpreting them inlarger frameworks. They also had a moreecocentric understanding of animal welfare. Thelater the conversion, the more important theeconomic reason for conversion appeared to be.Those converting later also tended to have amore superficial relationship to organicprinciples. However, the farmers also tended tobe more influenced by organic values the longerthey worked with organic farming. (shrink)

Humans’ indigenous microbes strongly influence organ functions in an age‐ and diet‐dependent manner, adding an important dimension to aging biology that remains poorly understood. Although age‐related differences in the gut microbiota composition correlate with age‐related loss of organ function and diseases, including inflammation and frailty, variation exists among the elderly, especially centenarians and people living in areas of extreme longevity. Studies using short‐lived as well as nonsenescent model organisms provide surprising functional insights into factors affecting aging and implicate attenuating effects (...) of microbes as well as a crucial role for certain transcription factors like forkhead box O. The unexpected beneficial effects of microbes on aged animals imply an even more complex interplay between the gut microbiome and the host. The microbiome constitutes the major interface between humans and the environment, is influenced by biosocial stressors and behaviors, and mediates effects on health and aging processes, while being moderated by sex and developmental stages. (shrink)

En el lila despertar de una crisálida que sueña compartir contigo el milagro Infinito de la Viday que más allá de la oscuridad que todo lo penetra llena de soles su propia noche. En la profunda certeza de que el Amor es color a las alas de la mariposa y poesía al sueño del que espera.Hemos querido abrir este número de Polis con el texto que nos enviara Jhenieffer Weissenberg, ante nuestra invitación a escribir sobre la espiritualidad en el (...) contexto del mundo contemporáneo. Su envío representa.. (shrink)

Background: Neonatal nurses report a great deal of ethical challenges in their everyday work. Seemingly trivial everyday choices nurses make are no more value-neutral than life-and-death choices. Everyday ethical challenges should also be recognized as ethical dilemmas in clinical practice. Research objective: The purpose of this study is to investigate which types of ethical challenges neonatal nurses experience in their day-to-day care for critically ill newborns. Research design: Data were collected through semi-structured qualitative in-depth interviews. Phenomenological-hermeneutic analysis was applied to (...) interpret the data. Participants and research context: Six nurses from neonatal intensive care units at two Norwegian hospitals were interviewed on-site. Ethical considerations: The study is designed to comply with Ethical Guidelines for Nursing Research in the Nordic Countries and the Helsinki declaration. Findings: Findings suggest that nurses experience a diverse range of everyday ethical challenges related to challenging interactions with parents and colleagues, emotional strain, protecting the vulnerable infant, finding the balance between sensitivity and authority, ensuring continuity of treatment, and miscommunication and professional disagreement. Discussion: A major finding in this study is how different agents involved in caring for the newborn experience their realities differently. When these realities collide, ethical challenges arise. Findings suggest that acting in the best interests of the child becomes more difficult in situations involving many agents with different perceptions of reality. Conclusion: The study presents new aspects which increases knowledge and understanding of the reality of nursing in a neonatal intensive care unit, while also demanding increased research in this field of care. (shrink)

The role of the Sustainability Manager (SM) is expanding. Whether SMs are turning into a new profession is under debate. Pointing to the need for a distinct professional logic to qualify as a profession, we identify what is contained within a professional logic of SMs. Through analyzing ambiguities present in the role of the SMs, we show that there is no specific distinct professional logic of SMs, but rather a meta-construct building on market, bureaucratic, and sustainability logics. In addition, we (...) point to the complex configurations of and relationships between these underlying logics. The complexities also explain why the SMs differ from traditional professions and why it is problematic to talk about a ‘SM profession’. Rather, SMs are ‘organizational professionals’. The article builds on 21 interviews with SMs working for Swedish companies. (shrink)

It is natural to assume that knowledge, like belief, creates a hyperintensional context, that is, that knowledge ascriptions do not allow for substitution of necessarily equivalent prejacents salva veritate. There exist a variety of different proposals for modelling the phenomenon. In the last years, the topic-sensitive approach to the hyperintensionality of knowledge has gained considerable traction. It promises to provide a natural account of why knowledge fails to be closed under necessary equivalence in terms of differences in subject matter. Here, (...) we argue that the topic-sensitive approach, as recently put forward by Franz Berto, Peter Hawke, Aybüke Özgün, and others, faces formidable problems. The root of these problems lies in the approach’s prediction that a mere grasp of subject matter may help to provide insights into necessary implications that it would seem to require more substantive epistemic work to gain. (shrink)

This chapter contains sections titled: Introduction Historical Perspective Progressivism: Five Themes Progressivism Today.

People increasingly access news through ‘new’, algorithmic intermediaries such as search engines or aggregators rather than the ‘old’ (i. e., traditional), journalistic intermediaries. As algorithmic intermediaries do not adhere to journalistic standards, their trustworthiness comes into question. With this study, we (1) summarize the differences between journalistic and algorithmic intermediaries as found in previous literature; (2) conduct a cross-media comparison of information credibility and intermediary trustworthiness; and (3) examine how key predictors (such as modality, reputation, source attribution, and prior experience) (...) affect the trustworthiness and credibility assessments. Results from a quasi-experimental online survey (n = 485) confirm that recipients assess journalistic intermediaries more positively than algorithmic intermediaries and audio more positively than text intermediaries. Furthermore, we found reputation and information credibility to be the most important predictors of intermediary trustworthiness, while general media trust is the most important predictor of information credibility. Implications and directions for future research are discussed. (shrink)

This chapter responds to criticismsmade in Volume 8 of this series, in reply to another chapter of that volume. The initial chapter resurrected the Growing Block Theory from its grave, devising a coherent formulation of it and arguing that its burial was premature. It aimed to show that GBT has the wherewithal to explain how we might easily come to know that we are living on the edge of reality posited by GBT. Braddon-Mitchell, in the reply, remained unconvinced. His objections (...) are addressed here. (shrink)

ADP‐ribosylation is a post‐translational modification catalyzed by writer enzymes – ADP‐ribosyltransferases. The modification is part of many signaling events, can modulate the function and stability of target proteins, and often results in the recruitment of reader proteins that bind to the ADP‐ribosyl groups. Erasers are integral actors in these signaling events and reverse the modification. ADP‐ribosylation can be targeted with therapeutics and many inhibitors against writers exist, with some being in clinical use. Inhibitors against readers and erasers are sparser and (...) development of these has gained momentum only in recent years. Drug discovery has been hampered by the lack of specific tools, however many significant advances in the methods have recently been reported. We discuss assays used in the field with a focus on methods allowing efficient identification of small molecule inhibitors and profiling against enzyme families. While human proteins are focused, the methods can be also applied to bacterial toxins and virus encoded erasers that can be targeted to treat infectious diseases in the future. (shrink)

Background In nursing homes, residents’ relatives represent important sources of support for nurses. However, in the heightened stress of emergency situations, interaction between nurses and relatives can raise ethical challenges. Research objectives The present analysis aimed at elaborating a typology of nurses’ experience of ethical support and challenges in their interaction with relatives in emergency situations. Research design Thirty-three semi-structured interviews and six focus groups were conducted with nurses from different nursing homes in Germany. Data were analysed according to Mayring’s (...) method of qualitative content analysis. Participants and research context Participants were licensed nurses working in nursing homes. Ethical considerations Ethical approval was granted by Ostfalia University of Applied Sciences (02.07.2020) and the Ethics Committee of Hannover Medical School (Nr. 8866_BO_K_2020; 27.01.2020). Interviewees were anonymised and focus group were pseudonymised during transcription. All participants provided written consent. Findings/results In emergency situations, relatives can represent important sources of support for nurses. However, they may also give rise to different challenges, relating to four ethical conflicts: (1) the challenge of meeting the information needs of relatives while providing appropriate care to all residents; (2) the challenge of managing relatives’ demands for hospitalisation when hospitalisation is not deemed necessary by nurses; (3) the challenge of managing relatives’ demands for lifesaving treatment when such treatment contradicts the will of the resident; and (4) the challenge of attempting to initiate hospitalisation when relatives oppose this course of action. Several external factors make these conflicts especially challenging for nurses: fear of legal consequences, a low staffing ratio, and a lack of qualified nursing staff. Conclusions Conflict between nurses and relatives typically revolves around hospitalisation and the initiation of lifesaving treatment. Whether nurses perceive interaction with relatives as supportive or conflictual essentially depends on the quality of the relationship, which may be negatively influenced by a number of external factors. (shrink)

Corporate responsibility (CR) communication has risen dramatically in recent years, following increased demands for transparency. One tendency noted in the literature is that CR communication is organised and structured. Corporations tend to professionalise CR communication in the sense that they provide information that corresponds to demands for transparency that are voiced by certain stakeholders. This also means that experts within the firm tend to communicate with professional stakeholders outside the firm. In this article, a particular aspect of the organisation of (...) CR communication is examined, a phenomenon that we refer to as the ' filtration effect'. By comparing CR communication in parent companies and their subsidiaries, we show empirically that there is considerably less CR communication on the subsidiary level compared to the parent level. We see filtration as a sign of conscious organising of CR communication that implies particular attention to certain stakeholder groups with clearly defined demands and expectations on companies. The strong filtration effect noted in the study suggests that CR communication does not seem to be very much adapted to customers, which may be problematic both from a communicative and ethical perspective. The study covers Sweden's 206 largest retail firms. (shrink)

Traffic research shares a fundamental dilemma with other areas of empirical research in which humans are potentially put at risk. Research is justified because it can improve safety in the long run. Nevertheless, people can be harmed in the research situation. Hence, we need to balance short-term risks against long-term safety improvements, much as in other areas of research with human subjects. In this paper we focus on ethical issues that arise when human beings are directly affected in the performance (...) of research by examining how the ethical requirements in biomedical research can inform traffic research. After introducing the basic ethical requirements on biomedical research, each of the major requirements is discussed in relation to traffic research. We identify the main areas where biomedical research and traffic research differ, and where the ethical requirements from the former cannot easily be transferred to the latter. Finally, we argue that there is a need for systematic studies of the ethics of traffic research and point to some of the issues that need to be addressed. (shrink)

Sven Bernecker presents an analysis of the concept of propositional (or factual) memory, and examines a number of metaphysical and epistemological issues crucial to the understanding of memory. -/- Bernecker argues that memory, unlike knowledge, implies neither belief nor justification. There are instances where memory, though hitting the mark of truth, succeeds in an epistemically defective way. This book shows that, contrary to received wisdom in epistemology, memory not only preserves epistemic features generated by other epistemic sources but also (...) functions as a source of justification and knowledge. According to the causal theory of memory argued for in this book, the dependence of memory states on past representations supports counterfactuals of the form: if the subject hadn't represented a given proposition in the past he wouldn't represent it in the present. The book argues for a version of content externalism whereupon the individuation of memory contents depends on relations the subject bears to his past physical or social environment. Moreover, Bernecker shows that memory doesn't require identity, but only similarity, of past and present attitudes and contents. The notion of content similarity is explicated in terms of the entailment relation. (shrink)

Justification as Ignorance offers an original account of epistemic justification as both non-factive and luminous, vindicating core internalist intuitions without construing justification as an internal condition knowable by reflection alone. Sven Rosenkranz conceives of justification, in its doxastic and propositional varieties, as a kind of epistemic possibility of knowing and of being in a position to know. His account contrasts with recent alternative views that characterize justification in terms of the metaphysical possibility of knowing. Instead, he develops a suitable (...) non-normal multi-modal epistemic logic for knowledge and being in a position to know that respects the finding that these notions create hyperintensional contexts. He also defends his conception of justification against well-known anti-luminosity arguments, shows that the account allows for fruitful applications and principled solutions to the lottery and preface paradoxes, and provides a metaphysics of justification and its varying degrees of strength that is compatible with core assumptions of the knowledge-first approach and disjunctivist conceptions of mental states. (shrink)

This book argues that we need to explore how human beings can best coordinate and collaborate with robots in responsible ways. It investigates ethically important differences between human agency and robot agency to work towards an ethics of responsible human-robot interaction.

An alarming number of philosophers and cognitive scientists have argued that mind extends beyond the brain and body. This book evaluates these arguments and suggests that, typically, it does not. A timely and relevant study that exposes the need to develop a more sophisticated theory of cognition, while pointing to a bold new direction in exploring the nature of cognition Articulates and defends the “mark of the cognitive”, a common sense theory used to distinguish between cognitive and non-cognitive processes Challenges (...) the current popularity of extended cognition theory through critical analysis and by pointing out fallacies and shortcoming in the literature Stimulates discussions that will advance debate about the nature of cognition in the cognitive sciences. (shrink)

Many ethicists writing about automated systems attribute agency to these systems. Not only that; they seemingly attribute an autonomous or independent form of agency to these machines. This leads some ethicists to worry about responsibility-gaps and retribution-gaps in cases where automated systems harm or kill human beings. In this paper, I consider what sorts of agency it makes sense to attribute to most current forms of automated systems, in particular automated cars and military robots. I argue that whereas it indeed (...) makes sense to attribute different forms of fairly sophisticated agency to these machines, we ought not to regard them as acting on their own, independently of any human beings. Rather, the right way to understand the agency exercised by these machines is in terms of human–robot collaborations, where the humans involved initiate, supervise, and manage the agency of their robotic collaborators. This means, I argue, that there is much less room for justified worries about responsibility-gaps and retribution-gaps than many ethicists think. (shrink)

In the middle of the 1980s, logical tools were discovered that make it possible to model changes in belief and knowledge in entirely new ways. These logical tools turned out to be applicable both to human beliefs and to the contents of databases. This is the first textbook in this new area. It contains both discursive chapters with a minimum of formalism and formal chapters in which proofs and proof methods are presented. By using different selections from the formal section (...) the book can be used on all levels of University education. (shrink)

This book investigates central issues in the philosophy of memory. Does remembering require a causal process connecting the past representation to its subsequent recall and, if so, what is the nature of the causal process? Of what kind are the primary intentional objects of memory states? How do we know that our memory experiences portray things the way they happened in the past? Given that our memory is not only a passive device for reproducing thoughts but also an active device (...) for processing stored thoughts, when are thoughts sufficiently similar to be memory-related? The Metaphysics of Memory defends a version of the causal theory of memory, argues for direct realism about memory, proposes an externalist response to skepticism about memory knowledge, and develops a contextualist account of the factivity constraint on memory. (shrink)

Formal representations of values and norms are employed in several academic disciplines and specialties, such as economics, jurisprudence, decision theory and social choice theory. Sven Ove Hansson closely examines such foundational issues as the values of wholes and the values of their parts, the connections between values and norms, how values can be decision-guiding and the structure of normative codes with formal precision. Models of change in both preferences and norms are offered, as well as a method to base (...) the logic of norms on that of preferences. Hansson has developed a unified formal representation of values and norms that reflects both their static and their dynamic properties. This formalized treatment, carried out in terms of both informal value theory and precise logical detail, will contribute to the clarification of certain issues in the basic philosophical theory of values and norms. (shrink)

Self-driving cars hold out the promise of being safer than manually driven cars. Yet they cannot be a 100 % safe. Collisions are sometimes unavoidable. So self-driving cars need to be programmed for how they should respond to scenarios where collisions are highly likely or unavoidable. The accident-scenarios self-driving cars might face have recently been likened to the key examples and dilemmas associated with the trolley problem. In this article, we critically examine this tempting analogy. We identify three important ways (...) in which the ethics of accident-algorithms for self-driving cars and the philosophy of the trolley problem differ from each other. These concern: the basic decision-making situation faced by those who decide how self-driving cars should be programmed to deal with accidents; moral and legal responsibility; and decision-making in the face of risks and uncertainty. In discussing these three areas of disanalogy, we isolate and identify a number of basic issues and complexities that arise within the ethics of the programming of self-driving cars. (shrink)

Proponents of situated affectivity hold that “tools for feeling” are just as characteristic of the human condition as are “tools for thinking” or tools for carpentry. An agent’s affective life, they argue, is dependent upon both physical characteristics of the agent and the agent’s reciprocal relationship to an appropriately structured natural, technological, or social environment. One important achievement has been the distinction between two fundamentally different ways in which affectivity might be intertwined with the environment: the “user-resource-model” and the “mind-invasion-model.” (...) The twofold purpose of this paper is to complement the debate about situated affectivity in general and about “mind invasion” in particular by, firstly, connecting it to situationist research in social psychology and, secondly, broadening the perspective to not only accommodate decidedly detrimental “invasions” but also potentially beneficial forms of “mind shaping” that include the manipulation of an agent’s experiential life and behaviour through the moulding of both the agent’s environment and the agent’s body. (shrink)

Is more information always better? Or are there some situations in which more information can make us worse off? Good (1967) argues that expected utility maximizers should always accept more information if the information is cost-free and relevant. But Good's argument presupposes that you are certain you will update by conditionalization. If we relax this assumption and allow agents to be uncertain about updating, these agents can be rationally required to reject free and relevant information. Since there are good reasons (...) to be uncertain about updating, rationality can require you to prefer ignorance. (shrink)

According to T. M. Scanlon's 'buck-passing' analysis of value, x is good means that x has properties that provide reasons to take up positive attitudes vis-à-vis x. Some authors have claimed that this idea can be traced back to Franz Brentano, who said in 1889 that the judgement that x is good is the judgement that a positive attitude to x is correct ('richtig'). The most discussed problem in the recent literature on buckpassing is known as the 'wrong kind of (...) reason' problem (the WKR problem): it seems quite possible that there is sometimes reason to favour an object although that object is not good and possibly very evil. The problem is to delineate exactly what distinguishes reasons of the right kind from reasons of the wrong kind. In this paper we offer a Brentano-style solution. We also note that one version of the WKR problem was put forward by G. E. Moore in his review of the English translation of Brentano's Vom Ursprung sittlicher Erkenntnis. Before getting to how our Brentano-style approach might offer a way out for Brentano and the buck-passers, we briefly consider and reject an interesting attempt to solve the WKR problem recently proposed by John Skorupski. (shrink)

The paper explores a structural account of propositional justification in terms of the notion of being in a position to know and negation. Combined with a non-normal logic for being in a position to know, the account allows for the derivation of plausible principles of justification. The account is neutral on whether justification is grounded in internally individuated mental states, and likewise on whether it is grounded in facts that are already accessible by introspection or reflection alone. To this extent, (...) it is compatible both with internalism and with externalism about justification. Even so, the account allows for the proof of principles that are commonly conceived to depend on an internalist conception of justification. The account likewise coheres both with epistemic contextualism and with its rejection, and is compatible both with the knowledge-first approach and with its rejection. Despite its neutrality on these issues, the account makes propositional justification luminous and so is controversial. However, it proves quite resilient in the light of recent anti-luminosity arguments. (shrink)

When is it morally acceptable to expose others to risk? Most moral philosophers have had very little to say in answer to that question, but here is a moral philosopher who puts it at the centre of his investigations.

How do we ascribe subjective probability? In decision theory, this question is often addressed by representation theorems, going back to Ramsey (1926), which tell us how to define or measure subjective probability by observable preferences. However, standard representation theorems make strong rationality assumptions, in particular expected utility maximization. How do we ascribe subjective probability to agents which do not satisfy these strong rationality assumptions? I present a representation theorem with weak rationality assumptions which can be used to define or measure (...) subjective probability for partly irrational agents. (shrink)

Recent studies on neural pathways in a broad spectrum of vertebrates suggest that, in addition to migration and an increase in the number of certain select neurons, a significant aspect of neural evolution is a “parcellation” (segregation-isolation) process that involves the loss of selected connections by the new aggregates. A similar process occurs during ontogenetic development. These findings suggest that in many neuronal systems axons do not invade unknown territories during evolutionary or ontogenetic development but follow in their ancestors' paths (...) to their ancestral targets; if the connection is later lost, it reflects the specialization of the circuitry.The pattern of interspecific variability suggests (1) that overlap of circuits is a more common feature in primitive (generalized) than in specialized brain organizations and (2) that most projections, such as the retinal, thalamotelencephalic, corticotectal, and tectal efferent ones, were bilateral in the primitive condition. Specialization of these systems in some vertebrate groups has involved the selective loss of connections, resulting in greater isolation of functions. The parcellation process may also play an important role in cell diversification.The parcellation process as described here is thought to be one of several underlying mechanisms of evolutionary and ontogenetic differentiation. (shrink)