Komparatystyczna analiza wybranych utworów z nurtu literatury zombi z Argentyny (Ávalos Blacha, Pailos) oraz Polski (Dehnel, Ostachowicz) wskazuje na pewne paralelizmy w wykorzystaniu motywu żywego trupa w literaturach narodowych, jako metafory społecznej, politycznej, związanej z pamięcią historyczną i zmianami kulturowymi.

Perez-Rodriguez and de la Fuente (2017) assume that although human races do not exist in a biological sense (“geneticists and evolutionary biologists generally agree that the division of humans into races/subspecies has no defensible scientific basis,” they exist only as “sociocultural constructions” and because of that maintain an illusory reality, for example, through “racialized” practices in medicine. Agreeing with the main postulates formulated in the article, we believe that the authors treat this problem in a superficial manner and have failed (...) to capture the current state of the field of knowledge in science and the humanities. In our commentary, we want to highlight two main omissions, and to notice three important implications for “a postracial medicine.”. (shrink)

While agreeing with the main conclusion of Dominic Wilkinson and colleagues (Wilkinson, Butcherine, and Savulescu 2019), namely, that there is no moral difference between treatment withholding and withdrawal as such, we wish to criticize their approach on the basis that it treats the widespread acceptance of withdrawal aversion (WA) as a cognitive bias. Wilkinson and colleagues understand WA as “a nonrational preference for withholding (WH) treatment over withdrawal (WD) of treatment” (22). They treat WA as a manifestation of loss aversion (...) and refer to Kahneman and colleagues (1991), which defined this effect as follows: “the disutility of giving up an object is greater that the utility associated with acquiring it” (194). In a previous work, Wilkinson and Savulescu understood nonequivalence between treatment withholding and withdrawal as a reflection of slightly different, although related, phenomena: status quo bias or omission bias (Wilkinson and Savulescu 2012, 130–131). In neither of these two papers do they describe precisely the relation between these well-known psychological effects and WA, nor do they explain why they treat these effects as examples of nonrational preferences, despite the fact that these issues have been the subject of wide-ranging discussions on the intersection of psychology, economy, and philosophy. (shrink)

The effects of public announcements, private communications, deceptive messages to groups, and so on, can all be captured by a general mechanism of updating multi-agent models with update action models, now in widespread use. There is a natural extension of the definition of a bisimulation to action models. Surely enough, updating with bisimilar action models gives the same result (modulo bisimulation). But the converse turns out to be false: update models may have the same update effects without being bisimilar. We (...) propose action emulation as a notion of equivalence more appropriate for action models, and generalizing standard bisimulation. It is proved that action emulation provides a full characterization of update effect. We first concentrate on the general case, and next focus on the important case of action models with propositional preconditions. Our notion of action emulation yields a simplification procedure for action models, and it gives designers of multi-agent systems a useful tool for comparing different ways of representing a particular communicative action. (shrink)

One of the most common questions in today’s cognitive studies is the one regarding embodied cognition. The answer to this question draws our attention to many factors, including bodily actions, which also work to embody cognition. With this in mind, enactivism is included in discussions of embodiment.

Studies show that rejection increases negative affect and aggression and decreases helping behavior toward the excluder. Less is known about emotions and behavior after rejection by a friend for someone else. In two experimental studies (N = 101 and N = 169), we tested the predictions that rejection would feel worse in a close relationship but would result in less aggression and more reconnecting behavior, especially when the reasons for rejection were unknown. The results of study 1 showed that, as (...) expected, among acquaintances, more aggression was noted only after comparative rejection, but among strangers, aggression was also observed after rejection with no stated reason. Negative feelings toward a new acquaintance were only marginally stronger than those toward a stranger in study 1, but study 2 confirmed that rejection by a best friend, and especially comparative rejection by a friend, felt worse than other conditions. Study 2 also showed that reconnecting behavior was more likely to dominate over aggressive behavior between people in close relationships than between strangers. The results are discussed mostly in light of the multimotive model of rejection. (shrink)

In this paper we show that if the real line \documentclass[12pt]{minimal} \usepackage{amsmath} \usepackage{wasysym} \usepackage{amsfonts} \usepackage{amssymb} \usepackage{amsbsy} \usepackage{mathrsfs} \usepackage{upgreek} \setlength{\oddsidemargin}{-69pt} \begin{document} ${\Bbb R}$\end{document} is not a union of less than continuum many of its meager subsets then there exists an almost continuous Sierpiński–Zygmund function having a perfect road at each point. We also prove that it is consistent with ZFC that every Darboux function \documentclass[12pt]{minimal} \usepackage{amsmath} \usepackage{wasysym} \usepackage{amsfonts} \usepackage{amssymb} \usepackage{amsbsy} \usepackage{mathrsfs} \usepackage{upgreek} \setlength{\oddsidemargin}{-69pt} \begin{document} $f\colon{\Bbb R}\to{\Bbb R}$\end{document} is continuous on some set (...) of cardinality continuum. In particular, both these results imply that the existence of a Sierpiński–Zygmund function which is either Darboux or almost continuous is independent of ZFC axioms. This gives a complete solution of a problem of Darji [4]. The paper contains also a construction (in ZFC) of an additive Sierpiński–Zygmund function with a perfect road at each point. (shrink)

The aim of this paper is to reconstruct and correct one argument in support of the symmetrization postulate in quantum mechanics. I identify the central premise of the argument as a thesis specifying a particular ontic property of quantum superpositions. The precise form of this thesis depends on some underlying assumptions of a metaphysical character. I compare the exchange degeneracy argument with alternative formal arguments for the symmetrization postulate, and I discuss the role and meaning of labels in the symmetric/antisymmetric (...) representations of the states of many particles. (shrink)

In this interview, Tomasz Zarębski speaks with Allan Janik, co-author of _Wittgenstein’s Vienna_ (1973, with Stephen Toulmin), on the occasion of the 50 th anniversary of the publication of this pathbreaking book. The conversation concerns the circumstances, motivations and reasons for his undertaking the work on the book, as well as its reception and place in Wittgenstein scholarship. A large part of the discussion refers to his perspective of Wittgenstein, Toulmin’s philosophical writings, and Janik’s own vision of philosophy. The (...) interview took place in Innsbruck on 23 rd and 25 th August 2023. (shrink)

Reclamation of a slur involves the creation of a new, positively-valenced meaning that gradually replaces the old pejorative meaning. This means that at a critical stage, the slur is ambiguous. It has been claimed that this ambiguity is polysemy. However, it is far from clear whether the view can explain why the introduction of the new meaning forces the old one out of existence. I argue that this datapoint can be explained by invoking the mechanism of homonymic conflict, and, therefore, (...) that the ambiguity involved in reclamation is homonymy. One generalization that follows from my account is that conventionalized verbal irony, unlike conventionalized metonymy and metaphor, begets homonymy. Along the way, I criticize the standard ways of drawing the distinction between polysemy and homonymy in terms of semantic and etymological relatedness. If the notions of polysemy and homonymy are to be invoked in explanations, they should be understood in terms of how meanings are stored in the mental lexicon. My account also provides an elegant way of conceptualizing the difference between two types of conceptual engineering, namely reclamation and amelioration. (shrink)

We prove that all semisimple varieties of FL ew-algebras are discriminator varieties. A characterisation of discriminator and EDPC varieties of FL ew-algebras follows. It matches exactly a natural classification of logics over FL ew proposed by H. Ono.

In recent years, the so-calledindispensability argument has been given a lotof attention by philosophers of mathematics.This argument for the existence of mathematicalobjects makes use of the fact, neglected inclassical schools of philosophy of mathematics,that mathematics is part of our best scientifictheories, and therefore should receive similarsupport to these theories. However, thisobservation raises the question about the exactnature of the alleged connection betweenexperience and mathematics (for example: is itpossible to falsify empirically anymathematical theorems?). In my paper I wouldlike to address this (...) question by consideringthe explicit assumptions of different versionsof the indispensability argument. My primaryclaim is that there are at least three distinctversions of the indispensability argument (andit can be even suggested that a fourth,separate version should be formulated). I willmainly concentrate my discussion on thisvariant of the argument, which suggests thepossibility of empirical confirmation ofmathematical theories. A large portion of mypaper will focus on the recent discussion ofthis topic, starting from the paper by E.Sober, who in my opinion put reasonablerequirements on what is to be counted as anempirical confirmation of a mathematicaltheory. I will develop his model into threeseparate scenarios of possible empiricalconfirmation of mathematics. Using an exampleof Hilbert space in quantum mechanicaldescription I will show that the most promisingscenario of empirical verification ofmathematical theories has neverthelessuntenable consequences. It will be hypothesizedthat the source of this untenability lies in aspecific role which mathematical theories playin empirical science, and that what is subjectto empirical verification is not themathematics used, but the representabilityassumptions. Further I will undertake theproblem of how to reconcile the allegedempirical verification of mathematics withscientific practice. I will refer to thepolemics between P. Maddy and M. Resnik,pointing out certain ambiguities of theirarguments whose source is partly the failure todistinguish carefully between different sensesof the indispensability argument. For thatreason typical arguments used in the discussionare not decisive, yet if we take into accountsome metalogical properties of appliedmathematics, then the thesis that mathematicshas strong links with experience seems to behighly improbable. (shrink)

W artykule omówione zostały sprawy organizacyjne, przebieg i znaczenie polityczne pobytu elektora saskiego Fryderyka Augusta w Opolu w dniach 15 grudnia 1733 r. – 3 stycznia 1734 r. Jest to ważny epizod tak w dziejach miasta, jak i Rzeczypospolitej Obojga Narodów, pomijany jednak do tej pory w historiografii. Tymczasem na przełomie 1733 i 1734 r. o wizycie przyszłego króla polskiego w Opolu było stosunkowo głośno w Europie, a notatki informujące o tym publikowane były w prasie wydawanej w Austrii, Rzeszy Niemieckiej, (...) Rosji czy Wielkiej Brytanii. W artykule wykorzystano doniesienia gazetowe, a przede wszystkim relacje z podróży elektora, jego żony Marii Józefy i dworu saskiego, dokumenty logistyczne oraz korespondencję i rachunki przechowywane w archiwach saskich, austriackich oraz w Archiwum Państwowym w Opolu. (shrink)

The article presents a formalization of Anselm's so-called Ontological Arguments from Proslogion . The main idea of our research is to stay to the original text as close as is possible. We show, against some common opinions, that (i) the logic necessary for the formalization must be neither a purely sentential modal calculus, nor just non-modal first-order logic, but a modal first-order theory; (ii) such logic cannot contain logical axiom ⌜ A → ⋄ A ⌝; (iii) none of Anselm's reasonings (...) requires the assumptions that God is a consistent object or that existence of God is possible (in symbols "⋄Eg"); (iv) no such thing as the so-called Anselm's Principle (in symbols "□(Eg → □Eg)") is involved in any of the proofs; (v) Anselm's claims (that God exists in reality and that God necessarily exists in reality) can be obtained independently, hence there is no need for presenting them in an opposite order than Anselm did. Moreover we show a single line of reasoning underlying the whole Proslogion and allowing Anselm to deduce many theorems concerning God's nature. Last but not least we study the possibility of proving the uniqueness of God within the outlined theory. (shrink)

Wincenty Lutosławski (1863–1954) was internationally recognized in the academic world as a prominent Plato scholar. His fragmentary correspondence with Bertrand Russell is presented in this paper. Before World War II he initiated an exchange of letters with Russell on issues such as reincarnation, but the replies he received were laconic and discouraging. This changed, however, after the war when Russell published his History of Western Philosophy. Despite their different philosophical positions, Lutosławski’s opinion on this work as a whole was favourable, (...) in particular the chapters on Plato. Such an assessment was the exception rather than the rule for that book, and knowing Lutosławski’s general recognition in Platonic studies, Russell forwarded the letter to his publisher. (shrink)

Here, we discuss historical, philosophical and technical problems associated with relating logic and relating semantics. To do so, we proceed in three steps. First, Section 1 is devoted to providing an introduction to both relating logic and relating semantics. Second, we address the history of relating semantics and some of the main research directions and their philosophical applications. Third, we discuss some technical problems related to relating semantics, particularly whether the direct incorporation of the relation into the language of relating (...) logic is needed. The starting point for our considerations presented here is the 1st Workshop On Relating Logic and the selected papers for this issue. (shrink)

In "Variations on a theme of Curry," Humberstone conjectured that a certain logic, intermediate between BCI and BCK, is none other than monothetic BCI—the smallest extension of BCI in which all theorems are provably equivalent. In this note, we present a proof of this conjecture.

We prove that certain natural sequent systems for bi-intuitionistic logic have the analytic cut property. In the process we show that the (global) subformula property implies the (local) analytic cut property, thereby demonstrating their equivalence. Applying a version of Maehara technique modified in several ways, we prove that bi-intuitionistic logic enjoys the classical Craig interpolation property and Maximova variable separation property; its Halldén completeness follows.

In the paper we study the method of Socratic proofs in the intuitionistic propositional logic as a reduction procedure. Our approach consists in constructing for a given sequent α a finite tree of sets of sequents by using invertible reduction rules of the kind: ? is valid if and only if ?1 is valid or... or ?n is valid. From such a tree either a Gentzen-style proof of α or an Aristotle-style refutation of α can also be extracted.

General metaphysical arguments have been proposed in favour of the thesis that all dispositions have categorical bases (Armstrong; Prior, Pargetter, Jackson). These arguments have been countered by equally general arguments in support of ungrounded dispositions (Molnar, Mumford). I believe that this controversy cannot be settled purely on the level of abstract metaphysical considerations. Instead, I propose to look for ungrounded dispositions in specific physical theories, such as quantum mechanics. I explain why non-classical properties such as spin are best interpreted as (...) irreducible dispositional properties, and I give reasons why even seemingly classical properties, for instance position or momentum, should receive a similar treatment when interpreted in the quantum realm. Contrary to the conventional wisdom, I argue that quantum dispositions should not be limited to probabilistic dispositions (propensities) by showing reasons why even possession of well-defined values of parameters should qualify as a dispositional property. I finally discuss the issue of the actuality of quantum dispositions, arguing that it may be justified to treat them as potentialities whose being has a lesser degree of reality than that of classical categorical properties, due to the incompatibility relations between non-commuting observables. (shrink)

Deutsch 2010 (The Review of Philosophy and Psychology 1: 447–460) claims that hypothetical scenarios are evaluated using arguments, not intuitions, and therefore experiments on intuitions are philosophically inconsequential. Using the Gettier case as an example, he identifies three arguments that are supposed to point to the right response to the case. In the paper, I present the results of studies ran on Polish, Indian, Spanish, and American participants that suggest that there’s no deep difference between evaluating the Gettier case with (...) intuitions and evaluating it with Deutsch’s arguments. Specifically, I argue that one would find these arguments persuasive if and only if one is already disposed to exhibit the relevant intuition. (shrink)

This book uses the formal semantics of counterfactual conditionals to analyze the problem of non-locality in quantum mechanics. Counterfactual conditionals enter the analysis of quantum entangled systems in that they enable us to precisely formulate the locality condition that purports to exclude the existence of causal interactions between spatially separated parts of a system. They also make it possible to speak consistently about alternative measuring settings, and to explicate what is meant by quantum property attributions. The book develops the possible-world (...) semantics of quantum counterfactuals using David Lewis's famous approach as a starting point but modifying it significantly in order to achieve compatibility with the demands of the special theory of relativity as well as quantum mechanics. There have been several attempts to use counterfactuals semantics to strengthen Bell's theorem and its cognates such as the GHZ and Hardy theorems. These are critically evaluated in the book. Finally, a counterfactual reconstruction of the EPR argument and Bell's theorem is proposed that sheds a new light on their philosophical consequences regarding the relations between realism and local causation. (shrink)

The promise of a new cultural periodization:Realism, Modernism, PostmodernismThis article discusses the problem of a possibility of finding a comprehensive narrative encompassing the entire course of history and forming an interpretive framework for cultural studies. The author presents Fredric Jameson’s original concept of the history of aesthetic forms: realism, modernism, postmodernism and argues that if offers a promising interpretative framework for Polish studies.

We show that Pitts' modeling of propositional quantification in intuitionistic logic (as the appropriate interpolants) does not coincide with the topological interpretation. This contrasts with the case of the monadic language and the interpretation over sufficiently regular topological spaces. We also point to the difference between the topological interpretation over sufficiently regular spaces and the interpretation of propositional quantifiers in Kripke models.

Cet article vise à présenter les principales étapes de l’histoire des traductions polonaises des dialogues de Platon, qui sont intimement liées à l’histoire de la Pologne et à la renaissance de la vie académique dans l’entre-deux-guerres. L’attention se porte en particulier sur les travaux de traductions de F.A. Kozłowski, A. Bronikowski, S. Lisiecki et W. Witwicki, qui représentaient diverses approches et appliquaient des méthodes différentes pour rendre les textes de Platon en polonais. Le développement de cette série de dialogues accessibles (...) au public polonais dans différentes traductions a suscité des discussions sur les méthodes mêmes pour rendre Platon. Chaque nouveau dialogue était discuté et examine par les philologues classiques, les enseignants, les spécialistes de littérature, et même les théologiens, et seulement accessoirement par les philosophes. Bien que de nouvelles traductions de Platon commencent de plus en plus à apparaître, les productions anciennes, en particulier celles de Witwicki, restent populaires et sont encore largement lues. (shrink)

We show that truth conditions for counterfactuals need not always be given in terms of a vague notion of similarity. To this end, we single out the important class of historical counterfactuals and give formally rigorous truth conditions for these counterfactuals, employing a partial ordering relation called "comparative closeness" that is defined in the framework of branching space-times. Among other applications, we provide a detailed analysis of counterfactuals uttered in the context of lost bets. In an appendix we compare our (...) theory with the branching space-times based reading of counterfactuals recently proposed by Belnap. (shrink)

Three basic positions regarding the nature of fundamental properties are: dispositional monism, categorical monism and the mixed view. Dispositional monism apparently involves a regress or circularity, while an unpalatable consequence of categorical monism and the mixed view is that they are committed to quidditism. I discuss Alexander Bird's defence of dispositional monism based on the structuralist approach to identity. I argue that his solution does not help standard dispositional essentialism, as it admits the possibility that two distinct dispositional properties can (...) possess the same stimuli and manifestations. Moreover, Bird's argument can be used to support the mixed view by relieving it of its commitment to quidditism. I briefly analyse an alternative defence of dispositional essentialism based on Leon Horsten's approach to the problem of circularity and impredicativity. I conclude that the best option is to choose Bird's solution but amend the dispositional perspective on properties. According to my proposal, the essences of dispositions are determined not directly by their stimuli and manifestations but by the role each property plays in the structure formed by the stimulus/manifestation relations. (shrink)

The article undertakes the problem of a Wittgensteinian background of Toulmin’s model of argument. While appreciating the original character of the investigations set out by Toulmin in The Uses of Argument, Wittgenstein’s ideas taken to be forerunners of both Toulmin’s philosophical method and the particular elements of the model of substantial argument are traced backward, to Toulmin’s earlier books: The Philosophy of Science (Toulmin, The philosophy of science. An introduction, Hutchinson University Library, London, 1953) and An Examination of the Place (...) of Reason in Ethics (Toulmin, An examination of the place of reason in ethics, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1950). The technique of pinpointing the constituents of that model in the books preceding The Uses of Argument is superposing the layout of Toulmin’s model on the crucial arguments concerning the earlier books: the scientific one based on Newtonian optics and the moral one concerning keeping promises. Such a procedure allows identifying backing for warrants and argument fields with the methods of representation in The Philosophy of Science and with modes of reasoning in An Examination of the Place of Reason in Ethics. The former is traced to passages 6.3 ff of Wittgenstein’s Tractatus, while the latter—to the concept of word-games (the later Wittgenstein’s language games). The claim regarding Wittgenstein’s background is that in Toulmin’s view of Wittgenstein, some parts of Tractatus concerning representing are in line with Wittgenstein’s later reflections on language games; as well as that the overall method of The Uses of Argument goes along with Wittgenstein’s therapeutic approach to philosophical problems that have to be placed in the context of their ordinary use. (shrink)

In this paper I consider the question of whether absolute discernibility is attainable in symmetric languages. Simon Saunders has proven that all facts expressible in first-order language with identity can be equivalently stated within its symmetric sublanguage. I use this result to show specifically how particles of the same type can be absolutely discerned in the permutation-invariant language of the quantum theory of many particles.

In this paper I discuss some metaphysical consequences of an unorthodox approach to the problem of the identity and individuality of “indistinguishable” quantum particles. This approach is based on the assumption that the only admissible way of individuating separate components of a given system is with the help of the permutation-invariant qualitative properties of the total system. Such a method of individuation, when applied to fermionic compositions occupying so-called GMW-nonentangled states, yields highly implausible consequences regarding the number of distinct components (...) of a given composite system. I specify the problem in detail, and I consider several strategies of solving it. The preferred solution of the problem is based on the premise that spatial location should play a privileged role in identifying and making reference to quantum-mechanical systems. (shrink)

Author: Kupś Tomasz Title: ELEMENTS OF TRANSCENDENTAL THEOLOGY IN THE PHILOSOPHY OF RELIGION OF IMMANUEL KANT (Elementy teologii transcendentalnej w filozofii religii Immanuela Kanta) Source: Filo-Sofija year: 2005, vol:.5, number: 2005/1, pages: 91-103 Keywords: TRANSCENDENTAL THEOLOGY, PHILOSOPHY OF RELIGION, KANT Discipline: PHILOSOPHY Language: POLISH Document type: ARTICLE Publication order reference (Primary author’s office address): E-mail: www:In Kantian philosophical system transcendental theology is a part of cognition of pre-being educed only from transcendental notions. Nevertheless any attempts of speculative cognition of (...) pre-being are futile. The value of the transcendental theology is thus merely negative as it shows the bounds of theoretical use of the reason. The idea of the pre-being gains its reality only in the practical use of the reason. In this way transcendental theology becomes the first premise of religion. (shrink)

In Section 2 I give a criterion of decidability that can be applied to logics (i.e. Tarski consequence operators) without the finite model property. In Section 3 I study ukasiewicz-style refutation procedures as a method of obtaining decidability results.This method also proves to be more general than Harrop's criterion.

“If the tower is any taller than 320 ms, it may collapse,” Eiffel thinks out loud. Although understanding this counterfactual poses no trouble, the most successful interventionist semantics struggle to model it because the antecedent can come about in infinitely many ways. My aim is to provide a semantics that will make modeling such counterfactuals easy for philosophers, computer scientists, and cognitive scientists who work on causation and causal reasoning. I first propose three desiderata that will guide my theory: it (...) should be general, yet conservative, yet useful. Next, I develop a formalization of events in the form of an algebra. I identify an event with all the ways in which it can be brought about and provide rules for determining the referent of an arbitrary event description. I apply this algebra to counterfactuals expressed using underdeterministic causal models-models that encode non-probabilistic causal indeterminacies. Specifically, I develop semaphore interventions, which represent how the target system may be modified from without in a coordinated fashion. This, in turn, allows me to bring about any event within a single model. Finally, I explain the advantages of this semantics over other interventionist competitors. (shrink)

In this paper, I argue that enactivism and computationalism—two seemingly incompatible research traditions in modern cognitive science—can be fruitfully reconciled under the framework of the free energy principle. FEP holds that cognitive systems encode generative models of their niches and cognition can be understood in terms of minimizing the free energy of these models. There are two philosophical interpretations of this picture. A computationalist will argue that as FEP claims that Bayesian inference underpins both perception and action, it entails a (...) concept of cognition as a computational process. An enactivist, on the other hand, will point out that FEP explains cognitive systems as constantly self-organizing to non-equilibrium steady-state. My claim is that these two interpretations are both true at the same time and that they enlighten each other. (shrink)

W artykule podjęta jest próba intuicyjnej syntetycznej interpretacji sokratejskiej maieutyki w duchu psychologii homeryckiej. Bazując na tej interpretacji, opracowano ćwiczenie uświadomionego mówienia, które zostało włączone do zajęć akademickich: „Jak praktycznie wykorzystać własną głupotę? – doradztwo filozoficzne w warsztacie psychologa”, prowadzonych na Uniwersytecie Warszawskim i w Szkole Wyższej Psychologii Społecznej w latach 2004–2012. Na gruncie akademickim były to pierwsze w Polsce seminaria poświęcone doradztwu filozoficznemu. Podczas ćwiczeń studenci byli proszeni o zapisywanie swoich obserwacji. Niektóre ćwiczenia były filmowane. W ten sposób został (...) zebrany bardzo ciekawy materiał, który może być podstawą do dalszych poszukiwań teoretycznych i empirycznych. W artykule krótko przedstawiam, czym jest uświadomione mówienie, prezentuję zapiski z ćwiczeń studentów oraz wskazuję na krótki materiał filmowy. (shrink)