It is argued that the Nash bargaining solution cannot serve as a principle of distributive justice because (i) it cannot secure stable cooperation in repeated interactions and (ii) it cannot capture our moral intuitions concerning distributive questions. In this article, I propose a solution to the first problem by amending the Nash bargaining solution so that it can maintain stable cooperation among rational bargainers. I call the resulting principle the stabilized Nash bargaining solution. The principle (...) defends justice in the form 'each according to her basic needs and above this level according to her relative bargaining power'. In response to the second problem, I argue that the stabilized Nash bargaining solution can serve as a principle of distributive justice in certain situations where moral reasoning is reduced to instrumental reasoning. In particular, I argue that rational individuals would choose the stabilized Nash bargaining solution in Rawls' original position. (shrink)

Skyrms has pointed out differences between the results of rational choice theory and evolutionary game theory. This commentary argues that there is a great deal of agreement on the Nash Bargaining Solution, which maximizes the product of player payoffs, in both rational-choice-based and evolution-based theories of equilibrium selection. While evolutionary game theory has the potential to explain how we arrive at the behavioural rules that govern what we do, realistic models will require calibration through laboratory experiments. Indeed, experimental evidence (...) strongly supports the Nash Bargaining Solution. (shrink)

In a recent article, McClennen (2012) defends an alternative bargaining theory in response to his criticisms of the standard Nash bargaining solution as a principle of distributive justice in the context of the social contract. McClennen rejects the orthodox concept of expected individual utility maximizing behavior that underlies the Nash bargaining model in favor of what he calls full rationality, and McClennen’s full cooperation bargaining theory demands that agents select the most egalitarian strictly Pareto-optimal distributional (...) outcome that is strictly Pareto-superior to the state of nature. I argue that McClennen’s full cooperators are best described as reasonable agents whose rationality is constrained by moral considerations and that McClennen’s bargaining theory is moralized in this regard. If, by contrast, the orthodox concept of rationality is assumed and plausible assumptions are made about human nature and social cooperation, then a modified version of the standard Nash bargaining solution, which I call the stabilized Nash bargaining solution (Moehler 2010), is justified. From the perspective of rational agents, the stabilized Nash bargaining solution can accommodate McClennen’s criticisms of the standard Nash bargaining solution in the context of the social contract and, for such agents, it can serve as a principle of distributive justice in deeply morally pluralistic societies. (shrink)

Recently, philosophers have investigated the emergence and evolution of the social contract. Yet extant work is limited as it focuses on the use of simple behavioral norms in rather rigid strategic settings. Drawing on axiomatic bargaining theory, we explore the dynamics of more sophisticated norms capable of guiding behavior in a wide range of scenarios. Overall, our investigation suggests the utilitarian bargaining solution has a privileged status as it has certain stability properties other social arrangements lack.

A situation, in which a finite set of players can obtain certain payoffs by cooperation can be described by a cooperative game with transferable utility, or simply a TU-game. A (point-valued) solution for TU-games assigns a payoff distribution to every TU-game. In this article we discuss a class of equal surplus sharing solutions consisting of all convex combinations of the CIS-value, the ENSC-value and the equal division solution. We provide several characterizations of this class of solutions on variable (...) and fixed player set. Specifications of several properties characterize specific solutions in this class. (shrink)

Abstract:I examine from a conventionalist perspective the Nash bargaining problem that philosophers use as a tool for analyzing fair division. From this perspective, the solutions to bargaining problems are conventions that can emerge from inductive learning and focal point effects. I contrast the conventionalist approach to analyzing the bargaining problem with the better-known rational choice approach, which I criticize for having overly demanding epistemic presuppositions and for producing disappointing results. I apply a simple model of inductive (...) learning to specific bargaining problems to show that agents can learn from repeated experience to follow a variety of bargaining conventions in a given problem. I conclude that such agents can come to regard two such conventions as focal for the bargaining problem, one that assigns claimants equal shares of a good and another egalitarian solution of equal payoff gains, and that the egalitarian solution tends to prevail when these two solutions differ. I conclude further that the above analysis lends support for admitting interpersonal utility comparisons into the analysis of fair division problems, and also suggests a focal point explanation of the wide acceptance of the Aristotelian proportionality principle of distributive justice. (shrink)

A situation, in which a finite set of players can obtain certain payoffs by cooperation can be described by a cooperative game with transferable utility, or simply a TU-game. A (point-valued) solution for TU-games assigns a payoff distribution to every TU-game. In this article we discuss a class of equal surplus sharing solutions consisting of all convex combinations of the CIS-value, the ENSC-value and the equal division solution. We provide several characterizations of this class of solutions on variable (...) and fixed player set. Specifications of several properties characterize specific solutions in this class. (shrink)

In this paper, I offer a novel solution to the well-known problem concerning two polarity items in Korean, amu-(N)-to and amu-(N)-rato, that show a complementary distribution within the set of typical NPI-licensing contexts. I present a uniform analysis of the distribution of these NPIs, where the complementary distribution follows from the opposite scope properties of the emphatic particles to and rato contained in the NPIs in question. As the- oretical background, I adopt Karttunen and Peters’s (1979, Syntax and Semantics (...) 11: Presuppositions (pp. 1–56). New York: Academic Press) and Wilkinson’s (1996, Natural Language Semantics, 4, 193–215) scope analysis of even, Lahiri’s (1998, Natural Language Semantics, 6, 57–127) analysis of Hindi NPIs, and Guerzoni’s (2002, Proceedings of NELS 32 (pp. 153–170); GLSA, University of Massachusetts, Amherst, Mass.; 2004, Natural Language Semantics, 12, 319–343) analysis of the negative bias of yes/no-questions containing minimizers. The current analysis also lends further support to Guerzoni’s approach in that it bears out the prediction that in certain environments, a yes/no-question can be positively biased, i.e., only the positive answer is allowed as a legitimate answer in the context; this prediction was left unconfirmed in Guerzoni’s work. (shrink)

One of the conceptual limitations of the orthodox game theory is its inability to offer definitive theoretical predictions concerning the outcomes of noncooperative games with multiple rationalizable outcomes. This prompted the emergence of goal-directed theories of reasoning – the team reasoning theory and the theory of hypothetical bargaining. Both theories suggest that people resolve non-cooperative games by using a reasoning algorithm which allows them to identify mutually advantageous solutions of non-cooperative games. The primary aim of this thesis is (...) to enrich the current debate on goaldirected reasoning theories by studying the extent to which the principles of the bargaining theory can be used to formally characterize the concept of mutual advantage in a way which is compatible with some of the conceptually compelling principles of orthodox game theory, such as individual rationality, incentive compatibility, and non-comparability of decision-makers’ personal payoffs. I discuss two formal characterizations of the concept of mutual advantage derived from the aforementioned goal-directed reasoning theories: A measure of mutual advantage developed in collaboration with Jurgis Karpus, which is broadly in line with the notion of mutual advantage suggested by Sugden, and the benefit-equilibrating bargaining solution function, which is broadly in line with the principles underlying Conley and Wilkie’s solution for Pareto optimal point selection problems with finite choice sets. I discuss the formal properties of each solution, as well as its theoretical predictions in a number of games. I also explore each solution concept’s compatibility with orthodox game theory. I also discuss the limitations of the aforementioned goal-directed reasoning theories. I argue that each theory offers a compelling explanation of how a certain type of decision-maker identifies the mutually advantageous solutions of non-cooperative games, but neither of them offers a definitive answer to the question of how people coordinate their actions in non-cooperative social interactions. (shrink)

Miyagawa (Games and Economics Behavior 41(2), 292–308 [2002]) provides a simple extensive game form that implements a large class of two-agent bargaining solutions in subgame-perfect equilibrium. This class includes all of the Nash, Kalai–Smorodinsky, and relative utilitarian solutions. This note extends Miyagawa’s result to multi-agent bargaining problems.

Artificial intelligence (AI) has sparked interest in various areas, including marketing. However, this exhilaration is being tempered by growing concerns about the moral and legal implications of using AI in marketing. Although previous research has revealed various ethical and legal issues, such as algorithmic discrimination and data privacy, there are no definitive answers. This paper aims to fill this gap by investigating AI’s ethical and legal concerns in marketing and suggesting feasible solutions.,The paper synthesises information from academic articles, industry (...) reports, case studies and legal documents through a thematic literature review. A qualitative analysis approach categorises and interprets ethical and legal challenges and proposes potential solutions.,The findings of this paper raise concerns about ethical and legal challenges related to AI in the marketing area. Ethical concerns related to discrimination, bias, manipulation, job displacement, absence of social interaction, cybersecurity, unintended consequences, environmental impact, privacy and legal issues such as consumer security, responsibility, liability, brand protection, competition law, agreements, data protection, consumer protection and intellectual property rights are discussed in the paper, and their potential solutions are discussed.,Notwithstanding the interesting insights gathered from this investigation of the ethical and legal consequences of AI in marketing, it is important to recognise the limits of this research. Initially, the focus of this study is confined to a review of the most important ethical and legal issues pertaining to AI in marketing. Additional possible repercussions, such as those associated with intellectual property, contracts and licencing, should be investigated more deeply in future studies. Despite the fact that this study gives various answers and best practices for tackling the stated ethical and legal concerns, the viability and efficacy of these solutions may differ depending on the context and industry. Thus, more research and case studies are required to evaluate the applicability and efficacy of these solutions in other circumstances. This research is mostly based on a literature review and may not represent the experiences or opinions of all stakeholders engaged in AI-powered marketing. Further study might involve interviews or surveys with marketing professionals, customers and other key stakeholders to offer a full knowledge of the practical difficulties and solutions. Because of the rapid speed of technical progress, AI’s ethical and regulatory ramifications in marketing are continually increasing. Consequently, this work should be a springboard for more research and continuing conversations on this subject.,This study’s findings have several practical implications for marketing professionals. Emphasising openness and explainability: Marketing professionals should prioritise transparency in their use of AI, ensuring that customers are fully informed about data collection and utilisation for targeted advertising. By promoting openness and explainability, marketers can foster customer trust and avoid the negative consequences of a lack of transparency. Establishing ethical guidelines: Marketing professionals need to develop ethical rules for the creation and implementation of AI-powered marketing strategies. Adhering to ethical principles ensures compliance with legal norms and aligns with the organisation’s values and ideals. Investing in bias detection tools and privacy-enhancing technology: To mitigate risks associated with AI in marketing, marketers should allocate resources to develop and implement bias detection tools and privacy-enhancing technology. These tools can identify and address biases in AI algorithms, safeguard consumer privacy and extract valuable insights from consumer data.,This study’s social implications emphasise the need for a comprehensive approach to address the ethical and legal challenges of AI in marketing. This includes adopting a responsible innovation framework, promoting ethical leadership, using ethical decision-making frameworks and conducting multidisciplinary research. By incorporating these approaches, marketers can navigate the complexities of AI in marketing responsibly, foster an ethical organisational culture, make informed ethical decisions and develop effective solutions. Such practices promote public trust, ensure equitable distribution of benefits and risk, and mitigate potential negative social consequences associated with AI in marketing.,To the best of the authors’ knowledge, this paper is among the first to explore potential solutions comprehensively. This paper provides a nuanced understanding of the challenges by using a multidisciplinary framework and synthesising various sources. It contributes valuable insights for academia and industry. (shrink)

We consider bargaining situations where two players evaluate outcomes with reference-dependent utility functions, analyzing the effect of differing levels of loss aversion on bargaining outcomes. We find that as with risk aversion, increasing loss aversion for a player leads to worse outcomes for that player in bargaining situations. An extension of Nash's axioms is used to define a solution for bargaining problems with exogenous reference points. Using this solution concept we endogenize the reference points into the (...) model and find a unique solution giving reference points and outcomes that satisfy two reasonable properties, which we predict would be observed in a steady state. The resulting solution also emerges in two other approaches, a strategic (non-cooperative) approach using Rubinstein's (1982) alternating offers model and a dynamic approach in which we find that even under weak assumptions, outcomes and reference points converge to the steady state solution from any non-equilibrium state. (shrink)

For every 2-person bargaining problem, the Nash bargaining solution selects a point that is “between” the relative utilitarian point and the relative egalitarian point. Also, it is “between” the utilitarian and egalitarian points. I improve these bounds. I also derive a new characterization of the Nash solution which combines a bounds property together with strong individual rationality and an axiom which is new to Nash’s bargaining model, the sandwich axiom. The sandwich axiom is a weakening of Nash’s (...) IIA. (shrink)

This paper investigates a stochastic two-patch predator-prey model with ratio-dependent functional responses. First, the existence of a unique global positive solution is proved via the stochastic comparison theorem. Then, two different methods are used to discuss the long-time properties of the solutions pathwise. Next, sufficient conditions for extinction and persistence in mean are obtained. Moreover, stochastic persistence of the model is discussed. Furthermore, sufficient conditions for the existence of an ergodic stationary distribution are derived by a suitable Lyapunov (...) function. Next, we apply the main results in some special models. Finally, some numerical simulations are introduced to support the main results obtained. The results in this paper generalize and improve the previous related results. (shrink)

A “post-work world” can mean a couple of things. First, it can mean a world where we attach less importance to work, restructure work so that tasks and authority are distributed more equitably, and otherwise decenter and reform the world of work. Second, it can mean a world where people are no longer working because robots, artificial intelligence, and other forms of automation have replaced humans and there are no longer enough jobs for everyone. This paper is about the second (...) kind of world, and how to support the workers it leaves behind. -/- Automation has always eliminated jobs, but in the past new jobs have appeared to replace them. This may be changing. Thanks to recent advances in automation, machines and software can now do an increasingly large percentage of the tasks that humans do. “Technological unemployment” is what happens when automation can do so many different tasks that new jobs do not appear in sufficient numbers to employ everyone (Keynes 1932). In short, automation may soon leave a very large part of the potential workforce permanently unemployed, leading to a social, political, economic, and humanitarian crisis. For ease of reference, I refer to the technologically unemployed as being displaced from the economy. -/- The displaced need incomes. One obvious source of funds is the money saved through technological unemployment. On the scale of an entire economy, technological unemployment increases the labor savings from automation, for in addition to the usual labor savings from automation, there is less of a need to pay new workers, for there are fewer new jobs. I call this money the displacement gain. This is money that becomes available precisely because technological unemployment has occurred. It is important to understand that the displacement gain is not the same thing as the profit that results from gains in productivity. Automation does not necessarily produce displacement but it does produce gains in productivity, and the profits from gains in productivity occur even when no one is displaced. A productivity gain does not become a displacement gain until technological unemployment occurs. -/- The core of this paper is a set of arguments that the displacement gain is not the private property of businesses or those who have ownership interests in businesses (I refer to both groups as “capitalists”), nor is it the private property of those lucky enough to still have jobs. For these and additional reasons, the displacement gain is collective property in which every person has an equal interest. Moreover, it is a kind of collective property that has been largely overlooked. (Better-known forms of collective property include the natural world and “social capital.” ) As far back as Thomas Paine (1796), many thinkers have argued that, because we all have equal interests in collective property, it should be distributed to everyone, working or not, rich or poor, as equal and unconditional basic incomes. The displacement gain is a new kind of collective property which can fund basic incomes, and those incomes can support the displaced. That’s how to pay for a post-work world. -/- However, I will argue, in order to distribute those funds equally we must pay unequal basic incomes, for those who are technologically unemployed bear a larger share of the burden involved in creating that collective property, and therefore deserve larger basic incomes to offset their larger burdens. My discussion of this leads to a possible solution to a problem that bedevils basic income proposals: how to prevent businesses from, in effect, appropriating basic incomes from their employees by simply paying them less, using basic incomes as a payroll subsidy . (shrink)

In this thesis I present a rights-based theory of exploitation. I argue that successful conceptions of exploitation should begin with the ordinary language claim that exploitation involves `taking unfair advantage'. Consequently, they must combine an account of what it means to take advantage of another with an account of when transactions are unfair. Existing conceptions of exploitation fail to provide adequate accounts of both aspects of exploitation. -/- Hillel Steiner and John Roemer provide convincing accounts of the unfairness involved in (...) exploitation, but because they fail to provide restrictive `advantage taking' conditions, their theories of exploitation include cases that we would not ordinarily describe as exploitations. Ruth Sample and Robert Goodin provide accounts that place a stronger emphasis on the attitudes involved in exploitation and the processes that bring it about. Unfortunately, these theories do not properly incorporate the unfairness aspect of exploitation. Consequently, they are either self-frustrating or incomplete. -/- I provide a conception of exploitation that combines both aspects. I claim that a bilateral, strictly Pareto improving, and voluntary transaction t between A and B is exploitative just in case (1) there exists an unrectified property rights violation at some point in the history of exchanges leading to t that (2) reduces B's bargaining power by altering her status quo point, and (3) the degree to which B's preferences are satisfied in t is less than it would be had B's bargaining power not been reduced (by the alteration of her status quo point). Further, (4a) A's egoistic preferences are better satisfied in t because B's bargaining power is limited, and (4b) if the previous conditions also hold for A, then the reduction in A's bargaining power is less than the reduction in B's bargaining power. Finally, (5) A truly believes the previous conditions hold. (shrink)

The current debate over the global distribution of COVID-19 vaccines once again highlights the many shortcomings of the modern intellectual property system, especially when it comes to equitable access to medicines. This essay argues that the conceptual center of struggles over access to new pharmaceuticals rests in the IP system's colonial legacy, which perceives the world as uncharted territory that is ripe for discovery and ownership. This vision of the world as a blank canvas, or terra nullius, sets aside any (...) other models of ownership and devalues other traditional modes of relating to territory and nature. Several examples show the long-lasting exclusionary effects of this hidden legacy of colonial conquest in the field of public health, ranging from the spiraling price of insulin to the distribution of COVID-19 vaccines to the negotiation of sharing mechanisms for virus samples. In all of these cases, the continuing marginalization of other interests by the IP system can lead to exploitation, without either the “sources” of materials, such as those from whom the samples were taken, or the recipients of the eventual product having any say in matters of price and access. This legacy of fundamental exclusion needs to be recognized and addressed in order to arrive at more equitable solutions to public health emergencies such as the current pandemic. (shrink)

We treat a class of multi-person bargaining mechanisms based on games in coalitional form. For this class of games we identify properties of non-cooperative solution concepts, which are necessary and sufficient for the equilibrium outcomes to coincide with the core of the underlying coalitional form game. We view this result as a non-cooperative axiomatization of the core. In contrast to most of the literature on multi-person bargaining we avoid a precise specification of the rules of the game. (...) Alternatively, we impose properties of such games, which give rise to a large class of mechanisms, all of which are relevant for our axiomatization. (shrink)

Evolutionary game theoretic accounts of justice attempt to explain our willingness to follow certain principles of justice by appealing to robustness properties possessed by those principles. Skyrms (1996) offers one sketch of how such an account might go for divide-the-dollar, the simplest version of the Nash bargaining game, using the replicator dynamics of Taylor and Jonker (1978). In a recent article, D'Arms et al. (1998) criticize his account and describe a model which, they allege, undermines his theory. I (...) sketch a theory of evolutionary explanations of justice which avoids their methodological criticisms, and develop a spatial model of divide-the-dollar with more robust convergence properties than the models of Skyrms (1996) and D'Arms et al. (1998). (shrink)

Using the time-dependent wave function we have studied the properties of the atomic transverse motion in an interferometer, and the cause of the non-classical behavior of atoms reported by Kurtsiefer, Pfau, and Mlynek [Nature 386, 150 (1997)]. The transverse wave function is derived from the solution of the two-dimensional Schrödinger's equation, written in the form of the Fresnel–Kirchhoff diffraction integral. It is assumed that the longitudinal motion is classical. Comparing data of the space distribution and of the transverse momentum (...) distribution in interferometers with one and two open slits, it follows that the atomic motion is influenced by the atomic matter wave and violates the laws of classical mechanics. However, the negative values of Wigner's function should not be taken as evidence that the atoms in an interferometer violate the classical statistical law of the addition of positive probabilities. This inference follows from the comparison of properties of Wigner's function and of the de Broglian probability density in phase space. (shrink)

We present experimental data on a simple market game. Several solution concepts from cooperative game theory are applied to predict the observed payoff distributions. Notably, a recently introduced solution concept meant to capture the influence of outside options on the payoff distribution within groups fares better than most other solution concepts under consideration. Our results shed some light on the effects of scarcity relations on markets on bargaining outcomes within negotiating dyads.

One influential approach to environmental problems holds that their solution requires the definition of full liberal property rights over goods that will enable their value to be registered in actual or hypothetical markets. How adequate is that solution? In this paper I offer reasons to be sceptical, by placing recent liberal arguments in the context of older debates about property, in particular those concerned with the distribution of care. Although proposals for the extension of liberal property rights over environmental goods (...) often appeal to arguments from the need to distribute care, I show that there are conflicts between them. Care for particular places that embody the life of a community that has an existence over time is often expressed through resistance to liberal property rights. We express mutual obligations to members of a community through a denial of exclusive property rights over certain common goods. Also, what constitutes care for environmental goods itself is contested across class, occupation, culture, and history. Conflicts between those with different conceptions of care are often expressed through conflicts in property rights. The justification of property rights by appeal to particular accounts of proper care has, from the time of Locke to the present, been invoked to legitimate the appropriation of goods. The introduction and maintenance of liberal property-rights regimes involves the creation and sustenance of a particular distribution of social power, and should be understood as such. (shrink)

A bargaining solution is a social compromise if it is metrically rationalizable, i.e., if it has an optimum (depending on the situation, smallest or largest) distance from some reference point. We explore the workability and the limits of metric rationalization in bargaining theory where compromising is a core issue. We demonstrate that many well-known bargaining solutions are social compromises with respect to reasonable metrics. In the metric approach, bargaining solutions can be grounded in axioms (...) on how society measures differences between utility allocations. Using this approach, we provide an axiomatic characterization for the class of social compromises that are based on p-norms and for the attending bargaining solutions. We further show that bargaining solutions which satisfy Pareto Optimality and Individual Rationality can always be metrically rationalized. (shrink)

In 1986 David Gauthier proposed an arbitration scheme for two player cardinal bargaining games based on interpersonal comparisons of players’ relative concessions. In Gauthier’s original arbitration scheme, players’ relative concessions are defined in terms of Raiffa-normalized cardinal utility gains, and so it cannot be directly applied to ordinal bargaining problems. In this paper I propose a relative benefit equilibrating bargaining solution for two and n-player ordinal and quasiconvex ordinal bargaining problems with finite sets of feasible basic (...) agreements based on the measure of players’ ordinal relative individual advantage gains. I provide an axiomatic characterization of this bargaining solution and discuss the conceptual relationship between RBEBS and ordinal egalitarian bargaining solution proposed by Conley and Wilkie. I show the relationship between the measurement procedure for ordinal relative individual advantage gains and the measurement procedure for players’ ordinal relative concessions, and argue that the proposed arbitration scheme for ordinal games can be interpreted as an ordinal version of Gauthier’s arbitration scheme. (shrink)

It is traditional to ascribe to Locke the view that every person who acquires natural property rights by labouring on resources is obligated to leave sufficient resources for everyone else. But during the last several decades, a number of authors have contributed to a compelling textual case against this reading. Nevertheless, Locke clearly indicates that there is something wrong with distributions in which some suffer while others thrive. But if he does not endorse the traditional proviso, what exactly is the (...) problem? In this paper, I offer a solution to this puzzle. I argue that according to Locke, once people use their natural rights to acquire large properties, many individuals are unable to enjoy the material and moral wellbeing, or “preservation,” that is the end of natural law. For even if such large properties pose no problem for material preservation, they foster arbitrary power that offends against moral preservation. (shrink)

I take up the "What is equality?" controversy begun by Amartya Sen in 1979 by critically considering utility, primary goods, property rights and basic capabilities in terms of what is to be distributed according to principles and theories of social justice. I then consider the four most general principles designed to answer issues raised by the Equality of Welfare principle, Equality of Opportunity for Welfare principle, Equality of Resources principle and Equality of Opportunity for Resources principle. I consider each with (...) respect to the more general normative principle that whatever theory of social or distributive justice we accept should be as ambition sensitive and endowment insensitive as feasible in real world circumstances. In this context I take up the problems of expensive tastes, expensive disabilities, lowered or manipulated preferences or ‘needs,’ and differential needs versus differential talents and abilities. I argue that the best solution is to adopt a modified version of Rawls’ theory which takes primary social goods as that which is to be distributed but which demands a Basic Rights principle that insures basic subsistent rights as the most fundamental principle of morality, and then demands that Rawls’ Difference Principle be applied lexically to the ‘material’ goods of income, wealth, and leisure time, but done so that the social basis of self-respect is never undermined. (shrink)

According to the tradition of natural law justice is inherent to, and should always be observed in, all interpersonal relations: the science of natural law is nothing more or less than the expression of such principles of justice. The theoretical peculiarities that crop up regarding the lawfulness of appropriation are determined by the indirect interpersonal relations that take place within the process of appropriation: though appropriation is an action directed not towards another person or his property, but towards tangible external (...) goods, this action may have important consequences for other people. Therefore Locke's theory of appropriation is a theory of justice.Locke's solution is made possible by the methodological improvement which allows a clear separation between the natural law and the historical and empirical conditions of its application: this improvement is a consequence of the distinction between modes and substances established in Locke's Essay. (shrink)

This paper presents a framework for discussing issues of ownership in connection to virtual worlds. We explore how divergent interests in virtual property can be mediated by applying a constructivist perspective to the concept ownership. The simple solutions offered today entail that a contract between the game producer and the gamer gives the game developer exclusive rights to all virtual property. This appears to be unsatisfactory. A number of legitimate interests on part of both producers and gamers may be (...) readily distinguished. More complex distributions of rights would allow many of these interests to be consistently respected. (shrink)

Focused on city-scale automation, and using self-driving cars (SDCs) as a case study, this article reflects on the role of AI—and in particular, computer vision systems used for mapping and navigation—as a catalyst for urban transformation. Urban research commonly presents AI and cities as having a one-way cause-and-effect relationship, giving undue weight to AI’s impact on cities and overlooking the role of cities in shaping AI. Working at the intersection of data science and social research, this paper aims to counter (...) this trend by exploring the reverse perspective: how do cities affect the development, and expose the present limits, of SDCs? The contribution of this paper is threefold. First, by comparing urban and nonurban environments and thoroughly examining the relationship between computer vision and city-specific sociality and form, it defines machine autonomy/automation as a function of the sociotechnical milieu in which an AI system operates. Second, and related, the paper problematizes the notion of SDCs as autonomous technologies and the role it plays in envisioning contending policy arrangements and technical solutions for achieving full driving automation. Finally, the article offers insight into a materialist and spatialized understanding of AI—namely, not as an abstract quality susceptible to replication within discrete machines, but rather as a distributed property emerging through embodied interactions among a multiplicity of agents (human, non-human, and technological) within/with their environments. (shrink)

We start by considering the Alternate Strike (AS) scheme, a real-life arbitration scheme where two parties select an arbitrator by alternately crossing off at each round one name from a given panel of arbitrators. We find out that the AS scheme is not invariant to “bad” alternatives. We then consider another alternating-move scheme, the Voting by Alternating Offers and Vetoes (VAOV) scheme, which is invariant to bad alternatives. We fully characterize the subgame perfect equilibrium outcome sets of these above two (...) schemes in terms of the rankings of the parties over the alternatives only. We also identify some of the typical equilibria of these above two schemes. We then analyze two additional alternating-move schemes in which players’ current proposals have to either honor or enhance their previous proposals. We show that the first scheme’s equilibrium outcome set coincides with that of the AS scheme, and the equilibrium outcome set of the second scheme coincides with that of the VAOV scheme. Finally, it turns out that all schemes’ equilibrium outcome sets converge to the Equal Area solution’s outcome of cooperative bargaining problem, if the alternatives are distributed uniformly over the comprehensive utility possibility set and as the number of alternatives tends to infinity. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Number: C72. (shrink)

The logicality of language is the hypothesis that the language system has access to a ‘natural’ logic that can identify and filter out as unacceptable expressions that have trivial meanings—that is, that are true/false in all possible worlds or situations in which they are defined. This hypothesis helps explain otherwise puzzling patterns concerning the distribution of various functional terms and phrases. Despite its promise, logicality vastly over-generates unacceptability assignments. Most solutions to this problem rest on specific stipulations about the (...) properties of logical form—roughly, the level of linguistic representation which feeds into the interpretation procedures—and have substantial implications for traditional philosophical disputes about the nature of language. Specifically, contextualism and semantic minimalism, construed as competing hypotheses about the nature and degree of context-sensitivity at the level of logical form, suggest different approaches to the over-generation problem. In this paper, I explore the implications of pairing logicality with various forms of contextualism and semantic minimalism. I argue that to adequately solve the over-generation problem, logicality should be implemented in a constrained contextualist framework. (shrink)

The first-order condition of the Nash bargaining solution equates the ratio of utilities to the ratio of marginal utilities. It turns out that this common ratio plays a role in determining whether the Nash solution, roughly speaking, is “more utilitarian” or “more egalitarian.” More specifically, I propose a sense of proximity to utilitarianism and/or egalitarianism according to which, in bargaining problems with distinct utilitarian and egalitarian points, the Nash solution is closer to utilitarianism if the aforementioned ratio is (...) smaller than one, and closer to egalitarianism if that ratio is greater than one. (shrink)

The notion of a conditionally distributive lattice was introduced by B. Wolniewicz while formally investigating the ontology of situations . In several of this lectures he has appealed for a study of that class of lattices. The present abstract is a response to that request.

We provide two alternative characterizations of the Nash bargaining solution. We introduce new simple axioms, strong undominatedness by the disagreement point, and egalitarian Pareto optimality. First, we prove that the Nash solution is characterized by symmetry, scale invariance, independence of irrelevant alternatives, and strong undominatedness by the disagreement point. Second, we replace the independence of irrelevant alternatives axiom with the sandwich axiom and egalitarian Pareto optimality. We then demonstrate that the Nash solution is characterized by symmetry, scale invariance, strong (...) undominatedness by the disagreement point, the sandwich axiom, and egalitarian Pareto optimality. (shrink)

As a sort of intellectual provocation and as a lateral thinking strategy for creativity, this chapter seeks to determine what the study of the dynamics of biodiversity can offer linguists. In recent years, the analogical equation "language = biological species" has become more widespread as a metaphorical source for conceptual renovation, and, at the same time, as a justification for the defense of language diversity. Language diversity would be protected in a way similar to the mobilization that has taken place (...) to protect endangered species. Nevertheless, one must be careful when uncritically transferring conceptualizations and theoretical frameworks from one field to another, since obviously, these two phenomena are quite different in the real world. The dialogue with bioecologists starts by asking about the formation of diversity, i.e., about specialization. Here, one can observe the similarity between the processes of linguistic and genetic fragmentation, in the sense that both phenomena have a (socio)geographical basis for dispersion and consequently, for the loss of their original compact nature and their intercommunication. The self-organizing and creative properties of human beings favor the development of specific varieties for each subset, varieties that continue to evolve constantly, through the unceasing "languaging" of humanity. Regarding the continuity of species or languages, one can also observe the decisive role of intragroup relations. The staying power of linguistic varieties will increase in direct proportion to the intensity of the relationship among the components of the subset. On the other hand, if exotic elements are introduced, especially if these elements are aggressive in nature, the alteration of the ecological niche may turn out to be fatal for the continuity of the previously existing forms. This suggests to us the need to make an in-depth study of what the minimal contextual conditions would be so that a set linguistic group could be assured a sustainable continuity within a framework of linguistic contact. What type of minimum (socio-)ecological niche would a language have to have if we wished to ensure its habitual reproduction? A proposal is made here to explore the ideas of "exclusive functions" and "non-hierarchical functional distribution" for codes in situations where there is high contact and a danger of disuse. As regards change, this phenomenon is seen as an inherent element in the tendency of life to create new developments, which may or not be accompanied by an adaptation to changing environmental conditions. It is pointed out that, similar to what happens in biology, much of linguistic innovation stems from a systemically reorganized mixture of solutions from different codes. An important research question would be, however, to determine why some of these innovations disappear and others survive and extend throughout the community. The big question mark, as Mufwene points out, is, then how to manage to understand how "the evolution of language proceeds by naturally selecting from among the competing alternatives available through the idiolects of individual speakers". Extinction, whether it be of languages or of species, is caused in most cases "by a combination of demographic processes and environmental changes", as Brown points out. Thus, the environment plays a fundamental role in the direction of evolution, since the "the survival of the fittest is, in actuality, the survival of those who fit into the context (Allen and Hoekstra)". This allows us to see the great degree of importance of political-economic contexts in the case of languages. In the same way, migratory movements are also one of the major variables determining the extinction of biodiversity and language diversity. Species and habitat form the basic unit of existence, and this is the major point of departure for understanding the problem of the preservation and recovery of species or languages. Given the increase in the degree of linguistic contact, the continuity of language diversity depends on determining, as exactly as possible, as Prigogine, the physicist, would say, what precise conditions of imbalance may prove to be stable. The great challenge is not so much avoiding contact but managing it. And "restorative ecology" can also be of help to us here. Being able to reach sustainable solutions for language diversity implies a profound knowledge of the dynamics for determining the ways in which language is used in contact situations. The general conclusion is that linguistics is still terminologically and conceptually ill prepared to deal with the dynamic character of human languages. The world and our objects must be conceived of as elements in a state of flux, as changing systems in an unstable equilibrium. With respect to language policy, it would be necessary to make an effort to manage to establish some general principles regarding the linguistic organization of the human species that would make it possible for local linguistic diversity and communication on a planetary scale, which must necessarily take place, to be compatible with each other. To succeed, it will be necessary to continue promoting an autonomous socio-ecological perspective devoted to the comprehension of language phenomena. Such a perspective would be based on a paradigm of complexity, and would, at the same time, place human beings at the center of its theoretical underpinnings. (shrink)