A large body of research in computational vision science stems from the pioneering work of David Marr. Recently, Patricia Kitcher and others have criticized this work as depending upon optimizing assumptions, assumptions which are held to be inappropriate for evolved cognitive mechanisms just as anti-adaptationists (e.g., Lewontin and Gould) have argued they are inappropriate for other evolved physiological mechanisms. The paper discusses the criticism and suggests that it is, in part, misdirected. It is further suggested that the criticism leads to (...) interesting questions about how one formulates constraints--across "levels of organization" and disciplinary boundaries--on one's models of complex systems, such as human vision. (shrink)

Block (1995t) has argued for a noncognitive and non- representational notion of phenomenal consciousness, but his putative examples of this phenomenon are conspicuous in their representational and functional properties while they do not clearly possess other phenomenal properties.

David Marr's theory of vision has been a rich source of inspiration, fascination and confusion. I will suggest that some of this confusion can be traced to discrepancies between the way Marr developed his theory in practice and the way he suggested such a theory ought to be developed in his explicit metatheoretical remarks. I will address claims that Marr's theory may be seen as an optimizing theory, along with the attendant suggestion that optimizing assumptions may be inappropriate for cognitive (...) mechanisms just as anti-adaptationists have argued they are inappropriate for other physiological mechanisms. I will discuss the nature of optimizing assumptions and theories. Considering various difficulties in identifying and assessing optimizing assumptions, I will suggest that Marr's theory is not purely an optimizing theory and that reaction to Marr on this issue prompts interesting considerations for the development of inter-disciplinary constraints in the cognitive and brain sciences. (shrink)

Criticism of the observation/theory distinction generally supposes it to be an empirical fact that even the most basic human perception is heavily theory-laden. I offer critical examination of experimental evidence cited by Thomas Kuhn and Paul Churchland on behalf of this supposition. I argue that the empirical evidence cited is inadequate support for the claims in question. I further argue that we have empirical grounds for claiming that the Kuhnian discussion of perception is developed within an inadequate conceptual framework and (...) that a version of the observation/theory distinction is indeed tenable. The connection between cognitive science and epistemology is also discussed. (shrink)

Paul Churchland has recently argued that empirical evidence strongly suggests that perception is penetrable to the beliefs or theories held by individual perceivers (1988). While there has been much discussion of the sorts of psychological cases he presents, little has been said about his arguments from neurology. I offer a critical examination of his claim that certain efferents in the brain are evidence against perceptual encapsulation. I argue that his neurological evidence is inadequate to his philosophical goals, both by itself (...) and taken in concert with his psychological evidence. (shrink)

The dissertation sketches a solution to the problem of pictorial representation. By appealing to the visual system as an information processing system, we understand how it is that certain sorts of pictures are seen as representing their subjects. ;The first chapter introduces the problem and discusses existing philosophical treatment of pictorial representation. Conventionalist arguments against the possibility of a naturalist account are refuted, thus clearing the way for a naturalist, realist, "resemblance" view of pictorial representation. ;The second chapter discusses the (...) notion of the modularity of mind. Aspects of perceptual holism are criticized. I support the modularist claim that one can make a useful distinction between observation and inference without suffering familiar positivist problems. I suggest that much of vision can fruitfully be studied in isolation from other mental processes. ;The third and fourth chapters provide a contemporary account of human vision. A model of the neural circuitry of vision is provided. Similar treatment is given to mathematical modeling of spatial vision . Also, some attention is paid to lower level biological details and to higher level functional attributes of the system. Research methodologies are discussed, as are the connections between the various levels of investigation. ;The concluding chapter begins with a theoretical and methodological comparison of experimental work cited as empirical foundation for various forms of conventionalism with that supporting modularity . The questions of Chapter I are then reconsidered in light of the vision science of Chapters III and IV. It is shown that current understanding of vision elucidates many of the problems of pictorial representation. Especially relevant is the observation that human spatial vision functions by abstracting certain features from the environment, features that are preserved in certain sorts of pictures. It turns out that many of the conventionalist claims about mind, vision and pictorial representation are unsupportable, given current understanding of mind and vision. (shrink)

Various claims for theory-laden perception have involved empirical as well as conceptual considerations. Thomas Kuhn cites New Look psychological research in discussing the role of a paradigm in perception (1970) and Paul Churchland (1988) appeals to biological evidence, as well as New Look sources similar to Kuhn's. This paper offers a critical examination of the empirical evidence cited by Kuhn and Churchland, including a look at the underlying experimental work. It also offers a comment on the application of such evidence (...) in a naturalized epistemology. (shrink)

A connectionist vehicle theory of consciousness needs to disambiguate its criteria for identifying the relevant vehicles. Moreover, a vehicle theory may appear entirely arbitrary in sorting between what are typically thought of as conscious and unconscious processes.

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:American Journal of Philology 121.4 (2000) 629-635 [Access article in PDF] Brief Mention Gildersleeve and M. Carey Thomas Ward W. Briggs IN A RECENT COLUMN on the dismissal of Professor Mary Daly of Boston College, who for decades has not permitted men in her women's studies classes, Garry Wills recalled two stories about Basil L. Gildersleeve: When women were admitted to the graduate school at the Hopkins, much to (...) Gildersleeve's regret, he said that he could not teach his course on the obscene Greek dramatist Aristophanes--he would be too inhibited when it came to explaining the dirty jokes. He was told that not even he, the founder of Greek studies at the place, could refuse to admit women. He countered that by putting up a screen in his classroom and making the women sit behind it. That way they could hear him, but he could pretend they were not there. 1This is virtually the version that I heard at roughly the same time as Wills. The anecdote, though fictional, offers the opportunity to provide a more nuanced if still problematic account that shows Gildersleeve respectful of the ambitions and achievements of a determined and successful woman, while retaining strong reservations on the desirability of higher education for women.In 1877 M. Carey Thomas (1857-1935) was among the first women to graduate from Cornell (the only university in the East that admitted women full-time). 2 She had majored in classics, to which she was drawn by her love of literature, and taken other coursework in mathematics, [End Page 629] literature, and philosophy. She read Agamemnon 3 and Oedipus Tyrannos with Tracy Peck (1838-1921). 4 Her thesis examined Greek civilization to the disadvantage of Roman political hegemony. She earned a B.A. degree, but her program had lasted only two years.The founding board of Johns Hopkins included among its largely Quaker membership Thomas's father, James Carey Thomas (1833-97), a prominent Baltimore physician, who was very keen that the new university should admit women. His daughter, still animated by the advice of Jane Slocum that had led her to Cornell, "What we want in the cause of women are not doctors and lawyers (there are plenty of those), we want scholars," 5 applied on 22 September 1877 to Gildersleeve's second annual graduate seminar. She had as yet no realistic understanding of the requirements, though she was aware of the difficulties of coeducation at that time, which she compared to "living on a volcano or on a housetop." 6She wrote directly to Johns Hopkins president Daniel Coit Gilman (1831-1908), who took her application to the board of trustees. The board, despite the influence of Thomas's father, decided that a difficult compromise was necessary: she, the only woman student at the university, in this its second year of existence, should "have the direction of studies by University Professors, and the final examination for degrees without class attendance in the University." 7 On this basis she first encountered the university's professor of Greek.Gildersleeve's time was precious that year: he was establishing the first graduate seminar in the country, getting the American Journal of Philology under way, organizing his edition of Pindar, and serving as president of the American Philological Association. The trustees' rule imposed the extra burden of a private tutorial. 8 Nevertheless, he agreed that Thomas could sit in his grammar lectures and that he would meet [End Page 630] with her regularly to discuss the work of his seminar. Her preparation was not up to the standard of the five advanced male students already in the seminar 9 and Gildersleeve indicated that she "might be able to take [the degree] in three years" (Thomas's emphasis) and insisted that she learn German. 10 She plunged into her work ("a terrible undertaking") 11 with enthusiasm, teaching herself German and reading Thucydides and the Odyssey. 12 The fall of 1877 was agony. She attended Gildersleeve's biweekly lectures on "Practical Exercises in Greek," but lamented that there were "so many books... waiting to... (shrink)

Identification of those who have the potential to become knowledgeable, skilled, and compassionate physicians, and determining how best to prepare them for medical education has been an on ongoing challenge since the mid-1800s (Ludmerer 1985). When medical education was almost exclusively proprietary, the primary consideration for admission was having adequate financial resources. However, in the late 1800s, two men became the driving forces for structuring medical and premedical education in the United States. Daniel Coit Gilman, of Yale and (...) the University of California, later the founding President of Johns Hopkins University, and Charles W. Eliot, President of Harvard, articulated two radical objectives that .. (shrink)

Naturalism and scientific creativity: new tools for analyzing science Content Type Journal Article Pages 1-4 DOI 10.1007/s11016-010-9513-1 Authors Daniel Burnston, Department of Philosophy, Interdisciplinary Cognitive Science Program, University of California, San Diego, 9500 Gilman Drive # 0119, La Jolla, CA 92093-0119, USA Journal Metascience Online ISSN 1467-9981 Print ISSN 0815-0796.

In the philosophy of language, conceptual role semantics (hereafter CRS) is a theory of what constitutes the meanings possessed by expressions of natural languages, or the propositions expressed by their utterance. In the philosophy of mind, it is a theory of what constitutes the contents of psychological attitudes, such as beliefs or desires. CRS comes in a variety of forms, not always clearly distinguished by commentators. Such versions are known variously as functional/causal/computational role semantics, and more broadly as use-theories of (...) meaning. Nevertheless, all are united in seeking the meaning or content of an item, not in what it is made of, nor in what accompanies or is associated with it, but in what is done with it, the use it is put to. Roughly, according to CRS, the meaning or propositional content of an expression or attitude is determined by the role it plays in a person’s language or in her cognition. Currently, many view CRS as the main rival to theories that take notions such as truth or reference as central (for example, Davidson 2001), although the relationship between the two is not straightforward. The following outlines the main varieties of CRS, provides a cursory survey of its history, introduces the central arguments offered in its favor, and provisionally assesses how the variants fair against a number of prominent criticisms. (shrink)

Believing in God requires not only a leap of faith but also an extension of people’s normal capacity to perceive the minds of others. Usually, people perceive minds of all kinds by trying to understand their conscious experience (what it is like to be them) and their agency (what they can do). Although humans are perceived to have both agency and experience, humans appear to see God as possessing agency, but not experience. God’s unique mind is due, the authors suggest, (...) to the uniquely moral role He occupies. In this article, the authors propose that God is seen as the ultimate moral agent, the entity people blame and praise when they receive anomalous harm and help. Support for this proposition comes from research on mind perception, morality, and moral typecasting. Interestingly, although people perceive God as the author of salvation, suffering seems to evoke even more attributions to the divine. (shrink)

In Lukács: Praxis and the Absolute, Daniel Andrés López reassembles Lukács’s philosophy of praxis on a Hegelian basis, as a conceptual-historical totality, both defending him and proposing an unprecedented, immanent critique that raises problems for Marxian philosophy as a whole.

In interpretations of the "Transcendental Aesthetic" section of the first Critique, there is a widespread tendency to present Kant as establishing that the representation of space is a condition for individuating or distinguishing objects, and to claim that it is on this basis that Kant establishes the apriority of this representation. The aim of this paper is to criticize this way of interpreting the "Aesthetic," and to defend an alternative interpretation. On this alternative, questions about the formation of the representation (...) of space figure more centrally, and the anti-Leibnizian character of Kant 's argument can be properly appreciated. (shrink)

The topic of standing to blame has recently received a lot of attention. Until now, however, it has focused mainly on the blamer's perspective, investigating what it means to say of blamers that they lose standing to blame and why it is that they lose this standing under specified conditions. The present paper focuses on the perspective of the blamees and tries to explain why they are allowed to disregard standingless, more specifically hypocritical, blame. According to the solution proposed by (...) the paper, while hypocritical blamers present themselves as caring about justice or about the moral or material good of the blamees—and they themselves half‐believe this presentation—their real motivation in blaming is less respectable. It is this problematic motivation that explains why blamees are permitted to disregard hypocritical blame. Ill‐motivated blame is often unreliable, and readiness to even consider it often involves a compromise on the self‐respect of the blamees. (shrink)

Barristers in England are obliged to follow the ‘cab rank rule’, according to which they must take any case offered to them, as long as they have time in their.

Traditionally, the language faculty was supposed to be a device that maps linguistic inputs to semantic or conceptual representations. These representations themselves were supposed to be distinct from the representations manipulated by the hearer’s perceptual and motor systems. Recently this view of language has been challenged by advocates of embodied cognition. Drawing on empirical studies of linguistic comprehension, they have proposed that the language faculty reuses the very representations and processes deployed in perceiving and acting. I review some of the (...) evidence and arguments in favor of the embodied view of language comprehension, and argue that none of it is conclusive. Moreover, the embodied view itself blurs two important distinctions: first, the distinction between linguistic comprehension and its typical consequences; and second, the distinction between representational content and vehicles. Given that these distinctions are well-motivated, we have good reason to reject the embodied view of linguistic understanding.Keywords: Language; Comprehension; Perception; Action; Embodied cognition; Representation. (shrink)

A reconstruction of F.W.J. Schelling's philosophy of language based on a detailed reading of §73 of Schelling's lectures on the Philosophy of Art.

��People spent 5 min before sleep at home writing their stream of thought as they suppressed thoughts of a target person, thought of the person, or wrote freely after mentioning the person. These presleep references generally prompted people to report increased dreaming about the person. However, suppression instructions were particularly likely to have this in- fluence, increasing dreaming about the person as measured both by participants’ self-ratings of their dreams and by raters’ coding of mentions of the person in written (...) dream reports. This effect was observed regardless of emotional attraction to the person. (shrink)

We often think about the alternatives to a decision that has been made. Thinking in this way is known as counterfactual thinking, that is, thinking about what could have been had an alternative dec...

The post-confinement phase of the COVID-19 pandemic will require that governments navigate more complex ethical questions than had occurred in the initial, ‘curve-flattening’ phase, and that will occur when the pandemic is in the past. By looking at the unavoidable harms involved in the confinement and quarantine methods employed during the initial phase of the pandemic, we can develop a harm reduction approach to managing the phase during which society will be gradually reopened in a context of managed risk. The (...) principles that are at the heart of such an approach include a reckoning with all of the harms involved in policy choice, including harms that might be given rise to by policy implementation itself; a focus on the harms to which already vulnerable populations are susceptible; and a strong preference for policies that economize on the use of prohibitions and of coercive state enforcement, and that instead emphasize the agency of citizens in realizing health-promoting behavior change. This framework is applied to a policy proposal that has been discussed in policy circles in a number of countries, that of immunity ‘passports’, and to policies that emphasize the creative use of space and time to achieve physical distancing goals. (shrink)

Abstract In the present article, we provide a critical overview of the emerging field of ‘neuroeducation’ also frequently referred to as ‘mind, brain and education’ or ‘educational neuroscience’. We describe the growing energy behind linking education and neuroscience in an effort to improve learning and instruction. We explore reasons behind such drives for interdisciplinary research. Reviewing some of the key advances in neuroscientific studies that have come to bear on neuroeducation, we discuss recent evidence on the brain circuits underlying reading, (...) mathematical abilities as well as the potential to use neuroscience to design training programs of neurocognitive functions, such as working memory, that are expected to have effects on overall brain function. Throughout this review we describe how such research can enrich our understanding of the acquisition of academic skills. Furthermore, we discuss the potential for modern brain imaging methods to serve as diagnostic tools as well as measures of the effects of educational interventions. Throughout this discussion, we draw attention to limitations of the available evidence and propose future avenues for research. We also discuss the challenges that face this growing discipline. Specifically, we draw attention to unrealistic expectations for the immediate impact of neuroscience on education, methodological difficulties, and lack of interdisciplinary training, which results in poor communication between educators and neuroscientists. We point out that there should be bi-directional and reciprocal interactions between both disciplines of neuroscience and education, in which research originating from each of these traditions is considered to be compelling in its own right. While there are many obstacles that lie in the way of a productive field of neuroeducation, we contend that there is much reason to be optimistic and that the groundwork has been laid to advance this field in earnest. Content Type Journal Article Category Original Paper Pages 1-13 DOI 10.1007/s12152-011-9119-3 Authors Daniel Ansari, Numerical Cognition Laboratory, Department of Psychology, The University of Western Ontario, Westminster Hall, London, ON N6A 3K7, Canada Bert De Smedt, Parenting and Special Education Research Group, Katholieke Universiteit Leuven, Leuven, Belgium Roland H. Grabner, Institute for Behavioral Sciences, Swiss Federal Institute of Technology (ETH) Zurich, Zurich, Switzerland Journal Neuroethics Online ISSN 1874-5504 Print ISSN 1874-5490. (shrink)

Artificial intelligence and robotic technologies have become nearly ubiquitous. In some ways, the developments have likely helped us, but in other ways sophisticated technologies set back our interests. Among the latter sort is what has been dubbed the ‘severance problem’—the idea that technologies sever our connection to the world, a connection which is necessary for us to flourish and live meaningful lives. I grant that the severance problem is a threat we should mitigate and I ask: how can we stave (...) it off? In particular, the fact that some technologies exhibit behavior that is unclear to us seems to constitute a kind of severance. Building upon contemporary work on moral responsibility, I argue for a mechanism I refer to as ‘technological answerability’, namely the capacity to recognize human demands for answers and to respond accordingly. By designing select devices—such as robotic assistants and personal AI programs—for increased answerability, we see at least one way of satisfying our demands for answers and thereby retaining our connection to a world increasingly occupied by technology. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Reviewed by:The Oxford Handbook of Charles S. Peirce ed. by Cornelis de WaalRoger WardThe Oxford Handbook of Charles S. Peirce Cornelis de Waal, editor. Oxford, 2024.As scholars of the American tradition, we know Charles Sanders Peirce as an original thinker with personal foibles and complex ideas, a primary source and yet an enigma in the main channel of the tradition. He is most profound in developing an architectonic system (...) that rivals and proceeds beyond Kant in the interest of furthering the inquiry necessary for self-control and the development of the community of inquiry. The object of the Real consistently appears as a figure to Peirce's inquiry as its true home, and the community of self-and-other correcting minds sharing this goal of inquiry may bring themselves together in experience and work. This handbook is an example of such work that extends beyond this immediate occasion, as Peirce reminds us, because once alive within us, how could we conceive of such inquiry ever ending?The vision of Peirce that comes clear in this volume arises from the coherence of his philosophical, logical, and mathematical thought, drawn out by historical as well as recent applications. The significant advance of this handbook is the combination of US and international scholars drawing upon a wide circle of Peirce's influence and interest. The depth and breadth of analysis speaks to the power of Peirce's method of self-correction; it is the engine of his method. We can assess the changes, the principles, and the expressed sentiments, but the origin or character of Peirce's sentiments themselves or the full ground of the emergence of his ideas remains obscure. De Waal organizes the book in six parts. What follows is an interpretation of the content of these parts via summaries of the chapters and a brief concluding observation.Part I examines Peirce's personal life and interactions with organizations in order to qualify his successes and failures and perhaps explain why this genius had such a difficult life. Daniel L. Everett (chap. 1) represents Peirce as a special case of academic genius and faults the leadership of Johns Hopkins and Harvard for failing to accommodate his behavior and eccentricities and also includes touching narratives of children who knew and cared for the Peirces in Milford (17). Jaime Nubiola and Sara Barrena (chap. 2) examine Peirce's career through his five European trips and their importance for his collaborative scientific ventures, encounters with beauty (39), and as occasions of family drama with first wife Zina Fay and later with Juliette Froissy. [End Page 78] Cheryl Misak (chap. 3) focuses on the difficult behavior of Peirce that finds its complement in the personal animus of Simon Newcomb, who assailed Peirce both at Johns Hopkins and at the US Coast Survey (51, 54). Despite these attacks, Peirce's genius was recognized by Venn, C. I. Lewis, and—through Lady Welby—by Ramsey and Wittgenstein. Pierce's uniqueness as a scientist, philosopher, and logician was mishandled by Charles Eliot and Daniel Gilman, who failed to recognize him as America's leading thinker (55). This beginning brings Peirce's personality forward as an angle of vision on his philosophical and scientific production, setting the ground for the technical evaluations of Peirce's philosophical and scientific career and the lasting impact of his logic and metaphysics after his death.Part II develops the topics of phenomenology and the normative sciences in six chapters. Richard Kenneth Atkins (chap. 4) provides a brilliantly clear description of the development of Peirce's categories and the phaneron that "needs no special tools and is open to all" to engage "whatever comes before the mind" (71). But this does not exhaust the "phaneron" due to the Real that remains beyond the representation by minds. Nathan Houser (chap. 5) develops Peirce's empiricism as the "rain of percepts" that is the inflow of phenomenal content: the "deeper levels of our bottomless lake of consciousness and subconscious mind consists mainly of conceptual or intellectual content based on our perceptual judgments" (88). This challenges Locke's and Dennett's attempts to articulate a completely materialist account of reality. Tiago da Costa... (shrink)

Ludwig Wittgenstein's notoriously elusive later writings are dominated by remarks on language. However, while the textual analysis of Wittgenstein's writings is presently a booming industry, the tendency is to focus narrowly on exegetical matters with little attention to their bearing on philosophy at large. Moreover, one finds in contemporary philosophy of language various ideas with a distinctively Wittgensteinian ring to them but whose pedigree is uncertain. This volume brings together distinguished Wittgenstein scholars and renowned philosophers of language in order to (...) examine just what Wittgenstein has to say about language and to assess its significance for current philosophy. The topics discussed include the connection between the meaning of a word and its use, the bearing the context of utterance has on how words are to be understood, the role of rules in the employment of language and whether Wittgenstein's reflections on these issues encourage sceptical or relativist thoughts."--BOOK JACKET. (shrink)

We discuss how the law and scholars have approached three questions. First, what acts count as acts of entrapment? Secondly, is entrapment a permissible method of law-enforcement and, if so, in what circumstances? Thirdly, what must criminal courts do, in response to the finding that an offence was brought about by an act of entrapment, in order to deliver justice? While noting the contrary tendency, we suggest that the first question should be addressed in a manner that is neutral about (...) the answers to the other two. On the second question, we summarize various arguments about the permissibility of entrapment, while remaining largely neutral about their merits. With regard to the third question, we summarize the approaches to entrapment in various jurisdictions, and we note some patterns, across the jurisdictions here surveyed, concerning shifts from one sort of entrapment remedy to another. (shrink)

European Journal of Philosophy, Volume 29, Issue 4, Page 731-745, December 2021.

A pergunta pelo sentido do ser será aqui orientada para a afirmação do postulado de uma condição essencialmente precária do mortal, a partir da qual ele deverá ser radicalmente situado em seu horizonte histórico-metafísico fundamentalmente através do seu comprometimento existencial com uma abertura abissal do fenômeno de mundo que excede sua capacidade de apreensão.

La Unión de Consumidores de España (UCE) es una asociación sin ánimo de lucro fundada en el año 1984 gracias a la integración en una misma institución de las diferentes asociaciones de consumidores de ámbito regional y local. UCE, al igual que otras asociaciones de consumidores, nace en plena transición al amparo de lo establecido en los artículos 22 y 23 de la Constitución Española.