The historical development of a field of human knowledge progresses like the solution of a jig-saw puzzle, the full extent of which is completely unknown. What begins as an ocean may become only a lake; what starts as a grove of trees may develop into a forest. As study advances through the decades, the situation is repeatedly surveyed and the interpretation of the whole is modified to accord with the added information. For these reasons, conceptions and generalizations periodically undergo (...) alteration, as effectively stated and discussed by Cooper. Universal conformity in such conceptions is of course hardly to be expected in matters that deal largely with speculation rather than with simple experimental data. (shrink)

We face severe global problems, many that we have inadvertently created ourselves. It is clear that there is an urgent need for more wisdom. One response is to improve knowledge about wisdom. This, I argue, is an inadequate response to the problems we face. Our global problems arise, in part, from a damagingly irrational kind of academic enterprise, devoted as it is to the pursuit of knowledge. We need to bring about a revolution in academic inquiry so that its basic (...) aim becomes to seek and promote wisdom. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:The Object of French Studies GebrauchkunstRichard Klein (bio)If I may say something about the title—it points to the possibility that we are discussing the nature and future of French studies at the precise moment that France is about to disappear. There are those who believe that on January 1, 1999, when the euro becomes the common currency of the European Union, France will become a province of Germany. (...) Effectively real sovereignty will pass from Paris to Frankfurt.Already there are those at Cornell, for example, who think that we, in the French section, should seek to merge with the German department. I support the move (which isn’t going to happen), if only as a permanent reminder to avoid the fetishism of French. In today’s world, French is a question more than an answer to any question. French studies should be open even to the possibility that, these days, to speak French, it is becoming more and more necessary to speak German. The opposite has been true for a long time, as the French smugly know all too well—having for centuries lent their language of refinement and savoir-vivre to the Huns. The imminence of the conjuncture should remind us, too, that French studies is itself situated within the history of French—is transformed in its possibilities and embodiments by that history and by what is happening now, as we say, historically. Finally, the point here is to recall that the question of French studies has a history, that it is not merely being invented at this moment, but also reactivated as an object of discussion and debate.In fact, the current debate has been going on for some time. In 1993–94 the issue was addressed at two national conferences: a two-part symposium was organized by the Committee for the Future of French Studies at the University of Pennsylvania and the University of Wisconsin; another was held at New York University organized by the Association for French Cultural Studies and the Institute of French Studies. Summer institutes at Dartmouth and Northwestern have dealt with the issue. There is a large and growing bibliography. I cite some of the most prominent recent articles—to judge by how frequently they are cited in others I have read:—Emily Apter, “Comparative Exile: Competing Margins in the History of Comparative Literature.”—Lawrence Kritzman, “Identity Crises: France, Culture, and the Idea of the Nation.—Marie-Pierre Le Hir, “French Cultural Studies in the United States.”—Sandy Petrey, “French Studies/Cultural Studies: Reciprocal Invigoration or Mutual Destruction?”—Kristen Ross, Fast Cars, Clean Bodies: Decolonization and the Reordering of French Culture (often cited as the best example we have of what French studies might be).—Kristen Ross, “World Literature and Cultural Studies.”—Thomas Pavel, “Les études culturelles: Une nouvelle discipline?” Many questions have been raised in these articles about the possibility and necessity of doing French studies. There are those here who take it for granted that one can identify something French, can locate whatever it is that may be said to participate in a specifically French identity. Some, like Pavel, see French studies (and a fortiori so-called cultural [End Page 5] studies) as an excuse for doing n’importe quoi; it defies definition and merely authorizes more confusion and incoherence. Others, like Kritzman, have a more optimistic notion of how one could define French studies without abandoning some notion of the specificity and uniqueness, the irreducible identity of what is called French.Some critics, like Ross and Le Hir, tend to see French studies as inevitably serving to dissolve any particularism associated with French. What is called French culture has been irretrievably pluralized by the effects of decolonization, by the multiplication of francophonies and by their insertion into an Americanized system of globalization. Kids in suburbs of Paris and Cairo wear American baseball hats turned around and grow up eating McDonald’s. Where is the French in that? The object of French studies may be nothing but France’s assimilationist tendency to colonize others, to claim a universal mission, even as it is transformed by its own failed colonial history and by the very diversity it aims to... (shrink)

Quantum mechanics has raised in an acute form three problems which go to the heart of man's relationship with nature through experimental science: (r) the public objectivity of science, that is, its value as a universal science for all investigators; (2) the empirical objectivity of scientific objects, that is, man's ability to construct a precise or causal spatio-temporal model of microscopic systems; and finally (3), the formal objectivity of science, that is, its value as an expression of what nature is (...) independently of its being an object of human knowledge. These are three aspects of what is generally called the "crisis of objec tivity" or the "crisis of realism" in modern physics. This crisis is. studied in the light of Werner Heisenberg's work. Heisenberg was one of the architects of quantum mechanics, and we have chosen his writings as the principal source-material for this study. Among physicists of the microscopic domain, no one except perhaps Bohr has expressed himself so abundantly and so profoundly on the philosophy of science as Heisenberg. His writings, both technical and non-technical, show an awareness of the mysterious element in scientific knowledge, far from the facile positivism of Bohr and others of his contemporaries. The mystery of human knowledge and human SUbjectivity is for him an abiding source of wonder. (shrink)

The article explores the way in which new objects of study, such as dance performance and art–practice, emerge in algorithmic aesthetics. The advent of digital communicative practices shapes new means of formalization of dance performance scripts, which nowadays have various technological solutions, including algorithmic ones. Classical aesthetics is unable to describe the technological modernization of artistic expression. The author offers a general framework of algorithmic aesthetics to study of dance performance and art practice.

November 1936 PREFACE THIS book is, in slightly revised form, a dis sertation presented for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in Yale University.

The object of Theological Ethics as presented by Hans Ulrich is immediately the content of the experience of God; reflectively it is God himself turned towards us; doubly reflected on, it is the inversion of our understanding of the good or conversion. The concept of an object may be traced to the discussion of the sciences from Schleiermacher to Barth. Three questions are put to it: (i) Does it assimilate the study too much to descriptive reason, as (...) opposed to practical reason? (ii) Does it narrow the study's range of interests so as to exclude the created world? (iii) Does it result in an idealised `creaturely man', wholly determined by his end and dissociated from the empirical man who may confront us as a neighbour? (shrink)

Objects of Metaphor puts forward a philosophical account of metaphor radically different from those currently on offer. Powerful and flexible enough to cope with the syntactic complexity typical of genuine metaphor, it offers novel conceptions of the relationship between simile and metaphor, the notion of dead metaphor, and the idea of metaphor as a robust theoretic kind. Without denying that metaphor can sometimes be merely ornamental, Guttenplan justifies the view of metaphor as fundamental to language and the study of (...) language. His book will be of great interest not only to philosophers in this field, but also to those working across psychology and linguistics. (shrink)

The debate over the relationship between political practice and theory is as old as political science itself. The study of ideology, this article contends, offers a unique opportunity to explore the nexus of social phenomena and political philosophy, provided the study is launched from a new perspective. Instead of undertaking another exercise in the endless effort to define the concept of ideology, this analysis emphasizes the objects of ideology. It thereby exposes, first of all, that historically analysts of (...) ideology have ineptly assumed they were studying the same concept -- ideology -- whereas in fact they used the same term to refer to significantly different political phenomena. Second, the genealogy of the objects of ideology discloses the changing terrain of political reality since the Enlightenment. Three moments in the history of 'ideology' are identified as heuristic devices: ideology as a function of class (eighteenth-nineteenth centuries), ideology as a function of (totalitarian) regimes (early twentieth century), and in the aftermath of the 'end of ideology' debate, ideology as a social discourse (1960s onward). Third, the role of the analyst is therewith also transformed: from a scientist, to a critical historian of ideas, to a political agent of social change. The inevitable embeddedness of political theory in changing political praxis urges a new dialogue between empirical and theoretical political scientists. (shrink)

This is a review of Dallas Willard's book of that title.

The article focuses on scientific reflection. The transcendental reflection does not analyse the content of knowledge, but reveals its conditions and is a condition of scientific research. This is not only thinking about thinking, but also the operations of identifying and distinguishing sensory data, and the rules for structuring the universe. The selection of input data depends on objective cognitive operations. Reflection reveals possible ways of transforming nature. Different forms of reflection achieve different goals. Reflection as a metatheory builds a (...) fundament for future science. The analysis of cognitive procedures reveals the privileged status of classical theory and possible ways of creating non-classical theories. The classical theory is the original theory from which the non-classical ones are derived. Correspondently, scientific knowledge is divided into initial and derived forms. Derived forms are established by second-order reflection. Thus, the objective structure of science is conditioned by the structure of the reflexive activity of the mind. (shrink)

상대성 이론에 대한 라이헨바흐의 철학적 분석을 대표하는 저술은 그의 1924년 저서 『상대성 이론의 공리화』이다. 이 책은 상대성 이론에서 제시된 시공간에 대한 일 종의 ‘합리적 재구성(rational reconstruction)’을 담고 있으며, 그는 이러한 재구 성을 통해 상대성 이론이 제시한 중요한 철학적 문제인 ‘시공간의 객관성’ 문제를 해 명하고자 했다. 우선 나는 논문 2장에서 라이헨바흐의 구성적 공리체계 속 공리와 정 의 및 단순성의 의미에 대해 논함으로써 이 체계가 갖는 ‘경험적 특성’을 밝힌다. 논문 3장에서 나는 ‘일치(coincidence)’에 대한 라이헨바흐의 해명 및 그가 구성적 공리체 계를 통해 재구성한 (...) 상대론적 시공간의 주요 내용을 기술한다. 이상의 논의를 통해 나는 라이헨바흐가 합리적 재구성을 통한 철학적 해명 과정에서 시공간의 물리적 객 관성에 관해 이론의 창시자였던 아인슈타인과는 다른 철학적 결론에 이르렀음을 보일 것이다. 논문 4장에서 나는 라이헨바흐의 구성적 공리화가 갖는 의의를 평가했던 주 요 철학적 논자들의 입장을 검토한다. 그중에서도 특히 나는 신칸트주의적 관점에서 라이헨바흐의 구성적 공리체계가 갖는 의의를 비판한 철학자 토머스 리크먼의 입장을 검토한 후, 이와 같은 리크먼의 부정적인 평가가 라이헨바흐의 구성적 공리체계에 대 한 일종의 오해에서 비롯되었음을 보인다. 리크먼의 주장과 달리 라이헨바흐는 강체 막대와 시계가 갖는 구조적 복잡성을 최소화하기 위해 빛 공리들과 물질 공리들을 분 리하였으며, 그는 물질 공리들과 계량적 공리들이 더 이상 적용되지 않는 일반 상대성 이론에 이르러서도 빛 신호로 구성된 위상적 공리들은 여전히 적용됨으로써 시공 간의 객관성이 유지됨을 보이고자 했다. 논문의 결론에서 나는 물리학자와 철학자의 이와 같은 의견 차이가 이후 물리적 기하학의 경험적 결정 가능성에 대한 아인슈타인 -라이헨바흐 논쟁으로 이어졌음을 지적하며 논의를 끝맺는다. (shrink)

BackgroundThis is the first qualitative study to investigate how researchers, who do empirical work in bioethics, relate to objectives of empirical research in bioethics (ERiB). We explore reasons that make some objectives more acceptable, while others are deemed less acceptable.MethodsUsing qualitative exploratory study design, we interviewed bioethics researchers, who were selected to represent different types of scholars working in the field. The interview data of 25 participants were analyzed in this paper using thematic analysis. ResultsFrom the eight objectives (...) presented to the study participants, understanding the context of a bioethical issue and identifying ethical issues in practice received unanimous agreement. Participants also supported other objectives of ERiB but with varying degrees of agreement. The most contested objectives were striving to draw normative recommendations and developing and justifying moral principles. The is-ought gap was not considered an obstacle to ERiB, but rather a warning sign to critically reflect on the normative implications of empirical results.ConclusionsOur results show that the most contested objectives are also the more ambitious ones, whereas the least contested ones focus on producing empirical results. The potential of empirical research to be useful for bioethics was mostly based on the reasoning pattern that empirical data can provide a testing ground for elements of normative theory. Even though empirical research can inform many parts of bioethical inquiry, normative expertise is recommended to guide ERiB. The acceptability of ambitious objectives for ERiB boils down to finding firm ground for the integration of empirical facts in normative inquiry. (shrink)

Questions concerning perception are as old as the field of philosophy itself. Using the first-person perspective as a starting point and philosophical documents, the study examines the relationship between knowledge and perception. The problem is that of how one knows what one immediately perceives. The everyday belief that an object of perception is known to be a material object on grounds of perception is demonstrated as unreliable. It is possible that directly perceived sensible particulars are mind-internal images, (...) shapes, sounds, touches, tastes and smells. According to the appearance/reality distinction, the world of perception is the apparent realm, not the real external world. However, the distinction does not necessarily refute the existence of the external world. We have a causal connection with the external world via mind-internal particulars, and therefore we have indirect knowledge about the external world through perceptual experience. The research especially concerns the reasons for George Berkeley’s claim that material things are mind-dependent ideas that really are perceived. The necessity of a perceiver’s own qualities for perceptual experience, such as mind, consciousness, and the brain, supports the causal theory of perception. Finally, it is asked why mind-internal entities are present when perceiving an object. Perception would not directly discern material objects without the presupposition of extra entities located between a perceiver and the external world. Nevertheless, the results show that perception is not sufficient to know what a perceptual object is, and that the existence of appearances is necessary to know that the external world is being perceived. However, the impossibility of matter does not follow from Berkeley’s theory. The main result of the research is that singular knowledge claims about the external world never refer directly and immediately to the objects of the external world. A perceiver’s own qualities affect how perceptual objects appear in a perceptual situation. (shrink)

Drawing on Security, Territory, Population and The Birth of Biopolitics, this article aims, firstly, to consolidate our understanding of Foucault’s engagement with law by fleshing out his approach to law and by clarifying that he distinguishes between different kinds of law on the basis of the objectives that law serves and the regime of truth that it embodies. Secondly, using this understanding, the article proceeds to illustrate how the objectives and the regime of truth of the EU internal market law (...) have been displaced in the last few decades. It is argued that this body of law has increasingly come to perform the tasks of law in neoliberal government as pointed out by Foucault in these lectures, namely of expanding the domain of market values and mechanisms, and of restricting the exercise of legitimate government by opposing the rule of law to planning. In this regard, particular attention is paid to the way in which justiciable rights function as a technology of neoliberal rule within the internal market. (shrink)

It typically taken for granted that agents can be morally responsible for such things as, for example, the death of the victim and the capture of the murderer in the sense that one may be blameworthy or praiseworthy for such things. The primary task of a theory of moral responsibility, it is thought, is to specify the appropriate relationship one must stand to such things in order to be morally responsible for them. I argue that this common approach is problematic (...) because it attempts to explain the way in which an agent can be morally responsible for something that is external to her, the agent. Since, I argue, everything that matters for moral responsibility is internal to the agent, the accounts that emerge from this approach are committed to a particular form of moral luck. Instead, we should reject this form of moral luck, and with it, the possibility of moral responsibility for objects external to the agent. We are, I argue, morally responsible only for our inner willings. Thus, a form of internalism about moral responsibility is defended. (shrink)

Recently within the critical accounting literature Funnell (1998) has argued that accounting was implicated in the Holocaust. This charge is primarily related to the technical, mathematical nature of accounting and its ability to dehumanise individuals. Broadbent (1998, see also DeMoss and McCann, 1997) has also contended that "accounting logic" excludes emotion. She suggests that a more emancipatory form of accounting could be possible if emotion were given a voice and allowed to be heard within accounting discourse (see also Kjonstad and (...) Wilmott, 1995). This paper contends that emotion should be introduced into accounting education and in particular emotional commitment to other individuals should be encouraged. It is suggested that one way to do this may be through business ethics education. It is also suggested that increasing ethical commitment to other individuals may go some way towards combating the tendency for accountancy to dehumanise other people. While there have been specific studies of ethics and accounting education there has, as yet, been little open debate about what the objectives of accounting ethics education should be or the specific techniques that could be used to meet the desired aims. This paper contends that accountancy has become dangerously dehumanised and that one of the most important objectives for any business ethics education must be to develop an empathy with "the other". The paper studies the developments within the medical, legal and engineering profession in order to suggest some specific methods which could be employed in order to re-humanise accountancy and develop a sense of moral commitment towards other individuals. (shrink)

First published in 2002. Routledge is an imprint of Taylor & Francis, an informa company.

Entitled merely “On the Object of Thought,” Chapter 8 of Gurwitsch’s Studies in Phenomenology and Psychology (Evanston, IL: Northwestern University Press, 1966) has the following note attached to its title: “Paper read at the meeting of the Phenomenological Society, April 27, 1946, at Hunter College, New York City. It was not possible to include here all the discussion. The original version was published in Philosophy and Phenomenological Research VII (1947).” What seems the integral script read at the International Phenomenological (...) Society meeting has, however, survived in the Nachlass. It is 596 lines long and 291 lines of it, i.e. practically half, correspond closely to the published version. The following, however, was added to the previously published version: and I must also forsake surveying the elaboration of concepts analogous to that of the “object of thought” in several contemporary psychological sciences. I have in view the abandonment of the constancy hypothesis in Gestalt theory, the studies of the late Gelb and Prof. Goldstein on the psychical effects of brain injuries, the late Levy-Bruhl’s account of mental functions in primitive societies, the views of the phonological school in linguistics, Max Weber’s verstehende Soziologie and especially his distinction between objektiver and subjektiver Sinn. (shrink)

The premise of this paper is that an adequate model of consciousness will be able to account for the fundamental duality in experience typified by thought and feeling, objectivity and subjectivity, science and art, and that it will do so without any of these terms assimilating its counterpart. The paper argues that such an account is possible using existing models of the cell assembly, but only if consciousness is conceived in structural rather than information processing terms. To this end, the (...) paper contests the viability of information processing models that identify consciousness with a substrate-independent flow of information, and instead identifies consciousness with the physical structure of the cell assembly itself. This allows a fuller and more parsimonious account of consciousness than existing information processing models, as well as the integration of a range of key related matters from the fields of neuroanatomy, psychology, philosophy, and the physical sciences. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:A View on the Future of an International Philosophy of Music Education:A Plea for a Comparative StrategyFrede V. NielsenIn the preface to the revised edition of my book, Almen musikdidaktik (The General Didaktik of Music) published in 1998, I wrote that the bibliography had been supplemented with a great deal of music education literature that had been published since the first edition of the book came out in 1994. (...) I drew attention in particular to, among other things, the journal Philosophy of Music Education Review, which began in 1993. I found that publication of this journal was significant and interesting not least because it continuously supplemented the approach to a theoretical and philosophic music pedagogical reflection with new English language literature. At the same time, it provided an opportunity to ask what sort of concepts and phenomena 'the philosophy of music education' and 'the philosophy of music teaching and learning' really are and what sort of functions they can have in relation to practice-oriented music education, including the education of music teachers. Therefore, the publication of PMER was a great step forward. But, like all such steps, it also revealed interesting issues and raised new questions. [End Page 7]In the Scandinavian countries too the research-based and theory-oriented music education literature has grown considerably since the early 1990s. This is the result of local initiatives in individual countries as well as Nordic cooperation in the form of the Nordic Network for Research in Music Education, which was formalized and institutionalized in 1992. The publication of the network's yearbooks, Nordic Research in Music Education–Yearbook, since 1995 is noteworthy in this context. In our part of the world this was another step forward, but one that also raised some challenging questions. In particular it gave rise to the question: What is the structure of the object of study for music education as a science and how can this object of study be delimited appropriately in relation to other disciplines? I think we have moved further toward giving reflected and well-founded answers to these questions, even though the answers are not unambiguous and may create problems in relation to the institutional affiliations of music pedagogy as a theoretical and scientific discipline.My first encounter with the initiators of the PME symposia took place in 2003 when I attended PME-5 in Lake Forest near Chicago. Even though there were participants from a number of different countries, including the Scandinavian countries (but none, for example, from Germany), it was clear that the event was dominated by North Americans. I contributed with a paper that was based on German and Nordic didactic (didactological) theory, which apparently was quite unfamiliar to most of the conference participants. To me this was a reminder of how important it is that a society that calls itself "international" should strive to embrace and include various traditions from several different points of view if it is to live up to the designation "international."The International Society for the Philosophy of Music Education (ISPME) was formally founded at the symposium in Lake Forest. For the past two years I have enjoyed the honor of being the society's co-chair together with Estelle Jorgensen. As those of you who attended the symposium in 2003 know, I accepted this task only after some hesitation and with some reservations. Since then I have had the opportunity to consider and experience what the task entails.I mentioned that my impression of PME-5 in Lake Forest was that it was dominated by North Americans. This was no wonder, since PME-5 took place in that part of the world. Moreover, the initiative behind the PME symposia originally came from the USA and Canada. Nonetheless, it gave impetus to a broader international orientation when the ISPME was founded two years ago.I come from a Scandinavian country. Scandinavia is a small language area situated in the northernmost region of Europe and has historically been very dependent on external cultural impulses. For centuries these have not least come from continental Europe and this is also true of the fields of education, philosophy, and music culture. The French and... (shrink)

This article develops an account of local epistemic practices on the basis of case studies from ethnobiology. I argue that current debates about objectivity often stand in the way of a more adequate understanding of local knowledge and ethnobiological practices in general. While local knowledge about the biological world often meets criteria for objectivity in philosophy of science, general debates about the objectivity of local knowledge can also obscure their unique epistemic features. In modification of Ian Hacking’s suggestion to discuss (...) “ground level questions” instead of objectivity, I propose an account that focuses on both epistemic virtues and vices of local epistemic practices. (shrink)

Context: Affordances are gaining momentum as a key object of study in the cognitive sciences and the philosophy of mind. In The Philosophy of Affordances I propose a new way to understand ….

According to the traditional account Mendel's paper on pea hybrids reported a study of inheritance and its laws. Hence, Mendel came to be known as The Father of Genetics. This paper demonstrates that, in fact, Mendel's objective in his research was finding the empirical laws which describe the formation of hybrids and the development of their offspring over several generations. Having found these laws (and not the laws of inheritance that he is generally credited with) he proposed a theoretical (...) scheme involving the formation of germinal and pollen cells in hybrids and their combination in fertilization competent to explain why his laws took the form that they did. Mendel's research shows a pattern of development closely paralleling the stages of empirical investigation beginning at the level of qualitative description in common language rising through four levels of increasing abstraction and culminating in a fifth level, his simple mechanical theory. This mechanism met all the tests that a theory of this type must pass. In that respect Mendel was highly successful and this success might be the reason why he did not push his theory to a higher level, a sixth level involving the use of particulate determiners; despite this fact, Mendel was credited with having taken exactly that step. (shrink)

A typical guiding principle of an account of truth is: “truth is objective,” or, to be clear, judging whether an assertion is true or false depends upon how things are in the world rather than how someone or some community believes it to be. Accordingly, whenever a claim is objectively true, its truth conditions ought not depend upon the context in which it is uttered or the utterer making the claim. Part of our ongoing empirical studies surveying people’s responses to (...) questions about truth involved prompts on objectivity. Our studies suggest the following: overall, individuals tend to endorse claims that are consistent with the objectivity of truth; not all conceptions of objectivity are equal, even people who endorse the objectivity of truth sometimes assent to one form of truth’s objectivity over other forms; philosophers and non-philosophers both endorse the objectivity of truth, but the apparent commitment of philosophers is stronger. (shrink)

The author of the work proposes a philosophical and methodological interpretation of the mathematical objects, using the system triad of the main directions of substantiation of mathematics: the formalism of Hilbert, Brouwer’s intuitionism and Godel’s Platonism. The need for these directions in the concept of substantiation of mathematics from the point of view of the current state of the philosophy of mathematics is shown on the mathematical examples. The philosophical and methodological analysis of objects of mathematics has never been unambiguous, (...) therefore in this paper the results of studies of philosophers, logicians and mathematicians, in which the problem of substantiation is explicated in the context of trends in the development of mathematics, are used. Their professional view on philosophical characteristics of the objects of mathematics contributes to the identification of the unity of all mathematical knowledge maintaining the initial mathematical base of knowledge and revealing new ways of integrating the directions of substantiation in the philosophy of mathematics. The practical problem of substantiation of mathematics is realized through the elaboration of metatheoretical knowledge under the paradigm shift in the philosophy of mathematics to the productive direction from analysis to synthesis. (shrink)

Conscious states as objects of awareness: on Uriah Kriegel, Subjective consciousness: a self - representational theory Content Type Journal Article Pages 1-9 DOI 10.1007/s11098-011-9763-9 Authors Brie Gertler, Corcoran Department of Philosophy, University of Virginia, Charlottesville, VA 22904, USA Journal Philosophical Studies Online ISSN 1573-0883 Print ISSN 0031-8116.

The purpose of the article is to study the influence of Nazi experiments on the formation of ideas about the ethos of science in the field of biomedicine. It is shown that the idea of discrediting a value-neutral science was often confronted with the resistance of the scientists themselves, who, in different contexts of condemning Nazi crimes, appealed to the fact that they acted for the good of science, and even of all mankind. The article discusses the strategy of (...) American lawyers adopted at the Nuremberg Trials aimed at demonstrating the perversity of Nazi crimes in the field of biomedicine both ethically and scientifically. In addition, an analysis of individual materials of the Nuremberg process was carried out, which made it possible to give an idea of the scientific and linguistic design of the human body (name correction strategy) as a “correct” scientific object with desired properties. The article considers the influence of the data obtained on Nazi crimes on the formation of the content of the Nuremberg Code and the design of the principle of informed consent in biomedicine. Ethical aspects related to the further use of Nazi scientific data are also considered. In conclusion, the problem of the formation of scientific knowledge in non-violence mode is articulated. (shrink)

ABSTRACT This article will examine the career of weaver and occupational therapist Mary E. Black by using her life as a lens through which to explore the intersection of arts and crafts revivalism with occupational therapy in early twentiethcentury northeastern North America. Born in Massachusetts, Black grew up in and was educated in Wolfville, Nova Scotia. She trained as ward's aide in Montreal in 1919 and worked in a string of hospitals and sanitariums throughout the United States and Nova Scotia. (...) Indeed, Black understood her work as an occupational therapist and what she described as “the therapeutics of weaving” to be intertwined. Like many arts and crafts revivalists of her period, Black saw the teaching of skilled craftmaking as a means to generate self-sufficiency, since it provided a way for displaced and injured people to make salable goods in the face of industrialization, war, and inadequate medical care. In Black's case, the utopian social mission of the new professional field of occupational therapy provided just the institutional means to disseminate the remunerative qualities of craftwork on a broad scale. (shrink)

Through a case study of the controversies surrounding the molecular clock, this paper examines the role of visual representation in the dynamics of scientific controversies. Representations of the molecular clock themselves became objects of controversy and so were not a means for closure. Instead visual representations of the molecular clock became tools for the further articulation of an ongoing controversy.

The paper is intended as a study in the philosophy of interpretation of Michael Krausz in relation to the philosophy of Arthur Schopenhauer. The idea is to throw some new lights on Schopenhauer’s philosophy by critically examining thc works of Schopenhauer in the light of Krausz’s philosophy of interpretation. We shall examine the extent to which Krausz’s philosophy of interpretation could provide a framework of interpretation of the more or less enigmatic parts of constructive realism in Schopenhauer’s The World (...) As Will and Representation and On the Fourfold Root. In particular, I have discussed in my paper the specific problems of (i) bridging the gulf between the object-as-such and the object-of-interpretation in Krausz’s philosophy and (ii) the Will and the Representation in Schopenhauer’s philosophy. (shrink)

From the daily life, how to get the access to philosophy, what is the approaches to philosophy? Regarding the big topics /big affair in the world, are they related to the philosophy? what and how shall the philosophy do? About some concept, word, have we already fully confirmed their meaning? What shall the philosophy do to make their meaning clear and confirmed? Refers to the philosophy itself, have we already confirmed its study object? What is Philosophy? what is (...) the main study object for the philosophy? It is the pity that till now, for the whole world philosophy field, the main study object for the philosophy have not been confirmed. There are various kinds of answer, this means philosophy, from the past one hundred years, till now, has not work out the state of downturn and confusion.Since the philosophy itself is not clear, then no wonder from the late of 19 century to now, philosophy seems did litting achievement for the human being, for the civilization, for the progress, its glory looks gray, compared with Science, which is in fact born by philosophy although. So, before the philosophy could work well for the civilization, firstly, we should make the philosophy clear, confirm the main object of philosophy, target the correct object for philosophy! Only after this first work, we could expect philosophy do well on its tasks and function. For my this paper, its essential point is to present an answer for the target object belongs to the philosophy. Through demonstrate as per scientific logic and philosophy’s whole history, this answer, namely, the only target object belongs to philosophyis the Ontology and Cognition. Let philosophy go back to its correct place, its correct way. Then, it could move ahead. only after we get new progress on the study of Ontology and Cognition, and with the help of this new achievement of Ontology and Cognition, we can get progress on the study of the fields related to the human being and progress of civilization. As far as what is the Ontology and Cognition, which kind new achievement of Ontology and Cognition we couldexpect, that is the next step. (shrink)