The article starts with the brief review of the history of the creation of actor-network theory (ANT), followed by the explanation of its basic notions. The author observes the difficulties of understanding and translation of the main ANT terms “actor” and “network”. In the main part of the article the author considers a famous episode from the history of giant airships known as “Miracle at Echterdingen” – that is a sudden revelation of the national spirit of German Empire as the (...) result of the flight and catastrophe of zeppelin LZ4 in august 1908. She discusses methodological limits of the historical reconstructions of “Miracle at Echterdingen” in Douglas Botting’s “The Giant Airships” (1980) and Peter Fritzche’s “Nation of Fliers” (1992). It is demonstrated that ANT allows to overcome not only the obvious weakness of the linear narrative that Botting followed, but also the oxydenthalism of Peter Fritsche’s approach and to confirm Latour’s thesis that “modernism’s accounts of itself may have no relation to what has actually happened to it”. As the result of the implementation of ANT, the network of forces which circulated in German society and lead to the Echterdingen phenomenon, is revealed. (shrink)

1885 faßte Friedrich Nietzsche den Entschluß, eine Neue Ausgabe seiner Schriften erscheinen zu lassen, die »das Eigene und Unvergleichliche in diesen Werken« herausstellen sollte. Diesem Konzept folgt auch die von Claus-Artur Scheier neu herausgegebene Ausgabe der philosophischen Werke in sechs in Bänden. BAND 1 Jenseits von Gut und Böse (1886) Die Geburt der Tragödie (Neue Ausgabe 1886) Ca. 399 Seiten BAND 2 Menschliches, Allzumenschliches 1 (Neue Ausgabe 1886) Ca. 366 Seiten BAND 3 Menschliches, Allzumenschliches 2 (Neue Ausgabe 1886) Ca. 332 (...) Seiten BAND 4 Morgenröthe (Neue Ausgabe 1887) Ca. 332 Seiten BAND 5 Die Fröhliche Wissenschaft / Wir Furchtlosen (Neue Ausgabe 1887) Ca. 312 Seiten BAND 6 Zur Genealogie der Moral (1887) Götzen-Dämmerung (1889) Ca. 276 Seiten Diese erste Ausgabe der philosophischen Werke Friedrich Nietzsches in der »Philosophischen Bibliothek« folgt dem 1885 von Nietzsche selbst gefaßten und begründeten Konzept einer Neuen Ausgabe seiner im eigentlichen Sinne »philosophischen« Schriften und bietet den Text nach den Originalausgaben von 1886/1887, ergänzt um die 1889 erschienene Götzen-Dämmerung. Eine »vollständige Ausgabe letzter Hand« nach dem Vorbild Goethes hat Friedrich Nietzsche nicht vorlegen können, denn am Ende war er nicht mehr Herr seiner Sinne. Doch gibt das wirklich Grund zur Klage? Oder anders gefragt: Hätte Nietzsche eine solche Ausgabe, die einfach alles versammelt, was er geschrieben hat, überhaupt gewollt und gutgeheißen? Die Frage muß offen bleiben. Doch es gibt gewiß Gründe, Nietzsche nicht mit jenen gleichzustellen, denen es auf diese Weise nur darum zu tun war, ihren Nachruhm zu sichern und nach eigenen Vorstellungen zu steuern. Denn es gibt sie ja, die von Nietzsche selbst gewollte und kritisch kommentierte Ausgabe ganz eigener Art: nämlich die durch Jenseits von Gut und Böse und die Genealogie der Moral eingerahmte Neue Ausgabe von 1886/87, die die vor dem Zarathustra veröffentlichten, mit neuen Vorreden versehenen philosophischen Schriften enthält, von denen der Autor selber sagte: »Sie werden bemerken, daß Menschliches, Allzumenschliches, die Morgenröte, die fröhliche Wissenschaft einer Vorrede ermangeln: es hatte gute Gründe, daß ich damals, als diese Werke entstanden, mir ein Stillschweigen auferlegte – ich stand noch zu nahe, noch zu sehr ›drin‹ und wußte kaum, was mit mir geschehen war. Jetzt, wo ich selber am besten und genauesten sagen kann, was das Eigene und Unvergleichliche in diesen Werken ist und inwiefern sie eine für Deutschland neue Literatur inaugurieren (das Vorspiel einer moralischen Selbst-Erziehung und Kultur, die bisher den Deutschen gefehlt hat), würde ich mich zu solchen zurückblickenden und nachträglichen Vorreden gerne entschließen. Meine Schriften stellen eine fortlaufende Entwicklung dar, welche nicht nur mein persönliches Erlebnis und Schicksal sein wird: – ich bin nur der Erste, eine heraufkommende Generation wird das, was ich erlebt habe, von sich aus verstehn und eine feine Zunge für meine Bücher haben. Die Vorreden könnten das Notwendige im Gange einer solchen Entwicklung deutlich machen.« (Brief vom 7. August 1886 an seinen Verleger Th. Fritsch) Mit der 1990 unter dem Titel ›Friedrich Nietzsche: Ecce auctor‹ vorgelegten Edition der Vorreden von 1886 hatte Claus-Artur Scheier zum ersten Mal darauf aufmerksam gemacht, daß Nietzsche die für die Neue Ausgabe seiner im eigentlichen Sinne »philosophischen« Schriften verfaßten Vorreden als in sich geschlossenen, genealogisch angelegten Versuch einer selbstkritischen Neubewertung und Einordnung seines Werkes ansah: »Von der Vorrede zur Geburt der Tragödie bis zur Vorrede des letztgenannten Buchs [der ›Genealogie der Moral‹] – das gibt eine Art ›Entwicklungsgeschichte‹« (zu der, des Erprobens der Tonlage wegen, noch die Vorrede zu »Jenseits von Gut und Böse« gerechnet werden kann). Jetzt sah sich Nietzsche im Zenit seiner Schaffenskraft, und die Neue Ausgabe sollte den Mitte 1885 gefaßten Plan vorantreiben, »eine große Schul-Tätigkeit als Philosoph auszuüben [...]. Die Bücher heraus aus diesem Winkel!!! Es sind meine Angelhaken; wenn sie mir keine Menschen fangen, so haben sie keinen Sinn!« (Brief an die Schwester, kurz vor dem 15. August 1885). (shrink)

" Pour devenir un parfait philosophe, il me manquait surtout une passion, a la fois profonde et pure, qui me fit assez apprecier la partie affective de la nature humaine " note Auguste Comte dans ses " Prieres quotidiennes " redigees peu apres 1845, cette " annee sans pareille " au cours de laquelle il rencontre, frequente et voit disparaitre Clotilde de Vaux a laquelle il voue un amour eperdu. Cette relation aussi profonde et intense que physiquement ephemere ne bouleverse (...) pas seulement la vie privee du fondateur du positivisme. La decouverte du role preponderant de l'affectivite dans les relations humaines et sociales inflechit de maniere definitive la doctrine positiviste dont la nouvelle devise devient L'amour pour principe, l'ordre pour base et le progres pour but. L'edifice theorique qu'est le Systeme de politique positive developpe l'idee d'un " nouveau pouvoir spirituel " qui prendra la forme d'une " religion de l'Humanite " a laquelle l'ordre et le progres doivent etre subordonnes, de meme que l'esprit au cur. Ce numero explore sous differents angles les implications de cet inflechissement majeur a l'uvre dans la philosophie positive, et sa complexe actualite. (shrink)

"Fritsche's book, which is closely researched, carefully argued, and philologically rigorous, will become an indispensable point of reference for further debates on Heidegger's ambiguous political and ethical legacy."—Richard Wolin, author of The Politics of Being "Unquestionably, Fritsche has a highly unusual command of the Heideggerian idiom, which he uses to very good effect."—Tom Rockmore, author of On Heidegger's Nazism and Philosophy.

Although Auguste Comte is conventionally acknowledged as one of the founders of sociology and as a key representative of positivism, few new editions of his writings have been published in the English language in this century. He has become virtually dissociated from the history of modern positivism and the most recent debates about it. Gertrud Lenzer maintains that the work of Comte is, for better or for worse, essential to an understanding of the modern period of positivism. This collection provides (...) new access to the work of Comte and gives practitioners of various disciplines the possibility of reassessing concepts that were first introduced in Comte's writings. Today much of the ordinary business of academic disciplines is conducted under the assumption that the realm of science is essentially separate from the realms of politics and science. A close reading of Comte will reveal how deeply such current ideas and theories were originally embedded in a particular political context. One of his central methodological principles was that the theory of society had to be removed from the arena of political practice precisely in order to control that practice by means of these same sciences. It is in Comte's work that the reader will be able to observe how the forces of social and political reaction began to be powerfully organized to combat the critical forces in its own and later eras. Auguste Comte and Positivism will be of importance to the work of philosophers, sociologists, political theorists, and historians. (shrink)

A collection bringing together a wide-varietyof world-renowned scholars on the import of Derrida's philosophy with respectto the current environmental crisis, our ecological relationships to 'nature'and the earth, our responsibilities with respect to climate change, pollution, and nuclear destruction, and the ethics and politics at stake in responding tothese crises.

Name der Zeitschrift: Deutsche Zeitschrift für Philosophie Jahrgang: 63 Heft: 5 Seiten: 913-940.

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Buddhist-Christian Studies 21.1 (2001) 161-164 [Access article in PDF] Book Review "Was Uns Unbedingt Angeht": Studien Zur Theologie Und Philosophie Paul Tillich "Was Uns Unbedingt Angeht":studien Zur Theologie Und Philosophie Paul Tillich. By Werner Schüssler. Münster, Germany: LIT Verlag, 1999. 271 pp. In this book we are introduced to central themes of Paul Tillich's theological and philosophical thinking. Several essays deal with the problems of secularism; Tillich's concept of (...) faith, religion, and theology; his understanding of authority, revelation, and prayer; his theology of culture and religion; his concept of "God above God"; his work on symbols; his relation to natural theology and metaphysics; and his thoughts on the danger of power and the ambivalence of progress. It becomes quite clear that Tillich--who, contrary to Karl Barth, explicitly searched for ways and methods of dialogue with culture, philosophy, and non-Christian religions--still offers much for human beings living in the Third Millennium to reflect upon.In the introductory notes we learn that Paul Tillich (1886-1965) was a thinker who was not bound by any borders between disciplines. The only discipline he explicitly referred to was philosophical theology, which had no place in the academic tradition [End Page 161] of German Protestantism at that time. If we follow his Main Works(Berlin/ New York, 1987-1998), we can differentiate between philosophical, cultural-philosophical, sociophilosophical-ethical, religious, and theological writings. Tillich's writings are the testimonies of a thinker who tried to understand his time--especially the religious, cultural, and political situation in Germany from 1918-1933 (including the problem and idea of totality, as in his three-volume Systematic Theology)--and later, after he had to emigrate, the problems of a civilization shaped by science, technology, the disintegration of traditional systems of meaning, the loss of the religious dimension in daily human life and, following this, the radical experience of nothingness, and finally the encounter with Far Eastern spirituality and religion. Always he wanted to correlate questions arising from the human situation with answers from the Christian message. Therefore, Schüssler argues, we cannot just casually review Tillich's thinking, but we have to dare it anew with honesty, realism, and passion and allow it to inform our ongoing interdisciplinary and intercultural conversations.The essays come in two parts: theology and philosophy. Theology The first part consists of eight contributions: Tillich and the problem of secularization, Tillich's dynamic concept of faith, Tillich's understanding of religion and theology, the relation between authority and revelation found in the writings of Tillich and Jasper, Tillich's theonomous theology of prayer, Tillich's contribution to interreligious dialogue from the viewpoint of philosophy of religion, the continuing effect of the christological paradox in Tillich's philosophy of religion and theology of religion, and Tillich's and Barth's first encounter in the 1920s.Schüssler's essay on interreligious dialogue makes clear that, like Barth, Tillich at the end of his life regretted not having included non-Christian religions into his systematic outlines. Although Tillich worked with history of religion and the question of other religions within his study of Schelling rather early, this aspect became relevant thematically only late (aside from a relatively short comment in his Philosophy of Religion from 1925 and in his Dogmatics from the same year). It was stimulated by two important encounters: a journey to Japan from May until July 1960, and contact with his colleague Mircea Eliade in Chicago. And although his Systematic Theologydeals primarily with the encounter with secular culture, in its chapter on "Manifestation of the Divine Spirit within Historical Humanity," Tillich speaks of the "spiritual community in its latent and manifest states" and in so doing represents the inclusivist model in interreligious dialogue. The author sees many different aspects in Tillich's thought as useful within the theology of religion, particularly the theocentric aspect in his concept of "God above God," the revelatory aspect in his discussion of primary revelation or fundamental revelation, the epistemological aspect in his definition of faith as "that... (shrink)

Selections from the most important and representative writings of the philosopher, economist, social reformer and political activist August Cieszkowski (1814 1894).

The environmental crisis, one of the great challenges of our time, tends to disenfranchise those who come after us. Arguing that as temporary inhabitants of the earth, we cannot be indifferent to future generations, this book draws on the resources of phenomenology and poststructuralism to help us conceive of moral relations in connection with human temporality. Demonstrating that moral and political normativity emerge with generational time, the time of birth and death, this book proposes two related models of intergenerational and (...) environmental justice. The first entails a form of indirect reciprocity, in which we owe future people both because of their needs and interests and because we ourselves have been the beneficiaries of peoples past; the second posits a generational taking of turns that Matthias Fritsch applies to both our institutions and our natural environment, in other words, to the earth as a whole. Offering new readings of key philosophers, and emphasizing the work of Emmanuel Levinas and Jacques Derrida in particular, Taking Turns with the Earth disrupts human-centered notions of terrestrial appropriation and sharing to give us a new continental philosophical account of future-oriented justice. (shrink)

In a paper entitled “Emmanuel Faye: The Introduction of Fraud into Philosophy?”, Thomas Sheehan accuses Faye of committing many blunders in Heidegger: The Introduction of Nazism into Philosophy. In this paper, I address what is according to Sheehan himself the most important part of his paper, namely his charges against Faye’s interpretation of Heidegger’s Being and Time. I show that they are all wholly unfounded. All the aspects of Being and Time that Sheehan addresses speak not only not against Faye (...) but rather even for Faye. (shrink)

Presque tous les interprètes considèrent qu’il va de soi qu’en Physique Β, 1, 192b8-193a9, Aristote présente ce qui constitue le cœur de sa propre théorie de la nature et des choses naturelles, par opposition à d’autres théories dont il avait connaissance. La question de savoir si, avec ses deux définitions, il renvoie à un principe actif, à un principe passif ou à quelque chose d’autre, a par ailleurs fait l’objet de discussions. Dans cet article, je cherche à montrer qu’en 192b8-193a9, (...) il ne met pas en place sa propre théorie, mais ne fait que préparer le terrain pour le déploiement d’une théorie, et qu’à l’évidence il renvoie à un principe actif, moteur. En outre, je montre comment il élabore au cours de Physique Β sa réponse à la question principale d’une théorie de la nature et des choses naturelles au niveau le plus général, et en quoi cette réponse est constitutive pour sa biologie. (shrink)

In the context of current environmental crises, which threaten to seriously harm living conditions for future generations, liberal-capitalist democracies have been accused of inherent short-termism, that is, of favouring the currently living at the expense of mid- to long-term sustainability. I will review some of the reasons for this short-termism as well as proposals as to how best to represent future people in today’s democratic decision-making. I will then present some ideas of my own as to how to reconceive the (...) idea of democracy and the responsibilities of citizenship in the face of increasing obligations to sustain both the environment and democratic institutions for future people. I argue that taking turns between governing and governed is a key dimension of democracy, and that it implies in-principle consent to others governing after my turn, including future generations. Thus, future people must be better represented than they generally are today, in particular when democratic institutions find themselves squeezed between an overburdened environment in which they are embedded, and a fast-paced and short-termist globalizing economy. (shrink)

This book draws on a spectrum of philosophical cultures to provide new perspectives on environmental ethics and intergenerational justice.

Languages play an essential role in communicating aesthetic, scientific and religious convictions, as well as laws, worldviews and truths. Additionally, metaphors are an essential part of many languages and artistic expressions. In this paper I will first examine the role metaphors play in religion and art. Is there a specific focus on symbolic and metaphoric language in religion and art? Where are the analogies to be found in artistic metaphors and religious ones? How are differences to be described? How do (...) various concepts of aesthetics and theological concepts explain those different kinds of language and how, if at all, do they make use of them? Lastly: what could be added to aesthetics, philosophy and theology by examining carefully the role and importance of language, including nonverbal, sign language and especially metaphorical language? Without the human capacity for language, religions are scarcely imaginable. A widening of traditional exegesis and hermeneutics by taking into account nonverbal semantics is needed. Religion is a cognitive and linguistic phenomenon. By taking this seriously, we set and enable an agenda to discuss religion scientifically, leaving aside for the purpose of a scientific understanding and discourse about the inter-religious and the inner-religious claims of truth and absolutist claims. To sum it up: metaphor is introduced as an important means of language when it comes to religious conceptualization. Next, I will show that art, more than religion, deals with visual metaphor – the latter being an image that suggests a particular association, similarity or analogy between two generally unconnected visual elements. This often, but not always, functions in a roughly comparable fashion to the better-known concept of verbal metaphor. In addition, visual metaphor has developed many original and unique characteristics. These two sections are followed by another one dealing with cultural philosophy of religion and aesthetics, as well as the meaning of metaphors for these disciplines. The next section is on metaphor and metaphorical language in mathematics, natural sciences and art and how they are related, i.e. influence and help each other. I will discuss the critical approach to metaphors in natural science and provide a short introduction to the cultural history of mathematics and art. Mathematicians and artists have long been on the quest to understand the physical world they see before them and the abstract objects they know by thought alone. How have art and mathematics helped each other in representing each other’s concepts? A final section provides a summary and an outlook: theology is contextual as is science – and so is art. All these disciplines partly rely upon metaphor and by the help of metaphor get closer to an intercultural and interdisciplinary understanding. I shall argue that, by dealing more carefully with their metaphorical language and their own metaphors, together they become better equipped to map the world. (shrink)

In Being and Time, Division One, Chapter 4, Heidegger develops the structures “Being-with and Dasein-with [Mitsein and Mitdasein]” and “what we might call the ‘subject’ of everydayness—the ‘they’”. In the last section of the chapter, Section 27, Heidegger presents six characters of the ‘they’, namely, “distantiality, averageness, levelling down, publicness, the disburdening of one’s Being, and accomodation”. The meaning of the last five characters is relatively unproblematic. For instance, by “averageness” Heidegger obviously wants to indicate that the ‘they’ establishes a (...) set of behavioural patterns as normal and ‘natural’. For example, at certain junctures of their lives, individual Daseine have to choose, or are able to choose, among several options within a given set of options. However, the entire set of options as such has already been adopted by them in a self-evident way and without much thought. The ‘they’ forces this choice by suppressing other possibilities and other ways of handling given possibilities. Thus, the respective averageness results from a screening process in which the ‘they’ constantly rules out other possibilities or prevents them from emerging in the first place. Heidegger calls this “the ‘levelling down’ [Einebnung] of all possibilities of Being”. However, the first character, distantiality, seems more difficult to understand. In the English translation, Heidegger characterizes it thus. (shrink)

One of the common denominators linking the many different strands and schools of philosophy in the second half of the twentieth century is an appreciation of, and reflection on, difference and translation. Each translation is a unique challenge. It is difficult to translate one theory into the conceptual framework of another, or to translate one performative game or text from one language into another. Heidegger provides a striking example of some of the problems associated with translation. His extensive use of (...) abstract nouns as subjects of sentences, his reference to idiomatic, or more or less archaic, words, his ability to unfold the meanings supposedly implicit in a word through the addition of various prefixes and suffixes, or, conversely, his penchant for tracing back different words to the same root, combined with his complicated, often somewhat convoluted, syntax and grammar, make it difficult to translate his texts. The wealth of possible connotations, associations, and references to other words and passages in his work and in everyday language simply cannot be preserved in any translation. In this paper, I will present an example of these problems in relation to four passages in the German texts and the English translations respectively. In the first section I will take my example from Being and Time, and in the second section from “The Question Concerning Technology” and “Building Dwelling Thinking.” In the third section this will be followed by a note on Heidegger’s notion of Gelassenheit which will draw together the preceding three passages. Thereafter, in the fourth section I will comment on some notions in “The Question Concerning Technology,” and in the fifth section I will discuss the passage from “The Question Concerning Technology” in the context of the entire essay. In these two sections, i.e. the fourth and the fifth, I will make a suggestion concerning the notorious question of “Heidegger and Auschwitz,” which in some sense is my only concern in the entire paper. Following this, in the sixth section I will address a passage in An Introduction to Metaphysics. In the seventh section, I will present a passage in the as yet untranslated lecture course on Hölderlin, given in the summer semester of 1942, and a short text of Heidegger’s, Der Feldweg, published in 1953, concluding with some summarizing remarks in the eighth and final section. (shrink)

This paper responds to five critics (Eva Buddeberg, Scott Marratto, Michael Naas, Janna Thompson, and Jason Wirth) and their commentaries on my Taking Turns with the Earth. Phenomenology, Deconstruction, and Intergenerational Justice (Stanford University Press, 2018). In relation to the book’s argument, my response seeks to clarify and elaborate the role of indigenous philosophies; the meaning and value of the concept of earth; the ontology-ethics interface and the emergence of normativity with birth and death; the practical feasibility and motivational force (...) of the book’s proposals for conceptualizing justice for future generations, namely asymmetrical reciprocity and taking turns; and the role of democratic institutions for justice between generations in view of the global capitalist economy. (shrink)

After having shown that time is neither identical with nor set apart from change, Aristotle concludes that time is some aspect of change. Following this, he sets forth two definitions. Time is “that which is determined [on both sides] by the now”. A few lines later, one finds what has usually been taken to be the binding, or even the only, definition of time: “a number of motion in respect to the before and after ”, with the subsequent explanation that (...) ‘number’ here does not mean the number with which we count, but rather the number being counted or the countable number. Over the long history of commentary and interpretation, there have been several controversial points concerning these definitions, three of which I shall discuss in this paper. For Aristotle, number is a discrete quantum. Motion, on the other hand, and along with it time, are continuous quantities. How, then, can we think discreteness and continuity as united in time? Furthermore, what does ‘number’ mean, and what is the cause of that specific number which time is? Aristotle says that time as some motion or change is only within the changing thing itself, yet time is equally everywhere and with everything. How, then, can it be thought that there are, in fact, many different changes, but of all these changes only one time? (shrink)

Joseph Heath's Communicative Action and Rational Choice may be read as a critical commentary upon Habermas's critical social theory, but it may also be read as merely using the latter as “scaffolding” for the presentation of Heath's own version of critical theory. In what follows, I will focus on the second option and thus largely ignore the exegetical question to what extent Heath provides a fair reading of Habermas. This does not mean, however, that I will not make comparative judgements. (...) On the contrary, my overall claim will be that Heath's new critical theory is more functionalist, and. partly as a result, less critical than Habermas's. Since lack of space does not permit me to argue this in accordance with the standards of detail that Heath's own book generally observes, my procedure may be justified by the attempt to provoke a clarificatory response from Heath. (shrink)

One of the major political problems the world faces at the moment of its so-called globalization concerns the possibilities of maintaining, transforming, and expanding democracy. Globalization, as the extension of neo-liberal markets, the formation of multi-national, non-democratic economic powers, and the ubiquitous use of teletechnologies, threatens the modus vivendi of older democracies in ways that call for the reinvention of an old idea. Inasmuch as teletechnical globalization transforms space and time so as to put into question their very presence, and (...) inasmuch as deconstruction has always sought to rethink the constitution as well as deconstitution of the metaphysics of presence, I will here examine the concept of democracy that Jacques Derrida developed over the last few years of his life. (shrink)

This paper draws out what Derrida’s work—in particular as concerns law, democracy, and intergenerational justice in the context of the European heritage—can contribute to constitutionalism and the legal relation to future people, at the national level and the supranational one of the European Union. The first section outlines some of Derrida’s contributions to legal scholarship and European identity, and then, in the following two sections, argue for two main points. First, Derrida can help us understand the much-discussed double bind of (...) the constitutional relation to future people as merely an instance of a more general aporia. The double bind consists in the fact that the constitutional promise to safeguard future freedom also limits and binds future people. I will show how this aporia results from the temporal structure of the constitutional founding of law. Accordingly, the double bind cannot be resolved, either conceptually or in constitutional practice, but only be negotiated with greater awareness. Second, the same aporia of time entails that future generations are already implicated in the founding and re-founding of law here and now. Because the present moment is constitutively related to the past and the future, the meaning of a constitutional founding can become legible only from the future. Hence, the present generation, whose unity is never given, cannot but draw an advance credit on the future whose cooperation it anticipates. As a result, the political promise of Europe depends on its relation to its geographical, but also to its temporal others. (shrink)

In the face of the ever-growing effect the actions of the present may have upon future people, most conspicuously around climate change, democracy has been accused, with good justification, of a presentist bias: of systemically favouring the presently living. By contrast, this paper will argue that the intimate relation, both quasi-ontological and normative, that Derrida's work establishes between temporality and justice insists upon another, more future-regarding aspect of democracy. We can get at this aspect by arguing for two consequences of (...) the deconstructive affirmation of sur-vivre, of the alterity of death in life. Firstly, justice is not first of all justice for the living, but intergenerational from the start. This is so because no generation coincides with itself; rather, it dies and is reborn at every moment, and so – and this is the second consequence – consists in taking turns. Affirming life as living-on means affirming that it involves exchanging life's stations, as the young become the old, and the unborn become the dead. In this sense, the justice of living-on, I will argue, shares an essential feature with democracy, whose principle of exchanging the rulers with the ruled led Derrida to characterize it in terms of the wheel. Democracy consists in the principled assent to power changing hands, a switchover life demands of every generation at every turn. This assent further requires an acceptance of the gift of inheritance without which no life can survive. But as the gift can also never be fully acknowledged or appropriated, it must be passed on to the indefinite, unknown future, in a turning that is the time of life. (shrink)