This article shows that judicial review has a democratic justification even though judges may be no better at protecting rights than legislatures. That justification is procedural, not consequentialist: reflecting the ability of judicial review to express and protect citizen’s interests in political participation, political equality, political representation and political accountability. The point of judicial review is to symbolize and give expression to the authority of citizens over their governors, not to reflect the wisdom, trustworthiness or competence of judges and (...) legislators. Above a threshold level of competence – which may be impossible to determine a-priori – the legitimacy of judicial review does not turn on the special wisdom, virtue or personal qualities of judges. Instead, it reflects the importance that democracies properly attach to the ordinary virtues and competences of individuals in justifying power and authority. Hence, this article takes issue with the defence of judicial review in Eisgruber and Brettschneider, as well as with the critiques of judicial review found in Waldron and Bellamy. (shrink)

Would randomly selecting legislators be more democratic than electing them? Lottocrats argue (reasonably) that contemporary regimes are not very democratic and (more questionably) that replacing elections with sortition would mitigate elite capture and improve political decisions. I argue that a lottocracy would, in fact, be likely to perform worse on these metrics than a system of representation that appoints at least some legislators using election – a psephocracy (from psēphizein, to vote). Even today's actually existing psephocracies, which are far from (...) ideally democratic, are better suited than a lottocracy would be to meet the demands of democratic citizenship (politics must be legible to ordinary people, who must have low-cost opportunities to participate) and the demands of democratic leadership (powerful representatives should be specialized and constrained by competitions for popular support). Democrats therefore have weighty instrumental reasons to reject lottocracy and work to democratize psephocracy, instead. (shrink)

La judicialización de la política argentina abre un hiato entre el creciente activismo en materia política desarrollado por los tribunales de justicia y la tradicional legitimidad atribuida al judicial en tanto que poder conservador de la constitución. Este déficit de legitimidad del poder judicial ha intentado subsanarse mediante el recurso a instancias participativas, inspiradas en el modelo de la democracia deliberativa. Esto ha dado lugar a una serie de innovaciones institucionales en la corte suprema argentina, como la admisión de amigos (...) del tribunal y la celebración de audiencias públicas. La evaluación de estas experiencias permite, sin embargo, identificar una concepción de la participación ciudadana que apunta a la intervención de especialistas y que privilegia la intermediación de abogados y juristas. The judicialization of Argentine politics opens a gap between the activism in political matters developed by the judges and the legitimacy traditionally attributed to the judiciary, as the power in charge of the conservation of the constitution. Recent efforts to supersede this deficit in terms of legitimacy pointed to participatory processes, inspired by the model of deliberative democracy. In this sense, the Argentine supreme court has developed a series of institutional innovations, such as the admission of amici curiae and the holding of public hearings. The evaluation of these experiences allows nonetheless to identify an underlying conception of citizen participation focused on the intervention of specialists and the intermediation of lawyers and legal scholars. (shrink)

This contribution develops two objections to Hans Lindahl’s legal philosophy, as exhibited in his Authority and the Globalization of Inclusion and Exclusion. First, his conception of constituent power overstates the necessity of violence in initiating collective action. Second, his rejection of the distinction between participatory and representative democracy on the grounds that participation is representation is misleading, and compromises our ability to differentiate qualitatively among various forms of (purportedly) democratic involvement. Both problems stem from the same root. They result (...) from conflating two distinct senses of ‘representation’: acting-for-someone (or representative agency) and portraying-something-as-something (or representation-as). (shrink)

_Contemporary democracies, despite ideals of citizen participation and equal representation, operate within a complex web of power dynamics that influence political decision-making. This article explores the multifaceted nature of power in contemporary democracies, focusing on the interplay between formal institutional structures, informal networks, and social and economic inequalities. It examines how these factors shape policy agendas, influence policy choices, and ultimately determine the distribution of benefits and burdens. Drawing on diverse theoretical frameworks and empirical evidence, the article argues for (...) a nuanced understanding of power dynamics that challenges simplistic notions of centralized control and acknowledges the fluidity and agency of various actors within the political sphere. Finally, it emphasizes the need for robust democratic institutions, engaged citizenry, and critical analysis of power imbalances to ensure that political decisions reflect the diverse needs and aspirations of the whole populace._. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Reviewed by:The Anchors of Democracy: A New Division of Powers, Representation, Sense of Limits by Rocco PezzimentiAdam CarringtonPEZZIMENTI, Rocco. The Anchors of Democracy: A New Division of Powers, Representation, Sense of Limits. Herefordshire, U.K.: Gracewing, 2021. 207 pp. Paper, $22.00Rocco Pezzimenti's The Anchors of Democracy: A New Division of Powers, Representation, Sense of Limits is an ambitious book. A professor at LUMSA, Rome, he seeks to consider anew the (...) nature, structure, and purposes of democracy as well as the society in which this form of government best operates. He sees this task as needed because, he argues, contemporary democracies face new challenges that threaten their legitimacy and their capacity to fulfill their just and needed purposes. He notes that democracies are not "infallible," either morally or in their ability to maintain themselves, and thus need conscious understanding and prudent maintenance.The subtitle establishes the three main themes by which he diagnoses and addresses democracy's trials. Pezzimenti orders his argument most through the lens of limits. While present in all spheres and regimes, popular government in particular partakes of limitation, since "mutual limitation... is the basis of our democracies." Limits for Pezzimenti stem from distinct elements of a society competing for finite power ordered toward action. Many of our political and social problems, both past and present, stem from denying limitations or misordering their interactions. The presentism that tempts democracy must be tempered by the limits the past places on it. Institutions are one helpful means for this interaction, which helps guard against a "utopianism which wants to solve everything immediately, deceiving itself that it can perform miracles." Law itself involves limits, placing boundaries on the action of private persons and public entities. So does pluralism and "polyarchy," whereby we recognize the limits particular persons and communities place on politics' universalism as well as how politics restrains these other elements from descending into intolerant, selfish particularity. Important to this point is Pezzimenti's discussion of sovereignty, which must not be reduced to a mere question of who rules and where but to the question of rightly pursuing a common good respectful of individual rights. True freedom inheres in the proper cohering of these elements.Pezzimenti turns to the distribution of powers within a community as part of the discussion of limits. He argues that "the traditional tripartition, theorized by Polybius and on to Montesquieu, today appears certainly insufficient." To define all political power as legislative, executive, and judicial, then to distribute them among competing institutions, does not fully account for the contemporary political landscape. Moreover, those [End Page 361] "classic" powers themselves need to be rethought to meet today's concerns. Legislative power must account for claims that its representative systems either are oligarchic in practice or lead to crass populism, and that they fail to account for group identities as opposed to class ones. The executive must evolve in pursuit of a better "efficiency and efficacy"—including speed of response to problems—that requires a better relationship with the modern bureaucracy, which he describes as "the other face of the executive." The judicial power must focus on a renewed impartiality, especially in relation to the additional powers Pezzimenti thinks need to be named and then tamed. The new powers that he says we must recognize include the press, mass media, technology, and more. Here, Pezzimenti categorizes as powers the functions of government (making, enforcing, and adjudication of the law) alongside avenues or means for exercising political influence, if not outright control. These other forces have distorted democracy's needed limits partly because law and custom have not adequately accounted for their evolving role in power.These issues lead to the last challenge, that of representation. The problem of representation threatens democracy's legitimacy, since this form of government is grounded more than any other in the idea that "power must be the expression of the community." Yet even here the issue of limits orders the discussion. The unaccounted-for new powers described above remove too many limitations either on crass populism or encroaching rule of elites. The former can abuse individual rights, which he says "are not negotiable," based on oppressive whims... (shrink)

Representational democracy has been the main form of government in the West since the English, American, and French revolutions of the 17th and 18th centuries. However, there are indications that its ability to frame the relationship between citizen and state has begun to weaken. This weakening can be traced to many factors. One of these is the emergence of new collective actors, such as social movements, and the (re)recognition of the arena of "civil society" just as the articulating power of (...) political parties began to erode. Although these emerged initially under the umbrella of the nation state, toward the end of the 20th century a qualitatively new dynamic of networked social activism illustrated that the nation-state was no longer the only location for political action and the exercise of citizenship. These trends point to a new participatory dynamic, which could not yet be said to offer a serious challenge to representative forms of politics, but that arguably marks the beginning of the decline of that form. However, we are far from understanding how a participatory democracy might replace representational government. This article argues that we should begin now to discuss the uncomfortable gaps in our understanding of what "qualifies" participation, in order to develop a new theory of new practice and strengthen the content and potential of this new political imaginary. (shrink)

The paper is focused on the criticisms that theorists of political constitutionalism raise against legal constitutionalism, especially with regard to the idea of representation and political sovereignty. At the same time, the intention is to reconstruct the debate between legal and political constitutionalism in contemporary liberalism, starting from the so-called counter-majoritarian difficulty. This debate concerns two different approaches: the political one rejects the idea of judicial review by the Supreme Court because it may establish a possible rule of the (...) judges (Michelman; Dworkin). It defends the role of Parliament in constitutional matters, in contrast with the role of the Supreme Court, inasmuch as – according to them – it is not open to political participation. Parliament is considered the only place in which we can exercise our constitutional power and in which our rights could be adequately protected (Bellamy; Waldron; Tushnet; Goldoni). On the other hand, legal constitutionalism upholds the idea of judicial review, defending the role of the Supreme Court as “exemplar of public reason” (Rawls 1993). This article tries to answer to three fundamental questions about constitutional democracy under the banner of political liberalism: 1. What do we mean by counter-majoritarian difficulty? 2. What is the answer that legal and political model of constitutionalism give to this question? 3. What is the role of constitutional courts in democratic regimes and what is their authority within the State? (shrink)

This article seeks to contribute to the debate on how political representation can promote democracy by analysing the Chamber in the Square, which is a component of legislative theatre. A set of techniques devised to democratise representative governments, legislative theatre was created by Augusto Boal when he was elected a political representative in 1993. After briefly reviewing Nadia Urbinati’s understanding of democratic representation as a diarchy of will and judgement, I partially endorse Hélène Landemore’s criticism and contend that if representation (...) is to be democratic, citizens’ exchange of opinions in the public sphere should be invested with the power not only to judge, but also to decide political affairs. By opening up a space where the represented can judge, decide, and contest the general terms of the bills representatives present in the assembly, the Chamber in the Square harnesses political representation to democracy. (shrink)

Many commentators lament that American democracy is in crisis. It is becoming a system of minority rule, wherein a party with a minority of the nationwide vote can control the national government. Partisan gerrymandering in the House of Representatives fuels this crisis, as does the equal representation of small and large states in the Senate. But altering these features of the legislature would not end minority rule. Indeed, it has long been held that majority rule cannot be guaranteed within any (...) district system, as a minority of voters nationwide can be efficiently distributed such that a minority party wins a majority of districts by narrow margins. -/- This Article offers a way to save majority rule. Since the way a party can gain control of the legislature with a minority of the vote is to win a majority of districts by narrow margins of victory and lose a minority of districts by large margins of victory, the solution is to make margins matter. Hence, this Article proposes that we preserve electoral districts in which the candidate with the most votes wins, while making the weight of their vote in the legislature (a representative’s “legislative power”) a function of margins of victory. The first goal of this Article is to outline how this proposal, which I call “weighted voting by margin of victory” (WVMV), retains the democratic virtues of district systems while ending minority rule. This is the first basis for the democratic imperative to make margins matter. -/- There is, however, a second basis for that same imperative, which turns on the political equality of voters. The U.S. Supreme Court has long held that the democratic equality should be understood in terms of equal voting power (one person, one vote). But when margins of victory don’t matter, the power of a vote lies exclusively in its potential decisiveness. A vote that changes the margin of victory without changing the victor is “wasted”. But it is an electoral reality that votes in competitive districts are more likely to be decisive, and votes in uncompetitive districts are more likely to be wasted; as a result, candidates and parties are more responsive to some voters than others. So voters are not political equals. They do not have equal voting power, except in an empty formalistic sense. By contrast, WVMV gives votes a second type of power. The power of a vote is to potentially decide who wins and to actually change the legislative power of the victor. Each vote, in effect, transfers a unit of political power to a democratic representative. This “transference” power can be meaningfully equalized between voters. A voter in an uncompetitive district is far less likely to change who wins, but is equally able to change the margin of victory, such that their vote is no longer wasted. This gives candidates and parties a strong reason to be more equally responsive to all voters who can change the margins. Hence, there is a democratic imperative to make margins matter, in order to give voters a meaningfully equal form of voting power. -/- The final goal of this Article is to explain how we can implement WMVM in modern democracies, focusing on three particularly challenging cases: the U.S. Senate, the Parliament of the United Kingdom, and the U.S. House of Representatives. These cases are challenging for several reasons, the most pertinent of which turn on the ways we should understand margins of victory when electorates are of unequal sizes (as in the U.S. Senate) or are contested by more than two parties (as in the U.K.) or are conducted under different voting procedures (as in many districts in the U.S. House). I argue that WVMV should be considered feasible in such contexts, and hence offers a practical, rather than purely theoretical, alternative to the status quo. (shrink)

Proceduralists hold that democracy has a non-instrumental value consisting in the ideal of equality incorporated by fair procedures. Yet, proceduralism does not imply that every outcome of a democratic procedure is fair per se. In the non-ideal setting of constitutional democracies, government and legislative decisions may result from factional conflicts, or depend on majoritarian dictatorships. In these circumstances, Supreme Courts provide a guardianship against contested outcomes by enacting mechanisms of checks and balances, constitutional interpretation and judicial review. Yet, in (...) virtue of this role, Supreme Courts exercise a form of epistocratic power, which rests at odds with the ideal of political equality. We analyse this dilemma and propose a solution, arguing that Supreme Courts do not run unrestrained decisions; rather their decisional power is bound to the protective function of fundamental rights, in which their constitutional mandate ultimately consists. (shrink)

In Brennan and Democracy, a leading thinker in U.S. constitutional law offers some powerful reflections on the idea of "constitutional democracy," a concept in which many have seen the makings of paradox. Here Frank Michelman explores the apparently conflicting commitments of a democratic governmental system where key aspects of such important social issues as affirmative action, campaign finance reform, and abortion rights are settled not by a legislative vote but by the decisions of unelected judges. Can we--or should we--embrace the (...) values of democracy together with constitutionalism, judicial supervision, and the rule of law? To answer this question, Michelman calls into service the judicial career of Supreme Court Justice William Brennan, the country's model "activist" judge for the past forty years. Michelman draws on Brennan's record and writings to suggest how the Justice himself might have understood the judiciary's role in the simultaneous promotion of both democratic and constitutional government.The first chapter prompts us to reflect on how tough and delicate an act it is for the members of a society to attempt living together as a people devoted to self-government. The second chapter seeks to renew our appreciation for democratic liberal political ideals, and includes an extensive treatment of Brennan's judicial opinions, which places them in relation to opposing communitarian and libertarian positions. Michelman also draws on the views of two other prominent constitutional theorists, Robert Post and Ronald Dworkin, to build a provocative discussion of whether democracy is best conceived as a "procedural" or a "substantive" ideal. (shrink)

This article addresses two great global challenges of the 2020s. On one hand, the accelerating climate crisis and, on the other, the deepening crisis of representation within liberal democracies. As temperatures and water levels rise, rates of popular confidence in existing democratic institutions decline. So, what is to be done? This article discusses whether sortition – the ancient Greek practice of selecting individuals for political office through lottery – could serve to mitigate both crises simultaneously. Since the 2000s, sortition has (...) attracted growing interest among activists and academics. Recently it has been identified in countries like the UK and France as a mechanism for producing legitimate political answers to the climate challenge. However, few theoretical reflections on the potentials and perils of sortition-based climate governance have yet emerged. This article contributes to filling the gap. Based on a critique of the first successful case of sortition used to enhance national environmental policy – in Ireland in 2017–18 – we argue that sortition-based deliberation could indeed speed up meaningful climate action whilst improving the health of democratic systems. However, this positive outcome is not preordained. Success depends not only on green social movements getting behind climate sortition but also on developing flexible, context-specific designs that identify adequate solutions to a number of problems, including those of power ; expertise ; and participation. (shrink)

The aim of this article is to explore the effects of the Istitutional Forum, a recent governance innovation legislated in South Africa in 1997, as a mechanism that contributes toward the democratisation of university governance. Forums were established to confront the legacy of structured disadvantage and to reorient the educational experience towards greater horizontal accountability. The article provides commentary on the Forum’s impact vis-a-vis participative ethos and deliberative democracy against the backdrop of the South African government’s post-apartheid commitments. Findings reveal (...) challenges in the Forum’s make-up and implementation that are linked to its degree of influence. Ultimately, the conclusions convey perspectives on role ambiguity and conflictual power dynamics. (shrink)

The two traditional justifications for bicameralism are that a second legislative chamber serves a legislative-review function (enhancing the quality of legislation) and a balancing function (checking concentrated power and protecting minorities). I furnish here a third justification for bicameralism, with one elected chamber and the second selected by lot, as an institutional compromise between contradictory imperatives facing representative democracy: elections are a mechanism of people’s political agency and of accountability, but run counter to political equality and impartiality, and are insufficient (...) for satisfactory responsiveness; sortition is a mechanism for equality and impartiality, and of enhancing responsiveness, but not of people’s political agency or of holding representatives accountable. Whereas the two traditional justifications initially grew out of anti-egalitarian premises (about the need for elite wisdom and to protect the elite few against the many), the justification advanced here is grounded in egalitarian premises about the need to protect state institutions from capture by the powerful few and to treat all subjects as political equals. Reflecting the “political” turn in political theory, I embed this general argument within the institutional context of Canadian parliamentary federalism, arguing that Canada’s Senate ought to be reconstituted as a randomly selected citizen assembly. (shrink)

The elementary, liberal form of democracy has been criticized for being purely political, predominantly representative, centralistic, involving struggle for power among oligarchic political parties, maintaining professional politics and domination of wealthy classes. A more rational and radical form, the council democracy, is projected as a historically possible and better alternative. It extends democratic principles to economy and culture, combines direct participation with representation, replaces centralism with federalism, develops political pluralism without ruling parties, deprofessionalizes politics, and dismantles any monopoly of (...) power. In the light of existing historical experiences the structure of council-democracy is analyzed, possible solutions of crucial practical problems indicated, and different strategies of its realization are examined. (shrink)

A political challenge facing constitutional democracies in Africa is the lack of adequate representation and participation of citizens in democratic processes and institutions. This challenge is manifest in the vesting of power solely in, and the exercise of this power by, a sectional group – the majority party – to the exclusion of others; as evinced in the liberal democratic systems extensively practised on the continent. Wiredu proposes as a solution to these challenges the adoption of consensual democracy; an (...) indigenous, non-party democratic system rooted in the traditional African humanist and communitarian conceptions of the individual and the community, in which political decisions are characteristically reached by consensus. In this article, I present a critical exposition of Wiredu’s consensual democracy and defend it against liberal democracy on the one hand, and criticisms levelled against it on the other hand. I also offer some modifications to Wiredu’s theory in a bid to render it more suitable for practice in Africa. (shrink)

Traditional conceptions of informed consent seem difficult or even impossible to apply to new technologies like biobanks, big data, or GMOs, where vast numbers of people are potentially affected, and where consequences and risks are indeterminate or even unforeseeable. Likewise, the principle has come under strain with the appropriation and monetisation of personal information on digital platforms. Over time, it has largely been reduced to bare assent to formalistic legal agreements. To address the current ineffectiveness of the norm of informed (...) consent, I suggest that we need a notion of structural injustice (on a distinctive interpretation, elaborated here, which takes account of unequal power and property relations). I then argue that in order to protect and enhance people's freedom, we have to go beyond traditional applied ethics and introduce perspectives from democratic theory and social philosophy. I attempt to show how applications of the ‘all‐affected principle’, together with new forms of democratic participation, deliberation, and representation can helpfully frame the narrower principle of informed consent. There is an important role for what we could call collective consent, and informed consent can only succeed in increasing individual agency if it is situated within enhanced forms of democratic decision‐making. (shrink)

This paper aims to explore the changes that representative democracy is experiencing as a result of the transformation of communication channels. In particular, it focuses on non-electoral representation in the form of movements that emerged throughout the 2010s and that were defined by a strong social media presence (e.g. Occupy Wall Street, Black Lives Matter, #MeToo, Yellow Vests). Despite not attempting to gain political power via elections, these movements, through online and offline activities, nonetheless managed to shape the realm of (...) politics. The paper thus analyzes the movements’ inner representative dynamics and the ways they reshape representative democracy. It engages with a critical reading of Hanna Pitkin’s concept of symbolic representation and draws on Michael Saward’s framework of the representative claim to reevaluate Bernard Manin’s notion of “audience” democracy as today’s form of representative government. The argument is that, as digital development provides citizens with less demanding modes of political participation and platforms of representative claim-making, it enhances the sphere of opinion formation and the role of non-electoral representation. This sphere entails a tendency towards a re-depersonalization of politics, thus leading towards the transformation of “audience” democracy. (shrink)

First published in 1987. The legal and political writings of the German Social Democrats Kirchheimer and Neumann, from the period prior to the National Socialist seizure of power, are little known to English readers. This volume presents a selection of important essays from this period, which focus on the prospects for the constitutional realization of a social democratic order in the first German Republic - the Weimar Republic, created out of the collapse of the monarchy in 1918, and destroyed by (...) the National Socialists in 1933. Both Kirchheimer and Neumann were active as lawyers in the later 1920s and early 1930s, the latter especially having a close connection with trade union legislation and labour law. From their viewpoint as Social Democrats and lawyers they present incisive analyses of the problems confronted by the attempt to realize the ideal of a social Rechtsstaat in a political environment increasingly dominated by forces on left and right which saw constitutional order only as a means to seize power, and not as a legitimate form of order in itself. In these circumstances, political issues translated into constitutional issues, and thus could be analysed in terms of the aims and objectives of a given constitutional order. A substantial introduction by the volume's editor, Keith Tribe, presents the political and theoretical background to these essays, which range over questions of industrial democracy, political representation, parliamentary rule and the role of judicial review. These issues are once more on the political agenda of Western industrial democracies, and the analyses of Kirchheimer and Neumann have lost none of their force and relevance, despite the catastrophic 'failure' of Weimar democracy in 1933. (shrink)

Dialogues on Democracy offers a panoramic overview of recent and classical debates on the meaning of democracy as a philosophical ideal. It features some of the most central discussions that exist in the literature regarding its value, its purpose, and its (possible) flaws. Accessibly written and efficiently organized, the book is structured around a fictional conversation involving four participants: a teacher of philosophy and political theory and three of her most notable and dedicated students. Their dialogues capture the essence of (...) some of the most powerful objections and counter objections to democracy and its institutions, allowing the reader to understand the origins and logic of much philosophical thinking concerned with political life. Maskivker provides succinct but highly informative arguments in defense of democracy while deftly addressing serious questions regarding its legitimacy coming from diverse corners of the ideological spectrum. The discussion addresses issues concerned with the justification and institutional plausibility of collective government, citizen equality, political representation, citizen action, civic virtue, and many other themes. Perfectly suited for a first introduction to the philosophical analysis of democracy, the book covers extensive ground in an instructive and dynamic way. In the book, Maskivker also offers her own novel insights regarding the value of democracy and its distinct interpretations-- a contribution that makes the book all the more interesting and complete. (shrink)

The neutrality of the art and architecture of courtrooms and courthouses has dominated the public perception in the Indian context. The courtroom design and the visual artistic elements present within these judicial places have very often been considered to be insignificant to the notions of law and justice that they reflect. As art and architecture present certain historical narratives, reflect political allegories and have significant impact on the perceptions of their viewers, they have critical socio-political ramifications. This makes it pertinent (...) to explore them and investigate the paradox of their deployment and interpretation in today’s increasingly mediatized world. Through an ethnographic study of the Supreme Court of India, this paper interprets its art and architecture, and, the symbolism and semiotics reflected through them. Arguing against their neutrality and insignificance, the paper demonstrates how they reflect nationalism, certain ideologies and power-space dynamics. It further argues that they act as evidence of political metaphors related to justice, power and democracy. With a conversation between law, architecture and semiotics, the paper investigates the historical and spatial dimensions of its architecture and artistic elements. Mapping the Court’s architectural elements, I examine how the visual representation of ‘justice as virtue’ finds translation in its design through transfer of certain images, including the image of the ‘scales of justice’, into it, while absenting the notion of ‘justice as struggle’—to contemplate on how legal architecture gives evidence to the vexed relationship between law and justice and also of the break from the colonial past. (shrink)

El término demokratia, que fue acuñado en el siglo V a.C. significa, literalmente, “gobierno del pueblo”, esto es, un orden social en el que el poder o la autoridad son ejercidos por el pueblo. Sin embargo, es obvio que la significación de la democracia no es, desde hace siglos, la misma que le fue otorgada en la antigua Grecia, pues no connota la misma realidad política de aquél tiempo. Las transformaciones experimentadas por la realidad de la democracia y su significación (...) han dado lugar a un extenso debate que ha puesto de relieve la tensión entre lo ontológico y lo fenomenológico, lo prescriptivo y lo descriptivo, el deber ser y el ser. Es el reconocimiento de esa tensión lo que permite comprender que la democracia constituye una realidad en permanente construcción, una realidad inacabada y contingente, siempre expuesta a peligros y amenazas. Este artículo se concentra en el examen de tres desafíos a los que se enfrentan las democracias en el siglo XXI: a) la necesidad de una mejor comprensión de los valores y prácticas de la democracia; b) el necesario balance entre legitimidad y eficacia, y; c) la adecuada integración de instituciones de representación y participación, para lo cual es crucial la “ciudadanía”. Palabras clave : democracias; siglo XXI; teorías de la democracia; legitimidad; eficacia; representación; participación; ciudadanía; Europa; América Latina; Venezuela. Three challenges for XXI century’s democraciesThe term demokratia, which was coined in the V century B.C., literally means “government of the people”, that is, a social order within which power or authority is exercised by the people. However, it is obvious that the significance of democracy is not, from some centuries ago up to now, the same that was given to the term in old Greece, for it does not denote the same political reality of that time. The transformations experienced by the reality of democracy and its significance have given rise to an extensive debate, which has brought out the tension between the ontological and the phenomenological, the prescriptive and the descriptive. Acknowledging this tension is what makes it possible to understand that democracy constitutes a reality under permanent construction, a contingent and unfinished reality, always exposed to dangers and threats. This paper focuses on the examination of three challenges that democracies in the XXI century face: a) the need of a better understanding of the values and practices of democracy; b) the necessary balance between legitimacy and democracy, and c) the adequate integration of both representation and participation institutions, for which citizenship is crucial. Key words : Democracies; XXI Century; Democratic Theories; Legitimacy; Effectiveness; Representation; Participation; Citizenship; Europe; Latin America; Venezuela. (shrink)

One under-theorized aspect of "multiculturalism and the antidiscrimination principle" is religious and ethnicity based political parties. With political organization, the fact of pluralism is made concrete for democratic purposes. When the struggle for empowerment is "waged within the world of democratic politics" it is waged through parties. That is the associational form modern democracies have settled on for participation, representation, and governing, and for countervailing power and regular opposition. Particularist parties and bloc voting are key instruments of political conflict (...) and, as important, of political integration. This Paper looks at the challenges these parties pose to democracy; specifically, at the principal reasons given for banning parties from participation in electoral politics. I identify four categories of justification for disqualification: violent overthrow, incitement to hate, altering the character of the nation, and outside support or control. This is a preliminary to setting out regulative principles of "defensive democracy.". (shrink)

In this article, I engage with what relevant literature addresses as the ‘paradox of democracy’ and trace it back to the dialectic between authorization and representation established by social contract theories. To make my argument, I take Rousseau’s Social Contract as a paradigmatic example of the paradox and analyse it in light of Hegel’s critical response. My aim is to show that, although Rousseau rejects the idea of representing the popular will, representation resurfaces in his Republic from top to bottom (...) and engenders a structural opposition between citizens and rulers: drawing on the Hegelian scrutiny of contractarianism, I focus on three key moments in Rousseau’s theory, namely the Lawgiver, the majority rule and the executive power. After illustrating how the social contract undermines democratic participation in deliberative processes, I suggest that Hegel’s philosophy of right overcomes the paradox by positively assuming it as a dialectical contradiction that requires a specific constitutional approach to democracy. In this sense, I argue, the Hegelian perspective on democratic deliberation helps us to better frame Rousseau’s ambition to conceive the Republic as a free community of equals and urges us to elaborate a more coherent understanding of participation in a pluralistic society. (shrink)

Around the world, many liberal democracies are facing in recent years serious challenges and threats emanating inter alia from the rise of political populism. Such challenges and threats are feeding an almost existential discourse about the crisis of democracy, and recent legal and political developments in Israel aimed at weakening the power of the Supreme Court and other rule of law institutions have also been described in such terms. This Article primarily intends to explore the relevance of the discourse (...) surrounding the decline of liberal democracy, and its possible relevance for Israeli democracy, by examining the principal similarities and differences between specific legislative and administrative measures recently taken or contemplated in Israel and in two Central European states: Poland and Hungary. We focus on three sets of illiberal measures adopted or contemplated in Hungary, Poland, and Israel: (i) measures directed at limiting the power of the judiciary; (ii) measures intended to restrict the operation of civil society organizations; and (iii) measures directed at curbing dissent to governmental policies and at influencing the discourse in the media and academia. Although Israeli democratic institutions still retain much of their independence and vitality, we nonetheless find some degree of similarity between measures taken or contemplated by Hungary, Poland, and Israel, despite the many differences between their legal systems, historical contexts, political cultures, and the distinct stages of backsliding they seem to experience. (shrink)

This paper addresses the problem of the strategies and theories of democratic participation in Nigeria that breed institutional marginality and bad governance due to shortfalls in pursuing the values of justice and empowerment as core democratic characteristics. The same democratic principles such as voting, parliament, constitution, judiciary, that are suggestive of gains such as responsible use, and peaceful transfer of power may not have translated fully into sociopolitical empowerment for responsibility and representation in evolving democratic practice in Nigeria due (...) to problems of agency and political ideology. Democratic theorizing and participation in Nigeria has defied orthodox presuppositions seen in the disrespect for basic rights and the disregard for the rule of law in democracy that allow for fair play within and among the elites and political grassroots. Thus this study investigates the Nigerian predicament as a model or case study, raising questions about the reasons for the systematic disempowerment of groups. (shrink)

Many scholars believe that it is procedurally undemocratic for the judiciary to have an active role in shaping the law. These scholars believe either that such practices as judicial review and creative statutory interpretation are unjustified, or that they are justified only because they improve the law substantively. This Article argues instead that the judiciary can play an important procedurally democratic role in the development of the law. Majority rule by legislatures is not the only defining feature of democracy; rather, (...) a government is democratic to the extent to which it provides egalitarian forms of political participation. One such form of participation can be the opportunity to influence the law through the courts, either directly by participating in a case or indirectly by advocating litigation. Arguing from several examples, this Article shows that judicial decision-making allows different voices to be heard that may not necessarily have influence or power in majoritarian legislative structures or popular initiatives. Giving citizens the opportunity to change, to preserve, and to obtain authoritative clarification of the law through the courts can thus make a government procedurally more democratic. (shrink)

This chapter criticizes several methods of responding to the techniques foreign powers are widely acknowledged to be using to subvert U.S. elections. It suggests that countries do this when they have a legitimate stake in each other’s political deliberations, but no formal voice in them. It also suggests that if they accord each other such a voice, they will engage as co-deliberators with arguments, rather than trying to undermine each other’s deliberative processes; and that this will be salutary for all (...) parties. It moots several methods for giving nations such a voice, ranging from inviting representatives of foreign powers to participate in debates in each other’s high-level elections, to having representatives of all nations vote in each other’s key elections or legislative bodies, or in international bodies constituted in recognition of the need for binding global deliberation about shared issues. (shrink)

The ascendency of executive power in the presence of weak parliamentary and societal control has given rise to a need for deliberative forms of diplomacy in international relations. As Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Norway, and Sweden regularly include members of parliament, party representatives, and representatives of civil society in their delegations to the General Assembly of the United Nations, does this imply that a Nordic model exists? This book reviews the practice of these countries and finds that the role of societal (...) representatives has diminished from participating members of delegations to mere observers. The Nordic examples illuminate the difficulties of achieving international governance through the practice of deliberative democracy. Table of Contents List of figures, images, and tables List of abbreviations Preface 1. Introduction The problem Why do the General Assembly and Norden matter? Theory and methodology Prior research 2. Challenges and traditions Delegation and representation at the United Nations Democracy and dilemmas at the UN General Assembly Nordic diplomacy at the League of Nations Unisex state actors and the representation of women 3. Parliament and UN delegations The Scandinavian model: Denmark An anachronism and parliamentarian stronghold: Norway Routine, squeeze-out, routine: Sweden Between Lilliputian and full-scale representation: Iceland Metamorphosis or parliament lost: The Finnish Sonderweg 4. The participation of civil society Scandinavian model revisited: Denmark The return of the body-snatched: Norway Corporatism and double universalism: Sweden Short stories: Finland and Iceland 5. Conclusions: On the way to deliberative diplomacy Archives Bibliography Author Index About the Author(s)/Editor(s) Norbert Gotz, Dr. phil. (2001) in Political Science, Humboldt University Berlin, Docent (2007) in Political History, University of Helsinki, habil. (2009) in Modern History and International Relations, University of Greifswald, is Professor at the Institute of Contemporary History, Sodertorn University, Sweden. His publications include the edited volume Regional Cooperation and International Organizations: The Nordic Model in Transnational Alignment (Routledge 2009). (shrink)

The “folk” theory of democracy that typically justifies the administrative state cannot help but lead to a discourse of constraint. If agency action is only legitimate when it mechanically applies the will of the voters as transposed by Congress through statutes, then the norms guiding that action will inevitably restrain agency discretion. As a result, attempts to establish the democratic credentials of the administrative state ironically obstruct the application of collective power. But this “folk” theory of democracy is bad theory. (...) It is empirically incredible and, alarmingly, facilitates dangerous populist politics. Political theory instead suggests that a theory of democratic representation not only better explains legislative outcomes, but also deprives demagogues and deregulatory partisans of the fictions that prop up their agendas. After a brief survey of representative theory, this article will demonstrate that a model of trustee representation adequately describes administration, reinforces its democratic credentials and constitutes a space for politics in shaping the regulations that govern us all. (shrink)

In recent years, children and young people (CYP) have been increasingly included in patient and public involvement (PPI) in health research and innovation. Such initiatives intend to give a voice to CYP in such matters. Given that it is debated whether PPI in health care fosters the values of participation, public discussion and decision making put forward by deliberative democracy, this article examines three sets of challenges concerning the involvement of CYP by focusing on age biases. After describing some (...) existing initiatives, the paper critically examines why CYP are involved, how the CYP group is constituted and then investigates the moral status of CYP in biomedical settings. It shows that the rationale for involving CYP in PPI is mainly top-down and adult-centric, thereby questioning the authentic participation in decision making. It also suggests that to ensure democratic inclusion, the CYP group should be constituted by considering both age and politics. Lastly, the article indicates that, despite the increasing recognition of child-specific rights, the sociocultural norms and power dynamics in pediatrics undermine their moral status and challenge political equality. These three sets of considerations offer a preliminary theoretical contribution toward improving democratic legitimacy and representation of CYP in health research and innovation. (shrink)

My text offers an attempt to justify theoretically the existence of an important pillar of contemporary constitutional democracy: judicial review. Why do Supreme and Constitutional Courts that are not electorally accountable organs have the power to modify and occasionally cancel from the books statutory legislation passed by elected and accountable representatives? The argument presented discusses and questions the standard doctrine of the separation of powers and is based on the foundations of modern political authority as the agency the function (...) of which is to protect and guarantee citizens’ rights. (shrink)

The purpose of this article is to analyse world-view and mythological expressions in Russian and Soviet Constitutional acts that implicitly or explicitly refer to any kind of idea legitimising the shape of the state, its political system or the nature of political power. The object of the argument will be exclusively such provisions of fundamental laws which: having neither a purely regulatory nor a purely programmatic character, model mental representations of the world of the legal text by reference to ‘situationally (...) transcendent’ ideas in Mannheim’s sense ; justify the content of the legal provision by means of such imagery, without being part of the preamble or any different integral part of the Constitution, characterised by a different ontology of the text; justify the content of provisions linked to political power and/or the nature of the state. The materials of the analysis are: Fundamental Laws of the Russian Empire of 1906, the Constitutional texts of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics of 1924, 1936 and 1977, and the current Constitution of the Russian Federation. Consecutive Constitutions of the Russian Soviet Federative Socialist Republic are also referred to. The analysed formulations, legally irrelevant in a conventional reading of a legal text, participate in the semiosis of both the provisions that contain them and the entire texts of the fundamental laws. In this way, the Constitutions incorporate into their complex of meanings either religious expressions, mythologised ideological figures or figures of historical memory associated with collective identity. (shrink)

The object of this thesis is the examination of the concept of political representation in the corpus of Hobbes, Locke, Hegel and Marx. Through the method of textualreconstruction I foreground the concept’s salience in their writings. Political representation constitutes a unitary political society as the basis of representative government by entrusting to a separate part of the political community the exercise of the legislative and executive functions on behalf of the political society. Hobbes’s author-actor model grounded the concept of political (...) representation by introducing the act of the transfer of will to a representative by authorisation. Thereby he established the problematic relationship of permanently alienated, absolute, representative power acting in the name of the political community. Locke conceptualised political representation in a way that restored to political society the power to determine the legitimacy of its representative government in case the latter transgressed the norm of acting for the public good of society. Hegel, in turn, assigned to political representation the crucial function of integrating civil society into the power system of the state thus securing the identity of subjective and objective freedom in the rational state, though political representation bestows only formal freedom to civil society’s involvement in the affairs of the state. For Marx, the relationship of political representation makes the representative polity appear as a democratically governed political society within which individual freedom and the public good are secured. This is vitiated by the rift between political society/state and civil society. Marx censures liberal and republican theory for ignoring the primacy of civil/bourgeois society over the representative political society. As a consequence,he argues,the representative polity is not a form of self-government but other-determined and neither freedom nor the public good are realised. Instead, under the regime of private property, money assumes the authorial function of organising social exchange and human relations, shaping the representative polity after its own image, and thus it renders democracy as popular sovereignty a lie. (shrink)

In this book Macdonald elaborates a democratic framework based on the new theoretical concepts of 'public power', 'stakeholder communities' and 'non-electoral representation', and illustrates the practical implications of these proposals for projects of global institutional reform.

In a wide-ranging, provocative anatomy of modern society and its origins, novelist and historian John Ralston Saul explores the reason for our deepening sense of crisis and confusion. Throughout the Western world we talk endlessly of individual freedom, yet Saul shows that there has never before been such pressure for conformity. Our business leaders describe themselves as capitalists, yet most are corporate employees and financial speculators. We are obsessed with competition, yet the single largest item of international trade is a (...) subsidized market in armaments. We call our governments democracies, yet few of us participate in politics. We complain about "invasive government," yet our legal, educational, financial, social, cultural and legislative systems are breaking down. While most observers view these problems separately, Saul demonstrates that they are largely manifestations of our blind faith in the value of reason. Over the last 400 years, our "rational elites" have gradually instituted reforms in every phase of social life. But Saul shows that they have also been responsible for most of the difficulties and violence of the same period. This paradox arises from a simple truth which our elites deny: far from being a moral force, reason is no more than an administrative method. Their denial has helped to turn the modern West into a vast, incomprehensible, directionless machine, run by process-minded experts - "Voltaire's bastards"--Whose cult of scientific management is bereft of both sense and morality. Whether in politics, art, business, the military, entertainment, science, finance, academia or journalism, these experts share the same outlook and methods. The result, Saul maintains, is a civilization of immense technological power whose peoples increasingly dwell in a world of illusion. Already known to millions of readers as the author of novels which portray the overwhelming effects of this power on the modern individual by weaving together international finance, the oil and arms business, guerrilla warfare, drug traffic, and the world of art, here Saul lays aside the mask of fiction to speak in his own voice. Only by withdrawing from our addiction to "solutions," he argues, reclaiming the citizens' right to question and participate in public life, and recovering a common sense capacity for intelligent panic, can we find a way out of our permanent crisis. (shrink)

Regarding the selection of the legislative representatives, the elective system is the system that most democratic organizations have adopted. It has become so present nowadays that we take for granted the identification between elective system and representative democracy. But is this identification a correct one? I argue that it is not, since the meaning of 'representative democracy' has no reference to specific mode of selection of the representatives. And, since democracy and other methods of selection are compatible, it should adopted (...) the best one. The criteria of competence for the exercise of the political power ought to be the adopted method of selection, for it is the best one. I too argue that, in the context of division of labor into public and private labor, this is precisely what public representation aims: to leave to the experts the exercise of public labor. (shrink)

Research on women's political representation in postsocialist Europe has highlighted the role of cultural and political factors in obstructing women's access to legislative power, such as the prevalence of traditional gender stereotypes, electoral systems, and the absence of a feminist movement. Yet, the role of women political elites in enhancing or hindering women's access to political power in the region has so far remained uncharted. This article seeks to fill some of the existing gaps in this literature by examining the (...) views of women politicians with regard to women's political underrepresentation and their assessments of strategies for redressing this imbalance. Findings from the analysis reveal that although women politicians recognize gender inequalities in representation as a problem requiring intervention, how the problem is perceived, and the preferred measures to deal with it, is largely shaped by the social and cultural context in which these actors are embedded. (shrink)

Robert Alexy has argued that the democratic objection to judicial review of legislation can be successfully addressed by assuming that judges exercise a special form of argumentative representation. In this article we argue that Alexy does not explain (as he should) under what circumstances judicial review tends to produce better decisions than parliamentary procedure, nor does he explain how judicial review can have a greater intrinsic value than parliamentary procedure. Subsequently, we argue that the intrinsic value of argumentative representation depends (...) on the promotion of citizen deliberation, whereas its instrumental value depends on judges being committed to the rights of discrete and insular minorities in the face of hostile majorities. (shrink)

After centuries of oblivion, the idea of using civic lotteries to select citizens to participate in major decision-making bodies has started gaining popularity among certain democratic theorists. Undoubtedly, this is an idea worth exploring, given the constantly rising dissatisfaction with the operation of major representative institutions. One should not, however, infer from this fact that any proposed sortition-based institutional arrangement is compatible with basic democratic principles. This article critically examines two such proposals: (a) that we should establish fully powered legislative (...) bodies consisting entirely of allotted citizens and (b) López-Guerra’s enfranchisement lottery, the gist of which is that voting rights should be granted only to a very small random sample of current electors, who will be subjected to a “competence-building process.” The article argues that both proposals run counter to the idea of rule by the people conceived as equally valuable and fully participating memb ers of a self-governing political entity. (shrink)

Participation of older people in designing and improving the care and services provided in residential care settings is limited. Traditional forms of democratic representation, such as client councils, and consumer models are management-driven. An alternative way of involving older people in the decisions over their lives, grounded in notions of care ethics and deliberative democracy, was explored by action research. In line with this tradition older people engage in collective action to enhance the control over their lives and those (...) of others. In this article the theoretical background of altruistic action is presented and illustrated by a case example of a group of older women who changed the food policies within their residential home. Altruistic action is the joint and coordinated action by a group of clients based on their agenda. Such action is given in by a shared dissatisfaction and search for connections. Altruistic action may enhance the sense of self, belonging and ownership, and create a transformative movement enhancing the wellbeing and community life in residential settings. (shrink)

Democracies that appoint legislators through elections in territorially defined, sub-national constituencies and simultaneously enfranchise expatriate citizens must either assign expatriate voters to in-country constituencies (assimilated representation) or group them into distinct overseas constituencies that elect their own legislators (discrete representation). This essay critically reviews extant normative discussions of the two models and develops a normative analysis of its own. This suggests that when expatriates form but a small part of a democracy’s overall demos, discrete representation is the more attractive model (...) of expatriate representation as it overall better satisfies four important standards of evaluation, namely: equal opportunities for political influence, deliberation within the legislature, deliberation among constituents, and partisan voter mobilisation. This argument is also defended against the potential objections that the said standards can be satisfied by other means than discrete expatriate representation and that the defence of discrete expatriate representation implies a proliferation of special constituencies. (shrink)

Rousseau has always had an uncertain relationship with the theory of constituent power. On the one hand, his distrust of political representation and support for popular sovereignty seem consistent with the idea of the people as a legally unlimited constitution-maker. On the other hand, if, from those views about representation and sovereignty, it follows that Rousseau is a proponent of direct democracy, then there seems to be no place in his thought for a theory that presupposes, above all, a separation (...) between those who exercise a delegated authority and those who possess an original constitution-making power. In a legal order in which all laws must be directly made by the people, such a separation is absent: the constituent and the legislative body are one and the same. It is therefore not surprising that Rousseau’s name is largely absent from contemporary literature on constituent power. In this article, however, I will show that once Rousseau’s particular conception of law, as well as his distinction between sovereignty and government, are properly understood, one finds in his work not only the first major formulation of the theory of constituent power, but also a careful exploration of its implications for actual constitutional practice. (shrink)

ABSTRACTIn this article, I argue that resistance and radical democracy can be used to the good of representative democracy. I submit that resistance is about the popular power – the freedom as power – to create better institutions. I argue that the conflict and resistance that is at the core of radical democracy enables freedom and democracy and resists domination best if it is institutionalized. This counterintuitive claim is substantiated by an argument for freedom as power through representation and how (...) the power to resist is linked to at least four domains of freedom. This builds on the work of Machiavelli, Marx and Foucault, amongst others, and insights drawn from resistance struggles across the globe. I end by proposing institutional changes to representative democracy that, I suggest, would allow us to conceive of democracy as both a form of government and a constantly destabilizing transgressive practice. (shrink)

When the Supreme Court in 2003 struck down a Texas law prohibiting homosexual sodomy, it cited the right to privacy based on the guarantee of "substantive due process" embodied by the Constitution. But did the court act undemocratically by overriding the rights of the majority of voters in Texas? Scholars often point to such cases as exposing a fundamental tension between the democratic principle of majority rule and the liberal concern to protect individual rights. Democratic Rights challenges this view (...) by showing that, in fact, democracy demands many of these rights. Corey Brettschneider argues that ideal democracy is comprised of three core values--political autonomy, equality of interests, and reciprocity--with both procedural and substantive implications. These values entitle citizens not only to procedural rights of participation but also to substantive rights that a "pure procedural" democracy might not protect. What are often seen as distinctly liberal substantive rights to privacy, property, and welfare can, then, be understood within what Brettschneider terms a "value theory of democracy." Drawing on the work of John Rawls and deliberative democrats such as Jürgen Habermas, he demonstrates that such rights are essential components of--rather than constraints on--an ideal democracy. Thus, while defenders of the democratic ideal rightly seek the power of all to participate, they should also demand the rights that are the substance of self-government. (shrink)

Landmark Supreme Court rulings determine American law by adjudicating among competing reasonable interpretations of basic political rights. Jeremy Waldron argues that this practice is democratically illegitimate because what determines the content of basic rights is a bare majority vote of an unelected, democratically unaccountable, elitist body of nine judges. I argue that Waldron's democratic critique of judicial review has implications for real-world reform, but not the implications he thinks it has. He argues that systems of legislative supremacy over the (...) judiciary are democratically preferable to the American one. I provide reasons why his argument is unsound and explain that, properly construed, Waldron's premises support implementing a system where ordinary citizens chosen by lottery participate in a deliberative mini-public to vote on which reasonable interpretation of a basic political right will become the law of the land. (shrink)

‘Framing the Refugee’ looks at the power of representation of liberal political theory with regard to refugees. In the author’s view, legal and political arbitrariness lies in the representing of refugees as lacking agency. His key point is that liberalism fails to conceive of refugees as politically capable actors, and he is thus complicit in the arbitrary neutralisation of their emancipatory potential and participatory powers. This paper emphasises the moral justifiability of that state of affairs by seeking some answers to (...) the question of why liberal political theory construes a concept of the refugee that does not contain any element of political agency. Most obviously, the author acknowledges that refugees perform a significant social role in contemporary societies and are hence active members in them. Nonetheless, they remain neglected in their political role by most political theory. What does it mean to have political agency for the author? It means to have the power of self-representation, that is, of being allowed and even enabled by a given legal system to bring about change in the political order, or at least to participate in that change. But the author also calls attention to the role of ‘theory’ in addressing this downside of the contemporary liberal democratic order. Theory becomes even more crucial at times of urgency, that is, when theorists have a moral responsibility to deepen their philosophical imagination, as Hannah Arendt so forcefully noted. The theoretical task of ‘re-framing’ the refugee entails reconfiguring political philosophy and its traditional categories of sovereignty, citizenship and nationality. The liberal inability to accommodate the political agency of many members of the political community – especially of non-nationals – is a sign of the historical contingency of the current rules of political membership. This inability makes evident the imperative of rethinking politics in ways that avoid the arbitrariness of treatment and aim instead at equality and justice. If political leaders can re-write the rules of membership to suit their own ideological agendas, the same demand should be addressed by – indeed demanded from – political and legal theorists. However, this is not as easy as it seems, according to the author. In his view, political theory is confronted with fundamental challenges, the most obvious one being that ‘theory’ is usually unequipped to defeat its own ‘topology’. Note that in saying this the author is raising a more pressing concern about arbitrary law-making: it may be that arbitrariness – especially the arbitrary treatment of aliens by the sovereign state and by liberal democracies in particular – is inscribed in the very DNA of liberalism. No matter how odd this may seem, the author advances the view that ideas, however creative of a new order, or transformative of a given status quo, never appear in "free form", and are instead deeply rooted in a structure that constrains our imagination. The challenge is thus to develop a meta-theory that reconceptualises the very way liberal political theory frames marginalised sectors of society – such as the "poor" – as a product of an international economic order that robs those sectors of their agency as the very condition of its internal functioning. We must therefore question how the very idea of the refugee is produced, because it symbolises the construction of an inside and an outside that is complicit with the arbitrary play of legal statuses involved in migration policy. The author’s main point regarding this is that certain groups are sidelined by economic, political and social systems because they are already excluded from theoretical systems to start with. Keywords: refugees, agency, political theory, migration. (shrink)