Pourquoi prend-on plaisir à dessiner et à regarder des images? A écouter de la musique, à en faire, à lire et à écrire, à aller au spectacle? Pour le comprendre, cette investigation nous entraîne vers des territoires inattendus, là où surgissent les idées et se manifeste la création. On y découvre que la joie singulière procurée par l'appréciation, ou la création d'une oeuvre, correspond à une sorte d'état second, un mode de vigilance aussi indispensable au bon fonctionnement de notre monde (...) mental que le sont le sommeil et les rêves. Une hypothèse novatrice qui explique la présence de l'activité esthétique dans toutes les sociétés humaines et nous offre la possibilité de repenser radicalement notre rapport à l'art, la beauté, l'artiste et la création. -- payot. (shrink)

ABSTRACT:In a series of reports the United Nations Special Representative on the issue of Human Rights and Transnational Corporations has emphasized a tripartite framework regarding business and human rights that includes the state “duty to protect,” the TNC “responsibility to respect,” and “appropriate remedies” for human rights violations. This article examines the recent history of UN initiatives regarding business and human rights and places the tripartite framework in historical context. Three approaches to human rights are distinguished: moral, political, and legal. (...) It is argued that the tripartite framework’s grounding of the responsibility of TNCs to respect human rights is properly understood as moral and not merely as a political or legal duty. A moral account of the duty of TNCs to respect basic human rights is defended and contrasted with a merely strategic approach. The main conclusion of the article is that only a moral account of the basic human rights duties of TNCs provides a sufficiently deep justification of “the corporate responsibility to respect human rights” feature of the tripartite framework. (shrink)

Is an appropriate causal connection to the past experience it represents a necessary condition for a mental state to qualify as an episodic memory? For some years this issue has been the subject of an intense debate between the causalist theory of episodic memory (CTM) and the simulationist theory of episodic memory (STM). This paper aims at exploring the prospects for an embodied approach to episodic memory and assessing the potential case for causalism that could be founded on it. In (...) a critical section, it argues that the empirical data to which STM appeals are both incomplete and inconclusive, and on closer examination even provide support for a proceduralist version of CTM. In a constructive section, it elaborates on the notion of a necessary causal connection in terms of particular procedural patterns acquired at encoding and operative at retrieval, grounding this move on recent empirical data about eye movements in mnemonic mental imagery. (shrink)

This article applies the Kantian doctrine of respect for persons to the problem of sweatshops. We argue that multinational enterprises are properly regarded as responsible for the practices of their subcontractors and suppliers. We then argue that multinationalenterprises have the following duties in their off-shore manufacturing facilities: to ensure that local labor laws are followed; to refrain from coercion; to meet minimum safety standards; and to provide a living wage for employees. Finally, we consider and reply to the objection that (...) improving health and safety conditions and providing a living wage will cause greater harm than good. (shrink)

There are two general approaches to characterising biological functions. One originates with Cummins. According to this approach, the function of a part of a system is just its causal contribution to some specified activity of the system. Call this the ‘C-function’ concept. The other approach ties the function of a trait to some aspect of its evolutionary significance. Call this the ‘E-function’ concept. According to the latter view, a trait's function is determined by the forces of natural selection. The C-function (...) and E-function concepts are clearly quite different, but there is an important relation between them which heretofore has gone unnoticed. The purpose of this paper is to outline that relation.This is not the first paper to discuss the relation of C-function and E-function. Previous attempts all follow either one of two strategies. The first proposes that the two concepts are ‘unified.’ The other proposes that they are radically distinct and apply to wholly different fields within biology. (shrink)

In recent years, there has been an increasing interest among philosophers of memory in the questions of how to characterize and to account for the temporal phenomenology of episodic memory. One prominent suggestion has been that episodic memory involves a feeling of pastness, the elaboration of which has given rise to two main approaches. On the intentionalist approach, the feeling of pastness is explained in terms of what episodic memory represents. In particular, Fernández has argued that it can be explained (...) in terms of memory representing itself as being caused by a past perceptual experience. On the metacognitive approach, which we have recently developed in, the feeling of pastness results from the monitoring and interpretation of the processing features of episodic remembering. In this paper, we show that the metacognitive approach should be preferred over the intentionalist approach. We argue that intentionalism, and Fernández’ causal self-referential view in particular, ultimately fail as accounts of the feeling of pastness. The difficulties faced by intentionalism allows us to single out three constraints that any satisfactory account of the temporal phenomenology of episodic remembering needs to meet. We conclude by arguing that the metacognitive view satisfies those constraints in a neat way, and as such, that it should be preferred over intentionalism. (shrink)

Skilled action typically requires that individuals guide their activities toward some goal. In skilled action, individuals do so excellently. We do not understand well what this capacity to guide consists in. In this paper I provide a case study of how individuals shift visual attention. Their capacity to guide visual attention toward some goal (partly) consists in an empirically discovered sub-system – the executive system. I argue that we can explain how individuals guide by appealing to the operation of this (...) sub-system. Understanding skill and skilled action thus requires appreciating the role of the executive system. (shrink)

We review recent developments in ethical pluralism, ethical particularism, Kantian intuitionism, rights theory, and climate change ethics, and show the relevance of these developments in ethical theory to contemporary business ethics. This paper explains why pluralists think that ethical decisions should be guided by multiple standards and why particularists emphasize the crucial role of context in determining sound moral judgments. We explain why Kantian intuitionism emphasizes the discerning power of intuitive reason and seek to integrate that with the comprehensiveness of (...) Kant’s moral framework. And we show how human rights can be grounded in human agency, and explain the connections between human rights and climate change. (shrink)

This paper tackles the issue of the diversity of déjà experiences. According to the standard view in the neuropsychological literature, they should all be defined by means of a psychological criterion, by which they are experiences triggered by a perceived item and consist of a conscious clash between a first-order feeling of familiarity about the item and a second-order evaluation that assesses the first-order feeling as erroneous. This paper dismisses the standard view and contends there are two types of déjà (...) experiences, labeled déjà vu and déjà vécu respectively. But it also takes issue with the rare proponents of a distinct déjà vécu type. Contrary to their achievement view, it argues that recollection is not involved in déjà vécu experiences as an actual mental state or a component thereof. In our ability view, déjà vécu involves the feeling that one could recollect past occurrences of a currently lived episode of experience. (shrink)

Annotation. Against the background of Aristotle's Nicomachean Ethics. Bradley provides a detailed differentiation between Aristotle's and Aquinas's view on moral principles and the end of man.

In this dissertation I develop a general theory of coercion that allows one to distinguish cases of interpersonal coercion from cases of persuasion or manipulation, and cases of institutional coercion from cases of oppression. The general theory of coercion that I develop includes as one component a theory of second-order coercion. Second-order coercion takes place whenever one person intentionally impairs the formation of the second-order desires of another person, or constrains them after their formation, in a way that frustrates or (...) eliminates the possibility of the victim fulfilling certain of his or her first-order desires. The concept of second-order coercion is important because it suggests that a person's autonomy may be violated in ways that have not been previously recognized. In this dissertation I argue that the unique feature of all cases of coercion is that the alternatives available to the victim, with regard to the formation of his or her will, are intentionally constrained by another person in a way that violates the victim's autonomy. A general theory of coercion should be able to explain how institutions may be understood as coercive. I argue that if institutions are understood as social practices maintained for the purpose of achieving some end, then they may be properly understood as capable of coercion. ;This theory of coercion allows me to make two arguments concerning moral responsibility. First, I argue that current discussions of moral responsibility are inadequate because they fail to take seriously the claim that a person may be responsible, at least in part, for having the beliefs and desires that make a particular action a case of coercion. Second, I argue that discussions of moral responsibility are inadequate because they fail to recognize that an agent may not be responsible for the state of his or her will because he or she may have been coerced in a way that has not been previously recognized. (shrink)

It is commonly thought that evolution is a chance process, an idea found in popular writings on evolution, but also in academic writing in a broad range of scientific disciplines: scientific, philosophical and theological. One problem is that words such as ‘chance’ and ‘random’ are used with a range of different meanings according to context, and in evolutionary biology the word ‘chance’ is sometimes used in a way that is different from its use in mathematics and philosophy. The present article (...) aims to clarify the range of meanings and to argue the case that the evolutionary process is far from being a ‘theory of chance’ from biological, mathematical, or indeed philosophical and theological perspectives. (shrink)

Emmet Gowin à la fondation Henri Cartier-Bresson (14 mai-27 juillet 2014) / Lewis Baltz au Bal (23 mai-24 août 2014) Depuis quelques semaines, les Parisiens ont la chance de pouvoir découvrir deux figures légendaires de la photographie américaine contemporaine, deux géants incontournables et pourtant peu exposés en France jusque-là : Lewis Baltz, au Bal, et Emmet Gowin à la fondation Henri Cartier-Bresson. De la même génération (ils sont nés dans les années 1940), ces deux artistes ont en commun (...) - (...) Arts plastiques et autres – GALERIE – Nouvel article. (shrink)

The meaning of the concept of fusion is discussed in relation with the works of Payer and those of Van Tieghem. It is pointed out that there is a difference, at the theoretical level, between the concept of fusion congénitale as defined by Payer and the concept of concrescence congénitale formulated by Van Tieghem. The former is inobservable by definition, while the latter deals with intercalary growth. For Van Tieghem, anatomy can prove the existence of fusion, even if we do (...) not see it during ontogenesis.We distinguish three complementary methods for explaining the unions of organs: ontogenetic, typological and phylogenetic. We have attempted, not so much to defend one or other of these methods, as to show that they often invoke very different interpretations for the same morphological phenomena. It is probable that only an analysis of the writings of 19th century botanists will clarify the concept of fusion and more generally the epistemology of plant morphology. (shrink)

Opéra en trois parties, Atlas, de Meredith Monk, a été donné au début des années 1990 à Paris, au théâtre de l'Odéon. C'est l'un des plus grands souvenirs de musique de ma vie. A cette époque, je ne connaissais pas grande chose à la musique dite contemporaine, j'y suis allé un peu par hasard, sans aucune idée préconçue ni a priori et j'en suis sorti complètement émerveillé. Atlas fait partie depuis vingt ans de mes CD favoris, que je me passe (...) et repasse avec un bonheur jamais démenti. Inspiré par la vie – hors (...) - Musique et Musicologie – GALERIE – Nouvel article. (shrink)

Alexandre Dikovsky is born in Leningrad, Russia on August 9, 1945. He died in Nantes, France in the beginning of 2014. He is well known for his significant contributions to the fields of Mathematics, Linguistics, and Informatics. In the course of his career, he published over 100 research papers, 12 book chapters, and participated in numerous national and international projects.

Brentano clearly asserts, in his Vienna lectures of 1887–1888, that his descriptive psychology is an a priori or “exact” science. Since he rejects Kant's idea of a synthetic a priori, this means that the descriptive psychologist's laws are analytic. My aim in this paper is to clarify and discuss this view. I examine Brentano's epistemology in the Psychology from an Empirical Standpoint and then its later developments. I conclude with a difficulty inherent in Brentano's psychological approach to a priori knowledge.

A common view about the phenomenology of episodic remembering has it that when we remember a perceptual experience, we can relive or re-experience many of its features, but not its characteristic presence. In this paper, we challenge this common view. We first say that presence in perception divides into temporal and locative presence, with locative having two sides, an objective and a subjective one. While we agree with the common view that temporal and objective locative presence cannot be relived in (...) remembering, we argue that subjective locative presence – the feeling of being immersed in a certain scene – can be so. Our argument for this claim starts by determining independently the underpinning mechanisms of subjective locative presence in quasi-perceptual imagination. These mechanisms are self-projection, imaginative pretence, and attentional focus. We then proceed to establish that they have been found to underpin conscious states of episodic remembering too. We conclude that episodic remembering can bring us to relive the subjective locative presence characteristic of a perceptual experience, and that the common view is mistaken. Our view – ‘mnemonic immersivism’ – has important consequences regarding the relationships between memory and imagination and the phenomenology of episodic remembering. (shrink)

Comment penser la métaphysique en protestant? Le parent pauvre de la Réforme et de la modernité méritait qu'on s'y attarde. Pour la première fois, et de manière originale et profonde, Denis Müller, expert reconnu de l'éthique, vient lui donner ses lettres de noblesse. Cette pensée exhumée par le biographe intellectuel de Calvin et de Barth se découvre alors terrestre, proche de la création et de la vie pratique ; elle anime d'un feu nouveau les notions d'existence, de raison et (...) de transcendance. Ce sont elles qui, dans cette nouvelle approche, s'en trouvent explorées, questionnées et revisitées. Avec pour paradoxale pierre angulaire, la tristesse. Quel trésor cache en effet la mélancolie? Convoquant tour à tour les figures de Vincent Van Gogh, d'Arthur Rimbaud, de James Joyce, puisant dans les productions artistiques le ressort de cette métaphysique subversive, cet ouvrage est une invitation à l'introspection pour penser l'expérience universelle de l'existence. Et s'ouvrir à son secret. Un immense traité de vie."--Page 4 of cover. (shrink)

Michael Psellos ist ein Philosoph, der wie kein anderer für die byzantinische Epoche steht. Das Denken dieses Großintellektuellen – der in subtilen Auseinandersetzungen mit antiken und spätantiken Positionen in Theologie, Ontologie und Ethik eine selbständige christliche Philosophie formuliert – findet in diesem Band erstmalig eine monographische Gesamtdarstellung. Die Arbeit liefert durch ihren systematischen Charakter, durch die Einbeziehung bisher nicht interpretierter Texte, durch die Darlegung der bisherigen Forschungsergebnisse und durch die Aufdeckung von Traditioinslinien eine wichtige Grundlage für die weitere Erforschung der (...) byzantinischen Philosophie. (shrink)

What is a logical constant? In which terms should we characterize the meaning of logical words like “and”, “or”, “implies”? An attractive answer is: in terms of their inferential roles, i.e. in terms of the role they play in building inferences. More precisely, we favor an approach, going back to Dosen and Sambin, in which the inferential role of a logical constant is captured by a double line rule which introduces it as reflecting structural links (for example, multiplicative conjunction reflects (...) comma on the right of the turnstyle). Rule-based characterizations of logical constants are subject to the well known objection of Prior’s fake connective, tonk. We show that some double line rules also give rise to such pseudo logical constants. But then, we are able to find a property of a double line rules which guarantee that it defines a genuine logical constant. Thus we provide an alternative answer to Belnap’s requirement of conservatity in terms of a local requirement on double line rules. (shrink)

Jeffrey conditioning tells an agent how to update her priors so as to grant a given probability to a particular event. Weighted averaging tells an agent how to update her priors on the basis of testimonial evidence, by changing to a weighted arithmetic mean of her priors and another agent’s priors. We show that, in their respective settings, these two seemingly so different updating rules are axiomatized by essentially the same invariance condition. As a by-product, this sheds new light on (...) the question how weighted averaging should be extended to deal with cases when the other agent reveals only parts of her probability distribution. The combination of weighted averaging and Jeffrey conditioning is a comprehensive updating rule to deal with such cases, which is again axiomatized by invariance under embedding. We conclude that, even though one may dislike Jeffrey conditioning or weighted averaging, the two make a natural pair when a policy for partial testimonial evidence is needed. (shrink)

This paper explores difficulties that resolute readers of the early Wittgenstein face, arising out of what I call the ‘sheer lack’ interpretation of their ‘austere’ conception of nonsense, and the intelligibility of philosophical confusion—there being a sense in which we rightly talk of a ‘grasp’ of philosophical nonsense and indeed of its ‘logic’. Such readers depict philosophical and ‘plain’ nonsense as distinct psychological kinds; but I argue that the ‘intelligibility’ of philosophical confusion remains invisible to the kind of psychology that (...) the ‘sheer lack’ interpretation would make available to Wittgenstein. These concerns relate to well-established worries concerning whether the Tractatus’s ‘ladder’ can be climbed by thinking through arguments—or indeed by thinking full stop—if it is austerely nonsensical. Though I argue that these worries can be met, doing so requires another interpretation of ‘austerity’, which I call the ‘equivocation’ interpretation, and reveals the difference between resolute and non-resolute readings to be less clear cut than has been thought. Key here is the failure of some hard-and-fast distinctions that inform the literature—distinctions shaped by intuitions about mind, meaning, inference, logic, and nonsense—to serve us well. (shrink)

How can we argue, from neural facts, that representational states exhibit some specific representational structure? This paper approaches the question through a case study on the priority map-mechanism that underlies our capacity to orient visual attention. Computational models from cognitive neuroscience describe this mechanism as operating over neural topographic structures. These neural structures exhibit the functional profile of topographic representational structure. I argue that this fact warrants attributing topographic structure to the priority map mechanism’s representational states.

Sont ici publiés trois décrets de la cité de Kyténion, ainsi qu'une série d'épitaphes de la Doride de Grèce Centrale. Les uns, inscrits sur une exèdre d'un type courant, peuvent, malgré leur forme abrégée, être datés de ca 150 av. J.-C, grâce à des recoupements prosographiques en Locride Ozole et en Doride. L'intérêt principal des autres est de livrer les premiers témoignages d'écriture de cette région. L'ensemble de ces textes donne de nouvelles attestations de noms rares et celles de quelques (...) noms nouveaux. La prosopographie des Doriens de la Métropole compte 243 numéros. (shrink)

Publication de 25 inscriptions nouvelles de Kallipolis d'Étolie, provenant presque toutes des fouilles françaises et grecques de 1977-1979. Sur une exèdre semi-circulaire probablement surmontée d'une statue équestre, étaient gravés 18 décrets honorifiques abrégés datant du IIe siècle av. J.-C., les premiers décrets émanant d'une cité étolienne trouvés en Étolie. L'étude de ces décrets conduit à examiner la façon dont la datation éponyme était indiquée chez les Kallipolitains, tantôt par un ou plusieurs archontes, tantôt par le seul secrétaire des archontes. Ces (...) textes permettent d'autre part d'ébaucher le cercle géographique des relations d'une petite cité de Grèce centrale. Ils amènent enfin à examiner le rapport entre Kallipolitas et Kallieus, deux ethniques qui coexistent pendant près de 80 ans, et ne doivent pas correspondre à une seule et même communauté politique : Kallipolitas désigne les citoyens de la cité, tandis que Kallieus serait un ethnique régional, désignant tout ou partie des communautés environnantes, et peut-être lié à l'un des districts de la confédération étolienne. Parmi les autres textes ici publiés, remarquable est un ex-voto dédié à la Nuit divinisée et à Artémis. L'étude se clôt par la liste récapitulative des 18 inscriptions de Kallion-Kallipolis antérieurement connues, et par la prosopographie des Kalliéens et Kallipolitains, qui compte 194 entrées. (shrink)

Une question très discutée chez les interprètes de Wittgenstein est celle de savoir comment comprendre le paradoxe au sujet des règles dont il parle dans le paragraphe 201 des Recherches philosophiques. Ilécrit: ‘Notre paradoxe était le suivant: une règle ne pourrait déterminer aucune conduite parce que n'importe quelle conduite pourrait être mise en accord avec la règle’. Un peu plus haut, il faisait dire à son interlocuteur: ‘“Mais comment une règle peut-elle m'apprendre ce que je dois faire en ce point? (...) Peu importe ce que je fais, cela pourra s’ accorder suivant une interprétation ou une autre avec la règle “’. (shrink)

Because a large number of molecular mechanisms involved in gene regulation have been described during the last decades, it is now becoming possible to address questions about the global structure of gene regulatory networks, at least in the case of some of the best-characterized organisms.This paper presents a global characterization of the transcriptional regulation in Escherichiacoli on the basis of the current data. The connectivity of the corresponding network was evaluated by analyzing the distribution of the number of genes regulated (...) by a given regulatory protein, and the distribution of the number of regulatory genes regulating a given regulated gene. The mean connectivity found (between 2 and 3) shows a rather loosely interconnected structure. Special emphasis is given to circular sequences of interactions (“circuits”) because of their critical dynamical properties. Only one-element circuits were found, in which negative autoregulation is the dominant architecture. These global properties are discussed in light of several pertinent theoretical approaches, as well as in terms of physiological and evolutionary considerations. BioEssays 20:433–440, 1998. © 1998 John Wiley & Sons Inc. (shrink)

Soul springs from Intellect, Intellect springs from the One. But quite how does the sensible world arise? A pair of almost successive treatises points to the answer. A lower manifestation of soul `makes' or `gives birth to' what is variously described as `non-being', `utterly indefinite' and `utterly dark', before covering what she has made with form, specifically the form of `body', and before `entering rejoicing' into the object that, by its reception of form, has been made ready to receive her (...) and that, as the `dwelling place' of soul, will be none other than the visible cosmos. A pair of earlier, again almost successive treatises, spells out the implication. The matter of the sensible world, covered with at least a minimum of form, is described as a `corpse adorned'. The same object, but prior to its `adornment', prior therefore to its appearance as a `body' that is a `corpse', and prior to any `indwelling' of soul, is specifically said to be `non-being' and the `darkness of matter', a transparent allusion to the product of soul in the two later treatises. The soul's making of `darkness', so we may infer, is a making of `matter', the final act in the drama by which everything that exists, including the material substrate of the world we see and feel around us, stems ultimately from the One. (shrink)