Les oeuvres de l'annee 1797 sont loin de porter la marque du vieillissement intellectuel de Kant; elles proposent meme une ouverture pathetique sur l'horizon ultime de la philosophie transcendantale et attestent de la sorte leur remarquable continuite avec les trois grandes Critiques qui lui ont precedees. Ciselant une conception de la sagesse dont la richesse apporte a l'idee de l'homme un eclairage eblouissant, Kant entend bien, en 1797, parachever le systeme emanant de la raison auquel il songe depuis trente annees (...) et, pour ce faire, il s'attache tout particulierement a montrer comment la liberte, la vertu et la dignite font l'honneur de l'homme. (shrink)

La guerre est le fait social par excellence : telle est la thèse que défend Rousseau dans ce grand texte méconnu, remarquable par la clarté de ses analyses et la limpidité de son écriture.

" Faites mieux : soyez raisonnable, et ne raisonnez point avec votre élève, surtout pour lui faire approuver ce qui lui déplaît ; car amener ainsi toujours la raison dans les choses désagréables, ce n'est que la lui rendre ennuyeuse, et la décréditer de bonne heure dans un esprit qui n'est pas encore en état de l'entendre. Exercez son corps, ses organes, ses sens, ses forces, mais tenez son âme oisive aussi longtemps qu'il se pourra. " Rousseau, Emile.

On n'a jamais fini de lire une œuvre qui s'offre selon des points de vue, des perspectives, des niveaux et des résonances multiples. C'est pourquoi lire Rousseau exige que l'on pense avec lui et que l'on retrouve le rythme rarement calme d'une méditation qui, coïncidant avec sa vie, s'élève vers les plus hautes réquisitions critiques de la raison et, tout ensemble, se trouve rongée par un tourment métaphysique. Ce livre montre que si Rousseau, pour qui " tout tient radicalement à (...) la politique ", n'a cessé de disputer à Hobbes l'honneur d'avoir, ne premier, frayé le chemin de la " science politique ", c'est en philosophe - en philosophe profond - qu'il a ouvert cette voie. En effet, sa philosophie politique, qui est d'abord une réflexion sur les " institutions politiques " propres à l'Etat du contrat, se hausse, par une intuition critique encore innomée, jusqu'à l'horizon transcendantal où elle découvre l'idéalité pure de la normativité politique. Mais, dans l'élan d'une pensée réflexive que même les " extravagances " de ses rêveries n'ont pas arrêté, Rousseau, miné par l'angoisse d'exister, cisèle aussi une politique philosophique qui renvoie au mystère ontologique de l'homme condamné à l'errance que lui inflige son historicité. Dès lors, parce que l'ambivalence et les contradictions de la réalité socio-politique taraudent la pensée de Rousseau, celle-ci, déchirée, ne trouve sa cohésion et n'atteint son unité de sens que dans une médiation douloureuse sur l'homme écartelé, incapable d'assumer sa destination dans sa destinée. Jusqu'en ses promenades solitaires, le " subtil Diogène " a, tel un Sphinx, forgé l'énigme de l'homme en ses traits métaphysiques les plus profonds. (shrink)

A previous paper examined Fabre's attitude toward Darwin's theory of evolution.1 It was concluded that while he was deeply influenced by the theory and rejected its principles, his work cannot possibly be read as a single minded anti evolutionary manifesto. The purpose of the present paper is to continue the account by unravelling the underlying themes which pervade Fabre's work. It will be argued that although he never offered a viable alternative to the theory of evolution, he did (...) subscribe to a set of rather vague and incomplete views concerning nature and the proper way to know it. It will be shown that even his studies which bear no discernable relation to the theory of evolution are clearly infused with these views. Fabre believed that natural phenomena reflect certain fixed harmonious relationships which cannot be deduced from a single unifying framework. He saw the scientific enterprise as a quest for these immutable harmonic principles which govern all natural phenomena. However, save for the ambiguous case of mathematics, he did not believe that man-made theories in any way approach these principles. The only things man can know with certainty are the phenomena of nature. Theory, he believed, is the human mind's way of infusing natural phenomena with meaning. As such, he regarded theory as an invaluable tool, but cautioned against ever allowing it to take precedence over the phenomena one unravels with its aid. This creates an ever present tension in Fabre's work: On one side it requires hypotheses and generalizations for guidance; on the other side it represents an uncompromising attempt to preserve the credibility and independence of '...the brutal fact, the only thing that can be trusted'. These vague, incomplete, and at times problematic notions are far more crucial to the understanding of Fabre's work than the criticism he levelled at the theory of evolution. Indeed, the criticism itself stems in large measure from these notions. (shrink)

Le moins que l’on puisse dire de Rousseau, c’est qu’il a donné du fil à retordre à ses exégètes. Simone Goyard-Fabre, dans son livre, tente de montrer que cela tient au discours même de Rousseau, qui donne autant de matériaux à une lecture individualiste qu’à une lecture étatiste. Il y aurait, dit-elle en substance, une équivocité sémantique dans le corps même de la conceptualité de Rousseau. Cette «indécision» serait liée au fait que Rousseau opère une «révolution méthodologique» que lui-même (...) n’a pas pensée jusqu’au bout. Cette révolution, c’est à Kant qu’il sera revenu de l’accomplir définitivement, et c’est bien évidemment la révolution criticiste. Rousseau serait précurseur de l’humanisme juridique. Et cela viendrait de ce qu’il aurait adopté, dans sa philosophie politique, une perspective «transcendantale»—bien qu’il ne l’ait pas nommée ainsi. Pour le montrer, Goyard-Fabre propose de lire l’œuvre de Rousseau suivant deux «niveaux», qui constituent les deux parties de son livre: dans un premier temps, donc, il s’agit de suivre sa «philosophie politique» afin de montrer qu’elle nous fait remonter jusqu’aux principes de l’appareil du droit, débouchant alors sur une «politique philosophique» dévoilant «la vérité de l’homme par une considération des normes qu’il se donne» ; dans un second temps, Goyard-Fabre entreprend de montrer que cette pensée politique permet de saisir le statut de l’existence humaine, à savoir la condition tragique d’un écartèlement irrémédiable entre sa destination et sa destinée, entre devoir-être et être. (shrink)

Ouvrage de base, indispensable, dont Jean Fabre dit : « (...) jamais interprétation aussi complète ni mieux équilibrée n’avait été proposée de la pensée de Rousseau ». Remarquable présentation et interprétation de la philosophie de la vie de Rousseau, au travers de laquelle l’écrivain se présente comme un rationaliste. Bibliographie et index des noms.

Recenze: Jean-Henri FABRE, Život pavouka. Praha: Volvox Globator 2011, 196 s..

This review seeks to present a comprehensive picture of recent discussions in the social sciences of the anticipated impact of AI on the world of work. Issues covered include: technological unemployment, algorithmic management, platform work and the politics of AI work. The review identifies the major disciplinary and methodological perspectives on AI’s impact on work, and the obstacles they face in making predictions. Two parameters influencing the development and deployment of AI in the economy are highlighted: the capitalist imperative and (...) nationalistic pressures. (shrink)

William Morton Wheeler -- The anti-colony as an organism -- Jean-Henri Fabre -- On instincts -- The termitodoxa, or biology and society -- The organization of research -- The dry-rot of our academic biology -- Emergent evolution and the development of societies -- Carl Akeley's early work and environment -- Present tendencies in biological theory -- Hopes in the biological sciences -- Some attractions of the field study of ants -- Animal societies.

Emotion Review, Volume 14, Issue 4, Page 244-253, October 2022. This article is a précis of my 2019 monograph The World-Directedness of Emotional Feeling: On Affect and Intentionality. The book engages with a growing trend of philosophical thinking according to which the felt dimension and the intentionality of emotion are unified. While sympathetic to the general approach, I argue for a reconceptualization of the form of intentionality that emotional feelings are widely thought to possess and, accordingly, of the kind of (...) role they play in our mental lives. More specifically, I argue that the way we feel in having an emotion is not a perception-like awareness of evaluative properties of its object, but instead constitutes the taking of a stand or position on this object in light of its evaluative properties. (shrink)

It is a commonplace that emotions are characteristically passive. As we ordinarily think of them, emotions are ways in which we are acted upon, that is, moved or affected by aspects of our environment. Moreover, we have no voluntary control over whether we feel them. In this paper, I call attention to a much-neglected respect in which emotions are active, which is no less central to our pretheoretical concept of them. That is, in having emotions, we are engaged with the (...) world insofar as we respond to aspects of our environment. In this context, to say that an emotion is a response to x is tantamount to saying that x is a reason for which we have it. Elaborating this claim in light of a historically prominent conception of the active/passive distinction, I will argue that emotions are a form of spontaneity in virtue of their responsive character and contrast in this respect with perceptions, which are fundamentally receptive. While this proposal is prima facie opposed to the ordinary image of emotions as passive, I will show that it actually allows us to make proper sense of it. (shrink)

Parce que toute justification du pouvoir politique échoue si elle ne présuppose pas l'existence d'un droit supra-positif, et parce que la juridicité des droits de l'homme exige la médiation du droit positif de l'État, la réflexion philosophique doit savoir, tout ensemble, en appeler à l'idée indifférenciée et abstraite des droits de l'homme et en rejeter une conception qui serait purement européocentriste. Cette double exigence est nécessaire si l'on veut retrouver la véritable signification des « droits de l'homme » : celle (...) d'un échange transcendantal entre des intérêts diversifiés qui sont constitutifs d'identités particulières.C'est précisement à cette tâche que se consacrent Quentin Skinner, Simone Goyard-Fabre, François Schröter et Jean-Christophe Merle en contribuant à la redéfinition des concepts du droit et des droits et c'est elle que poursuivent Benezet Bujo, Jean-Yves Goffi, Otfried Höffe, Pierre Laberge, Terry Pinkard, Gehrard Seel et Lucas Sosoe en questionnant les rapports entre « universalisme juridique » et « relativisme culturel ». (shrink)

The political writings of Jean-Francois Lyotard, the prophet of the postmodern, are presented here as both the missing dimension of his work and the key to understanding his position within contemporary debate.

"A driving force in all Sartre's writing is his serious desire to change the life of his reader." -- Iris Murdoch.

Un entretien avec Jean-Luc Gleyze, président du Conseil départemental de la Gironde, qui porte avec une vingtaine de départements français un projet d’expérimentation d’un revenu de base d’un montant suffisant, d’au moins mille euros, automatique, inconditionnel, mais dégressif, c’est-à-dire dépendant des revenus de chacun.

This paper provides a typology of appeals to authority, identifying three distinct types: that which is based on a command; that which is based on expertise; and that which is based on dignity. Each type is distinguished with respect to the reaction that a failure to follow it ordinarily evokes. The rhetorical roots of Locke's ad verecundiam are traced to the rhetorical practices of ancient Rome.

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Recovering Aquinas's Common-Good-Oriented Right of RebellionNathaniel A. MoatsIntroductionAs recent events have woefully displayed, armed rebellion is not a topic of merely theoretical interest.1 While theory seemingly has very little impact on the citizens participating in armed rebellions, theory still remains of paramount importance, providing crucial criteria to evaluate, restrain, apply, and respond to such force. Criteria such as legitimate authority, just cause, right intention, necessity, proportionality, and likelihood of (...) success have been offered by thinkers advocating "just war" theory from across diverse political, philosophical, and religious backgrounds, garnering widespread agreement over the centuries. Contemporary scholars who identify as "historically oriented" just war thinkers have continued to defend that historical tradition as a sufficient and substantial guide for contemporary practice.2 Yet some have questioned whether the it can provide useful aid for dealing with contexts of political tyranny. In a 2013 article, Valeria Morkevičius describes [End Page 175] Western culture as divided over the moral permissibility of armed rebellion, with advocates basing their views on the Enlightenment ideas found in John Locke and Jean-Jacques Rousseau, whereas traditional just war theorists have generally denied a right to armed rebellion.3 In Morkevičius's perspective, she argues that there can be justified use of armed force against tyranny and calls upon other scholars to help create a "just rebellion theory" that would "radically reimagine" traditional just war thinking.4 She claims that there is a "lack of a systematic and rigorous ethical framework for evaluating the justness of rebellions"5 and that "a new theory of just rebellion—a systematic way of evaluating the justness of real world rebellions, of determining appropriate state responses to domestic rebellions, and of weighing the pros and cons of intervention" is needed.6In line with Morkevičius' sentiments, the last ten years has seen the increasing rise of self-proclaimed just war revisionists.7 Jeff McMahan, the figurehead for this movement, claims that the classical just war criteria "can no longer stand."8 McMahan argues that traditional just war theory has [End Page 176] depicted war as a morally sui generis category of violence in which unique moral principles apply.9 The moral asymmetry of war is also reinforced by a "statist" and "collectivist" orientation that overrides the importance of individuals and their rights of life, liberty, property, and other fundamental goods. Instead of seeing war as a distinct category of violence, McMahan argues that war and self-defense are morally symmetrical. Further, he argues that combatants should be depicted as individuals distinct from their political or collective identity.10 In other words, McMahan offers a theory of war oriented around individuals and their rights based in the concept of justified self-defense.11 Extending McMahan's theory, Cécile Fabre has particularly targeted the criterion of legitimate authority as morally problematic.12 Rejecting the exclusive authorization of armed force by political authorities, she argues in favor of an individual's right to war, and by extension the right to rebellion.13 Therefore, given the historical just war tradition's emphasis on the criterion of legitimate authority (i.e., the restriction of armed force [End Page 177] to established authorities) and resistance to support armed rebellions due to the lack of recognized political leaders, revisionists conclude that traditional just war thinking is inadequate for providing contemporary guidance in the context of rebellion.14To challenge revisionist claims, I analyze Thomas Aquinas's ingenuity and relevance for future "just rebellion" thinking. First, I argue that classical just war thinking is not as antithetical to armed rebellion as suggested.15 One just rebellion theory has coexisted alongside the classical formation of just war theory, albeit often neglected or ignored by contemporary thinkers.16 It is well known that Aquinas formalized the Augustinian classical just war theory revolving around the criteria of legitimate authority, just cause, and right intention. Much less known, however, is the fact that Aquinas also crafted criteria for justified armed rebellions. While Aquinas's just war thinking rearticulates Augustine's perspective, Aquinas appropriated his mentor's views to allow for justified armed rebellions. Aquinas's originality was displayed not only in allowing justified armed... (shrink)

The ambition and proposal for data modeling of myths presented in this paper is to link contemporary technical affordances to some canonical projects developed in structural anthropology. To articulate the theoretical promise and innovation of this proposal, we present a discrete-event system specification modeling and simulation approach in order to perform a generative analysis and a dynamic visualization of selected narratives, aimed at validating and revitalizing the transformational and morphodynamic theory and methodology proposed by Claude Lévi-Strauss in his structural analysis (...) of myth. After an analysis of Lévi-Strauss’s transformational methodology, we describe in detail how discrete-event system specification models are implemented and developed in the framework of a DEVSimPy software environment. The validation of the method involves a discrete-event system specification simulation based on the extension of discrete-event system specification models dedicated to provide a dynamic Google Earth visualization of the selected myth. Future work around the discrete-event system specification formalism in anthropology is described as well as future applications regarding the impact of computational models to new contemporary anthropological domains. (shrink)

La doctrine de Marx continue, alors même qu'elle n'a cessé d'être critiquée, de susciter l'intérêt voir l'adhésion d'un nombre croissant d'intellectuels. L'idée d'un "sens de l'Histoire", notamment, nourrit une littérature de recherche et un combat politique importants. Mais qu'en est-il réellement? A-t-on bien lu Marx? Jean Borella, qui cherche à tisser des liens entre philosophie et foi chrétienne, travaille dans cet ouvrage à sortir des sentiers battus du marxisme orthodoxe pour mettre en regard les conceptions matérialistes et christiques de (...) l'Histoire. (shrink)

Studies of nineteenth-century North American utopian communities are rarely interested in the relationships that these may have had with members or sympathizers from other communities outside the United States. It was between 1872 and 1901 that Oneida, one of the best-known communities in the United States, was the subject of an investigation conducted by Auguste Fabre, who was close to Jean-Baptiste André Godin, the founder of the Familistère de Guise in France. An analysis of the mail circulating in (...) the network formed by and around Auguste Fabre shows that much information on Oneida, including many written documents and photos, was exchanged by both sides of the Atlantic and contributed, albeit slowly, to an internationalization of the communitarian movement. (shrink)

(1) a. The fog extended from London toward Paris. (the state reading is an extent reading (Jackendoff 1990)) b. Debris covered the outfield. c. Water filled the glass.