Professor Jack Goody builds on his own previous work to extend further his highly influential critique of what he sees as the pervasive eurocentric or occidentalist biases of so much western historical writing. Goody also examines the consequent 'theft' by the West of the achievements of other cultures in the invention of (notably) democracy, capitalism, individualism, and love. The Theft of History discusses a number of theorists in detail, including Marx, Weber and Norbert Elias, and engages with critical (...) admiration western historians like Fernand Braudel, Moses Finlay and Perry Anderson. Major questions of method are raised, and Goody proposes a new comparative methodology for cross-cultural analysis, one that gives a much more sophisticated basis for assessing divergent historical outcomes, and replaces outmoded simple differences between East and West. The Theft of History will be read by an unusually wide audience of historians, anthropologists and social theorists. (shrink)

The importance of writing as a means of communication in a society formerly without it, or where writing has been confined to particular groups, is enormous. It objectifies speech, provides language with a material correlative, and in this material form speech can be transmitted over space and preserved over time. In this book the contributors discuss cultures at different levels of sophistication and literacy and examine the importance of writing on the development of these societies. All the articles except the (...) first were specially written for this book and the extensive introduction unites and synthesizes the material. (shrink)

International business organizations are regularly addressed on their corporate social responsibility (CSR). As illustrated in this paper, it is not yet clear exactly what CSR means to organizations and how to deal with it. In this paper, the authors explore how a sensemaking approach helps to understand the business challenges of CSR within an organizational context. The theories of Karl Weick are applied to the experiences of CSR in Royal Dutch Shell. The authors argue that the key to CSR in (...) international business organizations is to engage stakeholders and start a process of joint sensemaking. Three main competencies are crucial in this: the competency to engage stakeholders through listening and understanding; the creation of an organizational language so that CSR makes sense to members of the organization; and recognizing the momentum of taking action. (shrink)

Abstract[I] want to single out one phenomenon that could be called the ‘politics of sources’. It points to the extent to which the histories that both scientists and historians can write are artifacts of the available sources. The Rockefeller Foundation not only opened its archives very early on for historical work but also invested a lot in making the archives readily available for historical exploration. During the 1980s, many young historians took advantage of this opportunity. Thus, in a relatively early (...) phase of the professional historiography of molecular biology, one could have gained the impression that the development of the new biology as a whole was a bio‐politically directed enterprise of the Rockefeller Foundation sustained by the vision that social processes could ultimately be controlled by biological processes. (shrink)

The notion that there was a profound cultural boundary between Europe (defined as Christian) and Asia (defined as other, including Islam, Buddhism, Hinduism …) was dear to the hearts of the Europeans at least from the beginning of the Industrial Revolution. But it is as much a figment of European creation as the notion of a physical boundary. Of course there were cultural differences of a graduated kind and important political-military ones with the western developments of ships and guns (using (...) the Islamic compass and Chinese gunpowder), but especially with the development of industrial production. Pomerantz has recently argued that western economic supremacy was not in evidence until after that time, a thesis that obviously cuts at the roots of those many writers who claim a cultural advantage in the West going back perhaps to classical times, to Christianity, to the German heritage, or even to the Renaissance and Reformation. Some important changes did occur in the West following developments in the sphere of printing, mainly in the sphere of education and the modes of communication. That earlier levels of cultural attainment were not so very different is clear from the early Jesuit reports of their work in the East. (shrink)

The notion that there was a profound cultural boundary between Europe (defined as Christian) and Asia (defined as other, including Islam, Buddhism, Hinduism …) was dear to the hearts of the Europeans at least from the beginning of the Industrial Revolution. But it is as much a figment of European creation as the notion of a physical boundary. Of course there were cultural differences of a graduated kind and important political-military ones with the western developments of ships and guns (using (...) the Islamic compass and Chinese gunpowder), but especially with the development of industrial production. Pomerantz has recently argued that western economic supremacy was not in evidence until after that time, a thesis that obviously cuts at the roots of those many writers who claim a cultural advantage in the West going back perhaps to classical times, to Christianity, to the German heritage, or even to the Renaissance and Reformation. Some important changes did occur in the West following developments in the sphere of printing, mainly in the sphere of education and the modes of communication. That earlier levels of cultural attainment were not so very different is clear from the early Jesuit reports of their work in the East. (shrink)

This paper argues that the emergence of humanistic values is not a purely modern phenomenon. If by humanism we refer to secular learning and the development of science, there were periods in the history of Islam when this was encouraged. Humanism in the sense of the respect for ‘human values’ such as democracy is equally widely distributed in time and space, so that the idea that the West, as heirs of Ancient Greece, has a monopoly is quite untenable. Tribal societies (...) often practise versions of direct democracy; representation is an aspect of many more complex regimes. Even with monarchical states, few can afford to neglect public opinion over the longer term. Modern representative democracies moreover often fail to consult their people on major issues such as declaring war. In any case that is only one mode of representation among others and does not have the monopoly of virtue, especially in religiously divided communities. Elsewhere it may be adopted as a legitimating device in a specific context, as I suggested had been the case with Israel. (shrink)

In a recent article, Wilkinson puts forward the notion of identity-relative paternalism. According to Wilkinson’s final formulation of this principle, ‘[i]ndividuals should be prevented from doing to future selves (where there are weakened prudential unity relations between the current and future self) what it would be justified to prevent them from doing to others’.1 In medical ethics, it is usually assumed that hard paternalism, that is, acting against a competent person’s wishes for their own benefit, is not justified. According to (...) Mill’s harm principle, we may only limit people’s freedom if they cause harm to others.2 Harm to self is not a sufficient reason for overriding competent persons’ decisions. Wilkinson, however, draws on Parfit’s reductionist view of personal identity to argue that sometimes, patients’ future selves are sufficiently disconnected from their present selves to treat future selves like different persons. If a competent person’s medical decision negatively affects a future self, this should be treated like a case of harm to others. Thus, overriding competent persons’ decisions in such cases—and treating them against their will—could be justified. In this commentary, I point out two problems with this approach. First, I demonstrate that the cases Wilkinson’s argument is based on are not examples of harm to others but rather cases of surrogate decision making gone wrong, …. (shrink)

The overall goal of this target article is to demonstrate a mechanism for an embodied cognition. The particular vehicle is a much-studied, but still widely debated phenomenon seen in 7–12 month-old-infants. In Piaget's classic “A-not-B error,” infants who have successfully uncovered a toy at location “A” continue to reach to that location even after they watch the toy hidden in a nearby location “B.” Here, we question the traditional explanations of the error as an indicator of infants' concepts of objects (...) or other static mental structures. Instead, we demonstrate that the A-not-B error and its previously puzzling contextual variations can be understood by the coupled dynamics of the ordinary processes of goal-directed actions: looking, planning, reaching, and remembering. We offer a formal dynamic theory and model based on cognitive embodiment that both simulates the known A-not-B effects and offers novel predictions that match new experimental results. The demonstration supports an embodied view by casting the mental events involved in perception, planning, deciding, and remembering in the same analogic dynamic language as that used to describe bodily movement, so that they may be continuously meshed. We maintain that this mesh is a pre-eminently cognitive act of “knowing” not only in infancy but also in everyday activities throughout the life span. Key Words: cognitive development; dynamical systems theory; embodied cognition; infant development; motor control; motor planning; perception and action. (shrink)

Rebbetzin Esther Greenberg was famous throughout Israel as a mentor to countless women, including some of the best-known teachers and counselors.

Reasoning about bedrock abstract concepts such as time, number, and valence relies on spatial metaphor and often on multiple spatial metaphors for a single concept. Previous research has documented, for instance, both future-in-front and future-to-right metaphors for time in English speakers. It is often assumed that these metaphors, which appear to have distinct experiential bases, remain distinct in online temporal reasoning. In two studies we demonstrate that, contra this assumption, people systematically combine these metaphors. Evidence for this combination was found (...) in both directly elicited and spontaneous co-speech gestures about time. These results provide first support for the hypothesis that the metaphorical representation of time, and perhaps other abstract domains as well, involves the continuous co-activation of multiple metaphors rather than the selection of only one. (shrink)

Domjan et al. continue a consistent trend in Pavlovian conditioning, that of accounting for more behaviors while sacrificing specificity of predictions. Despite the sacrifice, their model provides a valuable framework within which social behavioral research may operate. It may also allow ethologists and evolutionary psychologists to pursue questions about which feed-forward systems should produce which behaviors in social settings.

Background: Ethics-of-care theories contain important notions regarding the quality of care; however, until now, concrete translations of the insights into instruments are lacking. This may be a result of the completely different type of epistemology, theories and concepts used in the field of quality of care research. Objectives: Both the fields of ‘ethics of care’ and ‘quality of care’ aim for improvement of care; therefore; insights could possibly meet by focusing on the following question: How could ethics-of-care theories contribute to (...) better quality in care at a measurement level? This study reviews existing instruments with the aim of bridging this gap and examines the evidence of their psychometric properties, feasibility and responsiveness. Research design: A systematic search of the literature was undertaken using multiple electronic databases covering January 1990 through May 2012. Method and findings: Of the 3427 unique references identified, 55 studies describing 40 instruments were selected. Using a conceptual framework, an attempt was made to distinguish between related concepts and to group available instruments measuring different types of concepts. A total of 13 instruments that reflect essential aspects of ethics-of-care theory were studied in greater detail, and a quality assessment was conducted. Conclusion: Three promising qualitative instruments were found, which follow the logic of the patient and take their specific context into account. (shrink)

Patients with mental illness, and depression in particular, present clinicians and surrogate decision-makers with complex ethical dilemmas when they refuse life-sustaining non-psychiatric treatment. When treatment rejection is at variance with the beliefs and preferences that could be expected based on their premorbid or “authentic” self, their capacity to make these decisions may be called into question. If capacity cannot be demonstrated, medical decisions fall to surrogates who are usually advised to decide based on a substituted judgment standard or, when that (...) is not possible, best interest. We propose that in cases where the patient meets the widely accepted cognitive criteria for capacity but is making decisions that appear inauthentic, the surrogate may best uphold patient autonomy by following a “restorative representation” model. We see restorative representation as a subset of substituted judgement in which the decision-maker retains responsibility for deciding as the patient would have, but discerns the decision their “truest self” would make, rather than inferring their current wishes, which are directly influenced by illness. Here we present a case in which the patient’s treatment refusal and previously undiagnosed depression led to difficulty determining the patient’s authentic wishes and placed a distressing burden on the surrogate decision-maker. We use this case to examine how clinicians and ethicists might better advise surrogates who find themselves making these clinically and emotionally challenging decisions. (shrink)

In several jurisdictions, irremediable suffering from a medical condition is a legal requirement for access to assisted dying. According to the expressivist objection, allowing assisted dying for a specific group of persons, such as those with irremediable medical conditions, expresses the judgment that their lives are not worth living. While the expressivist objection has often been used to argue that assisted dying should not be legalised, I show that there is an alternative solution available to its proponents. An autonomy-based approach (...) to assisted suicide regards the provision of assisted suicide (but not euthanasia) as justified when it is autonomously requested by a person, irrespective of whether this is in her best interests. Such an approach has been put forward by a recent judgment of the German Federal Constitutional Court, which understands assisted suicide as an expression of the person’s right to a self-determined death. It does not allow for beneficence-based restrictions regarding the person’s suffering or medical diagnosis and therefore avoids the expressivist objection. I argue that on an autonomy-based approach, assisted suicide should not be understood as a medical procedure but rather as the person’s autonomous action. (shrink)

Reading Westworld is the first volume to explore the cultural, textual and theoretical significance of the hugely successful HBO TV series Westworld. The essays engage in a series of original enquiries into the central themes of the series including conceptions of the human and posthuman, American history, gaming, memory, surveillance, AI, feminism, imperialism, free will and contemporary capitalism. In its varied critical engagements with the genre, narratives and contexts of Westworld, this volume explores the show’s wider and deeper meanings and (...) the questions it poses, as well considering how Westworld reflects on the ethical implications of artificial life and technological innovation for our own futurity. With critical essays that draw on the interdisciplinary strengths and productive intersections of media, cultural and literary studies, Reading Westworld seeks to respond to the show’s fundamental question; “Have you ever questioned the nature of your reality?” It will be of interest to students, academics and general readers seeking to engage with Westworld and the far-reaching questions it poses about our current engagements with technology. (shrink)

This paper enquires into the politics of real-time in online media. It suggests that real-time cannot be accounted for as a universal temporal frame in which events happen, but explores the making of real-time from a device perspective focusing on the temporalities of platforms. Based on an empirical study exploring the pace at which various online media produce new content, we trace the different rhythms, patterns or tempos created by the interplay of devices, users’ web activities and issues. What emerges (...) are distinct forms of ‘realtimeness’ which are not external from but specific to devices, organized through socio-technical arrangements and practices of use. Realtimeness thus unflattens more general accounts of the real-time web and research, and draws attention to the agencies built into specific platform temporalities and the political economies of making real-time. (shrink)

Goldman joins the ranks of epistemologists, philosophers, and science studies scholars trying to use economic models of science. For Goldman, these models are part of social rather than individual epistemics. His hope is that these models will illustrate that non-epistemic goals of individual scientists such as professional success do not necessarily undermine epistemic aims of science such as the acquisition of truth. This paper shows that there are inconsistencies between Goldman's individual and social epistemics, that these models do not live (...) up to Goldman's standards of evaluation, and that the economic models that Goldman uses are not social. (shrink)

Stanovich & West continue a history of norm-setting that began with deference to reasonable people's opinions, followed by adherence to probability theorems. They return to deference to reasonable people, with aptitude test performance substituting for reasonableness. This allows them to select independently among competing theories, but defines reasoning circularly in terms of aptitude, while aptitude is measured using reasoning.

In this commentary, we point to guidelines for performing human neuroimaging studies and their reporting in microbiota-gut-brain articles. Moreover, we provide a view on interpretational issues in MGB studies, with a specific focus on gut microbiota–derived metabolites. Thus, extending the target article, we provide recommendations to the field to increase reproducibility and relevance of this type of MGB study.

Scripts and deception are alternative means, both imperfect, to the goal of simulating an environment that cannot be created readily. Under scripts, participants pretend they are in that environment, while deception convinces participants they are in that environment although they are not. With repeated trials, they ought to be unnecessary. But they are not, which poses challenges to behavioral sciences.

Koehler's (1996t) target article raised, and various commentators discussed, two issues that seem far separated but actually have a great deal in common. These are the value of “ecologically valid” research and the effect of direct experience on base-rate usage. Koehler discussed the former as a methodological issue and the latter as a normative one, and no commentator chose to incorporate them, but directly experienced base rates are a good example of ecologically valid research. The state of the literature with (...) regard to directly experienced base rates is reviewed, and the emerging perception, that direct experience has a profound Bayesian effect on base-rate usage, is rejected. (shrink)

Several of Krueger & Funder's (K&F's) suggestions may promote more balanced social cognition research, but reconsidered null hypothesis statistical testing (NHST) is not one of them. Although NHST has primarily supported negative conclusions, this is simply because most conclusions have been negative. NHST can support positive, negative, and even balanced conclusions. Better NHST practices would benefit psychology, but would not alter the balance between positive and negative approaches.

In his essay “Critique of Violence,” Walter Benjamin argued that only certain types of strikes can be considered revolutionary, while others—i.e., most bread and butter, or “political” strikes—tacitly rely on the violent logics of the state. This paper suggests, however, that by reading Benjamin against himself and applying his discussion of “pure means” to those “political” strikes, the extent to which even these basic collective actions represent effective “strategies of resistance” becomes evident. This framework requires an interdisciplinary approach to radical (...) labor studies, combining political theory with history in order to identify and analyze past instances of joyful community-building during strikes. Relying also on a historical case study—the 1926 miners’ lockout in South Wales—and Benjamin’s own writings on the discipline of history, this paper contends that strikes, and the “alternative communities” they encourage workers and their families to build, present enormous revolutionary potential. When theory and history are studied together, and when we pay close attention to the actual tactics of solidarity that make up strike actions, this potential is uncovered. (shrink)

This essay introduces Michael Polanyi’s work through contrasting his innovative epistemology of subsidiary-focal integration with key distinctives of Christian analytic philosopher Alvin Plantinga. Polanyi’s contrasting proposals helpfully bring to light shaping assumptions of the analytic tradition, contributing creatively to a larger common agenda. Polanyi disputes the unexamined assumption that the simplest epistemic experience is a focally apprehended “find-myself-believing” that is explicitly and propositionally expressed. I also contrast the two regarding infallibilism, foundationalism, externalism, justification, epistemic duty, creative antirealism, and ways of (...) tapping Calvin’s notion of the sensus divinitatis. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:A Threat to Selfhood: Moral Distress and the Psychiatric Training CultureEsther NathansonWhile many medical specialties offer to heal, or even cure, psychiatry—uniquely—places the doctor–patient relationship at the center of the therapeutic effort. Psychiatrists must possess a complex and challenging combination of broad medical knowledge, finely honed interpersonal and analytic skills and confidence in their abilities, despite limited understanding of the workings of the brain. Inpatient psychiatry in particular demands (...) a degree of strength to withstand emotional, and sometimes physical, assault from patients who may be suicidal, desperate, paranoid, aggressive or delusional. Beyond these abilities, a good psychiatrist must have robust but ‘therapeutically porous’ emotional boundaries that allow genuine empathy for the patient but, at the same time, limit internalization of the patient’s anguish as the practitioner’s own: the exquisite balance of ‘self–versus–other’ in the therapeutic encounter.Unfortunately, during my psychiatry residency in the UK, development of these intangible but essential boundaries was entirely absent from the curriculum. Early in training I struggled with my tendency to become an emotional chameleon with feelings and energies buffeted around by the prevailing emotions of each patient that walked through the door. I felt that patients expected me to offer tidy explanations for their suffering and provide answers to profound questions of meaning; to make the world a safe and understandable place. Given the complexity of mental illness and its interplay with social circumstances this was naïve and, I now realize, often unnecessary, but the weight of responsibility was unbearable. I was also completely unprepared for the intensity of human suffering I saw, and wholly unready to provide the level of interpersonal engagement required for genuine healing. My own emotional integrity felt threatened by the depth of patients’ needs, and my response—both physical and emotional—was intense and frightening.Much of my distress resulted from the profound and inevitable tension between the empathy necessary to comprehend patients’ experiences, which were often extreme and bewildering, and the need for resilience and self–protection at a time when my grasp of psychological theories and treatment practices was still rudimentary. I felt guilty that patients bore the brunt of my inexperience, and duplicitous purporting to help while burdening them with intolerable drug side–effects and stigmatizing, albeit effective, treatments such as electroconvulsive therapy (ECT). Time constraints and guidance from senior faculty encouraged expediency over treatment efficacy or durability; psychopharmacology was prioritized over the psychotherapeutic techniques and psychosocial interventions I found more effective for many patients. During the phase of our training that took place in a rambling, now defunct, asylum in the U.K, visits to the locked ward, which was reserved for patients considered a danger to others, were usually prompted by nurses’ requests for chemical restraint, the ‘pharmaceutical strait–jacket’. I was deeply uncomfortable with the role of ‘restrainer’ but had insufficient experience or seniority to propose other methods. It was only when, years later, I investigated re–training in the U.S that the senior psychiatry resident at a well–known program told me gently, ‘Oh, we assume that students will have a breakdown in their first year, so we have systems in place to help’. I’ll never forget those words; they are, to this day, the only validation of the emotional toll of my early training years.Adding to my discomfort were various ethically dubious administrative practices, the most troubling being the clinic’s unwillingness to disclose to patients that we were trainees, with little clinical experience. Senior faculty were dismissive when I asked whether my first psychotherapy patient had been told I was a trainee, indeed that I had never conducted psychotherapy before. My question was greeted with amusement and an assurance that, although she had not been told, I (not the patient, interestingly) would do fine.Due to the large number of no–shows in psychiatric outpatient clinics it was also standard practice to triple–book appointment times on the [End Page 115] assumption that one or more patients would fail to attend. Not uncommonly, more than one patient would arrive for the same appointment, leaving others to suffer agonizing waits that were often intensified by the deep discomfort... (shrink)