Looking back on it, it seems almost incredible that so many equally educated, equally sincere compatriots and contemporaries, all drawing from the same limited stock of evidence, should have reached so many totally different conclusions---and always with complete certainty.

In this paper, I explore the relationship between epistemic rationality and instrumental rationality, and I attempt to delineate their respective roles in typical instances of theoretical reasoning. My primary concern is with the instrumentalist conception of epistemic rationality: the view that epistemic rationality is simply a species of instrumental rationality, viz. instrumental rationality in the service of one's cognitive or epistemic goals. After sketching the relevance of the instrumentalist conception to debates over naturalism and 'the ethics of belief', I argue (...) that, despite enjoying considerable popularity among both epistemologists and philosophers of science, it is ultimately indefensible. Having thus argued for the distinctness of epistemic and instrumental rationality, I attempt to clarify the role played by each in typical instances of theoretical reasoning. I suggest that being theoretically rational--that is, being proficient with respect to theoretical reasoning--is best construed as a hybrid virtue, inasmuch as it involves manifesting sensitivity to two very different kinds of reasons. (shrink)

ArgumentBetween 1838 and 1863 the Grimm brothers led a collaborative research project to create a new kind of dictionary documenting the history of the German language. They imagined the work would present a scientific account of linguistic cohesiveness and strengthen German unity. However, their dictionary volumes (most of which were arranged and written by Jacob Grimm) would be variously criticized for their idiosyncratic character and ultimately seen as a poor, and even prejudicial, piece of scholarship. This paper argues that such (...) criticisms may reflect a misunderstanding of the dictionary. I claim it can be best understood as an artifact of romanticist science and its epistemological privileging of subjective perception coupled with a deeply-held faith in inter-subjective congruence. Thus situated, it is a rare and detailed case of Romantic ideas and ideals applied to the scientific study of social artifacts. Moreover, the dictionary's organization, reception, and legacy provide insights into the changing landscape of scientific practice in Germany, showcasing the difficulties of implementing a romanticist vision of science amidst widening gaps between the public and professionals, generalists and specialists. (shrink)

Challenging Heidegger’s thesis that animals are poor in world while humans are world-building, in The Beast and the Sovereign, Volume II, Jacques Derrida claims that each singular living being inhabits its own solitary world, its own desert island. There, he claims both, on the one hand, that animals share our world and may be world-building and, on the other, that we cannot be certain that human beings share a world or are world-building (at least not in Heidegger’s sense as set (...) apart from animals). In this article, I trace the ethical implications of Derrida’s seemingly contradictory claims that we both share a world, and that each singular being, like an island, is a world unto itself. (shrink)

Recent severe environmental crises have brought us to recognize the need for a broad reevaluation of the relation of humans to their environments. I suggest that we consider the human-nature relation from two overlapping perspectives, each informed by the pragmatic philosophy of expeIience. The first is an anthropology, according to which humans are viewed as being radically continuous with their environments. The second is a comprehensive ecology, according to which both “natural” and “nonnatural” environments are studied as artificial habitats of (...) the human organism (i.e., as artifacts). The pragmatic approach has two features which make it promising as a way to ground environmental thinking. First, it allows us to avoid a human-nature dichotomy and the many problems which that dichotomy has traditionally engendered. Second, it ties environmental questions to a common cultural experience and a philosophical position from which environmentalists can effectively engage mainstream educational and political discussions. (shrink)

This paper presents an integrative, descriptive model of ethical decision making, with special attention given to issues of measurement. After building the model, hypotheses are developed from a portion of it. These hypotheses are tested in an exploratory analysis to determine if further research and testing of this model and the measurement instruments it employs are warranted.

Here is the usual way philosophers think about science and induction. Scientists do many things— aspire, probe, theorize, conclude, retract, and refine— but successful research culminates in a published research report that presents an argument for some empirical conclusion. In mathematics and logic there are sound deductive arguments that fully justify their conclusions, but such proofs are unavailable in the empirical domain because empirical hypotheses outrun the evidence adduced for them. Inductive skeptics insist that such conclusions cannot be justified. But (...) “justification” is a vague term— if empirical conclusions cannot be established fully, as mathematical conclusions are, perhaps they are justified in the sense that they are partially supported or confirmed by the available evidence. To respond to the skeptic, one merely has to explicate the concept of confirmation or partial justification in a systematic manner that agrees, more or less, with common usage and to observe that our scientific conclusions are confirmed in the explicated sense. This process of explication is widely thought to culminate in some version of Bayesian confirmation theory. (shrink)

Tommie Shelby argues that social injustice undermines the moral standing states would have, were they just, to condemn criminal wrongdoers. He makes a good argument, but he does not go far enough to reject the blaming function of punishment. Shelby’s argument from “impure dissent,” in particular, helps to demonstrate the limits of blame in criminal justice.

Discussion of reductive and non-reductive physicalism formulated in a priority monist framework.

This empirical work attends to the tensions and contradictions medical students articulate when they discuss their objection to industry’s influence in medicine. Findings are based on 50 semi-structured interviews with medical students who are critical of the pharmaceutical industry’s influence in medical education in the United States and Canada. These students advocate evidence-based medicine as one solution to the problems with industry influence in medicine; namely industry bias in medical research. This investigation is an effort to understand why EBM is (...) posed as a solution to industry bias in light of the literature demonstrating the ways that what is considered ‘evidence-based’ is influenced by industry. Participants articulate a struggle to find the ‘best’ evidence in a context where industry interests are integral in the production of medical knowledge. (shrink)

Our emotional faculties respond to successes, gains, advantages, threats, losses, obstacles, and other personally significant objects or situations, producing positive or negative evaluations of them according to their perceived import. Being an evaluative response is a feature that emotions share with paradigm attitudes (beliefs, intentions, judgments, etc.). However, recently philosophers have been reluctant to treat emotions as attitudes. The usual reasons given have to do with the automaticity of emotions and their occasional recalcitrance. In this article, I argue that these (...) things shouldn't disqualify emotions from counting as genuine attitudes. Our emotions do bear the kind of relationship with our reasons that is characteristic of our attitudes. (shrink)

As the term regenerative agriculture caught fire in public discourse around 2019, it was promptly labelled a buzzword. While the buzzword accusation tends to be regarded as negative, these widely used terms also reflect an important area of growing public interest. Exploring a buzzword can thus help us understand our current moment and offer insights to paths forward. In this study, we explored how and why different individuals and groups adopt certain key terms or buzzwords, in this case the term (...) “regenerative agriculture”. We used an interpretivist approach to understand how “regenerative agriculture” is being constructed, interpreted, understood, and employed, drawing from 19 semi-structured interviews conducted with farmers, researchers, private companies, and NGO/nonprofits. Several interviewees felt that regenerative agriculture is making an important societal shift in thinking towards addressing major issues like climate change and parity in our food and agricultural systems. However, farmers in particular felt that the term is being greenwashed, coopting the work they do, and even diluting the meaning. We also found that regenerative agriculture is being advanced as mobilizing “win-wins”—for farmers, for consumers, for society—but that this discourse may be veiling the political and economic agendas of the big companies using the term. Our findings further illustrated the debates over standardizing the term regenerative agriculture, with some contending that there should be room for “continuous improvement” but others felt it is meaningless without a definition. (shrink)

This information-packed volume, without doubt a landmark event in the developing neuroscientific study of consciousness, deserves the attention of anyone interested in this subject. It is a sequel and companion to an earlier collection, The Boundaries of Consciousness: Neurobiology and Neuropathology, also edited by Steven Laureys (2005), which contains the proceedings of a 2004 conference sponsored by the Association for the Scientific Study of Consciousness (ASSC). Published initially as a special issue of Progress in Brain Research (volume 150), Boundaries has (...) been reissued in paperback and appears on the ASSC website as one of its official titles. Both volumes include many prominent figures in contemporary neuroscience, and the two volumes together constitute about as clear, comprehensive, and authoritative a picture as one can find anywhere of the current state of mainstream neuroscientific thinking about consciousness and the brain. Like classical physics of the late 19th century, it is a picture of great power and beauty; nevertheless, just as discordant phenomena such as black-body radiation and the photoelectric effect presaged the rise of quantum mechanics, this book, precisely because of its clarity, reveals signs of trouble ahead. (shrink)

There has been increasing use of argument-based approaches in the development of safety-critical systems. Within this approach, a safety case plays a key role in the system development life cycle. The key components in a safety case are safety arguments, which are designated to demonstrate that the system is acceptably safe. Inappropriate reasoning in safety arguments could undermine a system's safety claims which in turn contribute to safety-related failures of the system. The review of safety arguments is therefore a crucial (...) step in the development of safety-critical systems. Reviews are conducted using dialogues where elements of the argument and their relations are proposed and scrutinised. This paper investigates an approach of conducting argument review using dialectical models. After studying five established dialectical models with varying strengths and drawbacks, a new dialectical model specially designed to support persuasion and information-seeking dialogues has been proposed to suit the requir... (shrink)

Rather than set out an overarching view or take a stand on the debunking of morality tout court, in what follows I’ll explore a divide and conquer strategy. First, I will briefly sketch a debunking argument that, instead of targeting all of morality or human moral nature, has a more narrow focus—namely, the intuitive moral authority of disgust. The argument concludes that as vivid and compelling as they can be while one is in their grip, feelings of disgust should be (...) granted no power to justify moral judgments. Importantly, the argument is grounded in empirical advances concerning the character of the emotion itself. Next, I will step back and consider the argument’s general form. I then point to arguments that others have made that seem to share this form and selective focus, and comment on what such arguments do and do not presuppose. Finally, I locate the selective strategy with respect to other approaches moral debunking. (shrink)

The theist affirms God's paternal care and his unsurpassable ability. If God is Father, he is obliged to prevent harms in a manner similar to earthly fathers; but he has not. This essay refutes the claim that God has obligations closely analogous to those of earthly parents. The essay is a conceptual analysis of what the father/ child relationship entails with respect to moral obligations and permissions. The dissimilarities between the divine and human parent create differences in obligation so great (...) as to nullify judgments that the atheologian makes about what is to believe about the obligations and goodness of God. (shrink)

There has been an explosion of interest in “innovation-oriented knowledge” and utility in early modern knowledge economies. Despite this, a healthy skepticism surrounding the category of “useful knowledge” persists, at least in part because of its association with intentional concealment. Helpful in many ways, this skepticism has fostered a tendency to overlook a variety of efforts to teach “useful knowledge” in the period: efforts that were anchored in engagement with the real and involved the cultivation of an ability to direct (...) the powers of the imagination. Indeed, for some the imagination served as a faculty central to an epistemology of use. This article takes as its example a handbook written by an early political economist (c. 1700) who endeavored to teach readers how to imagine uses for things they observed in collections while traveling so they would be better prepared to participate in a new, transnational culture of innovation. (shrink)

Michael Kelly is the author of 68 entries altogether. The New Oxford Companion to Literature in French is far more than a simple revision of the original Oxford Companion to French Literature, published in 1959, and described by The Listener as the `standard work of reference for English-speaking enquirers into French literature'. As the change in title implies, this completely new work presents an authoritative guide not only to ten centuries of literature produced in the territory now called France, (...) but also to the rich literary output of other French-speaking countries around the world. The scope of the Companion is deliberately open and inclusive, challenging and extending the traditional canon. Literature is understood in a broad sense, ranging from strip cartoon and pamphlet to tragedy and epic, and particular attention is devoted to francophone writing from outside France. Written by an international team of specialists, entries cover individual authors and works - over 3,000 of them - from the troubadours to Césaire, and from La Princesse de Clèves to La Vie mode d'emploi. Each is discussed in detail within their historical, cultural, and intellectual context. Among the new features of the Companion are the substantial essay-entries, reflecting up-to-date scholarship and theoretical debates on topics such as: - literary movements and genres - historical subjects such as chivalry, or Occupation and Resistance in wartime France - movements of thought from Scholasticism to feminism - linguistic topics - the sciences - the arts and media, including opera, cinema, and press. (shrink)

Kelly, Gerard There has always been a tension between the justice and the mercy of God. The two seem very uneasy companions. In the mind of some, justice and mercy are mutually exclusive. This, then, plays out in society and the way we practise justice. From my point of view, as a theologian, there is a genuine theological question here and it concerns how we understand God, and as a consequence how we understand the relationship between justice and mercy. (...) On the one hand, the traditional metaphysical starting point for the doctrine of God leaves little room for the mercy of God since God as perfect Being cannot suffer-to suffer would be a deficiency.1 On the other hand, there is a strong tradition, particularly since the Reformation, of the justice of God, where justice is an expression of the mercy of God. Yet this tradition struggles today to have an impact on religious consciousness. The theological question also has implications for the wider society. If Western society is no longer being shaped by the Christian faith, then the meaning of both mercy and justice may undergo change in such a way that they become incompatible. I will explore this question by referring to three articles that have appeared in popular journalism. This will lead me to a theological examination of mercy and justice. (shrink)

Summary This paper explores the collecting practices of German Protestant missionaries who lived in southern India (c. 1710–1740) as part of the Danish-Halle mission. Asked by their patrons to describe local plants, in situ, these individuals did not respond by carefully studying and describing the plants themselves. Despite being in a position to do this work, instead they chose mostly to engage local residents in conversations about the cultures of the plants in question. These conversations revolved around the origins and (...) meanings of plant names. The missionaries used names, local histories and accounts of peoples as tools for understanding plants found in specific places and to resolve confusion over the similarities and differences between various kinds. They practiced a form of ethno-botany that made the culture(s) of plants accessible to those who would never be able to actually travel to the region. (shrink)

This article examines Lincoln Clarkes’ photographic series Heroines, exploring the ways in which it demonstrates that available models for writing about photography are insufficient. The author argues that the Heroines series’ blurs the boundaries between commercial, documentary and fine art photography. The article examines how these images supplement a tradition of documentary after postmodernism and its critique of representation. Heroines evidences an as-yet uncategorizable form, one that brings into relief the ways in which certain theories of photography fail to explain (...) and fully interpret such photographs. On this basis, the article argues that the importance of Heroines lies ultimately in how it suggests new strategies of evaluating the political work of photography in the aftermath of identity politics. (shrink)

The essays explore virtually all of Johnson's writings: each of his novels, his numerous short stories, the range of his nonfiction essays, his many book ...

A finite data set is consistent with infinitely many alternative theories. Scientific realists recommend that we prefer the simplest one. Anti-realists ask how a fixed simplicity bias could track the truth when the truth might be complex. It is no solution to impose a prior probability distribution biased toward simplicity, for such a distribution merely embodies the bias at issue without explaining its efficacy. In this note, I argue, on the basis of computational learning theory, that a fixed simplicity bias (...) is necessary if inquiry is to converge to the right answer efficiently, whatever the right answer might be. Efficiency is understood in the sense of minimizing the least fixed bound on retractions or errors prior to convergence. (shrink)

Background: Nurses must balance their perceived duty to care against their perceived risk of harm to determine their willingness to report during disaster events, potentially creating an ethical dilemma and impacting patient care. Research aim: The purpose of this study was to investigate nurses’ perceived duty to care and whether there were differences in willingness to respond during disaster events based on perceived levels of duty to care. Research design: A cross-sectional survey research design was used in this study. Participants (...) and research context: Using a convenience sample with a snowball technique, data were collected from 289 nurses throughout the United States in 2017. Participants were recruited through host university websites, Facebook, and an American Nurses Association discussion board. Ethical considerations: Institutional review board approval was obtained from the University of Texas at Tyler and the University of Arkansas. Findings: Analysis of willingness to report to work based on levels of perceived duty to care resulted in the emergence of two groups: “lower level of perceived duty to care group” and “higher level of perceived duty to care group.” The most discriminating characteristics differentiating the groups included fear of abandonment by co-workers, reporting because it is morally the right thing to, and because of imperatives within the Nursing Code of Ethics. Discussion: The number of nurses in the lower level of perceived duty to care group causes concern. It is important for nursing management to develop strategies to advance nurses’ safety, minimize nurses’ risk, and promote nurses’ knowledge to confidently work during disaster situations. Conclusion: Level of perceived duty to care affects nurses’ willingness to report to work during disasters. Primary indicators of low perceived duty to care are amenable to actionable strategies, potentially increasing nurses’ perceived duty to provide care and willingness to report to work during disasters. (shrink)

In “Empiricism, Semantics, and Ontology” Camap drew his famous distinction between ‘internal’ and ‘external’ questions of existence, pronouncing the former meaningful and the latter meaningless. In The Significance of Philosophical Scepticism, Barry Stroud understands Carnap to be applying the verification criterion of meaningfulness in order to refute Cartesian skepticism. I suggest that Stroud misrepresents both Carnap's aim and method. Camap was responding to critics who suggested that his willingness to quantify over abstract entities in his work in semantics violated his (...) commitment to empiricism. He rejected that criticism as presupposing a super‐scientific standpoint from which constraints on the admissible domain of entities of science could be delivered. Carnap wanted to insulate science from the imposition of first‐philosophical metaphysical prejudice, not to defuse scepticism by appeal to verificationism. (shrink)

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