Die vorliegende Arbeit widmet sich dem Schweizer Philosophen, Psychologen und Pädagogen Paul Häberlin (1878-1960). In ausgreifenden Studien wird das komplexe Werk Häberlins detailliert in philosophische und pädagogische Reflexionen gebrochen, wobei nicht das Fragmentarische als Errungenschaft eines aufgeklärten Geistes gefeiert, sondern als dessen Konvergenz ausgewiesen wird. Schließlich fügt sich Häberlins Bearbeitung der Moderne mit deren Dichotomie von Einheit und Vielheit zu einem summarischen Entwurf. Daraus ergeben sich Anknüpfungen, die Schnittstellen bezeichnen und offene Fragen der disziplinären Diskurse verhandeln.

Moral philosophers and psychologists often assume that people judge morally lucky and morally unlucky agents differently, an assumption that stands at the heart of the Puzzle of Moral Luck. We examine whether the asymmetry is found for reflective intuitions regarding wrongness, blame, permissibility, and punishment judg- ments, whether people’s concrete, case-based judgments align with their explicit, abstract principles regarding moral luck, and what psychological mechanisms might drive the effect. Our experiments produce three findings: First, in within-subjects experiments favorable to reflective (...) deliberation, the vast majority of people judge a lucky and an unlucky agent as equally blameworthy, and their actions as equally wrong and permissible. The philosophical Puzzle of Moral Luck, and the challenge to the very possibility of systematic ethics it is frequently taken to engender, thus simply do not arise. Second, punishment judgments are significantly more outcome- dependent than wrongness, blame, and permissibility judgments. While this constitutes evidence in favor of current Dual Process Theories of moral judgment, the latter need to be qualified: punishment and blame judgments do not seem to be driven by the same process, as is commonly argued in the literature. Third, in between-subjects experiments, outcome has an effect on all four types of moral judgments. This effect is mediated by negligence ascriptions and can ultimately be explained as due to differing probability ascriptions across cases. (shrink)

Assertions are speech acts by means of which we express beliefs. As such they are at the heart of our linguistic and social practices. Recent research has focused extensively on the question whether the speech act of assertion is governed by norms, and if so, under what conditions it is acceptable to make an assertion. Standard theories propose, for instance, that one should only assert that p if one knows that p (the knowledge account), or that one should only assert (...) that p if p is true (the truth account). In a series of four experiments, this question is addressed empirically. Contrary to previous findings, knowledge turns out to be a poor predictor of assertability, and the norm of assertion is not factive either. The studies here presented provide empirical evidence in favour of the view that a speaker is warranted to assert that p only if her belief that p is justified. (shrink)

Computer assisted theorem proving is an increasingly important part of mathematical methodology, as well as a long-standing topic in artificial intelligence (AI) research. However, the current generation of theorem proving software have limited functioning in terms of providing new proofs. Importantly, they are not able to discriminate interesting theorems and proofs from trivial ones. In order for computers to develop further in theorem proving, there would need to be a radical change in how the software functions. Recently, machine learning results (...) in solving mathematical tasks have shown early promise that deep artificial neural networks could learn symbolic mathematical processing. In this paper, I analyze the theoretical prospects of such neural networks in proving mathematical theorems. In particular, I focus on the question how such AI systems could be incorporated in practice to theorem proving and what consequences that could have. In the most optimistic scenario, this includes the possibility of autonomous automated theorem provers (AATP). Here I discuss whether such AI systems could, or should, become accepted as active agents in mathematical communities. (shrink)

In a series of ten preregistered experiments (N=2043), we investigate the effect of outcome valence on judgments of probability, negligence, and culpability – a phenomenon sometimes labelled moral (and legal) luck. We found that harmful outcomes, when contrasted with neutral outcomes, lead to increased perceived probability of harm ex post, and consequently to increased attribution of negligence and culpability. Rather than simply postulating a hindsight bias (as is common), we employ a variety of empirical means to demonstrate that the outcome-driven (...) asymmetry across perceived probabilities constitutes a systematic cognitive distortion. We then explore three distinct strategies to alleviate the hindsight bias and its downstream effects on mens rea and culpability ascriptions. Not all are successful, but at least some prove promising. They should, we argue, be taken into consideration in criminal jurisprudence, where distortions due to the hindsight bias are likely considerable and deeply disconcerting. (shrink)

In this paper, I study the kind of questions we can ask about the existence of numbers. In addition to asking whether numbers exist, and how, I argue that there is also a third relevant question: why numbers exist. In platonist and nominalist accounts this question may not make sense, but in the psychologist account I develop, it is as well-placed as the other two questions. In fact, there are two such why-questions: the causal why-question asks what causes numbers to (...) exist and the teleological why-question asks for what purpose numbers exist. I argue that in a psychologist constructivist account, in which numbers are understood to exist as referents of a particular type of culturally shared concepts, both why-questions can get plausible answers. (shrink)

This paper offers a critique of sustainability reporting and, in particular, a critique of the modern disconnect between the practice of sustainability reporting and what we consider to be the urgent issue of our era: sustaining the life-supporting ecological systems on which humanity and other species depend. Tracing the history of such reporting developments, we identify and isolate the concept of the ‘triple bottom line’ (TBL) as a core and dominant idea that continues to pervade business reporting, and business engagement (...) with sustainability. Incorporating an entity’s economic, environmental and social performance indicators into its management and reporting processes, we argue, has become synonymous with corporate sustainability; in the process, concern for ecology has become sidelined. Moreover, this process has become reinforced and institutionalised through SustainAbility’s biennial benchmarking reports, KPMG’s triennial surveys of practice, initiatives by the accountancy profession and, particularly, the Global Reporting Initiative (GRI)’s sustainability reporting guidelines. We argue that the TBL and the GRI are insufficient conditions for organizations contributing to the sustaining of the Earth’s ecology. Paradoxically, they may reinforce business-as-usual and greater levels of un-sustainability. (shrink)

Why would we want to develop artificial human-like arithmetical intelligence, when computers already outperform humans in arithmetical calculations? Aside from arithmetic consisting of much more than mere calculations, one suggested reason is that AI research can help us explain the development of human arithmetical cognition. Here I argue that this question needs to be studied already in the context of basic, non-symbolic, numerical cognition. Analyzing recent machine learning research on artificial neural networks, I show how AI studies could potentially shed (...) light on the development of human numerical abilities, from the proto-arithmetical abilities of subitizing and estimating to counting procedures. Although the current results are far from conclusive and much more work is needed, I argue that AI research should be included in the interdisciplinary toolbox when we try to explain the development and character of numerical cognition and arithmetical intelligence. This makes it relevant also for the epistemology of mathematics. (shrink)

Leading linguists and philosophers report on all aspects of compositionality, the notion that the meaning of an expression can be derived from its parts. This book explores every dimension of this field, reporting critically on different lines of research, revealing connections between them, and highlighting current problems and opportunities.

This article makes the case for a specific variety of what we call Collective Capital Institutions (CCIs), by returning to the idea of Wage-Earner Funds (WEFs) – a 1970s Swedish policy proposal designed gradually to shift ownership and control over parts of the economy to democratically controlled institutions. We identify two attractive rationales in favour of such a scheme and argue that both can fruitfully be transposed to the current worldwide economic situation. The egalitarian rationale is that WEFs could help (...) in the pursuit of equality by giving a wider set of people a stake in collectively owned companies and a right to their profits. The democratic rationale is that WEFs redistribute not only these profits, but also the power over economic decisions made within companies. We then contrast such schemes for collective capital ownership with the similar but much more privatised proposals set out in, for instance, John Rawls's idea of a ‘property-owning democracy’. We argue that CCIs ultimately are more likely to contribute to the development of the ‘sense of justice’ within society that is needed for a stable just society. We conclude that CCIs deserve a great deal more exploration in academic and political discussions of egalitarian economic systems. (shrink)

Given some reasonable assumptions concerning the nature of mental causation, non-reductive physicalism faces the following dilemma. If mental events cause physical events, they merely overdetermine their effects (given the causal closure of the physical). If mental events cause only other mental events, they do not make the kind of difference we want them to. This dilemma can be avoided if we drop the dichotomy between physical and mental events. Mental events make a real difference if they cause actions. But actions (...) are neither mental nor physical events. They are realized by physical events, but they are not type-identical with them. This gives us non-reductive physicalism without downward causation. The tenability of this view has been questioned. Jaegwon Kim, in particular, has argued that non-reductive physicalism is committed to downward causation. Appealing to the nature of actions, I will argue that this commitment can be avoided. (shrink)

In Pantsar (2014), an outline for an empirically feasible epistemological theory of arithmetic is presented. According to that theory, arithmetical knowledge is based on biological primitives but in the resulting empirical context develops an essentially a priori character. Such contextual a priori theory of arithmetical knowledge can explain two of the three characteristics that are usually associated with mathematical knowledge: that it appears to be a priori and objective. In this paper it is argued that it can also explain the (...) ... (shrink)

One of the most fundamental questions in the philosophy of mathematics concerns the relation between truth and formal proof. The position according to which the two concepts are the same is called deflationism, and the opposing viewpoint substantialism. In an important result of mathematical logic, Kurt Gödel proved in his first incompleteness theorem that all consistent formal systems containing arithmetic include sentences that can neither be proved nor disproved within that system. However, such undecidable Gödel sentences can be established to (...) be true once we expand the formal system with Alfred Tarski s semantical theory of truth, as shown by Stewart Shapiro and Jeffrey Ketland in their semantical arguments for the substantiality of truth. According to them, in Gödel sentences we have an explicit case of true but unprovable sentences, and hence deflationism is refuted. -/- Against that, Neil Tennant has shown that instead of Tarskian truth we can expand the formal system with a soundness principle, according to which all provable sentences are assertable, and the assertability of Gödel sentences follows. This way, the relevant question is not whether we can establish the truth of Gödel sentences, but whether Tarskian truth is a more plausible expansion than a soundness principle. In this work I will argue that this problem is best approached once we think of mathematics as the full human phenomenon, and not just consisting of formal systems. When pre-formal mathematical thinking is included in our account, we see that Tarskian truth is in fact not an expansion at all. I claim that what proof is to formal mathematics, truth is to pre-formal thinking, and the Tarskian account of semantical truth mirrors this relation accurately. -/- However, the introduction of pre-formal mathematics is vulnerable to the deflationist counterargument that while existing in practice, pre-formal thinking could still be philosophically superfluous if it does not refer to anything objective. Against this, I argue that all truly deflationist philosophical theories lead to arbitrariness of mathematics. In all other philosophical accounts of mathematics there is room for a reference of the pre-formal mathematics, and the expansion of Tarkian truth can be made naturally. Hence, if we reject the arbitrariness of mathematics, I argue in this work, we must accept the substantiality of truth. Related subjects such as neo-Fregeanism will also be covered, and shown not to change the need for Tarskian truth. -/- The only remaining route for the deflationist is to change the underlying logic so that our formal languages can include their own truth predicates, which Tarski showed to be impossible for classical first-order languages. With such logics we would have no need to expand the formal systems, and the above argument would fail. From the alternative approaches, in this work I focus mostly on the Independence Friendly (IF) logic of Jaakko Hintikka and Gabriel Sandu. Hintikka has claimed that an IF language can include its own adequate truth predicate. I argue that while this is indeed the case, we cannot recognize the truth predicate as such within the same IF language, and the need for Tarskian truth remains. In addition to IF logic, also second-order logic and Saul Kripke s approach using Kleenean logic will be shown to fail in a similar fashion. (shrink)

How do we acquire the notions of cardinality and cardinal number? In the (neo-)Fregean approach, they are derived from the notion of equinumerosity. According to some alternative approaches, defended and developed by Husserl and Parsons among others, the order of explanation is reversed: equinumerosity is explained in terms of cardinality, which, in turn, is explained in terms of our ordinary practices of counting. In their paper, ‘Cardinality, Counting, and Equinumerosity’, Richard Kimberly Heck proposes that instead of equinumerosity or counting, cardinality (...) is derived from a cognitively earlier notion of _just as many_. In this paper, we assess Heck’s proposal in terms of contemporary theories of number concept acquisition. Focusing on bootstrapping theories, we argue that there is no evidence that the notion of _just as many_ is cognitively primary. Furthermore, since the acquisition of cardinality is an enculturated process, the cognitive primariness of these notions, possibly including _just as many_, depends on various external cultural factors. Therefore, being possibly a cultural construction, _just as many_ could be one among several notions used in the acquisition of cardinality and cardinal number concepts. This paper thus challenges those accounts which seek for a fundamental concept underlying all aspects of numerical cognition. (shrink)

In Pantsar, an outline for an empirically feasible epistemological theory of arithmetic is presented. According to that theory, arithmetical knowledge is based on biological primitives but in the resulting empirical context develops an essentially a priori character. Such contextual a priori theory of arithmetical knowledge can explain two of the three characteristics that are usually associated with mathematical knowledge: that it appears to be a priori and objective. In this paper it is argued that it can also explain the third (...) one: why arithmetical knowledge appears to be necessary. A Kripkean analysis of necessity is used as an example to show that a proper analysis of the relevant possible worlds can explain arithmetical necessity in a sufficiently strong form. (shrink)

Intellectual humility is an interesting but underexplored disposition. The claim “I am (intellectually) humble” seems paradoxical in that someone who has the disposition in question would not typically volunteer it. There is an explanatory gap between the meaning of the sentence and the meaning the speaker expresses by uttering it. We therefore suggest analyzing intellectual humility semantically, using a psycholexical approach that focuses on both synonyms and antonyms of ‘intellectual humility’. We present a thesaurus-based method to map the semantic space (...) of intellectual humility as a heuristic to support philosophical and psychological analysis of this disposition. We find three semantic clusters that compose intellectual humility: the sensible self, the discreet self, and the inquisitive self; likewise, we find three clusters that compose its contraries: the overrated self, the underrated other, and the underrated self. (shrink)

Kant's account of “precepts of prudence” raises a striking interpretive puzzle. On the one hand, he presents such precepts as normative-practical rules; on the other hand, he relegates them to theoretical philosophy. I argue that to render these two strands coherent, we must assume that our empirical nature is a source of normativity for us: prudence is normative for us just because we have an “unconditional” empirical desire for obtaining happiness, a maximum of pleasant sensations. Since rules of prudence cognize (...) the means for causing a state of affairs that we desire and value insofar as we are receptive natural beings, these rules do not presuppose the active self-legislation of practical reason. Hence they belong to the theoretical cognition of nature. (shrink)

I examine the division of labor between the Metaphysical Deduction (MD) and the Transcendental Deduction (TD). Against a common reading, I argue that the MD is insufficient to prove the a priori origin of the categories. For both Kant and his main opponent, namely Hume, the question of whether the categories have an a priori origin in the pure understanding is inseparable from the question of whether they have objective validity. Since the MD does not establish the objective validity of (...) the categories, it cannot establish their a priori origin either. The MD is nevertheless an indispensable part of Kant's project because it lays the argumentative groundwork for the proof structure of the TD and because it provides the systematic plan for the future metaphysics of experience. (shrink)

Upregulation of implicit positive affect (PA) can act as a mechanism to deal with negative affect. Two studies tracked temporal changes in positive and negative affect (NA) assessed by self-report and the Implicit Positive and Negative Affect Test (IPANAT; Quirin, Kazén, & Kuhl, 2009). Study 1 observed the predicted increases in implicit PA after exposure to a threat-related film clip, which correlated positively with the speed of recognising a happy face among an angry crowd. Study 2 replicated increases in implicit (...) PA after exposition to the same film clip, and showed that such increases were enhanced by priming self-referential stimuli. The findings are discussed against the background of personality systems interaction (PSI) theory (Kuhl, 2000, 2001), which emphasises the role of the implicit self in affect regulation. (shrink)

Hutto and Myin have proposed an account of radically enactive (or embodied) cognition (REC) as an explanation of cognitive phenomena, one that does not include mental representations or mental content in basic minds. Recently, Zahidi and Myin have presented an account of arithmetical cognition that is consistent with the REC view. In this paper, I first evaluate the feasibility of that account by focusing on the evolutionarily developed proto-arithmetical abilities and whether empirical data on them support the radical enactivist view. (...) I argue that although more research is needed, it is at least possible to develop the REC position consistently with the state-of-the-art empirical research on the development of arithmetical cognition. After this, I move the focus to the question whether the radical enactivist account can explain the objectivity of arithmetical knowledge. Against the realist view suggested by Hutto, I argue that objectivity is best explained through analyzing the way universal proto-arithmetical abilities determine the development of arithmetical cognition. (shrink)

In this conceptual analysis contribution to the special issue on radical embodied cognition, we discuss how embodied cognition can exist with and without representations. We explore this concept through the lens of judgment and decision making in sports (JDMS). Embodied cognition has featured in many investigations of human behavior, but no single approach has emerged. Indeed, the very definitions of the concepts “embodiment” and “cognition” lack consensus, and consequently the degree of “radicalism” is not universally defined, either. In this paper (...) we address JDMS not from a rigid theoretical perspective, but from two embodied cognition approaches: one that assumes there is mediation between the athlete and the environment through mental representation, and another that assumes direct contact between the athlete and the environment and thus no need for mental representation. Importantly, our aim was not to arrive at a theoretical consensus or set up a competition between approaches, but rather to provide a legitimate scientific discussion about how to explain empirical results in JDMS from contrasting perspectives within embodied cognition. For this, we first outline the definitions and constructs of embodied cognition in JDMS. Second, we detail the theory underlying the mental representation and direct contact approaches. Third, we comment on two published research papers on JDMS, one selected by each of us: (1) Correia et al. (2012) and (2) Pizzera (2012). Fourth, following the interpretation of the empirical findings of these papers, we present a discussion on the commonalities and divergences of these two perspectives and the consequences of using one or the other approach in the study of JDMS. (shrink)

Rubin and Pearl offered approaches to causal effect estimation and Lewis and Pearl offered theories of counterfactual conditionals. Arguments offered by Pearl and his collaborators support a weak form of equivalence such that notation from the rival theory can be re-purposed to express Pearl’s theory in a way that is equivalent to Pearl’s theory expressed in its native notation. Nonetheless, the many fundamental differences between the theories rule out any stronger form of equivalence. A renewed emphasis on comparative research can (...) help to guide applications, further develop each theory, and better understand their relative strengths and weaknesses. (shrink)

Libertarianism appears to be incoherent, because free will appears to be incompatible with indeterminism. In support of this claim, van Inwagen offered an argument that is now known as the “rollback argument”. In a recent reply, Lara Buchak has argued that the underlying thought experiment fails to support the first of two key premises. On her view, this points to an unexplored alternative in the free will debate, which she calls “chance-incompatibilism”. I will argue that the rollback thought experiment does (...) support the second key premise of the argument, and, more importantly, that libertarianism is committed to the first premise for independent reasons concerning the relationship between the normative and causal strength of the agent’s reasons. The upshot will be that chance-incompatibilism is not a promising new alternative in the free will debate, and we will see that the debate around those issues can benefit from more attention to the role of the agent’s reasons for action. (shrink)

Scientific perspectivism, or perspectival realism, is a view according to which scientific knowledge is neither utterly objective nor independent of the world “as it is”, but always tied to some particular ways of conceptualization and interaction with Nature. In the present paper, I employ Robert Rosen’s concept of the modeling relation for arguing that there are two basic reasons why our knowledge of natural systems is perspectival in this sense. The first of these pertains to the dualism between a system (...) and its environment, which is necessarily imposed by a scientist focusing on the former. The second pertains to the complexity of complex systems; a complex system understood as a system in which different kinds of causal entailments intertwine together. As I discuss in the paper besides developing the argument, perspectivism thus understood ties together several issues ranging from organicism to emergentism and to processual philosophy, and from the ceteris paribus talk of biology to the measurement problem of quantum mechanics. I also discuss Rosen’s relational formalisms as a concrete example of how perspectival epistemology might directly suggest novel strategies and practices of doing theoretical science. (shrink)

Pharmaceutical companies developed Covid-19 vaccines in record time. However, it soon became apparent that global access to the vaccines was inequitable. Through a qualitative inquiry as the pandemic unfolded (to mid-2021), we provide an in-depth analysis of why companies engaged with the Covid-19 Vaccines Global Access Facility (COVAX), identifying the internal (to the company) and external factors that facilitated or impeded engagement. While all producers of the World Health Organization (WHO)-approved vaccines engaged with COVAX, our analysis highlights the differential levels (...) of COVAX engagement and identifies contractual obligations, opportunities and company strategy, and reputational pressures as key explanatory factors. We discuss our empirical findings relative to the literature on political corporate social responsibility (PCSR). Accordingly, we question whether pharmaceutical companies lived up to their responsibilities as corporate citizens and conclude that they failed to fulfill the implied responsibility of combating inequitable vaccine distribution. We conclude with implications of our research for practice, in relation to the challenges of global access to Covid-19 vaccines and for access to medicines more generally. (shrink)

What has the self to be like such that introspective awareness of it is possible? The paper asks if Descartes’s idea of an inner self can be upheld and discusses this issue by invoking two principles: the phenomenal transparency of experience and the semantic compositionality of conceptual content. It is assumed that self-awareness is a second-order state either in the domain of experience or in the domain of thought. In the former case self-awareness turns out empty if experience is transparent. (...) In the latter, it can best be conceived of as a form of mental quotation. Various proposed analyses of direct and indirect quotation are discussed and tested regarding their applicability to thought. It is concluded that, on the assumption of compositionality, the inner self is only insofar accessible to awareness as it has an accessible phonological structure, as apparently only inner speech does. (shrink)

This paper addresses various solutions to Meno's Problem: Why is it that knowledge is more valuable than merely true belief? Given both a pragmatist as well as a veritist understanding of epistemic value, it is argued that a reliabilist analysis of knowledge, in general, promises a hopeful strategy to explain the extra value of knowledge. It is, however, shown that two recent attempts to solve Meno's Problem within reliabilism are severely flawed: Olsson's conditional probability solution and Goldman's value autonomization solution. (...) The paper proceeds with a discussion of the purpose of having a higher value of knowledge as opposed to merely true belief, both in evolutionary and social terms. It claims that under a reliabilist analysis of knowledge it can be explained how knowers could evolve rather than just truthful believers. Subsequently, the paper develops an account of how we can manipulate our testimonial environment in an epistemically beneficial way by valuing reliably produced true belief more that just true belief and so gives an indirect justification of the extra value of knowledge. (shrink)

Schelling entwirft in seiner Spätphilosophie einen neuen Philosophietypus, der in Konkurrenz zu Hegels Metaphysik tritt. Dabei greift er Hegel nicht nur auf dem Gebiet fundamentaler theoretischen Annahmen an, sondern sucht ihn insbesondere durch einen neuen Begriff von Religion zu überbieten. Die Arbeit untersucht dies im Ausgang von Schellings "Philosophie der Mythologie".

In 1927, Paul Dirac first explicitly introduced the idea that electrodynamical processes can be evaluated by decomposing them into virtual (modern terminology), energy non-conserving subprocesses. This mode of reasoning structured a lot of the perturbative evaluations of quantum electrodynamics during the 1930s. Although the physical picture connected to Feynman diagrams is no longer based on energy non-conserving transitions but on off-shell particles, emission and absorption subprocesses still remain their fundamental constituents. This article will access the introduction and the initial reception (...) of this picture of subsequent transitions (PST) by conceiving of concepts, models, and their representations as tools for the practitioners. I will argue for a multi-factorial explanation of Dirac’s initial, verbally explicit introduction: the mathematical representation he had developed was highly suggestive and already partly conceptualized; Dirac was philosophical flexible enough to talk about transitions when no actual transitions, according to the general interpretation of quantum mechanics of the time, occurred; and, importantly, Dirac eventually used the verbal exposition in the same paper in which he introduced it. The direct impact of PST on the conception of quantum electrodynamical processes will be exemplified by its reflection in diagrammatical representations. The study of the diverging ontological commitments towards PST immediately after its introduction opens up the prehistory of a philosophical debate that stretches out into the present: the dispute about the representational and ontological status of the physical picture connected to the evaluation of the perturbative series of QED and QFT. (shrink)

Psychological measurement has received strong criticism throughout the history of psychological science. Nevertheless, measurements of attributes such as emotions or intelligence continue to be widely used in research and society. I address this puzzle by presenting a new causal perspective to psychological measurement. I start with assumptions that both critics and proponents of psychological measurement are likely to accept: a minimal causal condition and the observation that most psychological concepts are ill-defined or ambiguous. Based on this, I argue that psychological (...) measurement is fundamentally different from measurement in the physical sciences but can nevertheless be useful. (shrink)

This paper presents two cognitive models that simulate the production of referring expressions in the iMAP task—a task-oriented dialog. One general model is based on Dale and Reiter’s (1995)incremental algorithm, and the other is a simple template model that has a higher correlation with the data but is specifically geared toward the properties of the iMAP task. The property of the iMAP task environment that is modeled here is that the color feature is unreliable for identifying referents while other features (...) are reliable. The low computational cost of the incremental algorithm for generating referring expressions makes it an interesting starting point for a cognitive model. However, its explanatory power is limited, because it generates uniquely distinguishing referring expressions and because it considers features for inclusion in the referring expression in a fixed order. The first model extends the original incremental algorithm by an ability to adapt to feedback of whether a referring expression was used successfully, but it seems to overpredict the frequency with which distinguishing expressions are made and underpredict the frequency of overspecified referring expressions. The second model produces features for referring expressions purely based on its current estimate of a feature’s utility. Both models predict the observed human behavior of decreasing use of color terms and increasing use of useful feature terms. (shrink)

In this essay I consider the relationship between Heidegger’s famous “turn” and realism. I begin with Heidegger’s critique of the problem of an external world, and I describe how this critique anticipates New Realism. I then provide a reconstruction of Heidegger’s self-critique of Being and Time, showing how this work exhibits a higher-order antirealism. Next, I show how Heidegger’s turn is motivated by the inadequacy of this earlier anti-realism. In his philosophy of the event he moves towards a realist ontology (...) by developing concepts such as “destiny”, which he understands to be independent of human attitudes. Nevertheless, Heidegger ultimately falls back into an anti-realism, because Being still remains dependent upon the involvement of human beings. I therefore conclude this essay by briefly arguing for my own version of New Realism, according to which objects are meaningful in a way that is independent of our attitudes towards them. (shrink)

Journal Name: SATS Issue: Ahead of print.

G. A. Cohen has argued that egalitarian justice proscribes equality-upsetting economic incentives, but that individuals nevertheless are required to make a sufficiently large productive contribution to society. This article argues, however, that Cohen’s claim that justice is insensitive to Pareto concerns and simply is equality, undermines such a duty. In fact, Cohen cannot say that justice prefers a distribution where everyone is equally well off to one where everyone is equally badly off. Individuals hence cannot have a duty of justice (...) to use their talents at a more productive level. This indifference risks removing Cohen’s egalitarianism’s appeal as an alternative to the Rawlsian position it challenges. Several ways of avoiding this problem are proposed and evaluated. Ultimately, it is argued that such a duty to contribute must instead be based on a concern for both equality and human flourishing. The ethos Cohen defends must hence be made pluralist, and encourage a commitment to both principles. (shrink)

In this paper, I study how mathematicians are presented in western popular culture. I identify five stereotypes that I test on the best-known modern movies and television shows containing a significant amount of mathematics or important mathematician characters: (1) Mathematics is highly valued as an intellectual pursuit. (2) Little attention is given to the mathematical content. (3) Mathematical practice is portrayed in an unrealistic way. (4) Mathematicians are asocial and unable to enjoy normal life. (5) Higher mathematics is ...

To solve the ancient Pyrrhonian problematic, it is not enough to show that knowledge and justified belief are possible. They must be shown to be actual. It is argued that the attempts by the main advocates of reliabilism, William Alston, Alvin Goldman, and Ernest Sosa, fail to solve the problematic because they fall under the Agrippan modes of circularity and hypothesis. There is also another sort of response implicit in their discussion. It is not to try to solve the problematic, (...) but to accept the Pyrrhonian moral and to settle for appearances. Finally, a version of Pyrrhonism is given, and it is suggested that reliabilism be understood as a case of this sort of Pyrrhonism. (shrink)

This paper addresses the questions concerningthe relationship between scientific andcognitive processes. The fact that both,science and cognition, aim at acquiring somekind of knowledge or representationabout the world is the key for establishing alink between these two domains. It turns outthat the constructivist frameworkrepresents an adequate epistemologicalfoundation for this undertaking, as its focusof interest is on the (constructive)relationship between the world and itsrepresentation. More specifically, it will beshown how cognitive processes and their primaryconcern to construct a representation of theenvironment and to (...) generate functionallyfitting behavior can act as the basis forembedding the activities and dynamics of theprocess of science in them by making use ofconstructivist concepts, such as functionalfitness, structure determinedness, etc.Cognitive science and artificiallife provide the conceptual framework of representational spaces and their interactionbetween each other and with the environmentenabling us to establish this link betweencognitive processes and thedevelopment/dynamics of scientific theories.The concepts of activation, synaptic weight,and genetic (representational) spaces arepowerful tools which can be used asexplanatory vehiclesfor a cognitivefoundation of science, more specifically forthe context of discovery (i.e., thedevelopment, construction, and dynamics ofscientific theories and paradigms).Representational spaces do not only offer us abetter understanding of embedding science incognition, but also show, how theconstructivist framework, both, can act as anadequate epistemological foundation for theseprocesses and can be instantiated by theserepresentational concepts from cognitivescience. The final part of this paper addresses somemore fundamental questions concerning thepositivistic and constructivist understandingof science and human cognition. Among otherthings it is asked, whether a purelyfunctionalist and quantitative view of theworld aiming almost exclusively at itsprediction and control is really satisfying forour intellect (having the goal of achieving aprofound understanding of reality). (shrink)

Starting from the premise that what calls for and happens in the work and thinking of translation is inseparable from the experience of reading Heidegger’sphilosophy, this article suggests that translation in Heidegger’s work is a philosophical problem fundamentally implicated in the thinking of Being. The article first examines Heidegger’s distinction between Übersetzen—a form of translation that seeks correspondences between words of different languages, and Übersetzen—a translation within one’s own language that seeks to respond to the “claim” of language itself. The (...) second part of the article links translation with Heidegger’s later reflections on language in Unterwegs zur Sprache, arguing that what is at stake in the work of translation is a thinking of our relation to language. Focusing on the notion of “usage/Brauch,” it concludes with the suggestion that insofar as thinking translation according to Heidegger requires a “response” to the claim of language, it also calls for a more sustained engagement with the question of how the human is claimed and used by language. (shrink)

One key question in the philosophy of artificial intelligence (AI) concerns how we can recognize artificial systems as intelligent. To make the general question more manageable, I focus on a particular type of AI, namely one that can prove mathematical theorems. The current generation of automated theorem provers are not understood to possess intelligence, but in my thought experiment an AI provides humanly interesting proofs of theorems and communicates them in human-like manner as scientific papers. I then ask what the (...) criteria could be for recognizing such an AI as intelligent. I propose an approach in which the relevant criteria are based on the AI’s interaction within the mathematical community. Finally, I ask whether we can deny the intelligence of the AI in such a scenario based on reasons other than its (non-biological) material construction. (shrink)

Abstract In the new millennium there have been important empirical developments in the philosophy of mathematics. One of these is the so-called “Empirical Philosophy of Mathematics”(EPM) of Buldt, Löwe, Müller and Müller-Hill, which aims to complement the methodology of the philosophy of mathematics with empirical work. Among other things, this includes surveys of mathematicians, which EPM believes to give philosophically important results. In this paper I take a critical look at the sociological part of EPM as a case study of (...) ... (shrink)

“Naturrecht Feyerabend” is a collection of student notes taken on a lecture that Kant gave around the time he was working on the Groundwork. I show that these notes portray Kant as proposing a defense of morality and freedom whose “subjectivism” is unparalleled by anything that we find in his major published works. Kant here traces both the normativity of the moral principle that we must treat humanity as an end in itself and the legitimacy of regarding ourselves as free (...) agents to the subjective needs of finite human reason that he discusses in the Transcendental Dialectic of the Critique of Pure Reason. I argue that this subjectivist defense of morality and freedom does not withstand the critical scrutiny that is suggested by Kant’s considered (published) views on these topics. (shrink)

Existential crises, referred to as inner conflicts, are characterized by identity confusion and meaninglessness. Tension and anxiety accompany them, often to the point where they produce melancholy and make it difficult to go about everyday tasks. Their negative outlook on meaning is reminiscent of some elements of the existentialist intellectual movement. It is possible to categories existential crises' emotional, cognitive, and behavioral aspects. Emotional components include emotions like emotional discomfort, helplessness, despair, guilt, concern, or loneliness. The issue of insignificance, the (...) erosion of one's spiritual beliefs or personal values, and death anxiety are examples of cognitive components. Among the behavioral components are addictions, which encompass antisocial and obsessive behavior. A person may have existential crises during any time, including adolescence, midlife, older life, and quarter-life. Early crises are typically forward-looking, with the person feeling uncertain and scared about their future course in terms of education, work, identity, and social connections. Subsequent crises are typically retroactive. They are typically accompanied by feelings of regret, humiliation, and fear of dying and are frequently sparked by the idea that one is past one's prime. It is easier for a person to resolve or avoid further existential crises if a previous crisis was well resolved. Existential crises do not occur to everyone. (shrink)

Tutkin tässä artikkelissa Kurt Gödelin epätäydellisyysteoreemojen tulkintoja filosofiassa. Aihepiiri kattaa valtavan määrän eri tulkintoja tekoälystä fysiikkaan ja runouteen asti. Osoitan, että kriittisesti tarkasteltuna kaikki radikaalit epätäydellisyysteoreemojen sovellukset ovat virheellisiä.