This study uses a comparative analysis of key texts in the history of literature and philosophy to uncover the historical-semantic foundations of structuralist thought. By examining shifts within the paradigm of 'articulation' the author demonstrates how language became an explanatory model for a range of other organizing systems. This background makes it possible to comprehend the broadly disseminated network of modern structuralist theories."--Publisher's website.

In very general terms, an agent is a being with the capacity to act, and 'agency' denotes the exercise or manifestation of this capacity. The philosophy of action provides us with a standard conception and a standard theory of action. The former construes action in terms of intentionality, the latter explains the intentionality of action in terms of causation by the agent’s mental states and events. From this, we obtain a standard conception and a standard theory of agency. There are (...) alternative conceptions of agency, and it has been argued that the standard theory fails to capture agency. Further, it seems that genuine agency can be exhibited by beings that are not capable of intentional action, and it has been argued that agency can and should be explained without reference to causally efficacious mental states and events. Debates about the nature of agency have flourished over the past few decades in philosophy and in other areas of research. In philosophy, the nature of agency is an important issue in the philosophy of mind, the philosophy of psychology, the debates on free will and moral responsibility, in ethics, meta-ethics, and in the debates on the nature of reasons and practical rationality. For the most part, this entry focuses on conceptual and metaphysical questions concerning the nature of agency. In the final sections, it provides an overview of empirically informed accounts of the sense of agency and of various empirical challenges to the commonsense assumption that our reasons and our conscious intentions make a real difference to how we act. (shrink)

Robustness is often presented as a guideline for distinguishing the true or real from mere appearances or artifacts. Most of recent discussions of robustness have focused on the kind of derivational robustness analysis introduced by Levins, while the related but distinct idea of robustness as multiple accessibility, defended by Wimsatt, has received less attention. In this paper, I argue that the latter kind of robustness, when properly understood, can provide justification for ontological commitments. The idea is that we are justified (...) in believing that things studied by science are real insofar as we have robust evidence for them. I develop and analyze this idea in detail, and based on concrete examples show that it plays an important role in science. Finally, I demonstrate how robustness can be used to clarify the debate on scientific realism and to formulate new arguments. (shrink)

In this paper I develop a philosophical account of actual mathematical infinity that does not demand ontologically or epistemologically problematic assumptions. The account is based on a simple metaphor in which we think of indefinitely continuing processes as defining objects. It is shown that such a metaphor is valid in terms of mathematical practice, as well as in line with empirical data on arithmetical cognition.

I propose a new way of understanding Kant’s doctrine of freedom. My reading seeks to combine features of two popular opposed lines of interpretation, namely, of metaphysical and anti-metaphysical readings. I defend the view that Kant’s idealist attempt to ‘save’ human freedom involves substantive metaphysical commitments. However, I show that this interpretation can fruitfully integrate important insights that are standardly associated with deflationary readings: first, the idea that for Kant freedom and natural necessity can be ascribed to one and the (...) same human being; and second, the idea that for Kant the belief in freedom and the belief in natural necessity belong to two different standpoints. (shrink)

Traditional compatibilism about free will is widely considered to be untenable. In particular, the conditional analysis of the ability to do otherwise appears to be subject to clear counterexamples. I will propose a new version of traditional compatibilism that provides a conditional account of both the ability to do otherwise and the ability to choose to do otherwise, and I will argue that this view withstands the standard objections to traditional compatibilism. For this, I will assume with incompatibilists that the (...) mere possession of a general ability to do otherwise is not sufficient for having the ability that is required for free will. This concession distinguishes the view from the traditional conditional analysis and from recent dispositional accounts of the ability to do otherwise, and we will see that this concession enables a straightforward response to the counterexamples. This, in turn, will play a crucial role in my response to the strongest version of the consequence argument for incompatibilism. (shrink)

This article aims to achieve two goals: to show that probability is not the only way of dealing with uncertainty ; and to provide evidence that logic-based methods can well support reasoning with uncertainty. For the latter claim, two paradigmatic examples are presented: logic programming with Kleene semantics for modelling reasoning from information in a discourse, to an interpretation of the state of affairs of the intended model, and a neural-symbolic implementation of input/output logic for dealing with uncertainty in dynamic (...) normative contexts. (shrink)

The volume contains the written versions of all papers given at the workshop, divided into five chapters and followed by Alvin Goldman's replies in the sixth.

Many commentators hold that in addition to the categorical imperative of morality, Kant also posits an objective law of non-moral practical rationality, 'the' Hypothetical Imperative. On this view, the appeal to the Hypothetical Imperative increases the dialectical options that Kantians have vis-a-vis Humean skepticism about the authority of reason, and it allows for a systematic explanation of the possibility of non-moral weakness of will. I argue that despite its appeal, this interpretation cannot be sustained: for Kant the only objective, universally (...) valid a priori principle of practical reason that governs transcendentally free agents is the moral law. All non-moral practical rules are mere “precepts” that lack genuine objectivity, certainty, and intersubjective validity. I suggest that for Kant the rejection of the possibility of non-moral practical laws plays an important part in his argument for the supreme rational authority of moral norms over prudential precepts of happiness. (shrink)

Este breve artigo traz em seu bojo a articulaçáo da compreensáo physiologica do corpo-carne em Epicuro com a Techne he Ietrike (Medicina Antiga), com vistas a mostrar o ethos (carater) comum à medicina e a filosofia na antiguidade.

This volume provides an overview of the most recent developments in empirical investigations of morality and assesses their impact and importance for ethical thinking. It involves contributions of scholars both from philosophy, theology and empirical sciences with firm standings in their own disciplines, but an inclination to step across borders-in particular the one between the world of facts and the world of norms. Human morality is complex, and probably even messy-and this clean distinction becomes blurred whenever one looks more closely (...) at the various components that enable and influence our moral actions and ethical orientations. In that way, morality may indeed be located between facts and norms-and an empirically informed ethics that is less concerned with analytical purity but immerses into this moral complexity may be an important step to make the contributions of ethics to this world more valuable and relevant. (shrink)

In this paper, we explore digitally fabricated aesthetic enhancements and modifications of the body as well as digitally fabricated fauna habitats. We will address how we utilize speculative works through our bio inspired digitally fabricated designs via two of our most recent projects: {skin} D.E.E.P. and in silico et in situ. Through these two projects we explore cultural implications of the intersection of technology and biologically inspired art/design. Technology has provided an ever increasing amount of data which has facilitated the (...) way data can be used in aesthetic explorations. Technology can redefine the human experience by enhancing our senses, experiences, and forms of expression. In our work {skin} D.E.E.P., we explore these ideas via augmentation through wearables and biomimetic expressions on the skin through digitally fabricated prosthetics. {skin} D.E.E.P. employs temporary biomimetic skin patterns via wearable 3D printed exoskeletons. The first series of this work mimics the patterns and textures of animal skin via ephemeral impressions onto human skin. Taking inspiration from shedding snakeskin, we shed the outer layer by removing the 3D printed prosthesis. The epidermis retains the negative imprint of the prosthetic mimicking the look of serpent skin. The dermis reestablishes the smooth form of the human skin as it heals itself within the hour, erasing the ephemeral imprint, symbolically representing rebirth and renewal. Investigating the ephemeral aesthetic of textured patterns on human skin will not by any means provide a solution to an engineering problem, yet acts as a larger philosophical basis to conduct a discussion about the possibilities of blending bio inspired designs. The manifestation of data into physical form occurs via digital fabrication in our most recent series in silico et in situ: fauna habitats in the age of voxels, where we aim to create a new ecosystem for animals and to potentially augment their habitat. The habitats include pollinator waterers, spider habitats and turtle basking platforms. This project pushes forward with a new piece—the development of a 20-foot avian sculpture that will solely exist to support the habitat of the Chimney Swift species. The Chimney Swift is a near-threatened bird species in the US. in silico et in situ investigates the interplay of art, nature and technology by contextualizing sculptural works and placing these sculptures into nature. The project serves as a breeding ground for a larger dialogue about nature, culture, human intervention, design art and technology. Providing the artwork in the public sphere, barrier free in nature, fosters this discourse. (shrink)

In a recent paper in 'Social Epistemology' Dimitri Ginev aims to show that Ludwik Fleck uses transcendental arguments in two contexts in his work that are closely intertwined: the context of comparative cognitive sociology and the context of socio-historical epistemology. I am skeptical about Ginev’s interpretation and my aim is to show that at least the part of Ginev’s argument in which he aims to show Fleck’s use of transcendental arguments in the context of socio-historical epistemology is not convincing. To (...) my mind, a much better interpretation of Fleck’s argument in this context is to see Fleck as using scientisticinstead of transcendental arguments. (shrink)

Advanced old age has been characterized as a biologically highly vulnerable life phase. Biological, morbidity-, and cognitive impairment-related factors play an important role as mortality predictors among very old adults. However, it is largely unknown whether previous findings confirming the role of different wellbeing domains for mortality translate to survival among the oldest-old individuals. Moreover, the distinction established in the wellbeing literature between hedonic and eudaimonic wellbeing as well as the consideration of within-person variability of potentially relevant mortality predictors has (...) not sufficiently been addressed in prior mortality research. In this study, we examined a broad set of hedonic and eudaimonic wellbeing indicators, including their levels, their changes, as well as their within-person variability, as predictors of all-cause mortality in a sample of very old individuals. We used data from the LateLine study, a 7-year longitudinal study based on a sample of n = 124 individuals who were living alone and who were aged 87–97 years at baseline. Study participants provided up to 16 measurement occasions between 2009 and 2016. Dates of death were available for 118 individuals who had deceased between 2009 and 2021. We ran longitudinal multilevel structural equation models and specified between-person level differences, within-person long-term linear change trends, as well as the “detrended” within-person variability in three indicators of hedonic and four indicators of eudaimonic wellbeing as all-cause mortality predictors. Controlling for age, gender, education, and physical condition and testing our sets of hedonic and eudaimonic indictors separately in terms of their mortality impact, solely one eudaimonic wellbeing indicator, namely, autonomy, showed significant effects on survival. Surprisingly, autonomy appeared “paradoxically” related with mortality, with high individual levels and intraindividual highly stable perceptions of autonomy being associated with a shorter residual lifetime. Thus, it seems plausible that accepting dependency and changing perceptions of autonomy over time in accordance with objectively remaining capabilities might become adaptive for survival in very old age. (shrink)

In early analytic philosophy, one of the most central questions concerned the status of arithmetical objects. Frege argued against the popular conception that we arrive at natural numbers with a psychological process of abstraction. Instead, he wanted to show that arithmetical truths can be derived from the truths of logic, thus eliminating all psychological components. Meanwhile, Dedekind and Peano developed axiomatic systems of arithmetic. The differences between the logicist and axiomatic approaches turned out to be philosophical as well as mathematical. (...) In this paper, I will argue that Dedekind’s approach can be seen as a precursor to modern structuralism and as such, it enjoys many advantages over Frege’s logicism. I also show that from a modern perspective, Frege’s criticism of abstraction and psychologism is one-sided and fails against the psychological processes that modern research suggests to be at the heart of numerical cognition. The approach here is twofold. First, through historical analysis, I will try to build a clear image of what Frege’s and Dedekind’s views on arithmetic were. Then, I will consider those views from the perspective of modern philosophy of mathematics, and in particular, the empirical study of arithmetical cognition. I aim to show that there is nothing to suggest that the axiomatic Dedekind approach could not provide a perfectly adequate basis for philosophy of arithmetic. (shrink)

In his Contributions to the Analysis of the Sensations (Mach 1885) the phenomenalist philosopher Ernst Mach confronts us with a difficulty: “If we regard the Ego as a real unity, we become involved in the following dilemma: either we must set over against the Ego a world of unknowable entities […] or we must regard the whole world, the Egos of other people included, as comprised in our own Ego.” (Mach 1885: 21) In other words, if we start from a (...) phenomenalist viewpoint, i.e., if we believe that the manifold of sensations we are confronted with is ontologically fundamental —as Mach clearly does: “For us, colors, sounds, spaces, times,… are the ultimate ele-ments” (Mach 1885: 23)—then we are in danger to end up in solipsism. Unless, that is, we assume that some underlying thing-in-itself substratum from which matter, we ourselves, and all the others emanate. The only other alter-native seems to be—and Mach advertises it vehemently for he denies any “mons-trous notion of a thing-in-itself” (Mach 1885: 6)1—that we get rid of the Ego. For, if there is no Self in the first place, then the question whether there are others dissolves. To put it the other way round, it is ok that the others do not exist because, really, I do not exist either. If the Ego is a Myth solipsism is not just wrong but nonsense. There are two questions this paper wishes to address: first, do we need independent additional support for the denial of the Self or is the avoidance of solipsism reason enough to assume the Ego’s non-existence? I will argue that we do need additional reasons and I will evaluate those that Mach indeed gives to prove that “the primary fact is not the I, the Ego, but the elements (sensations)” (Mach 1885: 19). Second, is the deconstruction of the I, even if further sufficient support can be found, really adequate to stop us from worrying about solipsism? The doubt I will put forward is that the illusion of a Self might conjure up enough of an Ego—just like feeling a pain is having a pain, even if it is located in a phantom limb—to start us wondering whether it also occurs elsewhere. (shrink)

Japanese rank among the least likely to intervene to help a stranger in a non-emergency situation while Americans rank among the most likely. Across four studies, we demonstrate that Japanese are less likely to offer help to strangers because their decisions rely more heavily on the assessment of the needs of others. Accordingly, when there is uncertainty about the need for help, Japanese are less likely to intervene than Americans because without an understanding of the needs of recipient, the impact (...) of intervention may also be harmful. When the situation is unambiguous, Japanese and Americans are equally likely to help. This divergence in readiness to help strangers elaborates the understanding of why people in Japanese contexts are more likely than those in United States contexts to attend to the situation and to avoid uncertain situations. It also illuminates cultural differences in models of agency—implicit understandings of when and why a person should act to aid another. (shrink)

The Philosophy ofLanguage belongs to the foundations of philosophical reflexion. In this volume, its central problems and strategies are explained, and the nature of sentences and other elements of language are analysed. The didactical exposition of the most important schools and thinkers makes the volume particularly interesting for readers new to the subject.

This volume covers a great range of topics within general metaphysics, featuring contributions by experts in the respective areas. The information contained is suitable for introductory as well as research purposes. The book equally targets laymen, students, and experts in their own right. Subjects range from the history of metaphysics, properties, objects, modality, structure, truth, etc. to methodological concerns of metaphysics.

This paper discusses Sosa’s via media between existential relativism and absolutism. We discuss three implications of Sosa’s account which require some further clarification. First, we distinguish three alternative readings of Sosa’s account – the indexicalist, the homonymist and the (proper) relativist reading – and argue that they differ with respect to two crucial points: (a) they lead to different analyses of the lack of disagreement in existential discourse, and (b) they differ with respect to the question of whether conceptual schemes (...) pick out different senses of “exist” or whether they pick out different entities to exist. Second, we ask Sosa to answer on four problematic implications of his final position: (a) Sosa appears to change the topic from ontology to semantics without solving the ontological issue. (b) It is puzzling why Sosa finally accepts the initially implausible explosion of reality. (c) Sosa is forced to accept that disputants really disagree in existential disputes (although faultlessly). (d) We offer an even simpler alternative option to reconcile the realist and the relativist intuitions by clarifying what is meant by “conceptual relativism”, without arguing for existential relativity at all. Third, we argue that Sosa’s argumentative reliance on an appropriate development of conceptual schemes drives him not only to a position of pure conceptual absolutism, but even to a more traditional form of ontological absolutism according to which nature itself manages to cut the cookies. In contrast to his apparent intention, this discharges Sosa’s via media from any relativist intuition. (shrink)

"Das Buch ist gut zu lesen und als Urlaubslektüre zu empfehlen." (Sachverhalte 3/2015) "Der klare und sachlogisch überzeugende Argumentationsgang des vorliegenden Bands macht ihn, in Kombination mit einer sehr gelungenen, sprachlichen Gestaltung zu einem echten Lesevergnügen und kann für philosophische 'Einsteiger' zum Beginn einer philosophischen Liebesgeschichte werden. Für Lehrende der Philosophie an Schule und Hochschule ist Tiedemanns Band (…) Fundgrube sowie fachlich fundierter und didaktisch ausgezeichnet aufbereiteter Begleiter durch Unterricht und Seminar." (Mathias Balliet, ZDPE 1/2015) Liebe, Sexualität und Freundschaft gehören (...) nicht nur zu den intensivsten Erfahrungen des Menschen, sie werfen auch zahlreiche Fragen auf: Wie wichtig sind sie für ein gelungenes Leben? Wie genau unterscheiden sich Liebe und Freundschaft? Ist Sexualität ein eigenständiges Phänomen oder notwendig mit Liebe verbunden? Besteht Liebe eher aus selbstloser Fürsorge oder aus eigennütziger Habsucht? Von der Antike bis zur Gegenwart haben sich namhafte Denker von Sokrates über Rousseau bis hin zu Sigmund Freud und Simone de Beauvoir dieser Fragen angenommen und dabei erstaunliche Antworten formuliert. Die Philosophie der Liebe ist so vielgestaltig wie ihr Gegenstand. Ist platonische Liebe wirklich lustfeindlich und entsagungsvoll? Beruht die christliche Sexualmoral auf einem Mutterkomplex? Muss man dichten können wie Goethe, um mit Schiller befreundet zu sein? Ist alle Liebe so egoistisch, wie Schopenhauer uns einreden will, oder sind wahre Liebe und Freundschaft vielleicht doch für jeden von uns möglich? Das Buch bietet einen abwechslungsreichen Streifzug durch die Antworten der Ideengeschichte und lädt ein zum Weiterdenken. Love, sexuality and friendship are not only among the most intense of human experiences, they also give rise to many questions: How important are they for a successful life? How exactly do love and friendship differ? Is sexuality an independent phenomenon or does it have to be connected with love? Is love more a matter of selfless care or of selfish desire? From antiquity to the present day prominent thinkers from Socrates through Rousseau to Sigmund Freud and Simone de Beauvoir have taken on these questions and come up with surprising answers. The philosophy of love is as varied as love itself. Is Platonic love really opposed to pleasure and obsessed with self-denial? Is Christian sexual morality based on a mother-complex? Is it necessary to write like Goethe to be friends with Schiller? Is all love as egotistical as Schopenhauer would have us believe, or are true love and friendship still possible for all of us? This book takes us on a diverse foray into the answers offered by intellectual history and invites us to think further for ourselves. (shrink)

Long non‐coding RNAs (lncRNAs) have recently gained increasing attention because of their crucial roles in gene regulatory processes. Functional studies using mammalian skin as a model system have revealed their role in controlling normal tissue homeostasis as well as the transition to a diseased state. Here, we describe how lncRNAs regulate differentiation to preserve an undifferentiated epidermal progenitor compartment, and to maintain a functional skin permeability barrier. Furthermore, we will reflect on recent work analyzing the impact of lncRNAs on the (...) progression from normal epithelium to the development of skin disorders and cancer. (shrink)