In 1969 Harry Frankfurt published his hugely influential paper 'Alternate Possibilities and Moral Responsibility' in which he claimed to present a counterexample to the so-called 'Principle of Alternate Possibilities' ('a person is morally responsible for what he has done only if he could have done otherwise'). The success of Frankfurt-style cases as counterexamples to the Principle has been much debated since. I present an objection to these cases that, in questioning their conceptual cogency, undercuts many of those debates. Such cases (...) all require a counterfactual mechanism that could cause an agent to perform an action that he cannot avoid performing. I argue that, given our concept of what it is for someone to act, this requirement is inconsistent. Frankfurt-style alleged counterexamples are cases where an agent is morally responsible for an action he performs even though, the claim goes, he could not have avoided performing that action. However, it has recently been argued, e.g. by John Fischer, that a counterexample to the Principle could be a 'Fischer-style case', i.e. a case where the agent can either perform the action or do nothing else. I argue that, although Fischer-style cases do not share the conceptual flaw common to all Frankfurt-style cases, they also fail as counterexamples to the Principle. The paper finishes with a brief discussion of the significance of the Principle of Alternate Possibilities. (shrink)

What does it mean to be an aesthetic beholder? Is it different than simply being a perceiver? Most theories of aesthetic perception focus on 1) features of the perceived object and its presentation or 2) on psychological evaluative or emotional responses and intentions of perceiver and artist. In this chapter I propose that we need to look at the process of engaged perception itself, and further that this temporal process of be- coming a beholder must be understood in its embodied, (...) contextual and dynamic speci- ficity. Through both phenomenological and neuroscientific explorations I analyze what is characteristic about a more “aesthetic stance” and argue that there is a certain asym- metry between beholder and beheld, which has to do with a disengagement of goal- directed action, and which allows for other kinds of perceptual involvement than in a more “practical stance”. It is a multi-disciplinary project integrating a sensorimotor no- tion of aesthetic affordances, 18th century philosophy, and large-scale brain network findings. What ensues is a new dynamic framework for future empirical and theoretical research on aesthetic perception. (shrink)

I examine the Aristotelean conception of virtuous character as firm and unchangeable, a normative ideal endorsed in the currently influential, broadly Aristotelean school of thought known as 'virtue ethics'. Drawing on central concepts of Aristotle's Nicomachean Ethics, I offer an account of how this ideal is supposed to be realized psychologically. I then consider present-day empirical findings about relevant psychological processes, with special attention to interpersonal processes. The empirical evidence suggests that over time, the same interpersonal processes that sometimes help (...) to sustain character may also disrupt it, even among agents who have the right values in principle. Fortunately, the evidence also suggests some remedial measures. An important philosophical measure, I conclude, is for advocates of virtue ethics to address agents' psychological need for a systematic decision procedure that will focus attention primarily on substantive ethical considerations, rather than characterological assessment. (shrink)

Action, reason, and causes in Kant -- Can we act without feelings? Respect, sympathy and other forms of love -- A place for affects and passion in the Kantian system -- What can Kant teach us about emotions? -- Physiology and the controlling of affects in Kant's philosophy -- Virtue as a cure for affects and passions -- The beautiful and the good: refinement as an introduction to morality -- Women and emotion -- Evil and passion -- An emotional Kant?

We expand and transform our habitual agency with countless technologies most moments of the day. Our environments, bodies, thoughts and social interactions are thoroughly shaped and mediated by tapestries of interweaving layers of old and new technologies. Perhaps this intimate relation with technology is at the core of our humanity. But our relation to technology has also repeatedly been feared as a Faustian deal that will be the dystopian end of us, or—in more utopian viewpoints— will bring us beyond our (...) earthbound finitudes toward virtual existences. What many agree on is that dramatic changes to our basic ecological and existential conditions are nearing. I suggest we should look for such critical tipping points and phase shifts not just in our biological bodies and environments but also in the informational and behavioral environments we rely on in our intentional and habitual agency. When thinking particularly about technologically mediated habitual agency an obvious place to start is with Don Ihde’s 4 classic human–technology relations. Interestingly, fellow post-phenomenologist Peter- Paul Verbeek has proposed new additional kinds of relations to e.g. “smart”and virtually “augmenting” technologies. While I find each of these analyses insightful, I worry that a focus on individual relations to particular spatio-temporally circumscribed artifacts falls short—or even obscures—some of the particular new challenges to our agency that networked, and data-driven smart technologies give rise to. I will therefore attempt to broaden the focus to how our agency is scaffolded by not just particular technological artifacts, but by our understanding of the broader informational and behavioral environment. To do this, I start by introducing some core theoretical background ideas that will support a more contextual approach and then proceed to consider both the classic and newer post-phenomenological relations from this more contextual perspective. The goal is not only to affirm the value of analyzing concrete technology relations but also to expand and contextualize the analyses. The latter is key if we want a post-phenomenological analysis that can help us understand how our habitual agency might be transformed as we come to live in increasingly “smart worlds”. These new data and algorithmically driven technologies not only transform our relation to a given context, but due to networked dataflows and “smart” decision-making (1) recursively act on us and (2) collapse and transcend the present context. This chapter will also highlight the uncertainties that informationally leaky and “smart” technologies introduce to our understanding of the kind of affordance space we are in and even what the expected outcomes of our actions will be. I suggest that technology relations with such effects might challenge some of the core contextual stabilities and informational segregations that our habitual agency have hitherto relied on. A further issue is if these new technological configurations challenge our habitual processes in ways we cannot easily adapt to. We certainly seem able to create new habits and adapt to these new technologies locally, but the new information flows, hidden audiences, and context collapses appear to challenge some conditions of agency that are typically out of sight, and the effects of which untraceably shows up well outside the present context. Overall, I shall argue that “smart” technologies can both expand and shrink our habitual agency—but that in terms of our ability to guide our action through various contexts in a perceived world something more fundamental appears to be breaking. (shrink)

We discuss the 'problem of convergent knowledge', an argument presented by J. Schaffer in favour of contextualism about knowledge attributions, and against the idea that knowledge- wh can be simply reduced to knowledge of the proposition answering the question. Schaffer's argument centrally involves alternative questions of the form 'whether A or B'. We propose an analysis of these on which the problem of convergent knowledge does not arise. While alternative questions can contextually restrict the possibilities relevant for knowledge attributions, what (...) Schaffer's puzzle reveals is a pragmatic ambiguity in what 'knowing the answer' means: in his problematic cases, the subject knows only a partial answer to the question. This partial knowledge can be counted as adequate only on externalist grounds. (shrink)

This article proposes an account of knowing-who constructions within a generalisation of Hintikka’s quantified epistemic logic employing the notion of a conceptual cover Aloni PhD thesis [1]. The proposed logical system captures the inherent context-sensitivity of knowing-wh constructions Boër and Lycan, as well as expresses non-trivial cases of so-called concealed questions Heim. Assuming that quantifying into epistemic contexts and knowing-who are linked in the way Hintikka had proposed, the context dependence of the latter will translate into a context dependence of (...) de re attitude ascriptions and this will result in a ready account of a number of traditionally problematic cases including Quine’s well-known double vision puzzles Quine. (shrink)

The Covid-19 pandemic has had a great impact on the life of every inhabitant of the planet. During 2020 and 2021 a significant amount of work on how the pandemic is being conceptualized and communicated has been done. Most work has focused on the role of metaphor in the construal of specific cognitive frames. In this paper, we turn to a similar but different conceptualization mechanism, i.e. simile. Drawing from recent socio-cognitive and discursive empirical approaches to similes, this paper focuses (...) on “target is like source” constructions in English and Spanish containing (corona)virus either as target or source of the simile. The analysis is based on 200 examples found in the digital media during the first wave of the pandemic in 2020. First, the constructions, conceptualizations and mappings are analyzed. Second, the relevant discourse features (genre type, relation to subjectivity, text location and structuring properties) are described. Finally, the cross-linguistic English-Spanish analysis shows that, despite the many coincidences in both datasets, there are different tendencies as for the use of culture-specific mappings and the genres where the similes occur in. The study aims at testing to what extent the general features characterizing similes also hold in the case of (corona)virus, both as source and as target. The corpus analysis contributes, in addition, to the emerging line of research on the use of figuration in the communication of the pandemic, as well as to the study of the discursive dimensions of similes in real settings. (shrink)

The aim of this chapter is to explore the safety value of implementing Asimov’s Laws of Robotics as a future general framework that humans should obey. Asimov formulated laws to make explicit the safeguards of the robots in his stories: (1) A robot may not injure or harm a human being or, through inaction, allow a human being to come to harm; (2) A robot must obey the orders given to it by human beings except where such orders would conflict (...) with the First Law; (3) A robot must protect its own existence as long as such protection does not conflict with the First or Second Law. In Asimov’s stories, it is always assumed that the laws are built into the robots to govern the behaviour of the robots. As his stories clearly demonstrate, the Laws can be ambiguous. Moreover, the laws are not very specific. General rules as a guide for robot behaviour may not be a very good method to achieve robot safety – if we expect the robots to follow them. But would it work for humans? In this chapter, we ask whether it would make as much, or more, sense to implement the laws in human legislation with the purpose of governing the behaviour of people or companies that develop, build, market or use AI, embodied in robots or in the form of software, now and in the future. (shrink)

A political discourse of peace marked the distribution and use of radioisotopes in biomedical research and in medical diagnosis and therapy in the post-World War II period. This occurred during the era of expansion and strengthening of the United States' influence on the promotion of sciences and technologies in Europe as a collaborative effort, initially encouraged by the policies and budgetary distribution of the Marshall Plan. This article follows the importation of radioisotopes by two Spanish research groups, one in experimental (...) endocrinology and one in molecular biology. For both groups foreign funds were instrumental in the early establishment of their laboratories. The combination of funding and access to previously scarce radioisotopes helped position these groups at the forefront of research in Spain. (shrink)

The discovery of so-called ‘mirror neurons’ - found to respond both to own actions and the observation of similar actions performed by others - has been enormously influential in the cognitive sciences and beyond. Given the self-other symmetry these neurons have been hypothesized as underlying a ‘mirror mechanism’ that lets us share representations and thereby ground core social cognitive functions from intention understanding to linguistic abilities and empathy. I argue that mirror neurons are important for very different reasons. Rather than (...) a symmetric ubiquitous or context- independent mechanism, I propose that these neurons are part of broader sensorimotor circuits, which help us navigate and predict the social affordance space that we meet others in. To develop both the critical and positive project I analyze the interpretive choices and the debate surrounding the mirror neuron research and show how the field is marred by highly questionable assumptions about respectively motor and social cognition. The discovery of mirror neurons - and the sensorimotor circuits of which these neurons are a part – actually empirically challenge many of these tacit assumptions. Findings of sensorimotor goal representations at levels of abstraction well beyond actual sensory information and kinetic movements challenge the idea of motor cognition as primarily output production. Additionally, the focus on 3rd person mindreading of hidden mental states is misguiding the field of social cognition. Much ‘mind-reading’ seems rooted in sensorimotor representations and a developmentally primary 2nd person understanding of actions and the mental lives of others, which precisely breaks the assumed dichotomy between mind and behavior. I propose a Social Affordance model where parallel fronto-parietal sensorimotor circuits support representations not just of other people’s actions but of the overall social affordance space. It is a process that monitors concrete goals and teleological possibilities that the environment affords respectively oneself and other present agents. With this model I hypothesize that the complex spectrum of sensorimotor integrations are indeed essential not only to normal action choice calibration but also to social cognitive abilities, as the sensorimotor teleological representations let us relate to others and understand their action choices in a shared pragmatic and intentional context. (shrink)

Food systems transformations require coherent policies and improved understandings of the drivers and institutional dynamics that shape (un)sustainable food systems outcomes. In this paper, we introduce the Chilean National Organic Agriculture Law as a case of a policy process seeking to institutionalize a recognized pathway towards more sustainable food systems. Drawing from institutional theory we make visible multiple, and at times competing, logics (i.e., values, assumptions and practices) of different actors implicated in organic agriculture in Chile. More specifically, our findings (...) identify five main institutional transformative logics underpinning the interests and actions of organic actors. However, we find that the Law was not motivated by these logics and did not advance them. Rather, the Law was designed to support a market niche targeted to elite consumers and to reinforce agricultural exports. As a result, the Law constrains rather than enables the practice of organic agriculture and access to organic food by consumers, especially at the domestic level. We note that attention to institutional logics in the analysis of food systems, and specifically food system transformation, is relevant to more comprehensive assessments of the transformational potential of food systems policies. We conclude that there is a need to further consider and make visible the way in which different drivers (i.e., laws) are constituted through and by diverse, and often competing, institutional logics. (shrink)

The widespread assumption that anger is a response to wrongdoing and motivates people to sanction it, as well as the lack of distinction between resentment and indignation, obscure notable differences among these three emotions in terms of their specific beliefs, goals, and action tendencies, their nonmoral or moral character, and the kinds of moral claim implied. We provide a cognitive-motivational analysis of anger, resentment, and indignation, showing that, while sharing a common core, they are distinguishable from one another because they (...) comprise nonoverlapping belief–goal compounds. We also emphasize the usefulness of applying a belief–goal analysis to kin emotions because, by comparison, one can sharpen the analysis and identify the distinctive features of each of them. (shrink)

ABSTRACTIn this paper, I argue for an Aristotelian way of accommodating supererogation within virtue ethics by retrieving an account of moral heroism and providing a picture of different degrees of virtue. This, I claim, is the most appropriate virtue-ethical background allowing us to talk about supererogation without falling prey to several dangers. After summarizing the main attempts to deny the compatibility of virtue and supererogation, I will present some recent proposals to accommodate supererogation within virtue ethics. Next, I will argue (...) that these proposals raise substantial worries. I will then offer an analysis of heroism and the degrees of virtue to outline my own alternative definition of supererogation in terms of heroic virtue. (shrink)

Mirror neuron research has come a long way since the early 1990s, and many theorists are now stressing the heterogeneity and complexity of the sensorimotor properties of fronto-parietal circuits. However, core aspects of the initial ‘ mirror mechanism ’ theory, i.e. the idea of a symmetric encapsulated mirroring function translating sensory action perceptions into motor formats, still appears to be shaping much of the debate. This article challenges the empirical plausibility of the sensorimotor segregation implicit in the original mirror metaphor. (...) It is proposed instead that the teleological organization found in the broader fronto-parietal circuits might be inherently sensorimotor. Thus the idea of an independent ‘purely perceptual’ goal understanding process is questioned. Further, it is hypothesized that the often asymmetric, heterogeneous and contextually modulated mirror and canonical neurons support a function of multisensory mapping and tracking of the perceiving agents affordance space. Such a shift in the interpretative framework offers a different theoretical handle on how sensorimotor processes might ground various aspects of intentional action choice and social cognition. Mirror neurons would under the proposed “social affordance model” be seen as dynamic parts of larger circuits, which support tracking of currently shared and competing action possibilities. These circuits support action selection processes—but also our understanding of the options and action potentials that we and perhaps others have in the affordance space. In terms of social cognition ‘ mirror ’ circuits might thus help us understand not only the intentional actions others are actually performing—but also what they could have done, did not do and might do shortly. (shrink)

The disjunction effect (Tversky & Shafir, 1992) occurs when decision makers prefer option x (versus y) when knowing that event A occurs and also when knowing that event A does not occur, but they refuse x (or prefer y) when not knowing whether or not A occurs. This form of incoherence violates Savage's (1954) sure-thing principle, one of the basic axioms of the rational theory of decision making. The phenomenon was attributed to a lack of clear reasons for accepting an (...) option (x) when subjects are under uncertainty. Through a pragmatic analysis of the task and a consequent reformulation of it, we show that the effect does not depend on the presence of uncertainty, but on the introduction of non-relevant goals into the text problem, in both the well-known Gamble problem and the Hawaii problem. (shrink)

Largely aided by the neurological discovery of so-called “ mirror neurons,” the attention to motor activity during action observation has exploded over the last two decades. The idea that we internally “ mirror ” the actions of others has led to a new strand of implicit simulation theories of action understanding[1][2]. The basic idea of this sort of simulation theory is that we, via an automatic covert activation of our own action representations, can understand the action and possibly the goal (...) and/or intentions of the observed agent. In this way motor “simulation” is seen as the basis for low-level “mind-reading”; i.e. for the ascription of goals and intentional mental states to others. The thought is that one, through mirroring simulations, can get beyond the observable behaviour to the hidden minds of others. I am questioning the idea of an exclusively “mirroring” role of the motor system in social perception, which is tacitly assumed in this sort of simulation theories. Is motor activity during action observation really primarily a simulation, a detailed “echo” of the others action? My point is not that we never simulate what we observe, but rather to question whether such processes are representative of the overall motor contribution to social cognition. More and more studies on the functional properties of mirror neurons and motor facilitation during perception points to a more complex role of the motor system in action perception. Recently, several proposals have been made attempting to reinterpret and critique the function of motor activity in social situations. I shall here briefly touch on a few of these and sketch parts of my own alternative “social affordance” hypothesis of the sensorimotor contribution to social perception. By way of these analyses I highlight how traditional discussions are marred by problematic theoretical assumptions. It seems to me that we need a thorough reinterpretation not just of mirror neurons and mirroring, but also of what we take motor and social cognition to be. In my view the details of the sensorimotor findings underline the need to move beyond the simplistic idea of the motor system as a unitary output system. In terms of social cognition I question the traditional focus on hidden mental states. I suggest that the motor contribution might have more to do with understanding the process of how others choose their actions, navigate the world and relate to others than with simulating specific actual actions or mental states. I conclude that low-level simulation theories, which see the motor role in social perception as passive “mirroring,” are faced with serious empirical challenges, and that the motor system serve a much more proactive and complex cognitive role in social perception and interaction than previously thought. But my claim is also that many empirical tensions have slipped out of focus due to entrenched theoretical assumptions. Narrow theoretical expectations have marked not only the interpretations but the research itself and I propose that we are in dire need of more studies of actual contextual and interactive social perception. (shrink)

This paper has two aims. First, to bring together the models of temporal phenomenology on offer and to present these using a consistent set of distinctions and terminologies. Second, to examine the methodologies currently practiced in the development of these models. To that end we present an abstract characterisation in which we catalogue all extant models. We then argue that neither of the two extreme methodologies currently discussed is suitable to the task of developing a model of temporal phenomenology. An (...) entirely top-down methodology is largely insensitive to empirical findings, while one that is entirely bottom-up is insensitive to both introspective evidence and more general philosophical considerations. We recommend a methodology that falls between these two extremes. (shrink)

Health researchers working in low-resource settings routinely encounter serious unmet health needs for which research participants have, at best, limited treatment options through the local health system (Taylor, Merritt, and Mullany 2011). A recent case discussion features a study conducted in Bamako, Mali (Dickert and Wendler 2009). The study objective was to see whether children with severe malaria develop pulmonary hypertension in order to improve the general understanding of morbidity and mortality associated with malaria. In the study team's interactions with (...) participating children, they encountered not only malaria but also "eye infections, upper respiratory tract illnesses, rashes, pericardial effusions," .. (shrink)

Although the STS literature on boundary-work recognizes that such work unfolds within a “terrain of uneven advantage” vis-à-vis gender, race, and other inequalities, reflection about that uneven advantage has been strikingly underdeveloped. This article calls for a retheorizing of boundary-work that engages more actively with feminist, critical race, and postcolonial scholarship and examines more systematically the relation between scientific boundary-work, broader structures of sociopolitical inequality, and boundary-workers’ positionality. To demonstrate the need for this retheorization, I analyze ethnographic and interview data (...) on scientific boundary-work in the natural and social sciences in Portugal, showing that scholars’ gender, sexuality, race, ethnicity, and nationality affect the success of their boundary-work. I suggest, therefore, that in unequal societies where credibility is unevenly distributed, the conditions are not in place for some scholars’ boundary-work to work. I draw on Sara Ahmed to argue that we must conceptualize scientific boundary-work as always potentially performative, but not always successfully so, and explicitly interrogate the actual conditions of performativity. Recognizing the links between inequality, embodiment, and non-performativity in scientific boundary-work will enable STS to better understand, and hopefully transform, the relations between contingent struggles over scientificity and entrenched structures of power. (shrink)

The present paper analyses how top managers construct the meaning of sustainable human resource management and its responsibility areas and how they identify and prioritize stakeholders in sustainable HRM. The empirical data were collected as part of the Finnish HR Barometer inquiry. A qualitative analysis reveals four dimensions of sustainable HRM: Justice and equality, transparent HR practices, profitability, and employee well-being. It also reveals four broader responsibility areas: Legal and ethical, managerial, social, and economic. Contrary to the prior green HRM (...) literature, ecological responsibility was largely ignored. The study also reveals a wide range of stakeholders, specifically, owners, managers, employees, customers, and employee representatives, as well as their special roles and requirements for sustainable HRM. These findings contribute to the literature of sustainable HRM by illustrating the dimensions and broader responsibilities of sustainable HRM as seen by top managers. Their conceptions of sustainable HRM are largely neglected in the prior literature despite their crucial role in legitimating HRM and thus sustainable HRM in companies. These results also contribute to the theory of stakeholder salience in the sustainable HRM context from the viewpoint of top managers. (shrink)

Harold Jeffreys' ideas on the interpretation of probability and epistemology are reviewed. It is argued that with regard to the interpretation of probability, Jeffreys embraces a version of logicism that shares some features of the subjectivism of Ramsey and de Finetti. Jeffreys also developed a probabilistic epistemology, characterized by a pragmatical and constructivist attitude towards notions such as ‘objectivity’, ‘reality’ and ‘causality’. 1 Introductory remarks 2 The interpretation of probability 3 Jeffreys' probabilistic epistemology.

This paper presents an overview of my work in philosophy from my first book on Friedrich Schiller and the political sublime to my most recent project on listening to traumatic forms of violence. Starting with a reflection on the autobiographical character of philosophy, I propose to take up the question of an aesthetic dimension of philosophical critique, where aesthetics is understood as an always already embodied perspective on the world, on truth, and on philosophical activity, as well as an always (...) already political realm, where the distribution of sense pre-determines our approach and articulation of experience. Departing from aesthetics understood and deployed as critique, the paper moves on to ask about the specific frameworks of sense or grammars that determine in advance the conditions of audibility in the realms of memory-building and history-making—particularly in those contexts where historical, political, and institutional forms of violence produce silencing and erasure. Putting in dialogue the latter with decolonial studies, I interpret “traumatic violence” as a colonizing form of violence, understanding that one of its central aspects is that it is not only an assault on life but on the conditions of production of sense that make life legible as such. In this context, my project on grammars of listening seeks to carefully unpack these complex intersections while also explaining why I believe that a radical form of listening is an essential subversive/imaginative strategy against traumatic/colonial violence. (shrink)

The rapid and unplanned change to teaching and learning in the online format brought by COVID-19 has likely impacted many, if not all, aspects of university students' lives worldwide. To contribute to the investigation of this change, this study focuses on the impact of the pandemic on student well-being, which has been found to be as important to student lifelong success as their academic achievement. Student well-being has been linked to their engagement and performance in curricular, co-curricular, and extracurricular activities, (...) intrinsic motivation, satisfaction, meaning making, and mental health. The purpose of this study was to examine how student perceptions of their degree completion and future job prospects during the pandemic impact their well-being and what role university support plays in this relationship. We used the conservation of resources theory to frame our study and to develop five hypotheses that were later tested via structural equation modeling. Data were collected from 2,707 university students in France, Germany, Russia, and UK via an online survey. The results showed that university support provided by instructors and administration plays a mediating role in the relationship between the perceived impact of COVID-19 on degree completion and future job prospects and levels of student well-being. Student well-being is decreased by their concerns for their degree completion but not by their concerns for future job prospects. In turn, concerns for future job prospects affect student well-being over time. These results suggest that in a “new normal,” universities could increase student well-being by making support to student studies a priority, especially for undergraduates. Also, universities should be aware of the students' changing emotional responses to crisis and ensure visibility and accessibility of student support. (shrink)

The cohesin complex is best known for its role in sister chromatid cohesion. Over the past few years, it has become apparent that cohesin also regulates gene expression, but the mechanisms by which it does so are unknown. Recently, three groups mapped numerous cohesin-binding sites in mammalian chromosomes and found substantial overlap with the CCCTC-binding factor (CTCF).1-3 CTCF is an insulator protein that blocks enhancer–promoter interactions, and the investigators found that cohesin also contributes to this activity. Thus, these studies demonstrate (...) at least one mechanism by which cohesin can control gene expression. BioEssays 30:715–718, 2008. © 2008 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. (shrink)

How do we perceive the agency of others? Do the same rules apply when interacting with others who are radically different from ourselves, like other species or robots? We typically perceive other people and animals through their embodied behavior, as they dynamically engage various aspects of their affordance field. In second personal perception we also perceive social or interactional affordances of others. I discuss various aspects of perceptible agency, which might begin to give us some tools to understand interactions also (...) with agents truly other than ourselves or “perhaps agents” like present and future social robots. Robots have various kinds of physical and behavioral presence and thus make their agency—if we want to call it that—perceptible in ways that computers and other forms of AI do not. The largely dualist assumptions pertaining to the hidden bodies of traditional Turing tests are discussed, as well as the social affordance effects of such indirect interactions as opposed to interactions in physically shared space. The question is what role various abilities to reveal, hide and dynamically control the body and broader behavior plays in heterogeneous tech or machine mediated interactions. I argue that the specifics and richness of perceptible agency matters to the kind of reciprocity we can obtain. (shrink)

In this paper, I will highlight the role played, within the group of Oxonian philosophers who revived virtue ethics beginning in the 1950s, by perhaps the most heterodox and elusive figure, Iris Murdoch. In particular, I will discuss whether Murdoch can be considered, like Anscombe and Foot, a promoter of virtue ethics, or whether points of contact with that strand are limited to the polemical goals that the philosopher and novelist shared, for a thirty-year period, with her colleagues and friends. (...) Increasingly, important differences have led scholars to treat Murdoch as a heterodox virtue ethicist or as an advocate of an entirely different theoretical framework: from Neo-Platonism, to anti-theory, to a kind of Christian Buddhism or practical mysticism. In this article, I will briefly explore some of these hypotheses and try to show how Murdoch can be seen as the proponent of a credible virtue theory, though certainly far removed from the "mainstream" Aristotelian strand. (shrink)

The nautical environment has been challenging for women. However, interviewing experienced female sailors, we noticed that despite the adversity they face, they consider the experience of sailing as something profoundly impactful and powerful in their lives. This research discusses the power of the aesthetic experience of sailing for women, thus adding to the gender discussion. In order to do so, we make use of a theoretical framework that addresses the relationship between being and the materiality of the world. In describing (...) these aesthetic experiences lived in the body, Bachelard’s phenomenology of the image stands out. By productive imagination and poetic images found in the field research and characterized as powerful by the sailors, the social construction of gender and the images between adventure and delicacy appears. (shrink)

An overview of Hilary Putnam's engagement with pragmatism.

There seems to be confusion and disagreement among scholars about the meaning of interpersonal forgiveness. In this essay we shall venture to clarify the meaning of forgiveness by examining various literary works. In particular, we shall discuss instances of forgiveness from Homer’s The Iliad, Euripides’ Hippolytus, and Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics and we shall focus on the changes that the concept of forgiveness has gone through throughout the centuries, in the hope of being able to understand, and therefore, of being able (...) to use more accurately, contemporary notions of forgiveness. We shall also explore the relationship between forgiveness and concepts that are closely associated with it, such as anger/resentment, hurt, clemency, desert/merit, excuse, etc. (shrink)