Feyerabend versucht, seinen Erkenntnisrelativismus für die Frage wie eine freie Gesellschaft beschaffen sein sollte, fruchtbar zu machen. Seine These ist, daß eine freie und demokratisehe Gesellschaft mit den Ideen des Rationalismus unvereinbar sei. Doch diese These ist falsch. Obwohl der Rationalismus im Abendland häufig als Ideologie der Intoleranz mißbraucht wurde, ist er doch ein unentbehrlicher Bestandteil von hochkomplexen demokratischen Gesellschaften. Diese benötigen zu ihrem Funktionieren Schutzstrukturen, welche nur auf der Basis des RationaHsmus legitimierbar sind.

Feyerabend versucht, seinen Erkenntnisrelativismus für die Frage wie eine freie Gesellschaft beschaffen sein sollte, fruchtbar zu machen. Seine These ist, daß eine freie und demokratisehe Gesellschaft mit den Ideen des Rationalismus unvereinbar sei. Doch diese These ist falsch. Obwohl der Rationalismus im Abendland häufig als Ideologie der Intoleranz mißbraucht wurde, ist er doch ein unentbehrlicher Bestandteil von hochkomplexen demokratischen Gesellschaften. Diese benötigen zu ihrem Funktionieren Schutzstrukturen, welche nur auf der Basis des RationaHsmus legitimierbar sind.

Unter den knappen Gütern, um deren Ersetzbarkeit die Menschheit des 21. Jahrhunderts ringt, gehört der Trost zu den unersetzlichen. Darin gründet die Schwäche unserer Kultur, deren Technik, Humanität und Moral doch unübertroffen zu sein scheinen. Strassers Essay spannt den Problembogen vom klassischen "Trost der Philosophie" des Boethius bis zu Ian Flemings James Bond-Erzählung "Quantum of Solace". Von der Metaphysik bis zur Psychologie reichen die rationalen Versuche, Tröstung zu "organisieren" im finsteren Tal, das wir alle durchwandern. Strasser zeigt, warum das (...) psychologische Modell zu schwach ist. Es verharrt im Subjektiven. Und das Modell der Metaphysik? Dieses verblasst vor den Wissenschaften, die es selbst inthronisierte. Daher sucht der Essay nach Spuren einer "Geborgenheit im Schlechten" - einer objektiven Quelle des Trostes und der ihm eigenen Glückseligkeit. (shrink)

Collecting, comparing, and computing molecular sequences are among the most prevalent practices in contemporary biological research. They represent a specific way of producing knowledge. This paper explores the historical development of these practices, focusing on the work of Margaret O. Dayhoff, Richard V. Eck, and Robert S. Ledley, who produced the first computer-based collection of protein sequences, published in book format in 1965 as the Atlas of Protein Sequence and Structure. While these practices are generally associated with the rise of (...) molecular evolution in the 1960s, this paper shows that they grew out of research agendas from the previous decade, including the biochemical investigation of the relations between the structures and function of proteins and the theoretical attempt to decipher the genetic code. It also shows how computers became essential for the handling and analysis of sequence data. Finally, this paper reflects on the relationships between experimenting and collecting as two distinct “ways of knowing” that were essential for the transformation of the life sciences in the twentieth century. (shrink)

Standard notions in philosophy of mind have a tendency to characterize socio-cognitive abilities as if they were unique to sophisticated human beings. However, assuming that it is likely that we are soon going to share a large part of our social lives with various kinds of artificial agents, it is important to develop a conceptual framework providing notions that are able to account for various types of social agents. Recent minimal approaches to socio-cognitive abilities such as mindreading and commitment present (...) a promising starting point from which one can expand the field of application not only to infants and non-human animals but also to artificial agents. Developing a minimal approach to the sociocognitive ability of acting jointly, I present a foundation for future discussions about the question of how our conception of sociality can be expanded to artificial agents. (shrink)

In a recent article in the Journal of Medicine and Philosophy , David Ost (1984) claims that patients do not have a right to waive their right to information. He argues that patients cannot make informed rational decisions without full information and thus, a right to waive information would involve a right to avoid one's responsibility to act as an autonomous moral agent. In support of his position, Ost cites a passage from Mill. Yet, a correct interpretation of the passage (...) in question would support one's right to remain uninformed in certain situations. If the information would hurt one's chances for survival or hurt one's ability to make calm, rational decisions, then one not only does not have a duty to find out the information, but one's exercising one's right to remain uninformed may be the only rational course of action to take. Keywords: medical ethics, informed consent, autonomy, information waiver, right, rationality CiteULike Connotea Del.icio.us What's this? (shrink)

Human and non-human animals are social beings, both have social interactions. The ability to anticipate behavior of others is a fundamental requirement of social interactions. However, there are several ways of how agents can succeed in this. Two modes of anticipation, namely mindreading and behavior-reading, shape the animal mindreading debate. As a matter of fact, no position has yet convincingly ruled out the other. This paper suggests a strategy of how to argue for a mentalistic interpretation as opposed to a (...) behavioral interpretation. The first step suggests considering a pluralistic approach in order to allow for shortcomings such as not having a natural language. Second, a critical examination of the principle called Morgan’s Canon will show that this principle cannot be used as a final argument to rule out mentalistic approaches. Finally, the author argues that the setting of current experiments is responsible for the indistinguishability of mindreading versus behavior-reading and she suggests alternative experimental designs. (shrink)

Dondeyne, A. Pluriformiteit en eenheid van de filosofie.--Peperzak, A. Wegwijzers naar een dialogiek?--Boer, T. de. De eindigheid van de mens en de oneindigheid van de waarheid.--Hollak, J. Wijsgerige reflecties over de scheppingsidee : St. Thomas, Hegel en de Grieken.--Plat, J. Kants kritiek op de rationele psychologie.--Melsen, A. van. Wijsgerige antropologie en de ontwikkeling van natuurwetenschap en techniek.--Buytendijk, F. Het pathisch aspect van de eindigheid.--Struyker Boudier, H. 's Bergbeklimmers einder.

Die Welt als Schöpfung zu betrachten, heißt, sie in all ihrer Schönheit, ihrem Schrecken und ihrer Banalität als etwas zuinnerst Lebendiges - Durchgeistigtes - "anzuschauen". Heißt dies aber nicht, so die reflexartige Frage, hinter den Stand des heutigen Wissens zurückzufallen? Nein, das heißt es nicht! Kein Mensch, der sein In-der-Welt-Sein wachen Sinnes erlebt, kann das Geheimnis der eigenen Existenz im aktuellen Standardmodell des Wissens, vom Urknall bis zum Genom, wiederfinden. Die Tatsachen des Bewusstseins bleiben diesem Modell fremd. Wir werden zu (...) Gefangenen unserer Hirnhöhle; und was immer der Reduktion auf Lebloses, "Materielles", widersteht, wird zu bloßem Schein. Wollen wir uns nicht selbst verlieren, dann ist es Zeit für eine Weltbetrachtung gegen den Zeitgeist. Um der Hirnhöhlengefangenschaft zu entgehen und unser Wesen jenseits szientifischer Verengungen zu wahren, bedarf es einer stillen Subversion: Es bedarf, ungeachtet allen neoreligiösen Getümmels, einer Anschauung der Dinge, wonach sich Geistiges als schöpferische Macht entfaltet. (shrink)

In order to reason in a non-trivializing way with contradictions, para- consistent logics reject some classically valid inferences. As a way of re- covering some of these inferences, Graham Priest ([Priest, 1991]) proposed to nonmonotonically strengthen the Logic of Paradox by allowing the se- lection of “less inconsistent” models via a comparison of their respective inconsistent parts. This move recaptures a good portion of classical logic in that it does not block, e.g., disjunctive syllogism, unless it is applied to contradictory (...) assumptions. In Priest’s approach the inconsistent parts of models are compared in an extensional way by considering their inconsis- tent objects. This distinguishes his system from the standard format of (inconsistency-)adaptive logics pioneered by Diderik Batens, according to which (atomic) contradictions validated in models form the basis of their comparison. A well-known problem for Priest’s extensional approach is its lack of the Strong Reassurance property, i.e., for specific settings there may be infinitely descending chains of less and less inconsistent models, thus never reaching a minimally inconsistent model. In this paper, we demonstrate that Strong Reassurance holds for the extensional approach under a cardinality-based comparison of the incon- sistent parts of models. Furthermore, we introduce and investigate the metatheory of the class of first-order nonmonotonic inconsistency-tolerant construct over the extensional or quantitative comparisons of their respec- tive models. Core model-theoretic properties for these logics, such as the Löwenheim-Skolem theorems, along with other nonmonotonic properties, are further studied. (shrink)

Standard notions in philosophy of mind have a tendency to characterize socio-cognitive abilities as if they were unique to sophisticated human beings. However, assuming that it is likely that we are soon going to share a large part of our social lives with various kinds of artificial agents, it is important to develop a conceptual framework providing notions that are able to account for various types of social agents. Recent minimal approaches to socio-cognitive abilities such as mindreading and commitment present (...) a promising starting point from which one can expand the field of application not only to infants and non-human animals but also to artificial agents. Developing a minimal approach to the socio-cognitive ability of acting jointly, I present a foundation for future discussions about the question of how our conception of sociality can be expanded to artificial agents. (shrink)

In dieser Arbeit wird die Frage nach der Handlungsfähigkeit künstlicher Systeme im Schnittfeld von Philosophie und KI behandelt. Eine positive Antwort auf Seiten der Philosophie hat deren anthropozentrischer Handlungsbegriff verhindert. Daher wird unterhalb des philosophischen Handlungsbegriffes der Begriff einer Quasi-Handlung entwickelt, welcher die Möglichkeit bietet, zwischen verschiedenen Kategorien des Verhaltens künstlicher Systeme zu unterscheiden. Als wesentliches Kriterium werden hierzu Unterschiede in der Flexibilität des Informationensverarbeitungsprozesses zur Differenzierung verschiedener Verhaltensklassen vorgeschlagen. Dies führt auch zu einer Auseinandersetzung mit dem Begriff der Kognition (...) und den verschiedenen Arten des Lernens. (shrink)

Peter Strassers neues Buch hat eine zentrale These, um welche die teilweise persönlich gehaltenen Reflexionen kreisen: Erst das Weltfremde in uns ermöglicht uns Beheimatung in der Welt. Wer nicht schon einmal selbst so dachte, wird auf die große Idioten-Literatur des Abendlandes verwiesen. Der moderne Idiot ist ein Weltfremder. Aber eben darin wurzelt seine Gabe, die Welt als einen Ort zu erfahren, wo es gerade die sich nahenden, sich der Anschauung öffnenden Phänomene sind, in denen eine letztmögliche Nähe zur Welt aufscheint. (...) Dieses Aufscheinen transzendiert das Faktische, wie es uns die Wissenschaft vermitte. (shrink)

Artificial agents have become increasingly prevalent in human social life. In light of the diversity of new human–machine interactions, we face renewed questions about the distribution of moral responsibility. Besides positions denying the mere possibility of attributing moral responsibility to artificial systems, recent approaches discuss the circumstances under which artificial agents may qualify as moral agents. This paper revisits the discussion of how responsibility might be distributed between artificial agents and human interaction partners (including producers of artificial agents) and raises (...) the question of whether attributions of responsibility should remain entirely on the human side. While acknowledging a crucial difference between living human beings and artificial systems culminating in an asymmetric feature of human–machine interactions, this paper investigates the extent to which artificial agents may reasonably be attributed a share of moral responsibility. To elaborate on criteria that can justify a distribution of responsibility in certain human–machine interactions, the role of types of criteria (interaction-related criteria and criteria that can be deferred from socially constructed responsibility relationships) is examined. Thereby, the focus will lay on the evaluation of potential criteria referring to the fact that artificial agents surpass in some aspects the capacities of humans. This is contrasted with socially constructed responsibility relationships that do not take these criteria into account. In summary, situations are examined in which it seems plausible that moral responsibility can be distributed between artificial and human agents. (shrink)

Natural language processing based on large language models (LLMs) is a booming field of AI research. After neural networks have proven to outperform humans in games and practical domains based on pattern recognition, we might stand now at a road junction where artificial entities might eventually enter the realm of human communication. However, this comes with serious risks. Due to the inherent limitations regarding the reliability of neural networks, overreliance on LLMs can have disruptive consequences. Since it will be increasingly (...) difficult to distinguish between human-written and machine-generated text, one is confronted with new ethical challenges. This begins with the no longer undoubtedly verifiable human authorship and continues with various types of fraud, such as a new form of plagiarism. This also concerns the violation of privacy rights, the possibility of circulating counterfeits of humans, and, last but not least, it makes a massive spread of misinformation possible. (shrink)

Research in social cognition aims to illuminate how agents can understand, communicate, and interact with other agents. When defining socio-cognitive abilities, standard cognitivist approaches tend to require demanding representational information processing. Thereby, they describe rather ideal cases. However, interdisciplinary research indicates multiple forms of how socio-cognitive abilities can be realized. Recent minimal approaches offer notions accommodating different kinds of cognitive processing. Nevertheless, the introduction of minimal cases of cognition raises new questions of how to account for commonalities and differences with (...) respect to the standard concepts. It seems to be a widespread strategy to adapt ideas of a two-system approach in order to distinguish less demanding instances from more demanding cases. This paper critically explores such an interpretation of a two-system approach and argues that a dichotomous understanding fails to capture the actual diversity of cognitive processes. (shrink)

Professor H. L. Van Breda had hoped to write this preface, but his recent, unexpected and untimely death has left that task in my hands. Although my remarks will not be as eloquent and insightful as his surely would have been, some few words are clearly in order here; for the phenomenological community has not only lost the leadership of Fr. Van Breda these last years, but also the scholarship and leadership of Aron Gurwitsch and Alden Fisher - both contributors (...) to this volume - as well as that of Dorion Cairns and John Wild. Our leaders are fewer now but Herbert Spiegelberg is still very obviously one of them. This volume thus presents the work of some of the past and presently recognized leaders in phenomenology - e. g. Gurwitsch, Straus, and Fisher - but, more important perhaps, it also presents the work of some of those who are sure to be future leaders of our community of phenomenological philosophers, if in fact they have not already achieved this status. Most, if not all, of the contribu tors to this volume are in some way or another indebted to Herbert Spiegelberg and his work in phenomenology. (shrink)

Eine immer wiederkehrende Frage der Analytischen Philosophie lautet: Wie kann man sich mit Sprache auf die Welt beziehen? Um eine Antwort auf diese Frage zu bekommen, muss man untersuchen, was alles eine Rolle spielt, wenn man Bedeutungen von Äußerungen versteht. Zu diesem Zwecke wird in dieser Arbeit der programmatische Vorschlag einer Bedeutungstheorie von Donald Davidson vorgestellt. Dazu ist es notwendig, sich mit der Wahrheitstheorie Tarskis zu beschäftigen. Interessant ist nun, welche Erkenntnisse unabhängig von Tarski in dieser Bedeutungstheorie enthalten sind. Hier (...) kann man zum einen die These der Unerforschlichkeit der Referenz und zum anderen das Prinzip der Nachsicht nennen. Durch die Voraussetzung des Prinzips der Nachsicht, nämlich größtmögliche Übereinstimmung zwischen Interpret und Sprecher anzunehmen, ist es einem Interpreten möglich, in die Interdependenzbeziehung zwischen Überzeugung und Bedeutung einzudringen. So kann der radikale Interpret erste Interpretationshypothesen aufstellen, die er später mit einem bedeutungsholistischen Ansatz auf logische Konsistenz in bezug auf die faktische Menge aller seiner Interpretationshypothesen überprüfen kann. (shrink)

Résumé C’ est pour « parler au lecteur de personne à personne » que Beauvoir se lance dans l’ écriture autobiographique en 1958. Elle semble y être parvenue, si on en juge par les nombreux lecteurs qui lui ont écrit pour lui parler à leur tour de personne à personne. Nous voudrions ici étudier la présence des lecteurs dans l’ autobiographie beauvoirienne : on y découvre le souci principal de l’ auteur, soit « dissiper les malentendus » tant à propos (...) d’ elle-même que de ses œuvres. On y lit aussi sa conception d’ une littérature engagée, étroitement liée à celle de son rapport à autrui, idéalement fait de réciprocité. (shrink)

Um die Sache der Phänomenologie handelt es sich in den folgenden Meditationen. Sie sind aus der Überzeugung des Verfassers erwach­ sen, daß die phänomenologische Philosophie imJahre 1990nochetwas zu sagen hat, etwas Bedeutsames. Sie ist keineswegs die sagenhafte "Philosophia perennis". Es ist auch nicht so, daß sie die Lösung der Probleme aller Philosophen und philosophischen Strömungen zu bie­ ten hätte. Abersiespieltnochstetseine unersetzliche Rolleimintellek­ tuellen Gespräch unseres Jahrhunderts. Sie verdient es nicht, zu dem alten Eisen geworfen zu werden, das lediglich als Material (...) für histori­ sche Betrachtungen Interesse erregt. Ist im produktiven Denken derer, die der phänomenologischen Be­ wegung zugerechnet werden, eine gewisse Erschlaffung eingetreten? "Die Phänomenologen werden sich etwas einfallen lassen müssen", sagte unlängst ein Bekannter. Dieser Rat, diese Mahnung sind jedoch ein wenig einseitig. Das bessere Neue soll ja jeweils aus dem guten Alten erwachsen. Eine Besinnung auf das bereits Geleistete sollte daher allem "Einfallen-lassen" vorhergehen. Die phänomenologische Bewegunghat im Laufe ihrerEntwicklung mancherlei wertvolleDenk­ anstöße hervorgebracht, die bisher nicht in ihrer philosophischen Be­ deutsamkeit erkannt wurden. An diese Denkmotive wäre zunächst anzuknüpfen. Dies gilt vor allem in Bezug auf den Initiator der phänomenologi­ schen Philosophie Edmund Husserl. Während einige seiner Schriften bekannt, ja überbekannt sind, bleiben manche seiner intimen Überle­ gungen unbeachtet. Sie fügen sich nicht in das, was man mit einem gewissen Recht die "offizielle Doktrin" nennen könnte. Der Verfasser wird bemüht sein, aufwichtiges Gedankengut Husserls aufmerksam zu machen und es zu verwerten. (shrink)

In many cases, the ascription of self-consciousness is uncontroversial. For example, the ability to use the first person pronoun ‘I’ in the right way is obviously related to self-consciousness, although this is not true in all cases. The ascription of self-consciousness to infants, to persons with psychopathological syndromes, or to animals is controversial. In this paper, I will focus on the question of how ascribing self-consciousness to infants can be justified. There are two main subjects relevant to this debate. Firstly, (...) the conceptual question: What notion of self-consciousness should be under discussion regarding infants? In other words: how minimal can a feasible notion of selfconsciousness be? Positions in this debate vary from presuming innate abilities such as the postulation of pre-reflexive self-consciousness (cp. Frank 1991) and the claim that language has to be developed and the right use of the personal pronoun ‘I’ has to be proven (cp. Castaneda 1966). Claiming that self-ascription abilities are an essential condition for all notions of self-consciousness, I begin by analyzing self-ascription abilities using the terminology of the sense of ownership, the sense of agency, and the sense of authorship. Equipped with this clarification, I suggest a minimal notion of self-consciousness that may serve as a foundation of a broader notion of self-consciousness. Secondly, the epistemological question: How can we know when ascribing self-consciousness is justified? This question is combined with an additional problem concerning the ascription of self-consciousness to infants. Infants show impressive behavior that seems to be tied to self-consciousness, but in some cases there are convincing alternative explanations for such behavior. Such alternatives do not refer to self-consciousness and still provide satisfying explanations. Finally, I will discuss several paradigmatic cases regarding the question of whether the ascription of self-consciousness is justified in such cases. (shrink)

To answer the question of whether artificial systems may count as agents in a collective action, I will argue that a collective action is a special kind of an action and show that the sufficient conditions for playing an active part in a collective action differ from those required for being an individual intentional agent.

In 1949, Linus Pauling and collaborators published in Science a paper provocatively titled: 'Sickle cell anemia, a molecular disease'. What was actually meant by 'molecular disease'? We interpret the concept of molecular disease in the frame of the traditional positions about the nature of diseases: the ontological and the physiological positions. We conclude that the physiological does not give an adequate account of what molecular diseases are. The ontological position, when correctly reinterpreted, leads to an understanding of molecular diseases where (...) the macromolecule is seen as a symptom or as a part of a mechanism leading to the symptoms of the disease. We then show that the concept of molecular disease leads to a particular view of therapy, emphasizing eugenics as a way of eliminating disease. On the individual level, this concept leads to an increased power of diagnosis, and especially predictive diagnosis, but has little therapeutic consequence. Lastly, we examine how this concept of disease unifies two contemporary classifications of diseases, one based on the location of the diseases, the other on the cause of the diseases. (shrink)