We discuss the problem of treating strongly correlated electrons by quantum chemical methods. It is shown how an incremental computational scheme for the ground-state energy can be related to a generalization of Faddeev's equations. We also discuss the application of the local increment method to lithium metal by the study of a Li8 cluster.

"Law and Economics has become an established field worldwide and it may be argued that it is one of the few examples of a successful interdisciplinary project. This book explores whether, or to what extent, that interdisciplinarity has indeed been a success. It provides insights on the foundations and methods, achievements and challenges of Law and Economics, at a time when both the continuing challenges to academic economics and the growth of empirical legal studies raise questions about the identity and (...) possible further developments of the project. Through a combination of reflections on long-term trends and detailed case studies on current developments, contributors to this volume analyse whether and in which sense Law and Economics is a successful interdisciplinary endeavour. Inspired by insights from the philosophy of social sciences, the book shows how concepts travel between legal scholarship and economics, how they change meanings when applied elsewhere, how economic theories and models inform, and transform, judicial practice, and addresses whether the transfers of knowledge between economics and law are symmetrical exchanges between the two disciplines"--. (shrink)

In the article, I analyze the representation of Blaise Pascal’s thinking that was presented by the German philosopher and theologian Romano Guardini. This author explored Pascal’s philosophy in the 1920s and 1930s when Germany experienced a large wave of interest in Kierkegaard’s thinking, known as the “Kierkegaard Renaissance.” Guardini participated actively in this renaissance but was strongly opposed to using Kierkegaard’s philosophy as an interpretative key for reading Pascal. He was concerned that the fashionable philosophy of Kierkegaard would overshadow Pascal’s (...) intellectual originality. I will try to demonstrate that Guardini did not entirely succeed in resisting the temptation of following popular trends and himself used Kierkegaardian concepts and topics when discussing Pascal’s thought. Thus we encounter in his works a specific image of Pascal that reflects in great measure contemporary intellectual tendencies. (shrink)

In this remarkably clear and original study of the Tractatus Peter Carruthers has two principal aims. He seeks to make sense of Wittgenstein's metaphysical doctrines, showing how powerful arguments may be deployed in their support. He also aims to locate the crux of the conflict between Wittgenstein's early and late philosophies. This is shown to arise from his earlier commitment to the objectivity of logic and logical relations, which is the true target of attack of his later discussion of (...) rule-following. Within this general framework Dr Carruthers explores a number of themes, including the early Wittgenstein's doctrine of the priority of logic over metaphysics, the nature and purpose of his programme of analysis for ordinary language and the various possible arguments supporting the existence of Simples. He offers many original interpretations and defends them with considerable attention to textual detail, yet the book's clarity and directness will make it accessible to anyone acquainted with the Tractatus. It will be required reading for all serious students of Wittgenstein's philosophy. (shrink)

Throughout the history of the Western world, science has possessed an extraordinary amount of authority and prestige. And while its pedestal has been jostled by numerous evolutions and revolutions, science has always managed to maintain its stronghold as the knowing enterprise that explains how the natural world works: we treat such legendary scientists as Galileo, Newton, Darwin, and Einstein with admiration and reverence because they offer profound and sustaining insight into the meaning of the universe. In The Intelligibility of Nature (...) , Peter Dear considers how science as such has evolved and how it has marshaled itself to make sense of the world. His intellectual journey begins with a crucial observation: that the enterprise of science is, and has been, directed toward two distinct but frequently conflated ends—doing and knowing. The ancient Greeks developed this distinction of value between craft on the one hand and understanding on the other, and according to Dear, that distinction has survived to shape attitudes toward science ever since. Teasing out this tension between doing and knowing during key episodes in the history of science—mechanical philosophy and Newtonian gravitation, elective affinities and the chemical revolution, enlightened natural history and taxonomy, evolutionary biology, the dynamical theory of electromagnetism, and quantum theory—Dear reveals how the two principles became formalized into a single enterprise, science, that would be carried out by a new kind of person, the scientist. Finely nuanced and elegantly conceived, The Intelligibility of Nature will be essential reading for aficionados and historians of science alike. (shrink)

In this paper we argue that awareness comes in degrees, and we propose a novel multi-factor account that spans both subjective experiences and perceptual representations. At the subjective level, we argue that conscious experiences can be degraded by being fragmented, less salient, too generic, or flash-like. At the representational level, we identify corresponding features of perceptual representations—their availability for working memory, intensity, precision, and stability—and argue that the mechanisms that affect these features are what ultimately modulate the degree of awareness. (...) We conclude the paper by demonstrating why the original interpretations of certain empirical findings that apparently pose problems for our account are, in fact, flawed. (shrink)

Stimulating introduction to the most central and interesting issues in the philosophy of mind. Topics covered include dualism versus the various forms of materialism, personal identity and survival, and the problem of other minds.

Many technology ethicists hold that the time has come to articulate _neurorights_: our normative claims vis-à-vis our brains and minds. One such claim is the right to _mental integrity_ (‘MI’). I begin by considering some paradigmatic threats to MI (§1) and how the dominant autonomy-based conception (‘ABC’) of MI attempts to make sense of them (§2). I next consider the objection that the ABC is _overbroad_ in its understanding of what threatens MI and suggest a friendly revision to the ABC (...) that addresses the objection (§3). I then consider a second objection: that the ABC cannot make sense of the MI of the _non-autonomous_. This objection appears fatal even to the revised ABC (§4). On that basis, I develop an alternative conception on which MI is grounded in a plurality of simpler capacities, namely, those for _affect_, _cognition_, and _volition_. Each of these more basic capacities grounds a set of fundamental interests, and they are for that reason worthy of protection even when they do not rise to the level of complexity necessary for autonomy (§5). This yields a fully general theory of MI that accounts for its manifestations in both the autonomous and the non-autonomous. (shrink)

Shows that the dialogue in Plato's Phaedo is primarily devoted to presenting Socrates' final defense of the philosophical life against the theoretical and political challenge of religion.

According to Bob Solomon, love is a human emotion, with a complex intentional structure, having its own kind of reasons. I will examine this account, which, in certain respects, tends to mask the deep and important differences between love and other emotions.

I criticize some arguments against the causal interpretability of population genetics put forward by Denis Walsh ([2007], [2010]). In particular, I seek to undermine the contention that population genetics exhibits frame of reference relativity or subjectivity with respect to its formal representations. I also show that classical population genetics does not fall foul of some criteria for causal representation put forward by James Woodward ([2003]), although those criteria do undermine some causalist stances. 1 Introduction2 Modularity3 The Crucially Important Point4 The (...) Gillespie Case: Density-Dependent Selection5 Conclusion. (shrink)

The principle of semantic compositionality, as Jerry Fodor and Ernie Lepore have emphasized, imposes constraints on theories of meaning that it is hard to meet with psychological or epistemic accounts. Here, I argue that this general tendency is exemplified in Michael Dummett's account of meaning. On that account, the so-called manifestability requirement has the effect that the speaker who understands a sentence s must be able to tell whether or not s satisfies central semantic conditions. This requirement is not met (...) by truth-conditional accounts of meaning. On Dummett's view, it is met by a proof conditional account: understanding amounts to knowledge of what counts as a proof of a sentence. A speaker is supposed always to be capable of deciding whether or not a given object is a proof of a given sentence she understands. This requirement comes into conflict with compositionality. If meaning is compositionally determined, then all you need for understanding a sentence is what you get from combining your understanding of the parts according to the mode of composition. But that knowledge is not always sufficient for recognizing any proof at all of a given sentence. Dummett's proof-theoretic argument to the contrary is mistaken. (shrink)

Generic statements play a crucial role in concept learning, communication and education. Despite many efforts, the semantics of generics remain a controversial issue, as they do not seem to fit our standard theories of meaning. In this article, we attempt to shed light on this problem by focusing on how these sentences function in reasoning. Drawing on a distinction between property and diagnostic generics, we defend three theses: First, property generics are not about facts but express relations between concepts. Second, (...) generics play an important role in everyday reasoning by interacting with our expectations about the world. Third, diagnostic generics emphasise properties that separate the category in the generics from other categories in the same contrast class. We use the theory of conceptual spaces to advance measures of typicality and diagnosticity capable of modelling different aspects of generics and apply them to the modifier effect and the inverse conjunction fallacy. Finally, we discuss the pragmatics of generics. (shrink)

Following Manne (1966, Insider Trading and the Stock Market (New York, Free Press)) we introduce a distinction between insider trading and market manipulation on the one hand and corporate insiders versus misappropriators on the other hand. This gives rise to four types of alleged inside transactions. We argue that the literature on insider trading has often targeted inside transactions type II, III and IV but that these arguments do not necessarily hold for type I transactions. We look for consequentionalist as (...) well as non-consequentionalist arguments against type I transactions and demonstrate that these are hard to find. Throughout the article we refer extensively to the economic literature on insider trading in order to overcome a relative divide between the economic, legal, and philosophical discussion on insider trading. (shrink)

Fictional truth is commonly analyzed in terms of the speech acts or propositional attitudes of a teller. In this paper, I investigate Lewis’s counterfactual analysis in terms of felicitous narrator assertion, Currie’s analysis in terms of fictional author belief, and Byrne’s analysis in terms of ideal author invitations to make-believe—and find them all lacking. I propose instead an analysis in terms of the revelations of an infelicitous narrator.

PETER GILMOUR Introduction Although the nine philosophers in this volume can be described as Enlightenment philosophers (or, at least, as philosophers who ...

The so called Ramsey test is a semantic recipe for determining whether a conditional proposition is acceptable in a given state of belief. Informally, it can be formulated as follows: (RT) Accept a proposition of the form "if A, then C" in a state of belief K, if and only if the minimal change of K needed to accept A also requires accepting C. In Gärdenfors (1986) it was shown that the Ramsey test is, in the context of some other (...) weak conditions, on pain of triviality incompatible with the following principle, which was there called the preservation criterion: (P) If a proposition B is accepted in a given state of belief K and the proposition A is consistent with the beliefs in K, then B is still accepted in the minimal change of K needed to accept A. (RT) provides a necessary and sufficient criterion for when a 'positive' conditional should be included in a belief state, but it does not say anything about when the negation of a conditional sentence should be accepted. A very natural candidate for this purpose is the following negative Ramsey test: (NRT) Accept the negation of a proposition of the form "if A, then C" in a consistent state of belief K, if and only if the minimal change of K needed to accept A does not require accepting C. This note shows that (NRT) leads to triviality results even in the absence of additional conditions like (P). (shrink)

Participants of low and high hypnotic susceptibility were tested on a temporal order judgement task, both with and without hypnosis. Judgements were made of the order of presentation of light flashes appearing in first one hemi-field then the other. There were differences in the inter-stimulus intervals required accurately to report the order, depending upon which hemi-field led. This asymmetry was most marked in hypnotically susceptible participants and reversed when they were hypnotised. This implies not only that brain activity changes in (...) hypnosis, but also that there is a difference in brain function between people of low and high hypnotic susceptibility. The latter exhibited a faster-acting left hemisphere in the waking state, but faster right when hypnotised. (shrink)

This book looks at how scientists investigate the nature of the mind and the brain, providing answers to these important questions.

Contrary to common belief, IT systems often disappoint the expectations to increase productivity and flexibility of work and value creation processes. Moreover, most IT design and implementation projects still fail or burst time and cost budgets to a high extent. After presenting significant empirical evidence for these phenomena, the paper reflects on the reasons for their persistence by developing a semiotic perspective on the processes of dealing with computer artifacts in organisations. This semiotic view allows understanding the processes of designing, (...) implementing and using IT systems as efforts of structuring social practices in organisations. A typical case of enterprise resource planning system implementation illustrates this. Finally, a number of guidelines for an improved practice of designing and appropriating IT systems for effective use in organisations are derived from the theoretical reflections. (shrink)

This two-part article includes the following: (1) excerpts from Peter H. Plesch’s essay originally published in Journal of Polymer Science, Part A (2004) 42, 7: 1537-1546 which reflects on Plesch’s research with Polanyi; (2) Plesch’s short account titled “Michael Polanyi and the Paranormal” which complements his original article’s discussion of his work with Polanyi. Together these two pieces provide interesting insights into P'olanyi’s work as a research scientist as weIl as reflections on the nature of scientific discovery.