Analyzing the position of two philosophers whose views are recognizably divergent, W. O. Quine and M. Dummett, we intend to support a striking point of agreement between them: the idea that our logical principles constitute our principles about what there is, and therefore, that logic is metaphysics.

Many factors contribute to the inappropriate use of medicines, including not only a lack of information but also inaccurate and misleading promotional information. This review examines how the promotion of pharmaceuticals directly affects the prescribing and use of medicines. We define promotion broadly as all actions taken directly by pharmaceutical companies with the aim of enhancing product sales. We look in greater detail at promotion techniques aimed at prescribers, such as sales representatives, pharmaceutical advertisements in medical journals and use of (...) key opinion leaders, along with the quality of information provided and the effects thereof. We also discuss promotion to the public, through direct-to-consumer advertising, and its effects. Finally, we consider initiatives to regulate promotion that come from industry, government and nongovernmental organizations. (shrink)

People judge positive information to be more alike than negative information. This good-bad asymmetry in similarity was argued to constitute a true property of the information ecology (Alves, H., Koch, A., & Unkelbach, C. (2017). Why good is more alike than bad: Processing implications. Trends in Cognitive Sciences, 21, 69–79). Alternatively, the asymmetry may constitute a processing outcome itself, namely an influence of phasic affect on information processing. Because no research has yet tested whether phasic affect influences perceived similarity (...) among stimuli, we conducted 5 Experiments that also tested whether phasic affect can account for the higher judged similarity among positive compared to negative stimuli. In three experiments, we affectively charged pictures of different Pokemon by pairing them with monetary gains and losses (Exp. 1a, 1b) as well as positive and negative trait words (Exp. 2); yet, the evaluative charge did not differentially influence perceived similarity among the Pokemon. Experiment 3 replicated the basic similarity asymmetry among positive and negative words, and found that it was unaffected by externally induced phasic affect. Experiment 4 showed that phasic affect had no influence on perceived similarity of non-evaluative words either. We conclude that albeit a weak influence of phasic affect on perceived similarity of stimuli cannot be ruled out entirely, it can most likely not account for the typically medium to large sized asymmetry in similarity among positive and negative stimuli. (shrink)

Stephanie Mills presented the following as the keynote address at the 2007 Annual Meeting of the International Association for Environmental Philosophy in Chicago. Mills addresses the readers of this journal in her role as a bioregional author and social critic. Adopting a narrative style rather than the typical format of the “philosophical essay,” she raises questions that are always and still at the core of our philosophical dialogue: What is nature? How do we humans perceive our relationship with nature? (...) And how may the blind spots of academic philosophy be discerned in traditional approaches to issues such as “nature versus humans,” the wilderness debate, and the possibility and limits of technology? (shrink)

A standard objection to socioeconomic human rights is that they are not claimable as human rights: their correlative duties are not owed to each human, independently of specific institutional arrangements, in an enforceable manner. I consider recent responses to this ‘claimability objection,’ and argue that none succeeds. There are no human rights to socioeconomic goods. But all is not lost: there are, I suggest, human rights to ‘socioeconomic consideration’. I propose a detailed structure for these rights and their correlative duties, (...) while remaining neutral on substantive moral debates. I argue that socioeconomic-consideration human rights are satisfactorily claimable and sufficiently practical. (shrink)

Plausibly, only moral agents can bear action-demanding duties. Not all groups are moral agents. This places constraints on which groups can bear action-demanding duties. Moreover, if such duties imply ability then moral agents – of both the individual and group varieties – can only bear duties over actions they are able to perform. I tease out the implications of this for duties over group actions, and argue that groups in many instances cannot bear these duties. This is because only groups (...) with the right kind of structure – groups I call ‘collectives’ – have the agency to bear action-demanding duties. Yet neither can individuals bear these duties, assuming that individuals cannot perform group actions and that duty implies ability. This appears to leave us at a loss when assigning duties to perform some group actions. I argue we can solve this problem by assigning collectivization duties to individuals – duties to form a collective that then incurs a duty over the action. I give criteria for when individuals have collectivization duties and discuss the demands these duties place on their bearers. (shrink)

Pope Jorge Mario Bergoglio released the "Encyclical Laudato Si': on the care of common home" on June 18, 2015, the same day that the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration has shown that the temperature of Earth continues increasing and that May of 2015 was Earth's warmest month, since 1880. By endorsing the scientific knowledge in relation to anthropogenic factors on global warming and by defending actions to confront the causes of climate change and ecosystem degradation, the Holy See has taken (...) a key step to put Catholics at the forefront of global ecological struggle and to encourage the signing of the global treaty to replace the Kyoto Protocol at the 21st Conference of the Parties, that will take place in December in Paris. But the encyclical of Pope Francis proposes a larger task that is to protect the poorest of the poor countries, addressing jointly the human environment and the natural environment from the perspective of an integral ecology. The purpose of this paper is to analyze the advances and limitations of the propositions of the encyclical Laudato Si ' and to expand the dialogue on gender relations and deep ecology. (shrink)

According to Schroeder-Heister 2018, proof-theoretic semantics is ‘an alternative to truth-condition semantics. It is based on the fundamental assumption that the central notion in terms of which meanings are assigned to certain expressions of our language, in particular to logical constants, is that of proof rather than truth. In this sense proof-theoretic semantics is semantics in terms of proof. Proof-theoretic semantics also means the semantics of proofs, i.e. the semantics of entities which describe how we arrive at certain assertions given (...) certain assumptions.' This text advocates that proof-theoretic semantics, as described above, was an approach to semantical issues in logic that appeared in mainstream philosophical literature at least a couple of centuries before the tradition of general proof theory (cf. Prawitz 1971) came into being. This is done by means of an interpretive analysis of Kant’s 1762 essay Die falsche Spitzfindigkeit der vier syllogistischen Figuren, in which two theses are argued: first, that the issue of justifying the logical validity of inferences is approached by Kant in this text, in a strong sense, in terms of proofs; and second, that the purpose of his effort is to establish a point concerning the semantical equivalence between certain distinct valid inferences. (shrink)

There is disagreement in the literature about the exact nature of the phenomenon of empathy. There are emotional, cognitive, and conditioning views, applying in varying degrees across species. An adequate description of the ultimate and proximate mechanism can integrate these views. Proximately, the perception of an object's state activates the subject's corresponding representations, which in turn activate somatic and autonomic responses. This mechanism supports basic behaviors that are crucial for the reproductive success of animals living in groups. The Perception-Action Model, (...) together with an understanding of how representations change with experience, can explain the major empirical effects in the literature. It can also predict a variety of empathy disorders. The interaction between the PAM and prefrontal functioning can also explain different levels of empathy across species and age groups. This view can advance our evolutionary understanding of empathy beyond inclusive fitness and reciprocal altruism and can explain different levels of empathy across individuals, species, stages of development, and situations. Key Words: altruism; cognitive empathy ; comparative; emotion; emotional contagion; empathy ; evolution; human; perception-action; perspective taking. (shrink)

Diese Arbeit widmet sich einem Hauptproblem der kantischen Pflichtensystematik in der Tugendlehre: Der Unterscheidung von vollkommenen und unvollkommenen Pflichten und der resultierenden Spannung zwischen Einleitung und Elementarlehre. Während in der Einleitung in die Tugendlehre Tugendpflichten begrifflich nur als unvollkommene Pflichten eingeführt und abgeleitet werden, beginnt die Elementarlehre mit einem extensiven Abschnitt über vollkommene Pflichten, die dennoch Tugendpflichten sein sollen. Nach einer kurzen Betrachtung einschlägiger Vorschläge der Literatur zu diesem Problem, versucht die vorliegende Arbeit aus dem Konzept der Weite von Pflichten (...) Kriterien für die Zuordnung der verschiedenen Tugendpflichten zu gewinnen. Im Lichte dieser Kriterien erscheint Kants Beurteilung mancher verhandelter Pflichten als ‚vollkommen’ gerechtfertigt. Abschließend wird gezeigt, inwiefern sie dennoch zu den Tugendpflichten gehören können, indem Kants eher beiläufige Unterscheidung von Strebens- und Erhaltungspflichten in den Mittelpunkt gerückt wird. Unvollkommenheit einer Pflicht folgt nur aus ethischen Strebenspflichten, nicht aus gebotenen Maximen überhaupt. Das Ziel der Exposition aller relevanten Merkmale, die zu einer Tugendpflicht gehören können, lässt verstehen, warum die Einleitung nur auf Strebenspflichten zentriert ist.This essay is concerned with one of the main problems in Kant’s system of duties in the Tugendlehre: the difference between perfect and imperfect duties and the resulting inconsistency between introduction and Elementarlehre. Even though the introduction establishes and derives duties of virtue as imperfect duties only, the Elementarlehre begins with a long section concerning perfect duties, which nevertheless are supposed to be duties of virtue. After a brief consideration of other interpreter’s views on this topic, this essay tries to develop criteria for the categorisation of the different duties of virtue from the concept of a duty’s latitude. In light of these criteria, Kant’s categorizing some of the discussed duties as perfect seems justifiable. Finally I will show, why they can nevertheless be ‘duties of virtue’, by emphasizing Kant’s distinction between duties to strive and those to conserve. Imperfection of a duty follows from duties to strive only, not from obligatory maxims per se. The goal of introducing all relevant characteristics, a duty of virtue may have, can explain, why the introduction is only concerned with duties to strive. (shrink)

RESUMO: No presente artigo, propõe-se apresentar e explicitar o estatuto teórico da categoria marxiana do valor, conforme determinado no contexto da crítica da economia política, em sua fase madura. Em especial, pretende-se discutir o modo como Marx aborda a relação da determinação categorial do valor com as demais que compõem e constituem a formamercadoria dos produtos do trabalho humano. Nesse sentido, a teoria marxiana do valor aparece como exposição crítica do modo de produção capitalista a partir da análise categorial da (...) mercadoria, tendo como meta revelá-la na sua dimensão mais essencial: a de veículo de realização da valorização do valor. A forma valor, acompanhando o desenvolvimento da argumentação marxiana em Grundrisse e O Capital, é analisada em sua configuração de determinação em processo, que se desdobra, pressupõe e implica um conjunto de outrasFormen que se articulam em momentos de diferenciação e desenvolvimento reais que se expressam concretamente nas objetivações do trabalho humano existindo como momentos do capital. Mercadoria, mercado e capital perdem todos sua aparência de exterioridade recíproca de "coisas" para se desvelarem realizações de um modo sócio-histórico de produzir a vida humana. ABSTRACT: The present article aims to present and explain the theoretical status of the Marxian category of value, as determined in the context of the critique of political economy in its mature phase. In particular, it discusses how Marx presents the relationship of categorical determination of value with other relationships that compose and constitute the commodity form of the products of human labor. In this sense, the Marxian theory of value appears as a critical exposition of the capitalist mode of production, based on the categorical analysis of the commodity and aiming to reveal it in its most essential dimension: as the vehicle for implementing the appreciation of value. Value, according to the development of the Marxian argument in the Grundrisse and the Capital, is analyzed in its configuration as a determination process that unfolds, presupposes, and implies a set of other formen. These are articulated in moments of real differentiation and development that are concretely expressed in objectifications human labor existing as moments of capital. Goods, market, and capital lose all their appearance as the reciprocal externality of "stuff", to reveal realizations of a socio-historical mode of producing human life. (shrink)

This paper provides an overview of Group Duties: Their Existence and Their Implications for Individuals.

En este documento, debato ampliamente sobre la fenomenología de la intersubjetividad presentada por Husserl y por Sartre, centrándome en los conceptos de empatía y ser-para-otros. Contrariamente a la opinión más común, rechazo la objeción de solipsista dirigida a Husserl y sostengo que es la descripción de Sartre la que da lugar a esa objeción, en la medida en que él describe la conciencia de otro sujeto como una forma de autoconocimiento como un "objeto" (para "otros"). Termino señalando algunas directrices para (...) convertir el análisis de Husserl de la aprehensión de otros sujetos en una fenomenología de la comunicación del más alto nivel. (shrink)

In this paper, I discuss the possible relations between Fritz London’s account of the status of the observer in quantum physics and transcendental phenomenology. Firstly, I discuss Steven French’s interpretation of London’s thesis as a phenomenological account of the status of the observer, along with the objections Otávio Bueno has brought forward. Secondly, refusing in part both French’s and Bueno’s theses for several reasons, I propose another way of reading London’s thesis in the framework of transcendental phenomenology. Namely, I put (...) London’s account of the observer against the backdrop of Husserl’s analyses of the objectifying acts and objectual constitution. Finally, I end this article with some criticisms of what seems to me the ontological indigency of the Copenhagen interpretation of quantum physics, to whose “spirit” London also belongs. (shrink)

Disagreement over what exists is so fundamental that it tends to hinder or even to block dialogue among disputants. The various controversies between believers and atheists, or realists and nominalists, are only two kinds of examples. Interested in contributing to the intelligibility of the debate on ontology, in 1939 Willard van Orman Quine began a series of works which introduces the notion of ontological commitment and proposes an allegedly objective criterion to identify the exact conditions under which a theoretical discourse (...) signals an assumption of existence. I intend to present the concept of ontological commitment and the Quinean criterion, to expose and evaluate some of the many criticisms to which the criterion has subject and to situate it in the context of Quine’s philosophy. As a product of such analyses, I hope to contribute to the discussion on the application and relevance of the notion of ontological commitment. (shrink)

Which kinds of responsibility can we attribute to which kinds of collective, and why? In contrast, which kinds of collective responsibility can we not attribute—which kinds are ‘gappy’? This study provides a framework for answering these questions. It begins by distinguishing between three kinds of collective and three kinds of responsibility. It then explains how gaps—i.e. cases where we cannot attribute the responsibility we might want to—appear to arise within each type of collective responsibility. It argues some of these gaps (...) do not exist on closer inspection, at least for some collectives and some of the time. (shrink)

O ficcionalismo, geralmente classificado como um tipo de nominalismo, apresenta como perspectiva precípua a tese de que os entes matemáticos são ficções. Para o ficcionalista, o discurso matemático é desprovido de conteúdo. Hartry Field, que é o principal defensor dessa concepção ontológica da matemática, contesta, em Science Without Numbers, a utilização de entes matemáticos na redação de teorias da física, alegando que a defesa mais plausível do realismo ontológico matemático é o argumento da indispensabilidade de Quine-Putnam. O ficcionalismo defendido por (...) Field nos permite, de acordo com Shapiro, classificá-lo no grupo filosofia-primeiro, ou seja, entre os filósofos que defendem que a filosofia deve ser responsável por legislar a respeito da prática matemática. Dessa forma, podemos considerar Field um revisionista epistemológico. Como se sabe, a dependência da ciência moderna em relação ao discurso matemático coloca a tese ficcionalista em xeque. Ainda assim, se partirmos dos pressupostos filosóficos da vertente formalista da filosofia da matemática, que concebe a matemática como constituída de um conjunto de regras sem significado que podem ser manipuladas de maneira puramente sintática, poderemos traçar importantes analogias entre matemática e ficção, tal como também entre metamatemática e metaficção. Para um formalista simpático à tese ficcionalista, o estatuto ontológico da matemática é semelhante ao das regras de um jogo de xadrez. (shrink)

Michael Tye proposed a way of understanding the content of hallucinatory experiences. Somewhat independently, Mark Johnston provided us with elements to think about the content of hallucination. In this paper, their views are compared and evaluated. Both their theories present intricate combinations of conjunctivist and disjunctivist strategies to account for perceptual content. An alternative view, which develops a radically disjunctivist account, is considered and rejected. Finally, the paper raises some metaphysical difficulties that seem to threaten any conjunctivist theory and to (...) lead the debate to a dilemma: strong disjunctivists cannot explain the subjective indistinguishability between veridical and hallucinatory experiences, whereas conjunctivists cannot explain what veridical and hallucinatory experiences have in common. This dilemma is left here as an open challenge. (shrink)

When a liberal-democratic state signs a treaty or wages a war, does its whole polity do those things? In this article, we approach this question via the recent social ontological literature on collective agency. We provide arguments that it does and that it does not. The arguments are presented via three considerations: the polity's control over what the state does; the polity's unity; and the influence of individual polity members. We suggest that the answer to our question differs for different (...) liberal-democratic states and depends on two underlying considerations: the amount of discretion held by the state's officeholders; the extent to which the democratic procedure is deliberative rather than aggregative. (shrink)

The most prominent theories of perceptual content are incapable of accounting for the phenomenal particularity of perceptual experience. This difficulty, or so I argue, springs from the absence of a series of distinctions that end up turning the problem apparently unsolvable. After briefly examining the main shortcomings of representationalism and naïve realism, I advance a proposal of my own that aims to make the trivial fact of perceptually experiencing a particular object as such philosophically unproblematic. Though I am well aware (...) of the sketchy and schematic way in which my proposal is advanced and the other alternatives are criticized, I hope this paper is still worth its ink at least insofar as it is capable of pointing to a novel and promising way out of old and resilient difficulties that have been haunting philosophers of perception. If not a fully developed theory, at least I deliver here a sketch that, or so I sell, is worth the bet. (shrink)

Partindo das reflexões de Michel Foucault no final dos anos 1970 e da noção desenvolvida mais recentemente de “governamentalidade algorítmica”, entendida como um novo regime de poder e saber baseado na coleta, mineração e cruzamento de grandes volumes de dados, o presente artigo pretende analisar criticamente as chamadas “cidades inteligentes”, nas quais a infraestrutura e os serviços são interligados de maneira supostamente mais racionalizada e eficiente, oferendo finalmente o sonhado bem-estar e a vida feliz. Essa utopia de organização social será (...) associada a uma nova forma de racionalidade política e estratégia de governo por meio de algoritmos, que colocam importantes e inquietantes questões. Neste trabalho, ressaltaremos a capacidade que os algoritmos possuem de nos governar, no sentido de conduzir nossas condutas e estruturar o campo das ações possíveis. E o foco deste artigo recairá sobre a tensão entre liberdade e controle inscrita nessa nova governamentalidade, que tem por objeto mais imediato os dados, as relações e os ambientes. (shrink)

Fábio Alves dos Santos (1954-2013) cursou Pedagogia, Ciências Sociais e Teologia, era Especialista em Filosofia da Religião (PUC Minas), Advogado (PUC Minas) e Mestre em Direito Constitucional (UFMG). Lecionou na PUC Minas como professor de Cultura Religiosa e depois como professor no Curso de Direito, atuando principalmente no Serviço de Assistência Judiciária – SAJ, especialmente cuidado de causas populares como as da ASMARE (Associação dos Catadores de Papel, Papelão e Material Reaproveitável de Belo Horizonte), da Pastoral de Rua, da (...) Pastoral Carcerária, de movimentos de “Sem Casa”, de ocupações e tantos outros grupos. Fábio sofria de grave problema de visão há mais de 15 anos. Quase ficou cego depois de diversas cirurgias de miopia. Isso, porém, não o impedia de seguir seu constante compromisso com as lutas populares. Na última entrevista que concedeu, menos de um mês antes de sua morte (19 de outubro de 2013), depois de duro sofrimento de quase dois anos, no tratamento de um câncer no pâncreas, conta um pouco de sua vida, sua luta e sua percepção de várias realidades, especialmente da Igreja e da pastoral. Militante formado na Teologia da Libertação, de profunda espiritualidade, marcada por traços da religiosidade popular nordestina e comprometida com a libertação, Fábio Alves também buscou em sua vida abrir-se à teologia do pluralismo religioso, especialmente com o Santo Daime, em cuja tradição religiosa chegou a ser “fardado”, mantendo uma profunda atitude espiritual aberta ao diálogo inter-religioso. Sua primeira publicação foi “Começo de mundo novo: sofrimento, luta e vitória dos posseiros de Santana dos Frades”, Sergipe, numa versão popular em 1981 e outra pela Editora Vozes (1990). Fruto de sua dissertação de mestrado, publicou o livro “Direito Agrário: política fundiária no Brasil (1995). Em 2001 saiu seu último livro, uma coletânea de artigos publicados em diversos jornais: “Em defesa da vida”. Num artigo em Horizonte (2004), juntamente com o advogado, amigo e colega Prof. Cristiano de Melo Bastos, discutiu “A prática jurídica na missão da PUC Minas”. Palavras-chave : Teologia da Libertação. Militância. Igreja Católica. Pastoral. Lutas populares. (shrink)

This papers aims at clarifying some misunderstandings that seem to block an adequate account of de re thoughts within the Fregean framework. It is usually assumed that Fregean senses cannot be de re, or dependent upon objects. Contrary to this assumption, Gareth Evans and John McDowell have claimed that Fregean de re senses are not just possible, but in fact the most promising alternative for accounting for de re thoughts. The reasons blocking this alternative can be traced back to Russellian (...) considerations that contaminated the interpretation of Frege. This contaminated understanding is first detected in Tyler Burge’s distinction between de dicto and de re, then connected to the motivations behind David Kaplan’s notion of character, and finally found in John Searle’s descriptivist account. The difficulty in understanding de re thoughts is, roughly speaking, a side effect of the misunderstanding of the boundaries separating internal and external elements of thoughts, as well as the distinction between mental content and means of representation. (shrink)

Este estudio aborda la Teoría de la Complejidad y el concepto de decolonialidad como herramientas cognitivas para orientar las direcciones epistémicas en el campo de la Ciencia de la Información. Se utiliza investigación bibliográfica y exploratoria para delinear los datos teóricos presentados. Los resultados alcanzados revelan un análisis crítico de los preceptos eurocéntricos del conocimiento científico, utilizando el pensamiento complejo y la decolonialidad como enfoque analítico de la colonialidad. Se identifica que el conocimiento científico está estructurado por aspectos de colonialidad, (...) patriarcado y capitalismo, los cuales, a su vez, se desarrollan en el racismo epistémico y el sexismo epistémico. Se concluye que tanto la teoría de la complejidad como la decolonialidad pueden ampliar el espectro epistemológico de la Ciencia de la Información y, en consecuencia, su objeto de estudio, la información. (shrink)

Organizations do moral wrong. States pursue unjust wars, businesses avoid tax, charities misdirect funds. Our social, political, and legal responses require guidance. We need to know what we’re responding to and how we should respond to it. We need a metaphysical and moral theory of wrongful organizations. This book provides a new such theory, paying particular attention to questions that have been underexplored in existing debates. These questions include: where are organizations located as material objects in the natural world? What’s (...) the metaphysical relation between organizations and their members? Can organizations be blameworthy for attitudes and character traits, as well as for actions? What about feelings of guilt, remorse, and shame—can organizations feel these emotions and why does this matter? How and why are members implicated in organizations’ wrongs? How should organizations’ reparative costs be apportioned among members? The book answers these questions. It argues that organizations are material objects with humans as material parts—much like how a pizza is a material object with slices as material parts. This picture helps us make sense of organizations’ blameworthiness, including blame for organization-level actions, attitudes, and character traits. The book argues that organizations can experience moral self-awareness—a crucial component of guilt, remorse, and shame. Members can be implicated in organizations’ actions in numerous ways—and, it is argued, members’ level of implication should determine their share of organizations’ reparative burdens. (shrink)

Based on the concept of intentionality, I argue for an integrative view of mental life as a higher function of the living organism, beyond the classical oppositions and dualisms between mind and body. Next, I claim in thesis that Phenomenology has never truly isolated and addressed the problem of consciousness, given the persistent confusion between it and intentionality. Similarly, I also isolate attention from consciousness and argue, based on experience, for the existence of both conscious and unconscious mental processes. In (...) the third section, I attempt a phenomenological description of consciousness as such, showing its high impact on mental life. Finally, some remarks are made about the difference between the concept of consciousness I propose and the classical analyses on qualia and sentience. (shrink)

A collective duty gap arises when a group has caused harm that requires remedying but no member did harm that can justify the imposition of individual remedial duties. Examples range from airplane crashes to climate change. How might collective duty gaps be filled? This paper starts by examining two promising proposals for filling them. Both proposals are found inadequate. Thus, while gap-filling duties can be defended against objections from unfairness and demandingness, we need a substantive justification for their existence. I (...) argue that substantive justification can be found in the normative force of commitments individuals make to others with regard to ends. Along the way, I argue that gap-filling duties must be conceptualized differently in group agents, as compared to non-agent groups: in the former, gap-filling duties can be understood as duties to “take up the slack”; in the latter, this would be a category error. (shrink)

Este artigo tem como objetivo investigar a coerência entre as práticas pedagógicas, suas teorias, perspectivas e bases filosóficas, segundo o ponto de vista de estudantes de Pedagogia da Faculdade de Educação da Universidade do Estado de Minas Gerais, Campus universitário de Belo Horizonte (FaE/UEMG-CBH), os quais encontram-se em estágio inicial de formação. A partir da premissa de que esses estudantes, ainda que com formação acadêmica padrão, quando da sua atuação, desenvolverão perfis e práticas pedagógicas diferenciadas, a questão que permeia a (...) pesquisa aqui apresentada é a seguinte: O que influencia essa diferença de perfis docentes em suas práticas pedagógicas? Metodologicamente, a pesquisa se caracteriza como um estudo de caso, com abordagem que conbina métodos de análise quantitativa e qualitativa de conteúdo, cujos procedimentos adotados foram a revisão bibliográfica e a pesquisa de campo, esta ancorada no instrumento questionário estruturado. Como aporte teórico, serão exploradas correntes filosóficas e teorias psicológicas de forma associada às perspectivas pedagógicas de cunho fenomenológico, comportamentalista e dialógico, as quais constituem o questionário aplicado e que diz respeito à pesquisa em si. Dentre os resultados obtidos, apesar de ter prevalecido uma suposta tendência dos sujeitos pela perspectiva dialógica, constatamos que diferentes estilos pedagógicos constroem a identidade pedagógica do docente, a qual não se restringe a um mero enquadramento generalista e exclusivo de um ou outra perspectiva pedagógica. (shrink)

Resumo: O artigo examina os desdobramentos dos atuais procedimentos de virtualização dos processos produtivos e interativos no que estes representam, e podem representar, para a constituição de um novo universo de experiência da realidade e das atividades cotidianas dos indivíduos. Reformulação que enquadra de novo modo a própria æsthesis, o conjunto das potências de percepção e apropriação objetiva e subjetiva de mundo. A partir da inquirição desses aspectos, ensaia-se, ao fim, uma prospecção das implicações práticas e teóricas de tais desenvolvimentos (...) para a atividade educativa. Palavras-chave: Sensibilidade; Virtualidade; Marx; Educação; Individualidade Æsthesis, Digital Technologies and Education: the formation of human senses in the virtual’s era Abstract: The article examines the current processes of virtualization of productive and interactive processes in what these represent, and can represent, for the constitution of a new universe of experience of reality and the daily activities of individuals. A reformulation framing in the new way the aesthesis itself, the set of all the powers of perception and objective and subjective appropriation of the world. From the examination of these aspects, a prospective study of the practical and theoretical implications of such developments for the educational activity. Keywords: Sensitivity; Virtuality; Marx; Education; Individuality Æsthesis, Technologies Numériques et Éducation : la formation des sens humains à l’ère du virtuelle Résumé : L’article examine les développements des procédures actuelles pour la virtualisation des processus productifs et interactifs dans ce qu’ils représentent, et peuvent représenter, pour la constitution d’un nouvel univers d’expérience de la réalité et des activités quotidiennes des individus. Reformulation qui encadre l’ésthèse elle-même, l’ensemble des pouvoirs de perception et d’appropriation objective et subjective du monde. De l’étude de ces aspects, il est testé, à la fin, une prospection des implications pratiques et théoriques de tels développements pour l’activité éducative. Mots-clés : Sensibilité ; Virtualité ; Marx ; Éducation ; Individualité Data de registro: 23/09/2022 Data de aceite: 23/08/2022. (shrink)

Este artigo pretende discutir a concepção de aparência desenvolvida por Hannah Arendt na obra A Vida do Espírito (1977), tendo em vista a centralidade da questão como elemento inicial da reflexão sobre as atividades do espírito. Inicialmente, o texto discorre sobre parte dos atravessamentos teóricos presentes na interpretação arendtiana da aparência, concentrando-se no conteúdo de referência em Martin Heidegger. Como resultado, ocorre um afastamento realizado pela autora em relação à metafísica tradicional, e tal postura crítica será compreendida a partir do (...) diálogo com Heidegger e Kant. Assim, na sua transversalidade com a faculdade do pensar e com o ser em geral, entende-se que a crítica à metafísica é consequência direta da concepção de aparência proposta pela autora. Por fim, uma breve elucidação metodológica do conteúdo de A Vida do Espírito será apresentada, com o intuito de justificar seu caráter interpretativo baseado no método fenomenológico-hermenêutico aos moldes heideggerianos, em detrimento de uma descrição fenomenológica de inspiração husserliana. (shrink)

A relação mente-corpo é um dos problemas componentes da agenda da filosofia. Na modernidade, Renê Descartes foi um dos que trataram da questão, adquirindo bastantes adeptos e críticos. Ele defende uma abordagem dualista substancial, segundo a qual mente e corpo são entes substancialmente distintos. Uma visão oposta a essa é defendida pelas perspectivas fisicalistas reducionistas, segundo as quais, de modo geral, toda a realidade é ou pode ser reduzida, ontológica e/ou epistemologicamente ao físico, de modo a dissolver o problema da (...) relação mente-corpo. Ambas as visões apresentam controvérsias. A dualista cartesiana, por afirmar que a mente pertence a um plano metafísico, não consegue explicar como seria possível a interação entre uma entidade imaterial e uma material. As de cunho fisicalista, com frequência, desconsideram processos mentais subjetivos, dada a dificuldade de sua redução aos termos físicos. Outra perspectiva explicativa do mental, denominada teoria do aspecto dual, pretende ser um meio termo entre os fisicalismos e o dualismo substancial. Analisamos algumas das principais correntes de pensamentos dentro da filosofia da mente buscando apresentar, de maneira simples, o quão plural são as perspectivas que tratam do mesmo objeto de pesquisa, qual, seja a mente, tratando em particular da relação entre a mente o corpo. (shrink)

In this article, I start with an analysis of Husserl’s description of the intentional structure of communicative intentions in the Logical Investigations, pointing to some obvious shortcomings of it. Then, I stress some important criticisms of Husserl’s approach, namely by Pfänder, and I endeavor to show that Husserl was very close to a full-fledged theory of communicative intentions in the years around 1910. I then turn to Reinach’s theory of social acts, without deciding whether Reinach’s approach was dependent or not (...) on Husserl’s new views concerning the intentionality of communicative acts. Regarding Reinach’s theory of the Vernehmung, I criticize a widespread trend to construe it as something like a perception, showing that it expresses what I call the “vocative element” of the communicative acts. Then, I point to some complements that Reinach’s description is in need, and I finish with an outline of a phenomenologically oriented concept of communication, based on Husserl’s and Reinach’s insights. (shrink)

The object of this paper is to show how one is able to construct a paraconsistent theory of models that reflects much of the classical one. In other words the aim is to demonstrate that there is a very smooth and natural transition from the model theory of classical logic to that of certain categories of paraconsistent logic. To this end we take an extension of da Costa''sC 1 = (obtained by adding the axiom A A) and prove for it (...) results which correspond to many major classical model theories, taken from Shoenfield [5]. In particular we prove counterparts of the theorems of o-Tarski and Chang-o-Suszko, Craig-Robinson and the Beth definability theorem. (shrink)