Cooperation is a great challenge for natural selection. Some scholars assume that cooperation could not evolve within the framework of natural selection. It is undeniable that natural selection, at least at the individual level, favors selfishness and defectors. Nonetheless, this selfish tendency does not necessarily imply that cooperation could not evolve by means of natural selection. In this paper, we specifically acknowledge certain basic challenges for the evolution of the human ability to cooperate at the level of large groups. In (...) this paper, we discuss topics like the human ability for “supercooperation,” the importance of repetition and reputation, and Multilevel Selection Theory as the basic mechanisms of evolution of cooperation. (shrink)

Stig Kanger made important contributions to logic and formal philosophy. Kanger's dissertation Provability in Logic, 1957, contained significant results in proof theory as well as the first fully worked out model-theoretic interpretation of quantified modal logic. It is generally accepted nowadays that Kanger was one of the originators of possible worlds semantics for modal logic. Kanger's most original achievements were in the areas of general proof theory, the semantics of modal and deontic logic, and the logical analysis of the (...) concept of rights. He also contributed to action theory, preference logic, and the theory of measurement. This is the first of two volumes dedicated to the work of Stig Kanger. The present volume is a complete collection of Kanger's philosophical papers. The second volume contains critical essays on Kanger's work, as well as biographical essays on Kanger written by colleagues and friends. (shrink)

Stig Kanger made important contributions to logic and formal philosophy. Kanger's most original achievements were in the areas of general proof theory, the semantics of modal and deontic logic, and the logical analysis of the concept of rights. But he contributed significantly to action theory, preference logic and the theory of measurement as well. This is the second of two volumes dedicated to the work of Stig Kanger. The first volume is a complete collection of Kanger's philosophical papers. (...) The present volume contains critical essays on the various aspects of Kanger's work as well as some biographical sketches. Lennart Åqvist, Jan Berg, Brian Chellas, Anatoli Degtyarev, Lars Gustafsson, Sören Halldén, Kaj Børge Hansen, Sven Ove Hansson, Risto Hilpinen, Jaakko Hintikka, Ghita Holmström-Hintikka, Lars Lindahl, Sten Lindström, Ingmar Pörn, Dag Prawitz, Wlodek Rabinowicz, Krister Segerberg, Amartya Sen, Sören Stenlund, Göran Sundholm, and Andrei Voronkov have contributed to this volume. (shrink)

Lewis, D. Semantic analyses for dyadic deontic logic.--Salomaa, A. Some remarks concerning many-valued propositional logics.--Chellas, B. F. Conditional obligation.--Jeffrey, R.C. Remarks on interpersonal utility theory.--Hintikka, J. On the proper treatment of quantifiers in Montague semantics.--Mayoh, B.H. Extracting information from logical proofs.--Åqvist, L. A new approach to the logical theory of actions and causality.--Pörn, I. Some basic concepts of action.--Bouvère, K. de. Some remarks concerning logical and ontological theories.--Hacking, I. Combined evidence.--Äberg, C. Solution to a problem raised by Stig Kanger (...) and a set theoretical statement equivalent to the axiom of choice.--Lindström, P. On characterizing elementary logic.-- Scott, D. Rules and derived rules.--Hansson, B. A program for pragmatics.--Hermerén, G. Models.--Fenstad, J.E. Remarks on logic and probability.--Stenlund, S. Analytic and synthetic arithmetical statements. (shrink)

In the work of both Ludwik Fleck and Thomas Kuhn the scientific literature plays important roles for stability and change of scientific phenomenal worlds. In this article we shall introduce the analyses of scientific literature provided by Fleck and Kuhn, respectively. From this background we shall discuss the problem of how divergent thinking can emerge in a dogmatic atmosphere. We shall argue that in their accounts of the factors inducing changes of scientific phenomenal worlds Fleck and Kuhn offer substantially different (...) approaches, and we shall discuss in which respects their approaches may be compatible. (shrink)

This Festschrift bears impressive testimony to the fascination which Icelandic and Norwegian sagas and Faroese ballads still exercise on researchers. Fifteen original papers examine central literary and historical aspects of Nordic sagas and ballads. The papers are published in German, English or Danish.

Hur verkar glömskan i samhällets och människors minne? Vilka kunskaper och erfarenheter glöms bort och försvinner, medvetet eller omedvetet, också inom forskarsamhället? Varför, hur, med vilka medel och med vilka konsekvenser? Hos den enskilda individen kan glömskan bero på olika sjukdomstillstånd. I vissa politiska sammanhang kan glömska vara ett försåtligt maktmedel. I dagens forskarsamhälle har publiceringsaktiviteten accelererat genom datoriseringen. Inom många kunskapsområden kan forskningen därför te sig som ett isberg, där endast ett fåtal arbeten sticker upp över ytan, refereras och (...) kommuniceras. Vad finns av viktigt vetande under ytan och hur förhåller vi oss till det övergripande - eller underliggande - behovet av "knowing-what-is-known"? (shrink)

Michael T. Stuart (2021 and 2022) has proposed imagination as an intellectual dual‐process virtue, consisting of imagination1 (underwritten by cognitive Type 1 processing) and imagination2 (supported by Type 2 processing). This paper investigates the consequences of taking such an account seriously. It proposes that the dual‐process view of imagination allows us to incorporate recent insights from virtue epistemology, providing a fresh perspective on how imagination can be epistemically reliable. The argument centers on the distinction between General Reliability (GR) and Functional (...) System Reliability (FSR), for example in relation to Kengo Miyazono and Uko Tooming's (2023) argument for epistemic generativity. Furthermore, the paper claims that the dual‐process virtue account enables us to integrate a wide range of findings from the literature on epistemology and imagination. Moreover, it suggests a novel way to distinguish the virtues of creativity and imagination and presents a case for viewing imagination as a virtue rather than a skill. (shrink)

Abstract: This paper explores the relevance of themes from Wittgenstein's Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus to the ongoing discussion of metaphysical nihilism. I set out by showing how metaphysical nihilism is of paramount importance for cosmological arguments. Metaphysical nihilism is the position that there might have been nothing. Two conflicting intuitions emerge from a survey of discussions of metaphysical nihilism: Firstly, that metaphysical nihilism is true, and secondly, that formulations of the position are somehow unclear or nonsensical. By considering formalizations of philosophical language, (...) the second intuition is sharpened, while the first intuition is given expression through the Tractarian distinction between what is said and what is shown by our symbolism. I conclude by exploring and rejecting objections to making metaphysical nihilism a scientific, rather than a philosophical question. (shrink)

This article studies the Islamic State's only remaining periodical, Al-Naba, identifying the most common tropes and patterns in the periodical's Sub-Saharan Africa coverage, and on Mozambique in particular. The Islamic State's increasingly important coverage of Africa focuses on terror attacks, military campaigns and on the fight against Christianity. However, it also employs more traditional anti-colonial arguments that have been used by other, more accepted, political actors during the struggle for decolonisation. Al-Naba also functions as a 'shamer' of non-African Muslims, to (...) get them to join jihad by pointing to the African successes of the organisation and set these successes up as examples to be followed. In this sense, the article illustrates how African jihadist branches can have global agency. (shrink)

Originating within research on design cognition, the term design thinking has been growing in popularity over the past three decades, and has become a matter in a variety of discourses, assuming diverse and not necessarily congruent notions. In this article we suggest how to differentiate those discourses on design thinking and discuss its evolution into a meta-disciplinary concept.

O objetivo deste texto é discutir o tema da desigualdade social a luz reflexão filosofia de John Locke e Karl Marx. Se o primeiro atribui ao componente moral a origem, o segundo é enfático ao afirmar que o aspecto econômico é predominante. Entretanto, ambos guardam em comum a questão da propriedade, conceito fundamental para entender a argumentação de cada um. Ao concluir, tem-se ciência de que eles não só autores fundamentais, mas indicam elementos fundamentais que tendem a auxiliar na compreensão (...) de um dos principais problemas nos dias atuais. (shrink)

L’enjeu de ce recueil est de contribuer à repenser la notion de limite, en l’envisageant sous les différentes figures, philosophiques, écologiques, politiques, que lui confère notre présent. Comme le montrent, sous des modalités diverses, les contributions de ce collectif, la limite peut et doit être conçue en dehors des valeurs négatives – borne, restriction ou frontière –, qui en affaiblissent la portée. Elle peut alors être pensée sur le fond de cet illimité où s’ouvre la question même du dehors. Si (...) la finitude demeure la condition de l’existence, de l’art et de la pensée, assumer notre condition finie ne consiste donc pas à se murer dans le connu, mais bien à en transgresser les bornes, et ce faisant, à s’illimiter. Au plus loin de la fermeture des frontières que prônent certaines politiques, ou de la certitude dogmatique dans laquelle certains cherchent à réassurer leur pensée, la limite ne vit que de son rapport fécond à l’illimité. Interrogeant l’existence, la politique, l’art – autant dire, la pensée même –, les textes de ce recueil mettent au jour un certain don de l’illimité. (shrink)

Cet article présente la conception hégélienne de la vie naturelle comme limite : la nature est la limite de l’esprit, et le vivant est une limite en soi. Examiné surtout dans l’animal, « vivre » équivaut à tracer les limites du vivant, dont on voit ainsi la plasticité fondamentale. La finitude du vivant se traduit en une imagination purement sensible, qui se réalise dans la création d’un espace-temps singulier ; le sens qui dirige cette activité vise à reproduire une existence, (...) non une forme, ce qui en fait plus un terme qu’un but de la téléologie animale. Or, si la nature vivante est la limite de l’esprit, peut-elle « surprendre » celui-ci ? Si la « surprise » dit l’apparition de l’inouï depuis la création libre, elle ne le peut pas, car la plasticité naturelle ne produit que la contingence de l’existence et de l’entendement. Mais la contingence ne soumet pas pour autant la nature intégralement à l’idée : en ce sens, la nature reste pour Hegel l’ « énigme » qui tient l’esprit en éveil.The article presents Hegel’s conception of natural life as a limit : nature is the limit of spirit, and the living being is a limit as such. Examined above all in the animal, life is the tracing of the limits of the living being, whose fundamental plasticity becomes manifest. The living being’s finitude is conveyed in its purely sensible imagination, which realises itself in the creation of a singular space-time ; the sense directing this activity aims at reproducing an existence, not a form, and such a sense is rather the end than the aim of animal teleology. Now, if living nature is spirit’s limit, can it « surprise » the latter ? It cannot, if « surprise » means the apparition of an unprecedented possibility of a free creation, for natural plasticity can only produce the contingencies of existence and understanding. But neither does the contingency of nature subjugate it integrally to idea : in this sense, nature remains for Hegel the « enigma » that keeps spirit awake. (shrink)

Summary According to the so-called Starnberger Group1, the amenability of a science to science policy measures, conceptualised by the Group in terms of finalization , depends crucially on conditions intrinsic to the science not invariably present at every stage of its development. Finalization is possible only at junctures where the science in question faces methodologically divergent alternative lines of development. The most significant kind of case depends on the presence of completed , or classical , theories.

This paper recognizes that quantum theory is not satisfactorily formulated; in spite of its empirical success, we may wish to consider the possibility to find more intuitively acceptable foundations. It is emphasized that the difference between classical physics and quantum theory lies in the fact that the latter depends in an essential way on classical descriptions of the observations from preparation to recording. In addition, only statistical predictions are possible. We discuss the case of entangled quantum systems. Performing an experiment (...) on one subsystem, we move a realized prediction to be a precondition for subsequent observations. The quantum features presented do not fit into a unified interpretation, they are found to be incompletely defined but pragmatically applied. No uniquely well defined interpretation is adequate for all cases. (shrink)

The purpose of this paper is to show that the methods of determining monetary values of biodiversity depend on one's ethical point of departure. After a short summary of the ethical principles of anthropocentrism and biocentrism, the paper discusses the problem wether we shouldextend the market system and let the price mechanism encompass biological diversity, i.e. put prices on biodiversity. Basically, the anthropocentric approach leads to an ethics of freedom, where the individual has the right to decide what is good (...) and to implement it. Then the individual's willingness to pay for biodiversity is a relevant criterion for its price. But the biocentric approach rather implies that an ethic of law is more important, valuing the real needs of Nature higher than the preferences of the individual consumers. Then the costs for protection or replacement are relevant, because they reflect what Nature needs.One further question concerns who is to decide the proces of biodiversity. If the willingness to pay is the criterion, then obviously the market should decide, using well-developed methods. If on the other hand the costs of protection or replacement are relevant, technical and economic experts have to calculat them—given the politically decided level of biodiversity to be restored.The basic question, whether the market and the price mechanism should be considered acceptable instruments to protect biodiversity, is not discussed in the paper. However, some environmentalists find the wish to maximize one's utility incompatible with environmental ethics. Also, the price mechanism may take various roles. Thus, prices may convey different information about the value of biodiversity, depending on which role we assign to them. (shrink)

Gene editing techniques, such as CRISPR, are being heralded as powerful new tools for delivering agricultural products and foods with a variety of beneficial traits quickly, easily, and cheaply. Proponents are concerned, however, about whether the public will accept the new technology and that excessive regulatory oversight could limit the technology’s potential. In this paper, we draw on the sociotechnical imaginaries literature to examine how proponents are imagining the potential benefits and risks of gene editing technologies within agriculture. We derive (...) our data from a content analysis of public comments submitted to the Food and Drug Administration’s 2017 docket titled “Genome Editing in New Plant Varieties Used for Food.” Our sample frame consists of 26 comments representing 30 agriculture and biotech companies, organizations, and trade associations. Our findings reveal three key sociotechnical imaginaries, including that gene editing technologies in agriculture: are not GMO but instead equivalent to traditional plant breeding; have the potential to usher in a new Green Revolution; and could facilitate the democratization of agricultural biotechnologies. We argue that forming and projecting these collective interpretations of the potential of gene editing technologies for crops and foods plays an important role in efforts by proponents to influence regulatory oversight, modes of governance, and build public acceptance. This research contributes to calls by science and technology studies scholars to investigate emergent concerns and imaginaries for novel technoscientific advances to help inform upstream models of public engagement and governance decisions. (shrink)

`Proto-idea' was a central concept in the thinking of the Polish microbiologist and philosopher of science Ludwik Fleck (1896–1961). Based on studies of the origin of the modern concept of syphilis, Fleck claimed that many established scientific facts are best understood as interpretations of pre scientific, somewhat hazy `proto-ideas' in the framework of a certain `thought-style'. As an example,Fleck saw the modern knowledge of infection as an interpretation of the ancient proto-idea of diseases as caused by minute `animalcules'. However, the (...) epistemological aspects of the concept of proto-ideas have only been sparsely developed and discussed by Fleck and his critics. This paper attempts to bridge the gap. Firstly, I reconstruct the concept of proto-ideasin the context of Fleck's constructivist theory of knowledge. Secondly, I illustrate the relation between Fleck's concept of proto-ideas and his nominalist view on medical taxonomy. Finally, I discuss four philosophical problems implied by Fleck's concept of proto-ideas: (a) the problem of combining two conflicting perspectives on the history of science (b) the problem of accounting for the notion of` continuity' within a non realist theory of knowledge (c) the problem of ascribing no truth-content to proto-ideas, and (d) the problem concerning the non-neutrality of the analyst's viewpoint. (shrink)