War and Border Crossings brings together renowned scholars to address some of the most pressing problems in public policy, international affairs, and the intercultural issues of our day. Contributors from widely varying disciplines discuss cross-cultural ethical issues and international topics ranging from American international policy and the invasion and occupation of Iraq to domestic topics such as immigration, the war on drugs, cross-cultural bioethics and ethical issues involving American Indian tribes. The culture clashes discussed in these essays raise serious questions (...) about what principles ought to inform the negotiating of conflicts in order to achieve, or at least approach, outcomes that are fundamentally just, fair, responsible, and ethical. (shrink)

When events such as a pandemic occur, and the entire population’s health must be ensured, the focus is on public health. Despite several criteria for decision-making, it is advisable to delve into the weighting beyond the mere consideration of plainly visible factors. We propose weighting as a mechanism instead of chance since, given the person’s substantial unity and intrinsic dignity, their destiny cannot be subject to anything less than the exercise of intelligible judgment inherent to human reason.

In 2015 Dag Prawitz proposed an Ecumenical system where classical and intuitionistic logic could coexist in peace. The classical logician and the intuitionistic logician would share the universal quantifier, conjunction, negation and the constant for the absurd, but they would each have their own existential quantifier, disjunction and implication, with different meanings. Prawitz’ main idea is that these different meanings are given by a semantical framework that can be accepted by both parties. The aim of the present paper is [1] (...) to prove the normalization theorem for the propositional fragment NEp of Prawitz’ ecumenical system, and [2] to show that NEp is sound and complete with respect to a Kripke-style semantics for the language of NEp. (shrink)

América Latina es un concepto, una construcción intelectual que intenta dar cuenta de un grupo de estados nacionales, variable en su composición pero con un núcleo estable, las ex colonias españolas y portuguesas del continente americano. Hoy no hay en América Latina un programa de desarrollo nacional alternativo a la integración al mundo capitalista global. Las experiencias nacionales que la izquierda dirige no constituyen una imagen como la que representó Cuba en los años sesenta, ni desde el punto de vista (...) de los programas ni desde el liderazgo. Lo que se construyó en las décadas de los cincuentas y sesentas fue una conciencia de la relevancia de un proyecto continental que merecía ser respaldado por una teorización del conjunto, la construcción de un objeto de conocimiento al mismo tiempo que un actor político colectivo. Como quiera que sea, esta conciencia se desarrolló alrededor de las instituciones internacionales y nacionales residentes en Santiago de Chile y comenzó a desvanecerse junto con el proyecto de Allende y la Unidad Popular. (shrink)

The deformation and wear events that underlie microwear and macrowear signals commonly used for dietary reconstruction in fossil animals can be replicated and quantified by controlled laboratory tests on extracted tooth specimens in conjunction with fundamental micromechanics analysis. Key variables governing wear relations include angularity, stiffness (modulus), and size of the contacting particle, along with material properties of enamel. Both axial and sliding contacts can result in the removal of tooth enamel. The degree of removal, characterized by a “wear coefficient,” (...) varies strongly with particle content at the occlusal interface. Conditions leading to a transition from mild to severe wear are discussed. Measurements of wear traces can provide information about contact force and particle shape. The potential utility of the micromechanics methodology as an adjunct for investigating tooth durability and reconstructing diet is explored. (shrink)

The objective of this research study was to determine if psychological distress, anxiety, and academic self-efficacy predict satisfaction with studies in Peruvian university students during the COVID-19 pandemic. A cross-sectional and predictive design was used, in which 582 Peruvian university students participated, 243 men and 339 women, between the ages of 16 and 41. Student’s t-statistics were used to analyze the differences in scores of psychological distress, anxiety, academic self-efficacy, and satisfaction with studies based on the sex of the participants, (...) Pearson’s R was used for the analysis of correlations between variables, and multiple linear regressions were used to evaluate the predictive model. In the analyses, the significance level was set at 0.05. The results show that men have higher levels of psychological distress, anxiety, and academic self-efficacy than women do ; high levels of psychological distress correlate with high levels of anxiety and low levels of satisfaction with studies and academic self-efficacy ; high levels of anxiety correlate with low levels of satisfaction with studies and academic self-efficacy ; and high levels of academic self-efficacy correlate with high levels of satisfaction with studies. Academic self-efficacy was also found to predict satisfaction with studies. This concludes that, although there are significant correlations between psychological distress, anxiety, academic self-efficacy, and satisfaction with studies, academic self-efficacy is the variable that most predicts satisfaction with studies in Peruvian university students. (shrink)

Oscar Masotta (Buenos Aires, 1930- Barcelona, 1979) is all but forgotten now, except perhapsin the field of Lacanian studies. This is because in the 1970s,Masotta would challenge the master psychoanalyst on hisown turf, creating his own post-Lacanian school of psychoanalysisin Barcelona. But in 1965, aged just 27, Masottataught at the University of Buenos Aires, lectured at theDi Tella, and edited a book series on communication andmedia. A product of the newly open post-Perón era." Page 91.. This is the first exhibition (...) organized with materials from the archive Juan Acha, and includes reactivations of non-object-based art and artistic documentation. (shrink)

Reconstruction is a central notion in Dewey’s account of inquiry and in his metaphilosophical commitments. In his work, Dewey made a call for reconstruction of philosophy, in the reconstruction of central notions of the discipline, like knowledge, logic, truth, the good, reason, and experience. Inquiry itself is reconstructive, according to Dewey, involving the transformation of an indeterminate situation into one which is determinate and understood. Dewey’s philosophical views should therefore be of interest to those taking part in the recent turn (...) towards revisionary philosophical methodologies, like conceptual engineering, explication, and amelioration. In light of the recent developments in revisionary methodologies, I aim to explore Dewey’s conception of concepts in relation to the conceptual engineering literature, suggesting that it provides a useful conception of concepts for conceptual engineering, and to suggest a Deweyan model of philosophical inquiry where concepts are the objects of inquiry. In both cases, I hope to show a productive interaction between Dewey’s ideas and contemporary discussions of conceptual engineering. (shrink)

I argue that a standard formulation of hinge epistemology is host to epistemic relativism and show that two leading hinge approaches (Coliva’s acceptance account and Pritchard’s nondoxastic account) are vulnerable to a form of incommensurability that leads to relativism. Building on both accounts, I introduce a new, minimally epistemic conception of hinges that avoids epistemic relativism and rationally resolves hinge disagreements. According to my proposed account, putative cases of epistemic incommensurability are rationally resolvable: hinges are propositions that are the objects (...) of our belief-like attitudes and are rationally revisable in virtue of our overarching commitment to avoid systematic deception in our epistemic practices. (shrink)

Insofar as development implies economic growth, the term ‘sustainable development’ appears to some as a contradiction in terms. However, such conclusions still lack a thorough examination of the conceptual structure of the two terms between which there is a purported contradiction. In order to address this issue, the present paper scrutinises some of the assumptions which underwrite the ideologies of sustainability and of development. It is argued that there are key assumptions which both ideas have in common, and that sustainable (...) development is thus perfectly coherent on a conceptual level. It is alternatives which retain either term (such as ‘sustainable degrowth') that are embroiled in paradox. The paper then examines two concepts for criticising the ideology of economic growth in other terms: dépense and conviviality. It is argued that the latter is preferable to the former for the purpose of developing post-sustainable critiques of growth. (shrink)

Dorian Gray pays a hefty price for years of sin and vice in this completely unabridged edition of The Picture of Dorian Gray.

In spite of the considerable literature nowadays existing on the issue of the moral exclusion of nonhuman animals, there is still work to be done concerning the characterization of the conceptual framework with which this question can be appraised. This paper intends to tackle this task. It starts by defining speciesism as the unjustified disadvantageous consideration or treatment of those who are not classified as belonging to a certain species. It then clarifies some common misunderstandings concerning what this means. Next, (...) it rejects the idea that there are different kinds of speciesism. Such an idea may result from confusion because there are (1) different ways in which speciesism can be defended; and (2) different speciesist positions, that is, different positions that assume speciesism among their premises. Depending on whether or not these views assume other criteria for moral consideration apart from speciesism, they can be combined or simple speciesist positions. But speciesism remains in all cases the same idea. Finally, the paper examines the concept of anthropocentrism, the disadvantageous treatment or consideration of those who are not members of the human species. This notion must be conceptually distinguished from speciesism and from misothery (aversion to nonhuman animals). Anthropocentrism is shown to be refuted because it either commits a petitio principia fallacy or it falls prey to two arguments: the argument from species overlap (widely but misleadingly known as “argument from marginal cases”) and the argument from relevance. This rebuttal identifies anthropocentrism as a speciesist view. (shrink)

Humans often intervene in the wild for anthropocentric or environmental reasons. An example of such interventions is the reintroduction of wolves in places where they no longer live in order to create what has been called an “ecology of fear”, which is being currently discussed in places such as Scotland. In the first part of this paper I discuss the reasons for this measure and argue that they are not compatible with a nonspeciesist approach. Then, I claim that if we (...) abandon a speciesist viewpoint we should change completely the way in which we should intervene in nature. Rather than intervening for environmental or anthropocentric reasons, we should do it in order to reduce the harms that nonhuman animals suffer. This conflicts significantly with some fundamental environmental ideals whose defence is not compatible with the consideration of the interests of nonhuman animals. (shrink)

An individual's health, genetic, or environmental-exposure data, placed in an online repository, creates a valuable shared resource that can accelerate biomedical research and even open opportunities for crowd-sourcing discoveries by members of the public. But these data become “immortalized” in ways that may create lasting risk as well as benefit. Once shared on the Internet, the data are difficult or impossible to redact, and identities may be revealed by a process called data linkage, in which online data sets are matched (...) to each other. Reidentification, the process of associating an individual's name with data that were considered deidentified, poses risks such as insurance or employment discrimination, social stigma, and breach of the promises often made in informed-consent documents. At the same time, re-ID poses risks to researchers and indeed to the future of science, should re-ID end up undermining the trust and participation of potential research participants. The ethical challenges of online data sharing are heightened as so-called big data becomes an increasingly important research tool and driver of new research structures. Big data is shifting research to include large numbers of researchers and institutions as well as large numbers of participants providing diverse types of data, so the participants’ consent relationship is no longer with a person or even a research institution. In addition, consent is further transformed because big data analysis often begins with descriptive inquiry and generation of a hypothesis, and the research questions cannot be clearly defined at the outset and may be unforeseeable over the long term. In this article, we consider how expanded data sharing poses new challenges, illustrated by genomics and the transition to new models of consent. We draw on the experiences of participants in an open data platform—the Personal Genome Project—to allow study participants to contribute their voices to inform ethical consent practices and protocol reviews for big-data research. (shrink)

OSCAR HORTA | : This paper examines the extent of the opposition between environmentalists and those concerned with wild-animal suffering and considers whether there are any points they may agree on. The paper starts by presenting the reasons to conclude that suffering and premature death prevail over positive well-being in nature. It then explains several ways to intervene in order to aid animals and prevent the harms they suffer, and claims that we should support them. In particular, the paper argues (...) in favour of carrying out more research to learn the best ways to intervene without causing more harm to other animals and to intervene first in areas significantly transformed by human action. It then examines what positions environmentalist views can have towards intervention in nature for the sake of animals. It claims that, while ecocentric and naturocentric views will strongly oppose intervention in certain circumstances, they should not do so in other cases in which the values they promote are not at stake or might be outweighed. The paper then argues that, contrary to what it might seem at first, biocentric views should strongly support intervention. It then discusses whether there may be certain practical issues about which those concerned with wild animal suffering and environmentalists may support the same approach, such as opposition to the greening of desert ecosystems. Finally, it claims that raising awareness about wild animal suffering seems to be the most urgent task now for those concerned about it. | : Le présent article examine l’étendue de l’opposition entre les environnementalistes et ceux qui se préoccupent de la souffrance des animaux sauvages, afin de déterminer s’il existe des points sur lesquels ils peuvent être en accord. L’article débute en présentant les raisons permettant de conclure que la souffrance et la mort prématurée l’emportent sur le bien-être positif dans la nature. Ensuite, il explique plusieurs façons d’intervenir afin d’aider les animaux et de prévenir les maux dont ils souffrent et plaide pour la mise en oeuvre de celles-ci. Plus précisément, l’article préconise un plus grand nombre de recherches afin de déterminer les meilleures façons d’intervenir sans causer davantage de maux à d’autres animaux ainsi que pour prioriser des interventions en des endroits que l’action humaine a significativement transformés. L’article examine par la suite les positions que les conceptions environnementalistes peuvent adopter quant aux interventions dans la nature pour le bien des animaux. L’article propose que, bien que des visions écocentriques et naturocentriques s’opposent vivement à l’intervention dans certaines circonstances, elles ne devraient cependant pas s’y opposer dans les cas où les valeurs qu’elles promeuvent n’entrent pas en jeu ou peuvent avoir moins de poids que d’autres facteurs. L’article soutient ensuite que, contrairement à ce que l’on pourrait penser à première vue, les théories biocentristes devraient fortement appuyer l’intervention. Il pose la question à savoir si certains problèmes pratiques peuvent faire l’objet d’une approche commune parmi les environnementalistes et ceux qui se soucient de la souffrance des animaux sauvages, par exemple s’opposer à l’écologisation des déserts. Enfin, l’article propose que la tâche la plus pressante pour ceux qui se préoccupent de la souffrance des animaux sauvages consiste à accroître la sensibilisation à ce problème. (shrink)

I argue against the Standard View of ignorance, according to which ignorance is defined as equivalent to lack of knowledge, that cases of environmental epistemic luck, though entailing lack of knowledge, do not necessarily entail ignorance. In support of my argument, I contend that in cases of environmental luck an agent retains what I call epistemic access to the relevant fact by successfully exercising her epistemic agency and that ignorance and non-ignorance, contrary to what the Standard View predicts, are not (...) modal in the sense that knowledge is. After responding to objections, I conclude by sketching an alternative account of ignorance centered on the notions of epistemic access and epistemic agency. (shrink)

Many people think we should refrain from intervening in nature as much as possible. One of the main reasons for thinking this way is that the existence of nature is a net positive. However, population dynamics teaches us that most sentient animals who come into existence in nature die shortly thereafter, mostly in painful ways. Those who survive often suffer greatly due to natural causes. If sentient beings matter, this gives us reasons to intervene to prevent such harms. This counterintuitive (...) conclusion can be opposed by arguing that we should not care about nonhuman animals; that other values, such as the existence of certain ecosystemic relations or of untouched wild areas, count for more than the interests of sentient beings; or that intervention in nature cannot succeed. There are, however, strong reasons to reject these claims and to support significant intervention in nature for the sake of animals, despite our deep-rooted intuitions to the contrary. (shrink)

This book presents an original thesis about the notion of sensory experience and of the mind’s architecture, which is grounded in current trends in cognitive science and philosophy of mind. Presented in the form of a dialogue, the book explores some of the psychological and philosophical consequences that the author derives from his proposal. "Provocative and imaginative, the first volume in the VIBS' Special Series in Cognitive Science is a critique of the traditional theoretical apparatus of the discipline. In The (...) Dissolution of Mind, neuroscientist Oscar Vilarroya undertakes the ambitious project of reformulating the traditional notions of "concept," "thought," "communication," "representation," "language" and eventually "mind." Metapsychology, May 2003. (shrink)

The author of Look Back in Anger, Inadmissible Evidence, and The Entertainer has created a brilliant dramatization of this classic about a man who retains his youth while the decay of advancing years and moral corruption appears on a portrait painted by one of his lovers.

The use of the concept of moral status is commonplace today in debates about the moral consideration of entities lacking certain special capacities, such as nonhuman animals. This concept has been typically used to defend the view that adult human beings have a status higher than all those entities. However, even those who disagree with this claim have often accepted the idea of moral status as if it were part of an undisputed received way of thinking in ethics. This paper (...) argues that the use of this concept, however common, distorts our understanding of how to behave towards different individuals in different circumstances. When moral status is identified with the interest in living or the capacity for well-being, it becomes an arbitrary and irrelevant criterion. When it is used as a synonym of moral consideration or considerability, in a way that is compatible with the principle of equal consideration, it becomes trivial and confusing. When used, instead, to defend the unequal moral consideration of interests of equal weight, it has several implausible implications. In particular, the claim that unequal status is justified because of the value of cognitive capacities implausibly entails that our exercising those capacities should have priority over the promotion of our wellbeing. The idea of full moral status is also problematic as it implies the possibility of status monsters. In addition, its use is based in a misconceived way of what it would really entail to have a full status by virtue of having rational capacities. The paper concludes that we have strong reasons to abandon the concept of moral status altogether. (shrink)

There are many circumstances in which vegans are treated or considered worse than nonvegans, both in the private and the public sphere, either due to the presence of a bias against them or for structural reasons. For instance, vegans sometimes suffer harassment, have issues at their workplace, or find little vegan food available. In many cases they are forced to contribute to, or to participate in, animal exploitation against their will when states render it illegitimate to oppose or refuse to (...) support some uses of animals. For the most part this remains socially invisible. Vegans, however, often recognize this as a form of discrimination against them. But they seldom campaign against it, as they regard it as a consequence of another and more important discrimination, i.e. speciesist discrimination against nonhuman animals. If this is correct, discrimination against vegans can be characterized as a form of second-order discrimination, that is, discrimination against those who oppose another form of discrimination. If speciesism really is unjustified and discriminatory, then discrimination against vegans will always be discriminatory and unjustified too. But even if our current attitudes towards animals were justified there would be strong reasons to claim that vegans do suffer several forms of private and public discrimination that are unjustified. (shrink)

El presente artículo desarrolla una reconsideración de las nociones de “mal radical” y “banalidad del mal” haciendo hincapié en la reflexión arendtiana en torno a la figura del “burgués”. En tal sentido, se ponen en primer plano las principales consonancias y diferencias entre ambos conceptos remarcando, puntualmente, su origen teórico común. Como resultado, el trabajo constata, después de una cuidadosa argumentación, el peso central que el multifacético análisis arendtiano del burgués tiene sobre la conformación de sus reflexiones acerca del mal, (...) tanto en el periodo temprano como en la faceta más tardía de su obra. (shrink)

In this article Bronislaw Malinowski’s ideas on humanism are analysed with reference to unpublished texts and drafts, published texts such as A Diary in the Strict Sense of the Term, his personal letters to his wife Elsie Masson and articles in which his ideals were reflected. An attempt will also be made to set Malinowski’s proposal for the New Humanism in its scientific and cultural context along with the work of other great thinkers and humanists of his day. Finally, it (...) is suggested that Malinowski’s ideas in this field, despite the passage of time, are still relevant to social anthropology and, at the very least, still inspire new thoughts. (shrink)

The notions of fetishism and mystification constitute the fundamental concepts with which Marx analyzes the forms of appearance relating to capitalist societies. These concepts have an architectural role in the internal structure of Marx’ project of a critique of political economy. This paper aims to expose and discuss the interpretative contributions opened up by the book by Clara Ramas San Miguel: Fetiche y Mistificación capitalistas. La crítica de la economía política de Marx published in 2018 at Siglo XXI.

The subtitle of the essay that Robert Markley attacks had, in its penultimate version, a parenthetical word that was ultimately dropped. It read, “ Metaphysical Snares of Ideological Criticism.” The editor of Critical Inquiry, W. J. T. Mitchell, politely suggested that my subtitle was redundant: snares, he observed, are by nature avoidable. Indeed they are. In fact, my parentheses were intended to indicate that the word didn’t really need to be there. The self-conscious redundancy was intended to underlines the fact (...) that the essay was not attacking ideological criticism in general, but only certain tendencies that seemed especially prevalent in ideological critiques of abstract ideas. Seeking support for my redundancy, I appealed to a sagacious friend, who promptly urged me to follow Mitchell’s suggestion and drop the “avoidable,” parentheses or no parentheses. I was asking my title to do too much, he observed; the essay itself would make it quite clear that I was undertaking to refine and strengthen the techniques of ideological criticism by urging that its pitfalls be avoided.If I had declined to follow this eminently reasonable advice and had retained the word “avoidable,” would that have kept Markley from so radically misconstruing my project? After all, near the end of his rebuttal, he acknowledges that “Kenshur is right … in one respect,” that there is a “lot of not particularly interesting pseudo-Marxist criticism being written” . If I had underscored my own sympathy toward and links with the new historicism—something that I could have done in all good conscience—would that have disarmed him? Or if I now undertook, after the fact, to offer assurances that I, like Markley, was working from within the capacious and self-critical Marxist tradition and trying to distinguish its strengths from its weaknesses, would that impel him, like Gilda Radner’s Emily Litella , meekly to say, “Never mind”? Perhaps, but somehow I doubt it. Oscar Kenshur is associate professor of comparative literature at Indiana University. He is author of Open Form and the Shape of Ideas and is completing Dilemmas of Enlightenment, a study that traces shifts in the ideological significance of early modern ideas about intellectual method, religious toleration, and female chastity. (shrink)

Some evolutionary psychologists contend that the best way to discover the functions of our present psychological systems is by appealing to the notion of functional mesh, that is, the assumed tight fit between a trait's design and the adaptive problem it is supposed to solve. In this paper, I argue that there exist theoretical considerations and empirical evidence that undermine this assumption of optimal design. Instead, I suggest that cognitive systems are constrained by what I call bounded functionality. This proposal (...) makes use of Jacob's (1977) notion of evolution as a bricoleur and Simon's (1981) idea that problems can have ``satisficing'' solutions. Functional mesh will thus be shown to neglect constraints that are necessary to explain the evolution of psychological mechanisms. (shrink)