W niniejszym artykule ukazana została polemika polskiego filozofa Wojciecha Dzieduszyckiego z jednym z postępowych haseł głoszonych w XIX wieku. Hasło to sam Dzieduszycki określił jako „bezwyznaniowość”. Autor artykułu analizuje argumentację Dzieduszyckiego co do negatywnych skutków wyrugowania religii z życia publicznego, zarówno w przeszłości, jak i w czasach mu współczesnych, a także ukazuje pozytywną rolę religii w życiu jednostek, państw, narodów, a nawet całych cywilizacji. Bez religii bowiem, twierdził polski myśliciel, społeczności degradują się i obumierają. Ciekawa, a współcześnie bardzo ważna dyskusja (...) o roli religii w życiu społecznym, została w artykule zestawiona z propagowaną przez Dzieduszyckiego ideą „mesjanizmu polskiego”, jak również z obecnymi dziś w kulturze i polityce propozycjami radykalnej laicyzacji. (shrink)

Ukazano relacje Polaków dotyczące przyrody południowoafrykańskiej z perspektywy ponad 400 lat. Afryka Południowa, praktycznie do naszych czasów, jawiła się im zawsze jako kraj nie tylko bardzo odległy, ale też egzotyczny i interesujący. Determinowało to w poważnym stopniu charakter relacji. Podkreślały one przede wszystkim różnorodność i bogactwo przyrody południowoafrykańskiej. Przyrodę południowoafrykańską postrzegano również przez pryzmat wielkich możliwości łowieckich. Wielu Polaków odwiedzających Afrykę Południową wyrażało zdziwienie z obecności w tym kraju dwóch wykluczających się w zasadzie światów – nietkniętej przyrody i cywilizacji europejskiej. (...) Najczęściej opisywanym miejscem Afryki Południowej był Przylądek Dobrej Nadziei oraz okolice dzisiejszego Kapsztadu. Pierwszego dokładnego zapisu interior dokonał Antoni Rehman w latach siedemdziesiątych XIX wieku. Rzeczowo i ze znawstwem pisali o przyrodzie południowoafrykańskiej polscy uczeni, którzy uczestniczyli w XV Międzynarodowym Kongresie Geologicznym w Pretorii w 1929 roku: Walery Goetel, Jan Lewiński, Józef Morozewicz i Jerzy Loth. Dość liczne relacje odnośnie przyrody południowoafrykańskiej pojawiły się współcześnie w kontekście złożonej sytuacji społeczno- politycznej Afryki Południowej. (shrink)

W artykule zasygnalizowano niektóre aspekty działalności południowoafrykańskich instytucji i organizacji państwowych, prywatnych i społecznych w dziedzinie ekologii. Aktywność ta ma w Afryce Południowej długą i bogatą tradycję, a jej intensyfikacja przypada na okres dwóch ostatnich dekad. Realizacja celów dokonuje się między innymi przez regulacje prawne, sankcje finansowe, program badań i kształcenia kadr, masową edukację społeczeństwa, pilotowanie konkretnych przedsięwzięć. Południowoafrykańskie działania ekologiczne mają często wymiar międzynarodowy i prowadzone są na poziomie kontaktów bilateralnych, regionalnych i globalnych.

The paper introduces the reader to the contemporary trends in the interpretation of Frege\'s thought. The point of departure in this description points out that the way of looking at Frege\'s accomplishment depends on the manner of characterising contemporary philosophy, in particular analytical philosophy. In order to have a closer look at the above relationship we have outlined the style of historical-systematic studies as proposed by Dummett. A series of historical facts are given with a view to explain the sources (...) of the renaissance of Frege\'s thought in contemporary philosophy. A description of various interpretations of the thoughts of Frege is given in line with four oppositions which appeared in contemporary literature: 1) genius - continuator; 2) epistemologist - philosopher of language; 3) theorist of meaning - theorist of thought; 4) anti-naturalist - realist. Noticing the drawbacks of the above characterisation, an alternative historical reconstruction is proposed. This proposal consists in distinguishing a basic category or object whose inquiries have become important and dominated various kinds of philosophical enterprise in a certain philosophical period. The category of proposition have been chosen to be such an object. At the same time, it is pinpointed that owing to this choice one may characterise Frege\'s accomplishment and explain from many points of view the sources of the relationship between Frege\'s thought and analytical philosophy. (shrink)

Artykuł stanowi wprowadzenie do lektury „pamiętnika z Sołówek” Mieczysława Lenardowicza, opublikowanego dwukrotnie w 1930 roku jako Na wyspach tortur i śmierci. Pamiętnik z Sołówek (Wojskowy Instytut Naukowo-Wydawniczy) i Pamiętnik z Sołówek (Towarzystwo Wydawnicze „Rój”). Utwór ten jest prawdopodobnie pierwszym dziełem polskiej literatury łagrowej i, szerzej, obozowej. W artykule zarysowano kontekst historyczny i historycznoliteracki utworu Lenardowicza: genezę bolszewickich i sowieckich obozów koncentracyjnych, a w szczególności Sołowieckiego Obozu Specjalnego Przeznaczenia, oraz wskazano najważniejsze wczesne świadectwa dotyczące sowieckich obozów koncentracyjnych (głównie Sołowek), w tym (...) teksty opublikowane w Polsce i w Generalnym Gubernatorstwie do 1945 roku. Są wśród nich, obok utworu Lenardowicza, świadectwa obcojęzyczne (rosyjskie, ukraińskie, niemieckie) i ich przekłady, napisane po polsku wspomnienia Białorusina Franciszka Alachnowicza oraz teksty napisane po polsku przez Polaków: artykuły prasowe, reportaże, eseje – traktujące o Sołowkach w sposób mniej lub bardziej bezpośredni. (shrink)

Artykuł dotyczy „pamiętnika z Sołówek” Mieczysława Lenardowicza, opublikowanego dwukrotnie w 1930 roku. Wersja krótsza utworu, zatytułowana Pamiętnik z Sołówek, ukazała się nakładem Towarzystwa Wydawniczego „Rój”, zaś wersja obszerniejsza, Na wyspach tortur i śmierci. Pamiętnik z Sołówek, została wydana przez Wojskowy Instytut Naukowo-Wydawniczy. Utwór Lenardowicza jest prawdopodobnie pierwszym polskim dziełem literatury łagrowej, i szerzej, literatury obozowej. Uwagi dotyczące utworu: jego genezy, wersji, formy, zawartości i pragmatyki, poprzedza próba ustalenia tożsamości autora, o którym praktycznie niczego nie wiadomo.

Stosunki polsko-węgierskie pozostają czymś niezwykłym na skalę europejską. Choć w świadomości społeczeństw obu narodów dominuje pozytywne postrzeganie wzajemnych relacji, nie było to zjawisko stale występujące w historii. Najintensywniej zachodziło, gdy oba kraje opierały się dominacji pierwiastka germańskiego. Węgry jako pierwsze utraciły niepodległość, ulegając naciskom ze Wschodu. Również Polska podzieliła los Węgier, ulegając presji zarówno ze Wschodu, jak i Zachodu. Doświadczenia historyczne obu krajów pokazały konieczność współdziałania wobec zagrożeń płynących z obu kierunków. Warunki po 1886 roku nie sprzyjały realizacji tego założenia, (...) choć w XIX i XX wieku Polacy i Węgrzy snuli wizje geopolityczne określające skalę możliwych przemian w Europie Środkowej. Zmiana nastąpiła po zakończeniu II wojny światowej. Niezależnie od naturalnie występujących rozbieżności w postrzeganiu własnego otoczenia, w XXI wieku trudno wskazać polską koncepcję geopolityczną, która nie uwzględnia regionalnej roli Węgier, czy też węgierską, ignorującą Rzeczpospolitą Polską. (shrink)

Viele Philosophen Glauben, daß die sogenannte „klassische” Definition des Wissens: -/- (W)Das Subjekt S weiß, daß p =Df. (i) S glaubt (ist überzeugt), daß p; (ii) S hat eine Begründung (eine epistemische Rechtferigung) für seine Überzeugung, daß p; und (iii) es ist der Fall, daß p. -/- durch das berühmte Gegenbeispiel Gettiers endgültig demoliert wurde: Gettier hat die folgende Situation konstruiert: -/- (G)(1) Das Subjekt S hat eine gute induktive Begründung für die Überzeugung, daß p. (2) S hat die Überzeugung (...) vom Inhalt p oder q. (3) S hat demgemäß die Begründung für seine Überzeugung, daß p oder q; und zwar kraft der Begründung, die es für die Überzeugung, daß p, hat. (4) Was q betrifft, so hat S gar keine epistemischen Gründe (weder für noch gegen q). (5) p erweist sich als falsch, q ist dagegen (dank eines Zufalls) wahr. -/- Wir argumentieren, daß die philosophische Bedeutung des Rätsels von Gettier in der Regel stark überschätzt wird. Das Subjekt S hat eine gute Begründung für die Überzeugung, daß p. Trotzdem ist der Inhalt seiner Überzeugung nicht einfach p, sondern stattdessen p oder q. Eine solche Über¬zeu¬gung wäre verständlich, wenn S für q noch eine unabhängige Begründung hätte. Kraft der Voraussetzung hat es jedoch keine solche Begründung. Das Gettiersche Subjekt hat in diesem Sinne gratis abgeschwächte Überzeugungen. Wir argumentieren, daß solche Überzeugungen nicht nur aus den psychologischen, sondern auch aus gewissen im weiten Sinne logischen Gründen ausgeschloßen werden soll, und versuchen die Regeln zu formulieren, die solche gratis abgeschwächten Überzeugungen ausschließen. (shrink)

Niniejszy artykuł podejmuje kwestię roli Filozofii dla Dzieci (P4C) w kontekście rozumienia emocji. Najpierw przedstawiamy początek koncepcji Filozofii dla Dzieci, jako metody pedagogicznej wspierającej umiejętność krytycznego myślenia oraz proces, w jakim przekształciła się w narzędzie badawcze rozwijane w postaci interwencji psychologicznych. Następnie pokazujemy, w jaki sposób narzędzie P4C można zastosować w badaniach rozwojowych dotyczących rozumienia emocji przez dzieci. Argumentujemy, że projekt P4C służy nie tylko budowaniu wiedzy i poprawie zdolności poznawczych, ale sprzyja również kształtowaniu rozumienia sfery emocjonalnej. Pokazujemy, że korzyści (...) z filozofowania w domenie emocji są obserwowane u coraz młodszych dzieci. Zaznaczamy przy tym, że P4C dopiero od niedawna jest wykorzystywana w kontekście wspierania rozwoju emocji, a także w ramach interwencji z udziałem dzieci poniżej wieku szkolnego. Pokazujemy, że jest wynikiem zmian w sposobie pojmowania umysłowości dziecka, które nastąpiły w psychologii rozwojowej w ciągu ostatnich kilkudziesięciu lat. (shrink)

Das Buch ist eine analytische Darstellung der Hauptideen der Erkenntnistheorie Ingardens. Es basiert zum größten Teil auf dem bis vor kurzem noch unpublizierten bzw. ausschließlich in polnischer Sprache verfaßten Material und wendet sich vor allem an die Phänomenologen aber auch an die analytischen Philosophen, die sich für die Erkenntnistheorie und Ontologie der Intentionalität interessieren. Die Ingardensche Erkenntnistheorie, seine Theorie der Intentionalität und die Hauptzüge seiner Ontologie werden auf dem Hintergrund der Brentanoschen und Husserlschen Tradition präsentiert und mit den begrifflichen Werkzeugen (...) der zeitgenössischen analytischen Philosophie analysiert. Die Erkenntnistheorie Ingardens bildet das Ergebnis einer Synthese der Husserlschen phänomenologischen Methode mit der ontologischen Präzision, die für die Schriften Ingardens so charakteristisch ist. Sie besteht aus zwei Disziplinen: der reinen und der angewandten Erkenntnistheorie. Die reine Erkenntnistheorie ist eine absolutistische, Cartesianische Disziplin. Sie formuliert die Definition der Erkenntnis und beruht auf einem besonderen, selbstreferierenden Bewußtseinszustand, den Ingarden Intuition des Durchlebens nennt. Die angewandte Erkenntnistheorie untersucht dagegen die konkreten Fälle der Erkenntnis und ist eine empirische, hypothetische und fehlbare Wissenschaft. (shrink)

The book is an analytic exposition of Brentano's early theory of intentionality. In spite of the immense influence of this theory it is the first separate monograph on this topic. The book is based in great part on the unpublished manuscripts where one can find substantially better articulated formulations then those expressed in the already published `standard' works. Our analysis concentrates mainly on the ontological and epistemological problems of Brentano's immanent object. We highlight an interesting ambiguity of this concept and (...) try to outline the inner logic of its evolution. It turns out that Brentano's early philosophy of intentionality should be conceived not as a single, well defined theory but rather as a bundle of kindred but not always fully consistent and sometimes even competing ideas. Primary audience for the work are philosophers interested in Brentano's philosophy, theory of intentionality and its epistemology and ontology, phenomenologists and cognitive scientists. Das Buch bietet eine analytische Darstellung von Brentanos früher Theorie der Intentionalität. Trotz der großen historischen Bedeutung dieser Theorie bildet es die erste Monographie zu diesem Thema. Das Buch basiert zum größten Teil auf den unveröffentlichten Manuskripten, in denen man die Formulierungen findet, die viel besser artikuliert sind als jene, die in den publizierten Standard-Werken Brentanos zu finden sind. Unsere Analyse konzentriert sich in erster Linie auf die ontologischen und epistemischen Probleme des Brentanoschen immanenten Objekts. Wir besprechen eine interessante Mehrdeutigkeit dieses Begriffs und skizzieren die innere Logik seiner Entwicklung. Es stellt sich heraus, daß die frühe Philosophie der Intentionalität Brentanos nicht als eine einheitliche, eindeutig bestimmte Theorie, sondern eher als ein Bündel von verwandten, jedoch nicht immer völlig koherenten und manchmal sogar konkurrierenden Ideen interpretiert werden soll. Das Buch wendet sich in erster Linie an die Philosophen, die sich für die Philosophie Brentanos, für die österreichische Philosophie, für die Theorie der Intentionalität und ihre Epistemologie und Ontologie interessieren. Es wird ferner auch für die Phänomenologen und die Forscher im Bereich der cognitive science interessant sein. (shrink)

The thought of Alexius Meinong (1853–1920) has a distinguished position within the conceptual space of ontology. He was the first philosopher who tried systematically to develop a quasi-ontological discipline which was intended to be much more general than the metaphysics in the traditional sense. Metaphysics investigates being qua being; and this constitutes only a small part of the domain of the theory of objects (Gegenstandstheorie) as Meinong conceived of it. For – so reads one of Meinong’s most frequently cited theses (...) – the objects considered purely qua objects are neutral concerning their being or non-being. In this book Meinong’s theory of objects is presented in its historical development and investigated within the context of his theory of intentionality. This connection is justified because the real motivation behind Meinong’s introduction of entities "beyond being and non being" lies in the philosophical puzzles of the theory of intentionality. (shrink)

It is often claimed that the beginnings of Brentano’s ontology were Aristotelian in nature; but this claim is only partially true. Certainly the young Brentano adopted many elements of Aristotle’s metaphysics, and he was deeply influenced by the Aristotelian way of doing philosophy. But he always interpreted Aristotle’s ideas in his own fashion. He accepted them selectively, and he used them in the service of ends that would not have been welcomed by Aristotle himself. The present paper is an exposition (...) of the development of Brentano’s ontology, beginning with the Lectures on Metaphysics first delivered by Brentano in Würzburg in 1867 and concluding with his late work from 1904–1917. (shrink)

The concept of a trope (understood as an individual property and not as a figure of speech) plays an important role in contemporary analytical metaphysics. It is, however, often far from clear what the logic of this concept really is. Indeed, there are two equally important intuitions underlying the concept of trope, two intuitions that generate two quite different conceptual frameworks. According to the first intuition, a trope is a particularised property – a property taken as an individual aspect of (...) a particular object. A trope is thus the colour of this table or the shape of this sculpture. In the light of this conception tropes are, as it were, direct abstractions from concrete individuals. According to the second intuition a trope is still such an individual (and abstract) colour or such an individual (and abstract) shape, but now it is not only abstracted from the concrete individual of which it is a trope but also taken in abstraction from the very fact that it has been abstracted this way. We can imagine that the cognitive access to these tropes is obtained by a kind of a double abstraction. All this can sound puzzling at first blush, but in what follows I hope to make the matter a little clearer. Let us anticipate briefly. On the second view, tropes are construed not so much as abstractions from concrete individuals, but rather as primitive items of which the concrete individuals are composed. Tropes so construed are, as it were, metaphysically prior to concrete individuals. We will call tropes of this kind unstructured tropes, whereas tropes conceived as aspects of individual things will be called propositional tropes. This terminology is justified because tropes understood as aspects of things seem to involve something like propositional structure, a structure that tropes conceived as primitive “building blocks” of reality definitely lack. It is sometimes believed that these two concepts of trope are nearly equivalent, that the difference between them is for the most part verbal. Yet it will turn out that there is an important ontological difference here. Propositional tropes are non-trivially propositional and unstructured tropes are non-trivially deprived of such a structure (althought not necessarily deprived of any dependence-links with respect to other tropes). It will be argued that tropes are metaphysically interesting only on the second conception (i.e., as primitive, unstructured items), whereas only on the first conception (tropes as propositionally structured entities) can they function as semantically efficient truthmakers. The moral of the paper will be that our trust in tropes must be mitigated. A trope ontology could plausibly be viewed as a serious metaphysical alternative, but its semantical possibilities should not be exaggerated. (shrink)

The present study addressed two related problems: The status of the concept of the soul in folk psychological conceptualizations across cultures, and the nature of mind-body dualism within Chinese folk psychology. We compared folk intuitions about three concepts – mind, body, and soul – among adults from China and Poland. The questionnaire study comprised of questions about the functional and ontological nature of the three entities. The results show that the mind and soul are conceptualized differently in the two countries: (...) The Chinese appear to think of the soul similarly to how they view the mind, while Poles differentiate it both in ontological and functional respects. The study provides important insights into cross-cultural differences in conceptualizing the soul as well as into the nature of Chinese mind-body dualism. (shrink)

Studien zur Phänomenologie von Brentano bis Ingarden Arkadiusz Chrudzimski. Husserl, Edmund 1908. Vorlesungen über Bedeutungslehre. Sommersemester I 908 (Husserliana XXVI, hrsg. von U. Panzer), Dordrecht/Boston/Lancaster 1987 ...

Das Buch bietet die erste systematische esamtdarstellung der Ontologie Brentanos. Es zeigt, daß es in Brentanos ontologischem Denken drei Perioden gibt: die frühe "konzeptualistische" (1862-1874), die mittlere "deskriptiv-psychologische" (1874-1904) und die späte "reistische" (1904-1917). Diese drei Perioden werden in ihrer Kontinuität und komplizierten Dialektik unter Rückgriff auf unveröffentlichte Manuskripte Brentanos dargestellt. Dabei wird von dem logischen Handwerkszeug der zeitgenössischen analytischen Ontologie Gebrauch gemacht. Das Buch wendet sich nicht nur an Brentano-Forscher, sondern an alle an ontologischen Fragen Interessierten. Die Analysen zur (...) Ontologie der Intentionalität sind insbesondere für Phänomenologen und für Forscher im Bereich der cognitive science von Interesse. (shrink)

The history of twentieth century philosophy is characterised by the gap between analytic and continental philosophy -- even though both have their roots in a tradition referred to as 'Austrian' or 'Central-European' philosophy. The essays in this volume show in historical and systematic studies, how a reassessment of this 'Central-European' tradition can build an interesting bridge between phenomenology and analytic philosophy and, thus, create a new foundation that allows for an original perspective on central problems of philosophy.

The paper examines narrative operations involved in the temporal configuration of experience within a general framework of the phenomenological treatment of temporality. Taking as its point of departure a most basic instantiation of temporal experience, namely that of a ticking clock, it argues that the narrative dynamics which give form and charge the interval between tick and tock with significant duration are directly derived from the time-constituting operations of the embodied mind and, as such, are independent of their linguistic articulations. (...) Thus, it critically invokes Husserl’s account of time-consciousness, more specifically his model of retention-primary impression-protention, first in the context of Francisco J. Varela’s account of the neurodynamics of lived time, and then with reference to David Carr’s argument for continuity between narrative and the world of our experiences and actions. Building on these critical trajectories, the paper outlines how proto-narrative elements of lived time form a basis for the properly narrative operation of emplotment and, in its final section, discusses some of the complex relations between lived time and narrative time by contrasting Carr’s account of narrative with Paul Ricoeur’s model of triple mimesis. (shrink)

The point of departure for Anton Marty's theory of intentionality is Franz Brentano's ontology of intentionality as outlined in the unpublished manuscript of his logic-lectures from the second half of the 1880's. This rich ontology comprises immanent objects, immanent propositional contents and states of affairs. The late Marty rejects all immanent entities in Brentano's sense and explains intentionality in terms of counterfactualconditionals.However,contraryto the late Brentano,he insists on the indispensability of the category of states of affairs. Consequently Marty can formulate a (...) realistic theory of truth, while Brentano holds an epistemic theory of truth. (shrink)

This volume is devoted to Brentano's influence on the Polish Analytic Philosophy better known under the name of: Lvov-Warsaw School.

In a paper entitled A Semantical Version of the Problem of Transcendental Idealism, Kazimierz Ajdukiewicz gives a very impressive analysis of transcendental idealism. He approaches the matter using the tools of formal semantics developed by Alfred Tarski and draws a rather surprising conclusion. According to Ajdukiewicz, the idealist position, claiming that the world around us is ontologically dependent on our cognitive activity can be shown to be implausible on purely logical grounds. It is worth taking a closer look at this (...) insightful argument, since Ajdukiewicz’s analysis, if sound, has a relevance reaching far beyond purely historical questions concerning the right interpretation and proper assessment of past idealist doctrines. These days various species of idealism are thriving under such labels as ‘anti realism’ or ‘pragmatism’. Ajdukiewicz’s venerable paper goes to the very core of many contemporary metaphysical discussions. (shrink)

At least since Hume we have a serious problem with explaining our moral valuations. Most of us – with notable exception of certain (in)famous esoteric thinkers like Nietzsche or De Sade – share a common intuition that our moral claims are in an important sense objective. We believe that they can be right or wrong; and we believe that if they happen to be right, then they are binding for each human being conducting a similar action in similar circumstances. Now (...) Hume drew our attention to the fact that our valuations do not follow from descriptions of the actions in question. There seems to be nothing in the “descriptive content” of the world around us that could make them true or false and in face of that it becomes very puzzling how they ever could be right, objective or committing. As we all know Hume’s solution proclaims emotions as the basis of our moral valuations. Calling something right or wrong should be in the first place understood as an expression of our emotional attitude toward it. This move explains a part of the initial puzzle, but it also leaves us with a certain unpleasant consequence. It seems that in the strict sense emotions could be neither rational nor true, and consequently we can hardly imagine any conclusive moral argument. De gustibus non disputandum est. Our feeling of objectivity vis a vis our moral valuations has to be classified as a kind of illusion and what follows is a kind of moral relativism or scepticism. Some philosophers are happy with this conclusion, but some others find it untenable. Brentano and his followers belonged to the second group. They generally accepted Hume’s claim that emotions constitute the basis of our moral valuations but developed interesting strategies to avoid his relativistic conclusions. (shrink)

In these works we find a rich arsenal of ontological tools which is interesting even for those philosophers who are not interested in the subtleties of the ...

In this paper, we present a battery of empirical findings on the relationship between cultural context and theory of mind that show great variance in the onset and character of mindreading in different cultures; discuss problems that those findings cause for the largely-nativistic outlook on mindreading dominating in the literature; and point to an alternative framework that appears to better accommodate the evident cross-cultural variance in mindreading. We first outline the theoretical frameworks that dominate in mindreading research, then present the (...) relevant empirical findings, and finally we come back to the theoretical approaches in a discussion of their explanatory potential in the face of the data presented. The theoretical frameworks discussed are the two-systems approach; performance-based approach also known as modularity-nativist approach; and the social-communicative theory also known as the systems, relational-systems, dynamic systems and developmental systems theory. The former two, which both fall within the wider modular-computational paradigm, run into a challenge with the cross-cultural data presented, and the latter - the systemic framework - seems to offer an explanatorily potent alternative. The empirical data cited in this paper comes from research on cross-cultural differences in folk psychology and theory-of-mind development; the influence of parenting practices on the development of theory of mind; the development and character of theory of mind in deaf populations; and neuroimaging research of cultural differences in mindreading. (shrink)

This is a japanese translation of Arkadiusz Chrudzimski, "Von Brentano zu Ingarden. Die phänomenologische Bedeutungslehre", Husserl Studies 18 (2002), 3, pp. 185-208.

In der Geschichte der Philosophie finden wir viele Intentionalitätstheorien, die spezielle Gegenstände zur Erklärung des Intentionalitätsphänomens einführen. Solche Theorien wurden in erster Linie von Philosophen eingeführt, die durch Franz Brentano beeinflusst waren. Gegenstände, um die es hier geht, werden üblicherweise intentionale Gegenstände genannt. Eine Theorie der intentionalen Gegenstände, die vom ontologischen Standpunkt aus betrachtet besonders detailliert ausgearbeitet ist, hat Roman Ingarden formuliert. Auch Ingardens Theorie ist daher Gegenstand einer oft geäußerten Kritik. Man behauptet, dass alles, was intentionale Gegenstände leisten, auch (...) in einer ontologisch sparsameren Weise zu erreichen ist. Wir werden allerdings zeigen, dass diese Behauptung unbegründet ist. Die Einführung intentionaler Gegenstände hat ihre guten Gründe und es ist unklar, ob eine ontologisch sparsamere Variante überhaupt funktionieren kann. Die adverbiale Theorie, die oft als ein Gegenkandidat vorgeschlagen wird, stößt jedenfalls auf große Schwierigkeiten. Was die Ingardensche Version der Theorie betrifft, so erweist sie sich als eine etwas kuriose Mischform der Theorie der intentionalen Gegenstände und der adverbialen Theorie. Wir werden sehen, dass der adverbiale Teil aus dieser Theorie am besten entfernt werden soll. (shrink)

The most striking feature of Meinong's theory of intentionality is his thesis that every mental act has its reference‐object “beyond being and non being”. This theory seems, at first, to be a clear example of the so called object‐theory of intentionality, as it introduces special “postulated” entities in the target‐position of the mental act. Closer examination, however, reveals in Meinong's works important elements of the mediator‐theory. Meinong speaks of auxiliary incomplete objects situated “between” the subject and the object of reference (...) and “mediating” the intentional access to the reference‐object. Moreover, even if the object of reference is of the simple nominal form, the mediating structure involves essentially propositional entities . In the paper we attempt to give a set‐theoretical interpretation of Meinong's theory in the frame of which we could eventually do without the incomplete mediating objects. Yet, some general epistemological considerations suggest the indispensability of such incomplete mediating structures. (shrink)

In this paper I argue that there are in fact external relations in Russell’s sense. The level at which we are forced to acknowledge them is, however, not the level of relations between concrete individual objects. All relations of this kind, which I will call “inter-individual” relations, can be construed as supervenient on the monadic properties of their terms. But if we pursue our ontological analysis a little bit deeper and consider the internal structure of a concrete individual, then we (...) will inevitably find irreducible external relations. I mean for example the relation of instantiation (in the frame of a realist’s theory) or that of concurrence (in the frame of a trope theory). I will show that such “intra-individual” relations – the relations that make up the internal structure of a concrete individual out of more primitive metaphysical “building blocks” like universals or tropes – could not (even in principle) be construed as supervenient. (shrink)

The majority of Polish phenomenologists never found Husserl’s transcendental idealism attractive. In this paper I investigate the source of this rather surprising realist attitude. True enough the founder of Polish phenomenology was Roman Ingarden - one of the most severe critics of Husserl’s transcendental idealism, so it is initially tempting to reduce the whole issue to this sociological fact. However, I argue that there must be something more about Ingarden’s intellectual background that immunized him against Husserl’s transcendental argumentation, and that (...) the same background made his students so sympathetic to his “naive” realism. My claim is thatthis “something” is Ingarden’s realist concept of truth that he learned (at least partially) from Tarski as opposed to Husserl’s epistemic construal that he took from Brentano. (shrink)

In Reinach’s works one finds a very rich ontology of states of affairs. Some of them are positive, some negative. Some of them obtain, some do not. But even the negative and non-obtaining states of affairs are absolutely independent of any mental activity. Despite this claim of the “ontological equality” of positive and negative states of affairs, there are, according to Reinach, massive epistemological differences in our cognitive access to them. Positive states of affairs can be directly “extracted” from our (...) experience, while to acquire a negative belief we must pass through a quite complicated process, starting with certain positive beliefs. A possible and reasonable explanation of this discrepancy would be a theory to the effect that these epistemological differences have their basis in the ontology of the entities in question. Our knowledge of the negative states of affairs is essentially dependent on our knowledge of the positive ones precisely becausethe negative states of affairs are ontologically dependent on the positive ones. Such a theory has, in fact, been formulated by Roman Ingarden. According to him, negative states of affairs supervene on some positive ones and on certain mental acts of the conscious subjects. (shrink)

Roman Ingarden (1893-1970) apparteneva a quegli allievi di Husserl che si designano come “fenomenologia di Gottinga”. Si tratta della prima generazione di fenomenologi, nella quale rientravano, fra gli altri, anche Adolf Reinach, Hedwig Conrad-Martius ed Edith Stein. I ricercatori di questo gruppo erano influenzati soprattutto dalle Ricerche logiche di Husserl e reagirono un po’ stupiti alla sua successiva svolta idealistica. Per quanto riguarda lo stesso Ingarden, egli incontrò Husserl solo dopo la pubblicazione delle Idee, tuttavia filosoficamente appartiene senza dubbio al (...) periodo della prima fenomenologia “realistica”. (shrink)

Bei Brentano finden sich zwei deutlich voneinander abweichende Lehren von der Intentionalität. Beide Theorien der Intentionalität werden im Detail analysiert und mit Freges Theorie von Sinn und Bedeutung verglichen. Die frühe Lehre, wie sie Brentano in seiner Psychologie vom empirischen Standpunkt einführt, ist eine Objekt-Theorie, bei der gewisse irreale Entitäten als Objekte der Intention fungieren, mit den bekannten kontraintuitiven Aspekten und logischen Anomalien als Folge, die von Brentano durch eine Umformulierung des Begriffs des Objektes der Intention gelöst werden. Diese Theorie (...) kritisiert Brentano später vehement und ersetzt sie durch eine Theorie der Relationen, die unvollständige intentionale Objekte vermeidet, allerdings um den Preis einer deutlich komplizierterenUrteils-, Wahrheits- und Evidenzlehre. (shrink)

Der semantischen Wahrheitsdefinition Tarskis wird of vorgeworfen, dass sie philosophisch uninteressant sei. Sie sei informativ leer, weil sie mit jeder erdenklichen Ansicht bezüglich der Natur der Wahrheit zu vereinbaren sei. Wir wollen zeigen, dass diese Meinung unhaltbar ist. Tarskis semantische Wahrheitsdefinition lässt sich im Besonderen mit den Versuchen der Epistemisierung und Pragmatisierung des Wahrheitsbegriffs nicht vereinbaren. (Vorausgesetzt, dass diese Versuche wirklich den Wahrheitsbegriff und nicht den Realitätsbegriff betreffen.) Darüber hinaus ist die Tatsache, dass Tarskis Definition eine Unterscheidung von Sprach¬ebenen voraus¬setzt, (...) für die Erklärung der Schwierigkeiten, die viele Philosophen mit dem klassischen Wahrheitsbegriff haben, sehr instruktiv. Wir argumentieren, dass diese Schwierigkeiten zum großen Teil mit der Grundhaltung zusammenhängen, die man als (im weiten Sinne) „Begriffsempirismus” bezeich¬nen kann. (shrink)

Ingarden’s official ontology of states of affairs is by no means reductionist. According to him there are states of affairs, but they are ontologically dependent onother entities. There are certain classical arguments for the introduction of states of affairs as extra entities over and above the nominal objects, that can be labelled “the problem of composition,” “the problem of relation” and “the problem of negation.” To the first two Ingarden proposes rather traditional solutions, while his treatment of negation proves to (...) be original and interesting. Ingarden doesn’t deny the existence of negative states of affairs altogether, but he (i) accepts only a restricted group of them and (ii) ascribes to them an extremely weak mode of being. Negative states of affairs are construed as supervenient entities, and their supervenience-basis involves two factors: on the one hand the appropriate positive states of affairs, and on the other hand certain mental acts of conscious subjects. They enjoy thus a curious “half-subjective” mode of being. (shrink)

Wittgenstein's Tractatus [6] contains some very striking theses. We read, e.g., that \in a sense" we could not be wrong in logic, and that the whole subject matter of the theory of modalities could be reconstructed on the ground of the insights in the mechanism of the linguistic reference. Yet in the light of the last sentences of Tractatus the whole semantics turns out to be principally ineffable. In our paper we will try to clarify these matters. We show how (...) these theses could be made plausible in the context of the transcendental method of Wittgenstein's Tractatus. (shrink)

About 1904 Meinong formulated his most famous idea: there are no empty (non-referential) terms. Russell also did not accept non-referential singular terms, but in “On Denoting” he claimed that all singular terms that are apparently empty could be explained away as apparent singular terms. However, if we take a more careful look at both theories, the picture becomes more complex. It is well known that Russell’s concept of a genuine proper name is very technical; but this is also true of (...) Meinong. Also, according to Meinong we can refer “directly” only to a very special category of ontologically simple objects. However, a very important difference is that, in the domain of Meinongian objects, a _plurality_ of objects always corresponds to each description. Thus, if Meinong were right, there could be _no definite descriptions_. If we narrow the domain of reference to _existent_ objects, we can secure the uniqueness of the reference object by specifying a collection of predicates that is contingently satisfied by only one (existing) object. But if we operate in the domain of all _possible_ objects, we have to specify _all_ properties that are had by the object in question. It turns out that such a “Leibnizian” specification amounts to the complete description of a possible world. (shrink)

The purpose of the article is to examine the post-pandemic business cycle in Poland and in the United States in the light of the Austrian business cycle theory. The study shows that this theory satisfactorily explains the post-pandemic business cycle. Moreover, it seems that the Austrian business cycle theory explains some important facts better than competing theories of business cycle. The analysis also indicates that the post-pandemic business cycle differs significantly in many respects from previous business cycles – and that (...) these differences could be explained within the framework of the Austrian business cycle theory. (shrink)

Die Theorie der Intersubjektivität bildet einen der zentralen Punkte des Husserlschen Systems. Im Rahmen der konsequenten Epistemisierung des Wahrheitsbegriffs, die Husserl von Brentano übernommen hat, wird die objektive Realität mittels des Begriffs der intersubjektiven epistemischen Begründung definiert. Die Konstitution der intersubjektiven Gemeinschaft bildet demgemäß die unentbehrliche Vorbedingung für die Konstitution der intersubjektiven Welt. Wir zeigen, daß die Husserlsche Theorie nicht einwandfrei funktioniert. Es ist vor allem das Zusammenspiel des Begriffsempirismus mit dem epistemologischen Fundamentalismus, das das Scheitern seiner Version der Analogieschluß-Theorie (...) bewirkt. (shrink)