In this article, some theories about evolutionary progress of human mind are examined and criticised. Through a comparative reading of these theories -which are sometimes contradictory to each other- it has been tried to present the common missing parts of these theories. The meaning of these theories for philosophy has been thought and the presupposition of linearity in these theories is criticised. The relation of the concept of emotion with the terms like cognition, apprehension, comprehension, intellect, self-awareness, consciousness -which (...) stand forward within these theories- is emphasized. Through the visual cliff experiment, it has been attempted to clarify this relation. (shrink)

Advances in neuroscience and its related technologies promise significant forms of cognitive enhancement, chiefly through the development of drugs, genetic engineering and screening, and electronic devices for augmenting brain functions. Such advances, however, raise a complex cluster of ethical questions that should increasingly concern us in the future as these technologies become more prevalent, powerful, and wide ranging in their effects. Most ethical dilemmas and debates about enhanced cognition seem to focus on our relation to others. These ethical (...) controversies typically concern two kinds of issues. The first is whether our enhanced knowledge about others may be unethically used to limit their freedom .. (shrink)

Engineers make decisions with global impacts and empathy can motivate ethical reasoning and behavior that is sensitive to the needs and perspectives of stakeholders across the globe. Microethics and macroethics offer two frames of reference for engineering ethics education, but different dimensions of empathy play distinct roles in micro- and macroethics. Microethics emphasizes individual responsibility and interpersonal relationships whereas macroethics emphasizes societal obligations and impacts. While empathy can support ethical reasoning and behavior for each, in this paper I argue (...) that affective empathy plays a primary (but not exclusive) role in microethics whereas cognitive empathy plays a primary role in macroethics. Gilligan’s and Kohlberg’s theories of moral development are used to further depict how affective empathy aligns with care (depicted as an interpersonal phenomenon) and how cognitive empathy aligns with justice (depicted as a systems-focused phenomenon), thus positioning these ethical principles as playing primary (but again, not exclusive) roles in micro- and macro-ethics, respectively. Building on these ideas, this study generates a framework that describes and visualizes how empathy manifests across six frames of reference, each of which are increasingly macro-ethical in nature: self, team, operators, participants, bystanders, and future generations. The paper describes how proxy stakeholders can be identified, developed, and leveraged to empathize with stakeholder groups. Taken together, the manuscript seeks to clarify the role of empathy in engineering ethics and can enable engineering students to better empathize with the range of stakeholders impacted by engineering decisions, ranging from one’s self to stakeholders across the globe. The intrapersonal understandings and motivations that students generate by empathizing across six frames of reference can facilitate ethical reasoning processes and behaviors that are more inclusive and comprehensive. (shrink)

Recent theories in cognitive science have begun to focus on the active role of organisms in shaping their own environment, and the role of these environmental resources for cognition. Approaches such as situated, embedded, ecological, distributed and particularly extended cognition look beyond ‘what is inside your head’ to the old Gibsonian question of ‘what your head is inside of’ and with which it forms a wider whole—its internal and external cognitive niche. Since these views have been treated as (...) a radical departure from the received view of cognition, their proponents have looked for support to similar extended views within (the philosophy of) biology, most notably the theory of niche construction. This paper argues that there is an even closer and more fruitful parallel with developmental systems theory and developmental niche construction. These ask not ‘what is inside the genes you inherited’, but ‘what the inherited genes are inside of’ and with which they form a wider whole—their internal and external ontogenetic niche, understood as the set of epigenetic, social, ecological, epistemic and symbolic legacies inherited by the organism as necessary developmental resources. To the cognizing agent, the epistemic niche presents itself not just as a partially self-engineered selective niche, as the niche construction paradigm will have it, but even more so as a partially self-engineered ontogenetic niche, a problem-solving resource and scaffold for individual development and learning. This move should be beneficial for coming to grips with our own (including cognitive) nature: what is most distinctive about humans is their developmentally plastic brains immersed into a well-engineered, cumulatively constructed cognitive–developmental niche. (shrink)

Cognitive neuroscience increasingly relies on complex data analysis methods. Researchers in this field come from highly diverse scientific backgrounds, such as psychology, engineering, and medicine. This poses challenges with respect to acquisition of appropriate scientific computing and data analysis skills, as well as communication among researchers with different knowledge and skills sets. Are researchers in cognitive neuroscience adequately equipped to address these challenges? Here, we present evidence from an online survey of methods skills. Respondents (n= 307) mainly (...) comprised students and post-doctoral researchers working in the cognitive neurosciences. Multiple choice questions addressed a variety of basic and fundamental aspects of neuroimaging data analysis, such as signal analysis, linear algebra, and statistics. We analyzed performance with respect to the following factors: undergraduate degree (grouped into Psychology, Methods, and Biology), current researcher status (undergraduate student, PhD student, and post-doctoral researcher), gender, and self-rated expertise levels. Overall accuracy was 72%. Not surprisingly, the Methods group performed best (87%), followed by Biology (73%) and Psychology (66%). Accuracy increased from undergraduate (59%) to PhD (74%) level, but not from PhD to post-doctoral (74%) level. The difference in performance for the Methods vs. non-methods (Psychology/Biology) groups was especially striking for questions related to signal analysis and linear algebra, two areas particularly relevant to neuroimaging research. Self-rated methods expertise was not strongly predictive of performance. The majority of respondents (93%) indicated they would like to receive at least some additional training on the topics covered in this survey. In conclusion, methods skills among junior researchers in cognitive neuroscience can be improved, researchers are aware of this, and there is strong demand for more skills-oriented training opportunities. We hope that this survey will provide an empirical basis for the development of bespoke skills-oriented training programs in cognitive neuroscience institutions. We will provide practical suggestions on how to achieve this. (shrink)

Dissatisfied with the descriptive and speculative methods of evolutionary biology of his time, the physiologist Jacques Loeb , best known for his “engineering” approach to biology, reflected on the possibilities of artificially creating life in the laboratory. With the objective of experimentally tackling one of the crucial questions of organic evolution, i.e., the origin of life from inanimate matter, he rejected claims made by contemporary scientists of having produced artificial life through osmotic growth processes in inorganic salt solutions. According (...) to Loeb, the answer to the question of whether or not life could be created artificially had to come from macro-molecular chemistry, in particular from the research on the recently discovered DNA. He was convinced that a prerequisite for making living matter from inanimate substances was the chemical synthesis of nuclear material capable of self-replication. Moreover, Loeb, experimentally refuting some vitalistic explanations as well as colloidal chemists’ far-reaching claims that biologically relevant macromolecules follow colloidal rather than chemical laws, pioneered research on the physical and chemical explanations of biological phenomena. (shrink)

The aim of this project was to explore the possibility of constructing a psychologic inference engine that might enhance introspective self-awareness by delivering inferences about a user based on what he said in interactive dialogues about his closest opposite-sex relation. To implement this aim, we developed a computer program (guru) with the capacity to simulate human conversation in colloquial natural language. The psychologic inferences offered represent the authors' simulations of their commonsense psychology responses to expected user-input expressions. The heuristics (...) of the natural language processor and its relation to output responses are described in enough detail for the operations of the implementation to be understood. Evaluation of this new cognitive agent presents, we hope, puzzles for artificial intelligence and cognitive science. (shrink)

The target article presents a stimulating account for some of the most challenging issues in cognitive neuroscience. The theory solves in neural terms cognitive problems beyond the scope of previous models. But in many aspects the neural implementation is a quite literal translation of symbolic descriptions and therefore still lacks some of the truly self-organizing properties characteristic of biological networks.

Humans are often extraordinary at performing practical reasoning. There are cases where the human computer, slow as it is, is faster than any artificial intelligence system. Are we faster because of the way we perceive knowledge as opposed to the way we represent it? -/- The authors address this question by presenting neural network models that integrate the two most fundamental phenomena of cognition: our ability to learn from experience, and our ability to reason from what has been learned. This (...) book is the first to offer a self-contained presentation of neural network models for a number of computer science logics, including modal, temporal, and epistemic logics. By using a graphical presentation, it explains neural networks through a sound neural-symbolic integration methodology, and it focuses on the benefits of integrating effective robust learning with expressive reasoning capabilities. -/- The book will be invaluable reading for academic researchers, graduate students, and senior undergraduates in computer science, artificial intelligence, machine learning, cognitive science and engineering. It will also be of interest to computational logicians, and professional specialists on applications of cognitive, hybrid and artificial intelligence systems. (shrink)

Drawing on shared research experiences and collaborative projects, this book offers a broad and timely perspective on research on the hand and its current challenges. It especially emphasizes the interdisciplinary context in which researchers need to be trained in contemporary science. From language to psychology, from neurology to the social sciences, and from art to philosophy and religion, the chapters discuss various aspects involved in hand research and therapy. On the basis of concrete and validated case studies, they approach hand (...) function and gestures from different perspectives – not only neurological and medical, but also philosophical, evolutionary and anthropological. By highlighting the overlaps between different areas of research, the book seeks to foster better communication between researchers, and ultimately a better understanding of hand function and its recovery. It offers essential information and inspirations for students, researchers and practitioners in the fields of psychology, epistemology, bioengineering, neuroscience, anthropology and bioethics. (shrink)

Research has examined various cognitive processes underlying ethical decision-making, and has recently begun to focus on the differential effects of specific emotions. The present study examines three self-focused moral emotions and their influence on ethical decision-making: guilt, shame, and embarrassment. Given the potential of these discrete emotions to exert positive or negative effects in decision-making contexts, we also examined their effects on ethical decisions after a cognitive reappraisal emotion regulation intervention. Participants in the study were presented with (...) an ethical scenario and were induced, or not induced, to feel guilt, shame, or embarrassment, and were asked to reappraise, or not reappraise, the situation giving rise to those emotions. Responses to questions about the ethical case were evaluated for the quality of ethical sensemaking, perceptions of moral intensity, and decision ethicality. Findings indicate that guilt, shame, and embarrassment are associated with different sensemaking processes and metacognitive reasoning strategies, and resulted in different perceptions of moral intensity. Additionally, cognitive reappraisal had a negative impact on each of these factors. Implications of these findings for ethical decision-making research are discussed. (shrink)

This book looks at the affective-cognitive roots of how the human mind inquires into the workings of nature and, more generally, how the mind confronts reality. Reality is an infinitely complex system, in virtue of which the mind can comprehend it only in bits and pieces, by making up interpretations of the myriads of signals received from the world by way of integrating those with information stored from the past. This constitutes a piecemeal interpretation by which we assemble our (...) phenomenal reality. In perceiving the complex world and responding to it, the mind invokes the logic of affect and the logic of reason, the former mostly innate and implicit, and the latter generated consciously in explicit terms with reference to mind-independent relations between entities in nature. It is a strange combination of affect and reason that enables us to make decisions and inferences, --- the latter mostly of the inductive type --- thereby making possible the development of theories. Theories are our tool-kits for explaining and predicting phenomena, guiding us along in our journey in life. Theories, however, are defeasible, and need to be constantly updated, at times even radically. In this, the self and the soul are of enormous relevance. The former is the affect-based psychological engine driving all our mental processes, while the latter is the capacity of the conscious mind to examine and reconstruct the self by modulating repressed conflicts. If the soul remains inoperative, all our theories become misdirected and a rot spreads inexorably all around us. (shrink)

This article deals with the question of how self-organization in living organisms is realized. Self-organization may be observed in open systems that are out of equilibrium. Many disequilibria-conversion phenomena exist where free energy conversion occurs by spontaneously formed engines. However, how is self-organization realized in living entities? Living cells turn out to be self-organizing disequilibria-converting systems of a special kind. Disequilibrium conversion is realized in a typical way, through employing information specifying protein complexes acting as nano (...) engines. The genetic code enables processing of information—derived from coding DNA—to produce these molecular machines. Hence, information is at the core of living systems. Two promising approaches to explaining living cells containing sequences carrying information are mentioned. Also discussed is the question of whether a second concept of self-organization—namely, the Kantian concept—applies. (shrink)

PurposeSelf-efficacy has been argued theoretically and shown empirically to be an essential construct for students’ improved learning outcomes. However, there is a dearth of studies on its causal effects on performance in mathematics among university students. Meanwhile, it will be erroneous to assume that results from other fields of studies generalize to mathematics learning due to the task-specificity of the construct. As such, attempts are made in the present study to provide evidence for a causal relationship between self-efficacy and (...) performance with a focus on engineering students following a mathematics course at a Norwegian university.MethodThe adopted research design in the present study is a survey type in which collected data from first-year university students are analyzed using structural equation modeling with weighted least square mean and variance adjusted estimator. Data were generated using mainly questionnaires, a test of prior mathematics knowledge, and the students’ final examination scores in the course. The causal effect of self-efficacy was discerned from disturbance effects on performance by using an innovative instrumental variable approach to structural equation modeling.ResultsThe findings confirmed a significant direct effect of the prior mathematics knowledge test on self-efficacy, a significant direct effect of self-efficacy on performance, and a substantial mediating effect of self-efficacy between a prior mathematics knowledge test and performance. Prior mathematics knowledge and self-efficacy explained 30% variance of the performance. These findings are interpreted to be substantial evidence for the causal effect of self-efficacy on students’ performance in an introductory mathematics course.ConclusionThe findings of the present study provide empirically supports for designing self-efficacy interventions as proxies to improve students’ performance in university mathematics. Further, the findings of the present study confirm some postulates of Bandura’s agentic social cognitive theory. (shrink)

Stereotype threat is a possible reason for difficulties faced by girls and women in the fields of science, technology, engineering, and mathematics. The threat experienced due to gender can cause elevated worry during performance situations. That is, if the stereotype that women are not as good as men in math becomes salient, this stereotype activation draws women’s attention to task-irrelevant worry caused by the fear of conforming to the negative stereotype. Increased worry can reduce cognitive resources, potentially leading (...) to performance decrements. We argue that such worry is more pronounced immediately after an unrelated self-control demand, which is assumed to temporarily decrease people’s self-control exertion over their attention and stream of thought. This prediction was examined in an experiment conducted with 102 participating university students enrolled in courses in which math plays a crucial role. After the manipulation of self-control capacity, stereotype threat was induced for the female students, but not the male students. Then, the students were asked to report their thoughts during a math performance situation three times. Multiple-group autoregressive path models revealed that when self-control capacity was relatively low, female compared with male students reported more intense worry in the initial two thought protocols. In contrast, in the relatively high self-control capacity condition, female and male students did not differ significantly in their reported worry at any time. These results expand on previous findings, suggesting that threat effects depend on definable situational self-control conditions. (shrink)

For 4E cognitive science, minds are embodied, embedded, enacted, and extended. Proponents observe that we regularly ‘offload’ our thinking onto body and world: we use gestures and calculators to augment mathematical reasoning, and smartphones and search engines as memory aids. I argue that music is a beyond-the-head resource that affords offloading. Via this offloading, music scaffolds access to new forms of thought, experience, and behaviour. I focus on music’s capacity to scaffold emotional consciousness, including the self-regulative processes constitutive (...) of emotional consciousness. In developing this idea, I consider the ‘material’ and ‘worldmaking’ character music, and I apply these considerations to two case studies: music as a tool for religious worship, and music as a weapon for torture. (shrink)

Increasingly complex working environments of school principals inevitably led them to face moral dilemmas in daily life. The aim of this research is to reveal which kinds of moral dilemmas principals fall into mostly, how principals follow the road to making decisions in the moral dilemmas, and if the nature of management affects the decision-making process of their moral dilemmas or not. For data collection process snowball sampling was used. Semi-structured interviews and vignettes which were designed by researchers were used (...) for data collection. According to results, principals in Turkey have experienced moral dilemmas based on self-interests instead of ethic of critique which is experienced by Canadian principals. Moreover, taking into consideration the decision-making process, although principals in Canada follow the same procedure as the Turkish principals, they have two extra steps: “considering the students’ benefit” and “considering teachers’ and parents’ needs.” Lastly, it is seen that the Turkish and Canadian principals’ natures which affect the moral dilemma decision-making process are totally different. The possible reasons for these differences and suggestions were discussed within this context. (shrink)

Abstract: One approach to alignment with human values in AI and robotics is to engineer artiTicial systems isomorphic with human beings. The idea is that robots so designed may autonomously align with human values through similar developmental processes, to realize project ideal conditions through iterative interaction with social and object environments just as humans do, such as are expressed in narratives and life stories. One persistent problem with human value orientation is that different human beings champion different values as ideal, (...) meaning that the values to which an AI should be aligned are ambiguous. Prior work considered human development of purpose and source of meaning in life in terms of project ideal conditions, in effect establishing lifelong value orientations according to which intermediate situations are evaluated. The present work compares views on motivating values from St. Augustine and from popular cognitive science. These accounts are described as divergent error theories which present to their proponents as mutually exclusive yet accurate accounts of personal experience due to differential development of variable innate potentials. SpeciTically, the hypothesis proposed is that differential development of spindle neural projections establishes enduring connections between prior established relatively immediate routine processes entrained during childhood and prioritized in popular cognitive science, and later developing higher-level social and self-processes entrained during adolescence and emphasized in Augustine's account, with these projections hard-wiring lifelong motivating value orientations more or less inaccessible to modiTication through material interaction. Robot experiments informed by this study may evaluate variable value orientation by design, with for example autonomous robots developing motivating associations with temporally distal project ideal conditions through love for humanity, as described by Augustine, and others pursuing adaptive Tit to passing norms consistent with popular contemporary accounts. (shrink)

The rapidly advancing field of brain-computer (BCI) and brain-to-brain interfaces (BBI) is stimulating interest across various sectors including medicine, entertainment, research, and military. The developers of large-scale brain-computer networks, sometimes dubbed ‘Mindplexes’ or ‘Cloudminds’, aim to enhance cognitive functions by distributing them across expansive networks. A key technical challenge is the efficient transmission and storage of information. One proposed solution is employing blockchain technology over Web 3.0 to create decentralised cognitive entities. This paper explores the potential of a (...) decentralised web for coordinating large brain-computer constellations, and its associated benefits, focusing in particular on the conceptual and ethical challenges this innovation may pose pertaining to (1) Identity, (2) Sovereignty (encompassing Autonomy, Authenticity, and Ownership), (3) Responsibility and Accountability, and (4) Privacy, Safety, and Security. We suggest that while a decentralised web can address some concerns and mitigate certain risks, underlying ethical issues persist. Fundamental questions about entity definition within these networks, the distinctions between individuals and collectives, and responsibility distribution within and between networks, demand further exploration. (shrink)

Bayesian reverse-engineering is a research strategy for developing three-level explanations of behavior and cognition. Starting from a computational-level analysis of behavior and cognition as optimal probabilistic inference, Bayesian reverse-engineers apply numerous tweaks and heuristics to formulate testable hypotheses at the algorithmic and implementational levels. In so doing, they exploit recent technological advances in Bayesian artificial intelligence, machine learning, and statistics, but also consider established principles from cognitive psychology and neuroscience. Although these tweaks and heuristics are highly pragmatic in (...) character and are often deployed unsystematically, Bayesian reverse-engineering avoids several important worries that have been raised about the explanatory credentials of Bayesian cognitive science: the worry that the lower levels of analysis are being ignored altogether; the challenge that the mathematical models being developed are unfalsifiable; and the charge that the terms ‘optimal’ and ‘rational’ have lost their customary normative force. But while Bayesian reverse-engineering is therefore a viable and productive research strategy, it is also no fool-proof recipe for explanatory success. (shrink)

Recently some bioethicists and neuroscientists have argued for an imperative of chemical cognitive enhancement. This imperative is usually based on consequentialist grounds. In this paper, the topic of cognitive self-enhancement is discussed from a Kantian point of view in order to shed new light on the controversial debate. With Kant, it is an imperfect duty to oneself to strive for perfecting one’s own natural and moral capacities beyond one’s natural condition, but there is no duty to enhance (...) others. A Kantian approach does not directly lead to a duty of chemical cognitive self-enhancement, but it also does not clearly rule out that this type of enhancement can be an appropriate means to the end of self-improvement. The paper shows the benefits of a Kantian view, which offers a consistent ideal of self-perfection and teaches us a lesson about the crucial relevance of the attitude that underlies one’s striving for cognitive self-improvement: the lesson of treating oneself as an end in itself and not as mere means to the end of better output. (shrink)

Much has been written about data politics in the last decade, which has generated myriad concepts such as ‘surveillance capitalism’, ‘gig economy’, ‘quantified self’, ‘algorithmic governmentality’, ‘data colonialism’, ‘data subjects’ and ‘digital citizens’. Yet, it has been difficult to plot these concepts into an historical series to discern specific continuities and discontinuities since the origins of modern power in its three major forms: sovereign, disciplinary and regulatory. This article argues that the coronavirus pandemic in 2020 brought these three forms (...) of power into sharp relief but made particularly visible a fourth form of power that we name ‘sensory power’, which has been emerging since the 1980s. The article draws on early studies of power by Michel Foucault, subsequent studies on biopower and biopolitics that expanded on them, and studies in the past decade that focused on data produced from apps, devices and platforms. Yet, despite its ambition, the article is inevitably an outline of a much larger project. (shrink)

Many special problems crop up when evolutionary theory turns, quite naturally, to the question of the adaptive value and causal role of consciousness in human and nonhuman organisms. One problem is that -- unless we are to be dualists, treating it as an independent nonphysical force -- consciousness could not have had an independent adaptive function of its own, over and above whatever behavioral and physiological functions it "supervenes" on, because evolution is completely blind to the difference between a conscious (...) organism and a functionally equivalent (Turing Indistinguishable) nonconscious "Zombie" organism: In other words, the Blind Watchmaker, a functionalist if ever there was one, is no more a mind reader than we are. Hence Turing-Indistinguishability = Darwin-Indistinguishability. It by no means follows from this, however, that human behavior is therefore to be explained only by the push-pull dynamics of Zombie determinism, as dictated by calculations of "inclusive fitness" and "evolutionarily stable strategies." We are conscious, and, more important, that consciousness is piggy-backing somehow on the vast complex of unobservable internal activity -- call it "cognition" -- that is really responsible for generating all of our behavioral capacities. Hence, except in the palpable presence of the irrational (e.g., our sexual urges) where distal Darwinian factors still have some proximal sway, it is as sensible to seek a Darwinian rather than a cognitive explanation for most of our current behavior as it is to seek a cosmological rather than an engineering explanation of an automobile's behavior. Let evolutionary theory explain what shaped our cognitive capacity (Steklis & Harnad 1976; Harnad 1996, but let cognitive theory explain our resulting behavior. (shrink)

An increase in narcissism has been reported by experts over the years. Narcissists bring a lot of negative consequences to themselves and to the people around them. This study investigates that perceived parenting leads to the development of inflated, unstable self-concept. The inflated self-concept lays the framework for the development of narcissistic traits among individuals; perceived parenting affects this relationship. A sample of 628 adults was taken from North Cyprus through purposive sampling. Scales for perceived parenting, self-concept, (...) and narcissism were administered. Results showed that the statistically significant variance in the self-concept is explained by perceived parenting. Both mothers and fathers contributed significantly to the development of inflated self-concept. Moreover, multiple linear regression results showed a higher significant variance in narcissistic traits due to self-concept compared with perceived parenting. Mediational tests also showed that high levels of narcissistic traits were indirectly related to self-concept through perceived parenting. The study findings have challenged the notion of only mothers being responsible for narcissistic traits among their children. The study results also suggest that targeting self-concept in individuals with narcissistic traits may be a good directive for therapeutic interventions. (shrink)

While 4E approaches to cognition are increasingly introduced in educational contexts, little has been said about how 4E commitments can inform pedagogy aimed at fostering ethical competencies. Here, we evaluate a 4E-inspired ethics exercise that we developed at a technical university to enliven the moral imagination of engineering students. Our students participated in an interactive tinkering workshop, during which they materially redesigned a healthcare artifact. The aim of the workshop was twofold. Firstly, we wanted students to experience how material (...) choices at the levels of design and functionality can enable morally significant reimaginings of the affordances commonly associated with existing artifacts. We term this type of reimagining world-directed moral imagination. Secondly, through the design process, we wanted students to robustly place themselves in the lived embodied perspectives of (potential) users of their selected artifacts. We term this person-directed moral imagination. While student testimonies about the exercise indicate that both their world-directed and person-directed moral imagination were enlivened, we note that the fostering of robust person-directed moral imagination proved challenging. Using 4E insights, we diagnose this challenge and ask how it might be overcome. To this end, we engage extensively with a recent 4E-informed critique of person-directed moral imagination, raised by Clavel Vázquez and Clavel-Vázquez (2023). They argue that person-directed moral imagination is profoundly limited, if not fundamentally misguided, particularly when exercised in contexts marked by emphatic embodied situated difference between the imaginer and the imagined. Building upon insights from both the 4E field and testimonies from critical disability studies, we argue that, while their critique is valuable, it ultimately goes too far. We conclude that a 4E approach can take on board recent 4E warnings regarding the limits of person-directed moral imagination while contributing positively to the development of moral imagination in engineering ethics education. (shrink)

Memories of our personal past are the building blocks of our narrative identity. So, when we depend on objects and other people to remember and construct our personal past, our narrative identity is distributed across our embodied brains and an ecology of environmental resources. This paper uses a cognitive niche construction approach to conceptualise how we engineer our memory ecology and construct our distributed narrative identities. It does so by identifying three types of niche construction processes that govern how (...) we interact with our memory ecology, namely creating, editing, and using resources in our memory ecology. It also conceptualises how identity-relevant information in objects and (family) stories is transmitted vertically, i.e., across different generations of people. Identifying these processes allows us to better understand the cultural information trajectories that constitute our memory ecologies. Thus, what I’ll argue is that our memory ecology distributes our narrative identity and that engineering our memory ecology is a form of narrative niche construction. (shrink)

Social engineering cyberattacks are a major threat because they often prelude sophisticated and devastating cyberattacks. Social engineering cyberattacks are a kind of psychological attack that exploits weaknesses in human cognitive functions. Adequate defense against social engineering cyberattacks requires a deeper understanding of what aspects of human cognition are exploited by these cyberattacks, why humans are susceptible to these cyberattacks, and how we can minimize or at least mitigate their damage. These questions have received some amount of (...) attention, but the state-of-the-art understanding is superficial and scattered in the literature. In this paper, we review human cognition through the lens of social engineering cyberattacks. Then, we propose an extended framework of human cognitive functions to accommodate social engineering cyberattacks. We cast existing studies on various aspects of social engineering cyberattacks into the extended framework, while drawing a number of insights that represent the current understanding and shed light on future research directions. The extended framework might inspire future research endeavor toward a new sub-field that can be called Cybersecurity Cognitive Psychology, which tailors or adapts principles of Cognitive Psychology to the cybersecurity domain while embracing new notions and concepts that are unique to the cybersecurity domain. (shrink)

Creativity pervades human life. It is the mark of individuality, the vehicle of self-expression, and the engine of progress in every human endeavor. It also raises a wealth of neglected and yet evocative philosophical questions: What is the role of consciousness in the creative process? How does the audience for a work for art influence its creation? How can creativity emerge through childhood pretending? Do great works of literature give us insight into human nature? Can a computer program really (...) be creative? How do we define creativity in the first place? Is it a virtue? What is the difference between creativity in science and art? Can creativity be taught? The new essays that comprise The Philosophy of Creativity take up these and other key questions and, in doing so, illustrate the value of interdisciplinary exchange. Written by leading philosophers and psychologists involved in studying creativity, the essays integrate philosophical insights with empirical research. CONTENTS I. Introduction Introducing The Philosophy of Creativity Elliot Samuel Paul and Scott Barry Kaufman II. The Concept of Creativity 1. An Experiential Account of Creativity Bence Nanay III. Aesthetics & Philosophy of Art 2. Creativity and Insight Gregory Currie 3. The Creative Audience: Some Ways in which Readers, Viewers and/or Listeners Use their Imaginations to Engage Fictional Artworks Noël Carroll 4. The Products of Musical Creativity Christopher Peacocke IV. Ethics & Value Theory 5. Performing Oneself Owen Flanagan 6. Creativity as a Virtue of Character Matthew Kieran V. Philosophy of Mind & Cognitive Science 7. Creativity and Not So Dumb Luck Simon Blackburn 8. The Role of Imagination in Creativity Dustin Stokes 9. Creativity, Consciousness, and Free Will: Evidence from Psychology Experiments Roy F. Baumeister, Brandon J. Schmeichel, and C. Nathan DeWall 10. The Origins of Creativity Elizabeth Picciuto and Peter Carruthers 11. Creativity and Artificial Intelligence: a Contradiction in Terms? Margaret Boden VI. Philosophy of Science 12. Hierarchies of Creative Domains: Disciplinary Constraints on Blind-Variation and Selective-Retention Dean Keith Simonton VII. Philosophy of Education (& Education of Philosophy) 13. Educating for Creativity Berys Gaut 14. Philosophical Heuristics Alan Hájek. (shrink)

Cognition is not, and could not possibly be, entirely representational in character. There is also a phenomenal form of cognitive expression that registers the intrinsic properties of mental states themselves. Arguments against the reality of this intrinsic phenomenal dimension to mental experience have focused either on its supposed impossibility, or secondly, the non-appearance of any such qualities to introspection. This paper argues to the contrary, that the registration of cognitive state properties does take place independently of representational content; (...) and necessarily so, since it supports an independent function—self-management. Given the fact that unlike a computer, the brain must, of necessity, operate itself, it needs to be in touch with itself to do so. Intrinsic phenomenal forms of cognitive expression allow the brain to do just that by registering characteristics of the cognitive states themselves. Self-management might well prove to constitute the prime reason for the emergence of subjectivity itself. (shrink)

A representationalist analysis of strong first-person phenomena is developed (Baker 1998), and it is argued that conscious, cognitive self-reference can be naturalized under this representationalist analysis. According to this view, the phenomenal first-person perspective is a condition of possibility for the emergence of a cognitive first-person perspective. Cognitive self-reference always is reference to the phenomenal content of a transparent self-model. The concepts of phenomenal transparency and introspection are clarified. More generally, I suggest that the (...) concepts of phenomenal opacity and phenomenal transparency are interesting instruments for analyzing conscious, self-representational content, and that their relevance in understanding reflexive, i.e., cognitive subjectivity may have been overlooked in the past. (shrink)

Daniel C. Dennett ha dedicado una parte considerable de su obra a concebir una aplicación de la ingeniería inversa y el adaptacionismo para explicar la evolución de la mente humana. Dennet considera esta perspectiva como una posibilidad prometedora en el desarrollo de una psicología científica, en contraposición al "materialismo eliminacionista" de la neurociencia. En este artículo se expone una aproximación conceptual y se examina un antecedente filosófico en las discusiones sobre el adaptacionismo en biología y psicología evolutiva: la intencionalidad o (...) teoría de los sistemas intencionales. Daniel C. Dennett has dedicated a great part of his work to the conception of an application of reverse engineering and adaptationism in order to explain the evolution of the human mind. Dennett sees this perspective as a promising possibility in the development of a scientific psychology, in contrast to the "eliminative materialism" of neuroscience. The article provides a conceptual approach and examines a philosophical precedent in the discussions regarding adaptationism in biology and evolutionary psychology: intentionality or the theory of intentional systems. Daniel C. Dennett dedicou uma parte considerável de sua obra a conceber uma aplicação da engenharia inversa e do adaptacionismo para explicar a evolução da mente humana. Dennett considera essa perspectiva como uma possibilidade prometedora no desenvolvimento de uma psicologia científica, em contraposição ao "materialismo eliminacionista" da neurociência. Neste artigo, expõe-se uma aproximação conceitual e examina-se um antecedente filosófico nas discussões sobre o adaptacionismo em biologia e psicologia evolutiva: a intencionalidade ou teoria dos sistemas intencionais. (shrink)

This paper describes the processes of cognitive modeling and representation of human expertise for developing an ontology and knowledge base of an expert system. An ontology is an organization and classification of knowledge. Ontological engineering in artificial intelligence has the practical goal of constructing frameworks for knowledge that allow computational systems to tackle knowledge-intensive problems and supports knowledge sharing and reuse. Ontological engineering is also a process that facilitates construction of the knowledge base of an intelligent system, (...) which can be defined as a computer program that can duplicate problem-solving capabilities of human experts in specific areas. This paper presents the processes of knowledge acquisition, analysis, and representation, which laid the basis for ontology construction. In this case, the processes are applied in ontological engineering for construction of an expert system in the domain of monitoring of a petroleum production and separation facility. The acquired knowledge was also formally represented in two knowledge acquisition tools. (shrink)

Drawing on a range of literature, I introduce two new concepts for understanding and exploring distributed cognition: resilience engineering and degeneracy. By re-examining Ed Hutchins’ (1995) ethnographic study of the navigation team I show how a focus on the developmental acquisition of cognitive practices can draw out several crucial insights that have been overlooked. Firstly, that the way in which agents learn and acquire cognitive practices enables a form of resilience engineering: the process by which the (...) system is able to overcome and adapt to errors and the vagaries of nature. Secondly, that the best way to engineer a resilient system is through promoting degeneracy – how differing structures produce the same function – at the level of cognitive practices. These two features show that focusing on cognitive practices and developmental trajectories is important for both greater explanatory leverage; and is also useful in regard to the practicalities of designing real-world cognitive systems. (shrink)

The first part of this article makes the case that human cognition is an intergenerational project enabled by the inheritance and bequeathal of cognitive technology (Sects. 2–4). The final two sections of the article (Sects. 5 and 6) explore the normative significance of this claim. My case for the intergenerational claim draws results from multiple disciplines: philosophy (Sect. 2), cultural evolutionary approaches in cognitive science (Sect. 3), and developmental psychology and neuroscience (Sect. 4). In Sect. 5, I propose (...) that cognitive technology should be given to future generations in accordance with principles of pluralism and transparency. In the final main section of the article, Sect. 6, I apply these principles to topics such as the preservation of information, environmental offloading of cognition, and thinking itself. (shrink)

Cognitive processes, cognitive psychology tells us, unfold in our heads. In contrast, several approaches in cognitive engineering argue for a shift of unit of analysis from what is going on in the heads of operators to the workings of whole socio-technical systems. This shift is sometimes presented as part of the development of a new understanding of what cognition is and where the boundaries of cognitive systems are. Cognition, it is claimed, is not just situated (...) or embedded, but extended and distributed in the world. My main question in this article is what the practical significance is of this framing of an expanded unit of analysis in a cognitive vocabulary. I focus on possible consequences for how cognitive engineering practitioners think about function allocation in system design, and on what the relative benefits and costs are of having a common framework and vocabulary for talking about both human and technical system components. I argue for what I call an *expansive but deflated conception of cognition*, primarily on pragmatic grounds. In addition, I claim that the important lesson of the “boundaries of cognition” debate in cognitive science is the negative claim that there is not anything special about the biological boundary of the skin and skull per se, rather than some positive claim about where the boundaries of extended or distributed cognitive systems really are. I also examine the role of the concept of cognition in the theoretical frameworks of distributed cognition, joint cognitive systems (also known as cognitive system engineering), and cognitive work analysis. (shrink)

As usually understood, ‘conceptual engineering’ is a form of conceptual inquiry aimed at diagnosing problems with extant concepts and finding better concepts to replace them. This can seem like an appropriate response to a skeptical concern that our concepts are cognitively deficient: unsuitable for use in serious inquiry. We argue, however, that conceptual engineering, so understood, cannot reasonably be motivated in this way. The basic problem is that on the first hand, since conceptual engineering is itself a (...) form of inquiry, it cannot succeed by using the problematic concept itself in inquiry (since it is unsuitable for use in inquiry); but, on the other hand, methods for carrying out inquiry directed at concepts without using those concepts are constrained in such a way as to make conceptual engineering very unlikely to succeed. The upshot is that conceptual engineering has no reasonable chance of addressing the skeptical concern about cognitive deficiency. This is an important and previously unarticulated result, about what conceptual engineering can and cannot reasonably be expected to do. (shrink)

Meeting 5G high bandwidth rates, ultra-low latencies, and high reliabilities requires of network infrastructures that automatically increase/decrease the resources based on their customers’ demand. An autonomous and dynamic management of a 5G network infrastructure represents a challenge, as any solution must account for the radio access network, data plane traffic, wavelength allocation, network slicing, and network functions’ orchestration. Furthermore, federation among administrative domains (ADs) must be considered in the network management. Given the increased dynamicity of 5G networks, artificial intelligence/machine learning (...) (AI/ML) solutions are strong candidates able to learn, and take quick provisioning decisions upon fast changes in network conditions. Therefore, this chapter presents an analysis of the state-of-the-art solutions for 5G networks’ management, where AI/ML solutions are discussed and compared with traditional methods. Additionally, the chapter provides a technology overview of both standards, and existing solutions regarding the 5G network management, and directions toward the integration of AI/ML in 5G networks. (shrink)

After reviewing the papers in this special issue, I must conclude that brains are not syntactic engines, but control systems that orient to biological, interindividual, and cultural norms. By themselves, syntactic constraints both underdetermine and overdetermine cognitive operations. So, rather than serving as the basis for general cognition, they are just another kind of empirically acquired constraint. In humans, symbols emerge from a particular sensorimotor activity through a process of contextual broadening that depends on the coordination of conscious and (...) nonconscious processing. This process provides the representational freedom and stability that constitute the human brain’s solution to the frame problem and symbol grounding problem. Symbol formation and grounding is an ongoing process of generalising constraints from particular contexts, selectively enlisting their use, and re-automating them. This process is central to the self-creation of a language-using person with beliefs, agency, and identity. (shrink)

The vivid terms, "Top-down" and "Bottom-up" have become popular in several different contexts in cognitive science. My task today is to sort out some different meanings and comment on the relations between them, and their implications for cognitive science.

I discuss whether there are some lessons for philosophical inquiry over the nature of simulation to be learnt from the practical methodology of reengineering. I will argue that reengineering serves a similar purpose as simulations in theoretical science such as computational neuroscience or neurorobotics, and that the procedures and heuristics of reengineering help to develop solutions to outstanding problems of simulation.

Describing a cognitive system at a mechanistic level requires an engineering task analysis. This involves identifying the task and developing models of possible solutions. Evolutionary psychology and Bayesian modeling make complimentary contributions: Evolutionary psychology suggests the types of tasks that human brains were designed to solve, while Bayesian modeling provides a rigorous description of possible computational solutions to such problems.

We explore and critically reflect on the process of science and engineering research assistant skill development both within laboratory-based research teams and, when no team is present, within the faculty supervisor-research assistant interactions. Using a performance-based measure of research skill development, we identify research assistants who, over the course of an academic year of service as a researcher, markedly developed, modestly developed, or failed to develop their research skills. Interviews with these research assistants and their faculty supervisors, seen through (...) the lens of cognitive apprenticeship, provide insight into this variation. We found that within the contours of supervisory relationships and research teams, research skill development is indelibly shaped, for better or worse, by supervisor influence and abundant trial-and-error. (shrink)

Should engineering ethics be taught? Despite the obvious truism that we all want our students to be moral engineers who practice virtuous professional behavior, I argue, in this article that the question itself obscures several ambiguities that prompt preliminary resolution. Upon clarification of these ambiguities, and an attempt to delineate key issues that make the question a philosophically interesting one, I conclude that engineering ethics not only should not, but cannot, be taught if we understand “teaching engineering (...) ethics” to mean training engineers to be moral individuals (as some advocates seem to have proposed). However, I also conclude that there is a justification to teaching engineering ethics, insofar as we are able to clearly identify the most desirable and efficacious pedagogical approach to the subject area, which I propose to be a case study-based format that utilizes the principle of human cognitive pattern recognition. (shrink)