The asymmetric distribution of lipids, maintained by flippases/floppases and scramblases, plays a pivotal role in various physiologic processes. Scramblases are proteins that move phospholipids between the leaflets of the lipid bilayer of the cellular membrane in an energy‐independent manner. Recent studies have indicated that viral infection is closely related to cellular lipid distribution. The level and distribution of phosphatidylserine (PtdSer) in cells have been demonstrated to be critical regulators of viral infections. Previous studies have supported that the infection of human (...) immunodeficiency virus (HIV), Zika virus, Ebola virus (EBOV), influenza virus, and dengue fever virus require the externalization of phospholipids mediated by scramblases, which are also involved in the pathogenicity of the pandemic severe acute respiratory syndrome coronavirus 2 (SARS‐CoV‐2). In this review, we review the relationship of scramblases with viruses and the potential viral effector proteins that might utilize host scramblases. (shrink)

Cet article présente les politiques de promotion des sciences humaines poursuivies par le gouvernement coréen au cours des dernières années. Il explique l’importance accordée à ces disciplines dans le contexte du développement économique du pays et insiste sur l’importance que revêt une formation humaniste pour une compétitivité accrue de la Corée à l’échelle globale. Il détaille les actions et programmes principaux mis en place ainsi que les perspectives d’avenir. L’auteur dirige la Division de affaires universitaires auprès du Ministère de l’Éducation, (...) de la Science et de la Technologie de la République de Corée. (shrink)

Kim Dong-ri et Seo Jeong-ju sont deux monuments de la littérature coréenne du XX e siècle. Les deux écrivains nouèrent une profonde amitié à partir des années 1930 et contribuèrent ensemble à la reconstruction du milieu littéraire de la Corée après la période de l’Occupation japonaise. Dans quel contexte le romancier et le poète se sont-ils rencontrés? Quelles sont les caractéristiques de leur lien amical? Comment celui a-t-il résisté aux vicissitudes du temps et au désaccord momentané lié aux circonstances? (...) À partir d’éléments biographiques, autobiographiques et de leurs témoignages réciproques, nous découvrons que la connaissance intime de l’univers de l’un par l’autre et leur inspiration mutuelle se fondent sur les valeurs littéraires et humanistes qu’ils partagent : fins connaisseurs de la littérature du monde, ils valorisent dans leur écriture des éléments proprement coréens. (shrink)

美學大師蔣勳用文字，在時間裡的俯仰自得，找回東方最美的事物 東方美學即將再崛起，我們都要重新做好東方的文化功課 ★藝術、自然、摯友，蔣勳談東方美學，談美麗心事 ★精采收錄蔣勳水墨油畫創作，以及東方經典美術作品 ★天地、隔水、錦眉、畫心，裝幀再現長卷的荒涼與繁華 東方美學其實是生命的領悟， 領悟能夠永續，才是來日方長，領悟能夠傳承，才是天長地久。 東方美學是在漫長的歲月裡領悟了時間的意義， 領悟了生命是一個圓，周而復始。 ——蔣勳 他在文人山水畫思考時間的過去與未來，他在古典詩詞中找回不遙遠的傳唱歌聲，他在蟲痕鳥跡獸足之中看到天地大美，他在縱谷春秋之中聆聽長卷跋尾餘音裊裊。美學大師蔣勳重新思考東方美學的特殊意義，在連續不斷的心的 收藏印記中，回歸自然、溫文爾雅，在可有也可無之間，綻放最美麗的光亮。 留白、長卷、水墨、跋尾等東方美學元素，在這個全球化的時代靈光乍現，卻也內斂含蓄。也許是時候回頭省思屬於這個時代的東方美學。東方美學若要重新崛起，我們都應該從頭開始，重新做好自己的功課，迎接屬於東方的文 藝復興。.

Yi jing dian jie du he guan nian quan shi wei ji nen jin lu de si xiang shi yan jiu, yu wei rao xin yang yu she hui shen g huo de hu dong zhan kai de she hui shi yan jiu ke yi bei shi zuo zong jiao li shi yan jiu de liang ge zhi dian. Xin yang cong dai dou shi yi ti liang mian de: shi zhong guan qie chao yue de zhi qu bi (...) ran shi de xin yang yi mou zhong si xiang huo guan nian de fang shi fou ding huo shu li ri chang sheng huo he shi su shi jie, que li du te de yu zhou zhi xu yu xin yang jia zhi; yu zhi xiang dui, xin yang shi jian de zhan kai you shi yu ri chang sheng huo xu yu bu li de, cong xian shi de yi yi shang shuo, yi zhong chun cui qie tuo li le shi su sheng huo de xin yang shi nan yi xiang xiang de. Jiu dao jiao er yan, xiu zhen deng xian de xuan si yu rang zai qi fu de shi jian shi bu ke fen ge de, ke yi jie lu de gui zhi yu du die zhang ji de lu fa ye shi bing xing bu bei de. Ru guo yao chang shi li jie mou yi ge li shi shi qi zhong de dao jiao xin yang, jiu xu yao jie he qi shi de jing dian wen xian yu she hui sheng huo. Jian ci, ben shu yi Tang Song shi qi de dao jiao xin yang wei zhu ti, fen bie cong Sui Tang shi qi de dao jiao xin yang si xiang yu Tang Song shi qi de lu fa ji xin yang guan lian liang ge shi jiao zhan kai zhuan ti yan jiu, zhan shi shang shu yi ti liang mian de xin yang shi kuang jia. (shrink)

이 글은 푸코 후기 철학에 중심 주제인 ‘자기 배려’에 대한 의미를 파악하는 데 있다. 아쉽게도 ‘자기 배려’에 대한 전체 내용은 푸코의 때 이른 죽음으로 완전한 채 남아 있지 않다. 하지만 ‘자기 배려’에 대한 문제의식과 쟁점 주제들의 파악은 후기저작인 『쾌락의 활용』, 『자기 배려』, 그리고 꼴레주 드 프랑스 강의안에서 파악은 가능하다. 이 글은 그러한 텍스트를 바탕으로 하고 있다. 먼저 ‘자기 배려’는 자기 지배의 관리법으로 이해해야 한다. 이곳에서 자기 지배의 관리법은 자신의 삶 전체에 대한 배려이고, 삶의 일상적인 활동을 건강과 도덕의 문제로 삼으려는 배려이다. (...) 따라서 관리법의 일반적인 배려는 구체적 삶의 영역에서 자기 지배의 양식화로서 나타난다. ‘자기 배려’는 개인이 자신을 윤리적 주체로 인식하고 구성하는 실천적인 과정으로서의 존재의 기술이다. ‘자기 배려’에서는 주체의 윤리적 성찰과 훈련이 필요한데, 그러한 실천으로서 ‘자기 연마’가 중요하게 다루어진다. ‘자기 연마’는 주체에게 발전시키고 완성해야 할 실천의 방법들을 제시하고 있다. 그 방법으로서 대표적인 것이 ‘자기에 대한 전념’과 ‘자기로의 전향’이다. 이것들은 자기 내부에서 사유를 검토하고 반성하는 작업을 말한다. ‘자기 배려’의 진실 접근 방식으로서 ‘파르헤지아’가 있다. ‘파르헤지아’는 자기 자신에게 자기의 진실을 말하는 주체의 구성과 타인에게 참된 담론을 전승하기 위한 기술적 절차를 의미한다. ‘파르헤지아’는 말하는 자와 듣는 자, 그리고 담론형성 과정의 순간을 배려하는 행위이다. ‘자기 배려’에서는 자신을 변형시키기 위한 결단과 용기가 필요한데, 그것을 실현시키는 기술로서 ‘파르헤지아아’가 필요하다. 자유롭게, 용기 있게 진실을 말함으로써 주체의 윤리성은 더욱 높아진다. (shrink)

들뢰즈의 존재론에서 존재는 곧 생명 또는 생명의 무한한 잠재성을 의미하기 때문에 존재는 존재의 운동 자체와 구분되지 않는다. 그리고 존재의 운동은 존재와 존재자들이라는 두 항을 잇는 서로 반대되는 방향의 두 운동의 대립을 전제한다. 이 글은 존재의 이 두 운동 가운데 특히 존재자들로부터 존재를 향해서 가는 운동(존재의 용해 운동)을 분석함으로써, 내재적인 동일성이라는 새로운 전망 아래, 들뢰즈의 존재론과 존재의 일의성에 대한 보다 깊이 있는 이해를 시도했다. 이에 따르면, 존재의 용해 운동은 그 자체가 존재와 존재자들 사이의 동일성의 발생 운동에 해당한다. 존재의 용해 운동 속에서 (...) 발생하는 이 동일성은, 그것이 들뢰즈적 내재성의 원리 위에 근거한다는 점에서, 또 그것이 다양한 다수가 초월적인 한 점에 통합될 때 보게 되는 동일성과 근본적으로 반대된다는 점에서, 그 자체가 내재적인 동일성으로 불릴 수 있다. 그리고 들뢰즈의 존재론에서 이 내재적인 동일성은, 존재론적으로 볼 때, 존재의 일의성의 논제의 들뢰즈적 성취를 뜻한다. 따라서 존재의 용해 운동에 대한 다음과 같은 규정이 자연스럽게 뒤따른다. 존재의 용해 운동은 내재적인 동일성의 운동이자 존재의 일의성의 논제를 성취하는 운동이다. (shrink)

이 논문은 근대의 지식의 정당성의 근거이었던 메타 이야기의 쇠퇴 이후, 소위 후기 산업 사회와 포스트모던적 문화 속에서 지식의 정당성 절차를 명백히 하는 것을 목적으로 삼는다. 지식의 지위의 변형의 요구는 실제적 측면에서 지식의 상품화와 이론적 측면에서 메타 이야기의 쇠퇴로 특징지어지는 포스트모던적 상황의 존재론적 경험으로부터 나온다. 이러한 상황에서 지식의 정당화 문제가 제기되지 않을 수 없다. 거대 이야기의 파산으로 말미암아 지식의 정당화 문제는 이제 언어 게임 이론의 견지에서 가장 잘 이해될 수 있을 것이다. 왜냐하면 언어 게임 이론은 어떤 이론도 언어를 그 총체성에 있어서 (...) 포착할 수 없음을 의미하기 때문이다. 따라서 이 이론에서 거대 이야기는 신뢰성을 얻지 못할 뿐만 아니라 단지 무수한 언어 게임 가운데 어느 한 부분에 지나지 않게 된다. 리요따르에 의하면, 정당화의 두 가지 절차, 즉 자기 내부에 정당성을 갖는 사변적 이야기와 계몽으로부터 나오는 해방적 이야기 모두 포스트모던적 시대에 파산했다. 진리와 정의의 정당성의 파산으로 말미암아 리요따르가 취할 수 있는 선택지는 탈정당화의 길과 수행성에 의한 정당화의 길뿐이었다. 그는 정당화의 요구로부터 나오는 탈정당화의 길로 나아간다. 왜냐하면 수행성에 의한 정당화는 체계의 성과를 극대화하는 것으로 이루어지는데, 이 경우 이 기준의 적용은 테러를 수반하기 때문이다. 이로부터 리요따르는 포스트모던적 지식의 정당성의 근거가 보편적이고 통일적인 이성에 의존하지 않는 작은 이야기들 속에서 발견할 수 있다고 논증한다. 왜냐하면 작은 이야기는 확립된 규칙들의 준수에 예속되는 것이 아니라, 새로운 게임을 정당화하기 위한 게임 규칙들을 창안하는 것에 관계하기 때문이다. 작은 이야기들이 거대 이야기의 지배력을 벗어나고 다수성과 이질성을 존중한다는 점에서, 이제 불일치가 정당화의 원리가 된다. 리요따르의 이러한 해결책이 불가지론이나 회의주의를 양산한다는 것은 부인할 수 없는 사실이지만, 다른 한편 그것이 인간 존재의 유한성과 연약성에 대한 예리한 통찰력을 엿보게 하며 다원성과 차이를 존중하는 포스트모더니티의 중심적 흐름에 빛을 던져준다는 점은 지적되어야 할 것이다. 포스트모던적 사회에서 리요따르의 이러한 불일치에 의한 정당화 원리는 작은 이야기들의 평화적 공존 가능성의 조건을 보완한다면, 사회적, 경제적, 정치적 및 문화적 갈등에 직면하여 테러와 전쟁에 대한 하나의 방지책으로 제시될 수 있을 것으로 보인다. (shrink)

이 논문은 푸코 후기 철학에서 주체성과 진실의 문제를 논한다. 푸코는 주체가 진실에 다가가기 위해 자신에게 필요한 변형을 가하는 일련의 실천 경험 전반을 영성적 실천이라고 말한다. 푸코는 진실에 접근하는 주체의 영성적 실천이 데카르트에 와서 자기 인식의 형상으로 변모되었다고 본다. 세네카와 마르쿠스 아우렐리우스가 세상을 바라보는 시선의 실존적 운동을 푸코는 살펴본다. 이곳에선 시선의 실존적 운동을 통한 주체의 이동의 문제가 중요하다. 주체의 이동의 목적은 세계와의 단절이 아니라 현재 자기 자신의 위치와 자기와의 관계를 정립하는 데 있다. 시선의 실존적 운동은 현재의 자기 자신을 정확히 볼 수 (...) 있게 하고, 그리고 진실의 효과에 의해 자신의 존재 방식 전반의 변화를 가능하게 한다. 근대적인 고백 장치는 주체에게 진실을 끊임없이 말하도록 요청함으로써 주체의 예속을 강화시킨다. 주체는 고백 담론 안에서 자신을 대상화한다. 푸코는 강요된 고백담론과는 달리 진실을 통해 자신을 구축함으로써 참된 담론의 주체가 되는 문제를 고대의 고행실천 속에서 찾는다. 진실을 자기 것으로 만드는 것, 참된 담론의 발화 주체가 되는 것이 바로 고대시대의 철학적 고행의 핵심이다. 그러한 고행의 대표적인 실천의 형식으로서 경청, 독서, 진실 말하기를 살펴본다. 진실을 경청하는 자는 침묵과 능동적인 주의가 요구된다. 독서를 통한 명상은 주체를 어떤 상황에 자신을 위치시키는 문제가 중요하다. 마지막 진실 말하기는 자기 삶의 배려와 자기 실천 간의 상호 작용이 중요하다. 푸코에게 진실의 문제는 주체에게 이론으로 제공되는 것이 아니라, 생의 실천 기술로서 작용한다. 그리고 참된 진실을 자기화 한 주체는 올바른 행위의 주체가 된다. (shrink)

The relationship of self, and self-awareness, and experience: exploring classical phenomenological analyses and their relevance to contemporary discussions in ...

One of the central questions within contemporary debates about collective intentionality concerns the notion and status of the we. The question, however, is by no means new. At the beginning of the last century, it was already intensively discussed in phenomenology. Whereas Heidegger argued that a focus on empathy is detrimental to a proper understanding of the we, and that the latter is more fundamental than any dyadic interaction, other phenomenologists, such as Stein, Walther and Husserl, insisted on the importance (...) of empathy for proper we-experiences. In this paper, I will present some of the key moves in this debate and then discuss and assess Husserl’s specific proposal, according to which reciprocal empathy, second-person engagement and self-alienation are all important presuppositions for group-identification and we-identity. (shrink)

Recent years have seen an upsurge of interest in the second-person perspective, not only in philosophy of mind, language, law and ethics, but also in various empirical disciplines such as cognitive neuroscience and developmental psychology. A distinctive and perhaps also slightly puzzling feature of this ongoing discussion is that whereas many contributors insist that a proper consideration of the second-person perspective will have an impact on our understanding of social cognition, joint action, communication, self-consciousness, morality, and so on, there remains (...) considerable disagreement about what exactly a second-person perspective amounts to (see Eilan 2014; Conant and Rödl 2014). What is the difference between adopting a second-person and a third-person perspective on another? How does one relate to another as a you and how does that differ from relating to another as a he, she or they? In the following, I will consider three different proposals and argue that a promising but somewhat overlooked account can be found in the work of Husserl. (shrink)

We have some of our properties purely in virtue of the way we are. (Our mass is an example.) We have other properties in virtue of the way we interact with the world. (Our weight is an example.) The former are the intrinsic properties, the latter are the extrinsic properties. This seems to be an intuitive enough distinction to grasp, and hence the intuitive distinction has made its way into many discussions in philosophy, including discussions in ethics, philosophy of mind, (...) metaphysics, epistemology and philosophy of physics. Unfortunately, when we look more closely at the intuitive distinction, we find reason to suspect that it conflates a few related distinctions, and that each of these distinctions is somewhat resistant to analysis. (shrink)

The article takes issue with the proposal that dominant accounts of collective intentionality suffer from an individualist bias and that one should instead reverse the order of explanation and give primacy to the we and the community. It discusses different versions of the community first view and argues that they fail because they operate with too simplistic a conception of what it means to be a self and misunderstand what it means to be (part of) a we. In presenting this (...) argument, the article seeks to demonstrate that a thorough investigation of collective intentionality has to address the status and nature of the we, and that doing so will require an analysis of the relation between the we and the I, which in turn will call for a more explicit engagement with the question of selfhood than is customary in contemporary discussions of collective intentionality. (shrink)

Non-skeptical robust realists about normativity, mathematics, or any other domain of non- causal truths are committed to a correlation between their beliefs and non- causal, mind-independent facts. Hartry Field and others have argued that if realists cannot explain this striking correlation, that is a strong reason to reject their theory. Some consider this argument, known as the Benacerraf–Field argument, as the strongest challenge to robust realism about mathematics, normativity, and even logic. In this article I offer two closely related accounts (...) for the type of explanation needed in order to address Field's challenge. I then argue that both accounts imply that the striking correlation to which robust realists are committed is explainable, thereby discharging Field's challenge. Finally, I respond to some objections and end with a few unresolved worries. (shrink)

When it comes to understanding the nature of social cognition, we have—according to the standard view—a choice between the simulation theory, the theory-theory or some hybrid between the two. The aim of this paper is to argue that there are, in fact, other options available, and that one such option has been articulated by various thinkers belonging to the phenomenological tradition. More specifically, the paper will contrast Lipps' account of empathy—an account that has recently undergone something of a revival in (...) the hands of contemporary simulationists—with various accounts of empathy found in the phenomenological tradition. I discuss the way Lipps was criticized by Scheler, Stein and Husserl, and outline some of the core features of their, at times divergent, alternatives. I then proceed by considering how their basic take on empathy and social cognition was taken up and modified by Schutz—a thinker whose contribution to the analysis of interpersonal understanding has been unjustly neglected in recent years. (shrink)

ABSTRACT In this paper, I present data involving the use of the Romanian slur ‘țigan’, consideration of which leads to the postulation of a sui-generis, irreducible type of use of slurs. This type of use is potentially problematic for extant theories of slurs. In addition, together with other well-established uses, it shows that there is more variation in the use of slurs than previously acknowledged. I explain this variation by construing slurs as polysemous. To implement this idea, I appeal to (...) a rich-lexicon account of polysemy. I show how such a theory can be applied to slurs and discuss several important issues that arise. (shrink)

In recent years, more and more people have started talking about the necessity of reconciling phenomenology with the project of naturalization. Is it possible to bridge the gap between phenomenological analyses and naturalistic models of consciousness? Is it possible to naturalize phenomenology? Given the transcendental philosophically motivated anti-naturalism found in many phenomenologists such a naturalization proposal might seem doomed from the very start, but in this paper I will examine and evaluate some possible alternatives.

In two experiments, we investigated whether 13-month-old infants expect agents to behave in a way consistent with information to which they have been exposed. Infants watched animations in which an animal was either provided information or prevented from gathering information about the actual location of an object. The animal then searched successfully or failed to retrieve it. Infants’ looking times suggest that they expected searches to be effective when—and only when—the agent had had access to the relevant information. This result (...) supports the view that infants’ possess an incipient metarepresentational ability that permits them to attribute beliefs to agents. We discuss the viability of more conservative explanations and the relationship between this early ability and later forms of ‘theory of mind’ that appear only after children have become experienced verbal communicators. (shrink)

The article examines some of the main theses about self-awareness developed in recent analytic philosophy of mind (especially the work of Bermúdez), and points to a number of striking overlaps between these accounts and the ones to be found in phenomenology. Given the real risk of unintended repetitions, it is argued that it would be counterproductive for philosophy of mind to ignore already existing resources, and that both analytical philosophy and phenomenology would profit from a more open exchange.

I present an account of mental representation based upon the ‘SINBAD’ theory of the cerebral cortex. If the SINBAD theory is correct, then networks of pyramidal cells in the cerebral cortex are appropriately described as representing, or more specifically, as modelling the world. I propose that SINBAD representation reveals the nature of the kind of mental representation found in human and animal minds, since the cortex is heavily implicated in these kinds of minds. Finally, I show how SINBAD neurosemantics can (...) provide accounts of misrepresentation, equivocal representation, twin cases, and Frege cases. (shrink)

If the self—as a popular view has it—is a narrative construction, if it arises out of discursive practices, it is reasonable to assume that the best possible avenue to self-understanding will be provided by those very narratives. If I want to know what it means to be a self, I should look closely at the stories that I and others tell about myself, since these stories constitute who I am. In the following I wish to question this train of thought. (...) I will argue that we need to operate with a more primitive and fundamental notion of self; a notion of self that cannot be captured in terms of narrative structures. In a parallel move, I will argue that there is a crucial dimension of what it means to be other that is equally missed by the narrative approach. I will consequently defend the view that there are limits to the kind of understanding of self and others that narratives can provide. (shrink)

Our main aim in this paper is to show that constructing an adequate theory of communication involves going beyond Grice’s notion of speaker’s meaning. After considering some of the difficulties raised by Grice’s three-clause definition of speaker’s meaning, we argue that the characterisation of ostensive communication introduced in relevance theory can provide a conceptually unified explanation of a much wider range of communicative acts than Grice was concerned with, including cases of both ‘showing that’ and ‘telling that’, and with both (...) determinate and indeterminate import. (shrink)

Empirical evidence indicates that bereaved spouses are surprisingly muted in their responses to their loss, and that after a few months many of the bereaved return to their emotional baseline. Psychologists think this is good news: resilience is adaptive, and we should welcome evidence that there is less suffering in the world. I explore various reasons we might have for regretting our resilience, both because of what resilience tells us about our own significance vis-à-vis loved ones, and because resilience may (...) render us incapable of comprehending how things really stand, valuewise. I also compare our actual dispositions to extreme alternatives (“sub-resilience” and “super-resilience”), and consider whether we might endorse (plain) resilience as a kind of mean. (shrink)

Phenomenology has recently come under attack from proponents of speculative realism. In this paper, I present and assess the criticism, and argue that it is either superficial and simplistic or lacks novelty.

Many accounts of collective intentionality target rather sophisticated types of cooperative activities, i.e., activities with complex goals that require prior planning and various coordinating and organizing roles. But although joint action is of obvious importance, an investigation of collective intentionality should not merely focus on the question of how we can share agentive intentions. We can act and do things together, but it is not obvious that the awe felt and shared by a group of Egyptologists when they gain entry (...) to a newly discovered pharaonic tomb can or should be analyzed in the same way as, say, a heist that a group of criminals carefully plan and execute together. The aim of the article is to better understand the kind of emotional sharing that can occur between two individuals who are perceptually co-present. Does the sharing involve a kind of phenomenal fusion? Is it a matter of sharing one and the same token experience? It will be argued that both of these recent suggestions must be rejected as misleading in favor of an account that sees emotional sharing as a form of emotional integration that involves constitutively interdependent processes of empathy, second-personal address, and identification. (shrink)

For a cou ple of decades, higher-order the o ries of con scious ness have enjoyed great pop u lar ity, but they have recently been met with grow ing dis sat is - fac tion. Many have started to look else where for via ble alter na tives, and within the last few years, quite a few have redis cov ered Brentano. In this paper such a Brentanian one-level account of con scious ness will be out lined and dis (...) - cussed. It will be argued that it can con trib ute impor tant insights to our under - stand ing of the rela tion between con scious ness and self-aware ness, but it will also be argued that the account remains beset with some prob lems, and that it will ulti mately make more sense to take a closer look at Sartre, Husserl, and Heidegger, if one is on the look out for prom is ing alter na tives to the higher-order the o ries, than to return all the way to Brentano. (shrink)

If one looks at the current discussion of self-awareness there seems to be a general agreement that whatever valuable philosophical contributions Husserl might have made, his account of self-awareness is not among them. This prevalent appraisal is often based on the claim that Husserl was too occupied with the problem of intentionality to ever really pay attention to the issue of self-awareness. Due to his interest in intentionality Husserl took object-consciousness as the paradigm of every kind of awareness and therefore (...) settled with a model of self-awareness based upon the subject-object dichotomy, with its entailed difference between the intending and the intended. As a consequence, Husserl never discovered the existence of pre-reflective self- awareness, but remained stuck in the traditional, but highly problematic reflection model of self-awareness. (shrink)

It is always risky to make sweeping statements about the development of philosophy, but if one were nevertheless asked to describe 20th century philosophy in broad strokes, one noteworthy feature might be the following: Whereas important figures at the beginning of the century, figures such as Frege and Husserl, were very explicit in their rejection of naturalism (both are known for their rejection of the attempt to naturalize the laws of logic, i.e., for their criticism of psychologism), the situation has (...) changed considerably. Today many philosophers – not the least within analytical philosophy – would subscribe to some form of naturalism. In fact, naturalism is seen by many as the default metaphysical position. If you don’t subscribe to naturalism you must be subscribing to some form of Cartesian substance dualism. Thus, whereas 20 or 30 years ago one might have been inclined to characterize the development of 20th century philosophy in terms of a linguistic turn, a turn from a philosophy of subjectivity to a philosophy of language, it might today be more apt to describe the development in terms of a turn from anti-naturalism to naturalism. (shrink)

Accusations of sexual creepiness are on the rise, but are such accusations morally problematic? Legal scholar Heidi Matthews thinks so, arguing that sexual creepiness as a category is in tension with liberal and progressive moral commitments. Principled liberals and progressives can reject creepiness as a category, but the costs of abandoning sexual creepiness may be high. Empirical findings about who gets accused of being creepy suggest that the creepiness norm is being repurposed to control male sexual advances in two ways: (...) first, by discouraging substandard male suitors from approaching young women unlikely to be interested in them (“prefiltration”), and second, by deflecting eligible older men away from young women and towards older women (“redirection”). If something like this hypothesis is correct, the ethical question liberals and progressives must wrestle with is whether these benefits justify maintenance of a norm that is (inter alia) lookist, ageist, sexist, sex-negative, and neuronormative. (shrink)

In this short paper I survey recent contextualist answers to the challenge from disagreement raised by contemporary relativists. After making the challenge vivid by means of a working example, I specify the notion of disagreement lying at the heart of the challenge. The answers are grouped in three categories, the first characterized by rejecting the intuition of disagreement in certain cases, the second by conceiving disagreement as a clash of non-cognitive attitudes and the third by relegating disagreement at the pragmatic (...) level. For each category I present several important variants and raise some (general) criticisms. The paper is meant to offer a quick introduction to the current contextualist literature on disagreement and thus a useful tool for further research. (shrink)

In this entry, I tackle the phenomenon known as "faultless disagreement", considered by many authors to pose a challenge to the main views on the semantics of subjective expressions. I first present the phenomenon and the challenge, then review the main answers given by contextualist, absolutist and relativist approaches to the expressions in question. I end with signaling two issues that might shape future discussions about the role played by faultless disagreement in semantics.

If one comes to Phénoménologie de la perception after having read Sein und Zeit (or Prolegomena zur Geschichte des Zeitbegriffs) one will be in for a surprise. Both works contain a number of both implicit and explicit references to Husserl, but the presentation they give is so utterly different, that one might occasionally wonder whether they are referring to the same author. Thus nobody can overlook that Merleau-Ponty’s interpretation of Husserl differs significantly from Heidegger’s. It is far more charitable. In (...) fact, when evaluating the merits of respectively Husserl and Heidegger, Merleau-Ponty often goes very much against the standard view. This is not only the case in his notorious remark on the very first page of Phénoménologie de la Perception where he declares that the whole of Sein und Zeit is nothing but an explication of Husserl’s notion of Lifeworld, but also - to give just one further example - in one of his Sorbonne-lectures, where Merleau-Ponty writes that Husserl took the issue of historicity far more seriously than Heidegger. (shrink)

In this chapter, we focus on the debate over publicly maintained racist monuments as it manifests in the mid-2010s Anglosphere, primarily in the United States and South Africa. After pointing to some representative examples of racist monuments, we discuss ways a monument can be thought racist and neutrally categorize removalist and preservationist arguments heard in the monument debate. We suggest that both extremist and moderate removalist goals are likely to be self-defeating and that when concerns of civic sustainability are put (...) on moral par with those of fairness and justice, something like a Mandela-era preservationist policy is best: one which removes the most offensive of the minor racist monuments, but which focuses on closing the monumentary gap between peoples and reframing existing racist monuments. (shrink)

There is a long tradition in philosophy for claiming that selfhood is socially constructed and self-experience intersubjectively mediated. On many accounts, we consequently have to distinguish between being conscious or sentient and being a self. The requirements that must be met in order to qualify for the latter are higher. My aim in the following is to challenge this form of social constructivism by arguing that an account of self which disregards the fundamental structures and features of our experiential life (...) is a non-starter, and that a correct description and account of the experiential dimension must do justice to the first-person perspective and to the primitive form of self-referentiality, mineness or for-me-ness that it entails. I then consider and discuss various objections to this account, in particular the view that an endorsement of such a minimal notion of self commits one to an outdated form of Cartesianism. In the final part of the paper, I argue that the self is so multifaceted a phenomenon that various complementary accounts must be integrated if we are to do justice to its complexity. (shrink)

The claim that the human cognitive system tends to allocate resources to the processing of available inputs according to their expected relevance is at the basis of relevance theory. The main thesis of this chapter is that this allocation can be achieved without computing expected relevance. When an input meets the input condition of a given modular procedure, it gives this procedure some initial level of activation. Input-activated procedures are in competition for the energy resources that would allow them to (...) follow their full course. What determines which of the procedures in competition get sufficient resources to trigger their full operation is the dynamics of their activation. This dynamics depend both on the prior degree of mobilisation of a modular procedure and on the activation that propagates from other active modules. It is quite conceivable also that the mobilisation of some procedures has inhibitory effects on some others. The relevance-theoretic claim is that, at every instant, this dynamics of activation provides rough physiological indicators of expected relevance. The flow of energy in the system is locally regulated by these indicators. As a result, those input-procedure combinations that have the greatest expected relevance are the more likely ones to receive sufficient energy to follow their course. (shrink)

What does the fact that we feel shame tell us about the nature of self? Does shame testify to the presence of a self-concept, a self-ideal, and a capacity for critical self-assessment, or does it rather, as some have suggested, point to the fact that the self is in part socially constructed? Should shame primarily be classified as a self-conscious emotion, is it rather a distinct social emotion, or might this forced alternative be misguided? In the chapter, I contrast certain (...) prevalent cognitivist accounts of shame with different proposals that can be found in the phenomenological tradition and ultimately argue that prototypical forms of shame provide vivid examples of other-mediated forms of self-experience. (shrink)

In his recent book ‘Kant and the Mind’ Andrew Brook makes a distinction between two types of selfawareness. The first type, which he calls empirical self-awareness, is an awareness of particular psychological states such as perceptions, memories, desires, bodily sensations etc. One attains this type of self-awareness simply by having particular experiences and being aware of them. To be in possession of empirical self-awareness is, in short, simply to be conscious of one’s occurrent experience. The second type of self-awareness he (...) calls apperceptive self-awareness. This type of self-awareness entails an awareness of oneself as the subject of experience. For this type of self-awareness to obtain, it would not be enough merely to be conscious of, say, an occurrent perception of a chair, one would also have to be aware that it was oneself who was perceiving the chair. And as Brook adds, when I am self-aware in this way, I am not only aware of being the subject of a single experience, but also aware of myself as the common subject of other psychological states (Brook, 1994: 55-57). I find Brook’s distinction illuminating, but it raises a question which I would like to pursue in this paper. When we speak of self-awareness, do we then necessarily also speak of a self, is there so to speak always a self involved in self-awareness, or is it rather the case, as Brook’s notion of empirical selfawareness might suggest, that there are types of self-awareness which are ‘selfless’, or to use two other related terms ‘subjectless’ or ‘non-egological’? Is self-awareness always to be understood as an awareness of a self, or can it be understood simply as the awareness which a specific experience has of itself? Ultimately, I believe an answer to these questions are important, both when it comes to an understanding of what exactly self-awareness amounts to, and also when it comes to a proper understanding of what a self is.. (shrink)

The central characteristic of cognitive explanations of behavior is the appeal to inner representations. I examine the grounds which justify representational explanations, seeking the minimum conditions which organisms must meet to be candidates for such explanations. I first discuss Fodor's proposal that representationality be attributed to systems which respond to nonnomic properties, arguing that the distinction between the nomic and nonnomic in perception is fatally ambiguous. Then I turn to an illustrative review of the behavior and neurobiology of Hermissenda crassicornis, (...) a marine mollusk. Concerning this "model system," I compare the representational style of explanation with both behaviorist and neurophysiological explanations. Representational explanation is potentially more comprehensive than its rivals, and thus I conclude that representations are useful posits wherever internal information-bearing states mediate behavior. (shrink)