Alvin Plantinga declared in 1983 that Classical Foundationalism had collapsed. He was convinced that he had found an utterly damaging argument against CF: CF is self-referentially incoherent. Already Alston and Quinn and recently DePoe have denied that Plantinga’s argument is successful. There are three objections against his argument:i) He has to show that there is no argument for CF; ii) there may be an inductive argument for CF; iii) there are other good arguments for CF, presented e.g. by Richard Fumerton. (...) In this paper I will argue that i) is wrong and that Quinn’s inductive argument fails. Plantinga has shown that the “old” type of CF is self-refuting. Plantinga’s argument is not successful if aimed against a contemporary Fumerton-style CF because this type of CF differs in at least one relevant aspect from the kind of CF Plantinga was struggling with. (shrink)

There is widespread consensus that there are undercutting and rebutting defeaters that diminish or destroy the warrant of a belief B. I argue that there are counterparts of defeaters: the counterparts of undercutting defeaters are “requirement fulfillment beliefs”, the counterparts of rebutting defeaters are “consistency beliefs”. These beliefs confirm the warrant of B, I therefore call them “confirmers”.

We give a direct and elementary proof of the fact that every real-valued probability measure can be approximated—up to an infinitesimal—by a hyperreal-valued one which is regular and defined on the whole powerset of the sample space.

Waiting lists are a standard approach to managing excess demand in elective health care. While waiting times are an important policy issue, the ethical validity of the first come, first served (FCFS) principle as such is rarely questioned. Presenting a psychiatric day hospital where all eligible patients have roughly equal claims as a case study, we criticize the reflex use of FCFS for allocation of elective psychiatric care, consider conditions under which this may not be the optimal strategy, and discuss (...) alternatives. We conclude that in our example prioritizing more recent referrals (last come, first served [LCFS]) makes more sense, clinically and ethically. Where several referrals arrive (near-)simultaneously under LCFS, we propose that a higher level of scrutiny be applied to detect possible good reasons for prioritizing one of them. We believe that our observations can be applied to other health care settings that share relevant characteristics with our case. (shrink)

Multigene delivery and expression systems are emerging as key technologies for many applications in contemporary biology. We have developed new methods for multigene delivery and expression in eukaryotic hosts for a variety of applications, including production of protein complexes for structural biology and drug development, provision of multicomponent protein biologics, and cell‐based assays. We implemented tandem recombineering to facilitate rapid generation of multicomponent gene expression constructs for efficient transformation of mammalian cells, resulting in homogenous cell populations. Analysis of multiple parameters (...) in living cells may require co‐expression of fluorescently tagged sensors simultaneously in a single cell, at defined and ideally controlled ratios. Our method enables such applications by overcoming currently limiting challenges.Here, we review recent multigene delivery and expression strategies and their exploitation in mammalian cells. We discuss applications in drug discovery assays, interaction studies, and biologics production, which may benefit in the future from our novel approach. (shrink)

In sexually reproducing organisms maintenance of germ stem cell immortality is fundamental for transmitting genetic material to future generations. While previous research has mainly considered intrinsic regulatory mechanisms in the germline, our recent study has found a direct contribution of somatic cells in preserving germline immortality via the somatically expressed endoribonuclease ENDU‐2 in Caenorhabditis elegans. We have identified ENDU‐2 as a secreted protein that can be taken up by the germline. Here, we discuss how ENDU‐2 might uncouple its RNA‐binding and (...) RNA‐cleavage activities to control gene expression via either an endoribonuclease dependent or an independent way. We also speculate on a possible functional conservation of its mammalian homologs in mediating cell‐cell communication as well as its potential significance in understanding human pathogenesis such as cancer development. (shrink)

Peter Abelard (1079–1142 ce) was the most wide‐ranging philosopher of the twelfth century. He quickly established himself as a leading teacher of logic in and near Paris shortly after 1100. After his affair with Heloise, and his subsequent castration, Abelard became a monk, but he returned to teaching in the Paris schools until 1140, when his work was condemned by a Church Council at Sens. His logical writings were based around discussion of the “Old Logic”: Porphyry's Isagoge, aristotle'S Categories and (...) On Interpretation and boethius'S textbook on topical inference. They comprise a freestanding Dialectica (“Logic”; probably c.1116), a set of commentaries (known as the Logica [Ingredientibus], c. 1119) and a later (c. 1125) commentary on the Isagoge (Logica Nostrorum Petititoni Sociorum or Glossulae). In a work Abelard called his Theologia, issued in three main versions (between 1120 and c.1134), he attempted a logical analysis of trinitarian relations and explored the philosophical problems surrounding God's claims to omnipotence and omniscience. The Collationes (“Debates,” also known as “Dialogue between a Christian, a Philosopher and a Jew”; probably c.1130) present a rational investigation into the nature of the highest good, in which the Christian and the Philosopher (who seems to be modeled on a philosopher of pagan antiquity) are remarkably in agreement. The unfinished Scito teipsum (“Know thyself,” also known as the “Ethics”; c.1138) analyses moral action. (shrink)

The microbiome of human hair follicles (HFs) has emerged as an important player in different HF and skin pathologies, yet awaits in‐depth exploration. This raises questions regarding the tightly linked interactions between host environment, nutrient dependency of host‐associated microbes, microbial metabolism, microbe‐microbe interactions and host immunity. The use of simple model systems facilitates addressing generally important questions and testing overarching, therapeutically relevant principles that likely transcend obvious interspecies differences. Here, we evaluate the potential of the freshwater polyp Hydra, to dissect (...) fundamental principles of microbiome regulation by the host, that is the human HF. In particular, we focus on therapeutically targetable host‐microbiome interactions, such as nutrient dependency, microbial interactions and host defence. Offering a new lens into the study of HF – microbiota interactions, we argue that general principles of how Hydra manages its microbiota can inform the development of novel, microbiome‐targeting therapeutic interventions in human skin disease. (shrink)

Der Artikel befasst sich zunächst mit Ralf Stoeckers Analyse des Krankheitsbegriffs, speziell mit der Auffassung, dass es sich um einen Bündelbegriff handelt, der verschiedene Dimensionen des Phänomens Krankheit verbindet. Im Anschluss wird ein mögliches Szenario entworfen, in dem es gar keinen Krankheitsbegriff mehr gibt und damit die steuernde Funktion beim Zugang zu Gesundheitsressourcen wegfiele. Wäre es gut, wenn der gebrechliche Begriff der Krankheit, wie Stoecker ihn ebenfalls bezeichnet, das Zeitliche segnete?

Im Anschluss an seinen Artikel „Actions, Reasons, and Causes“ hat Davidson seine Auffassung in Bezug auf praktisches Überlegen grundlegend revidiert. Der vorliegende Beitrag präsentiert zunächst diese Modifikation und motiviert sie. Danach wird auf die zentrale Rolle von Alles-in-allem-Urteilen und dem Kontinenzprinzip näher eingegangen. Abschließend wird ein anderes Verständnis von Alles-in-allem-Urteilen und dem Kontinenzprinzip propagiert und ein möglicher Einwand diskutiert, der sowohl gegen Davidsons als auch gegen das alternative Verständnis der beiden Konzepte vorgebracht werden kann.

Das Buch stellt den ersten Teil eines mehrbändigen Sammelwerkes dar, in dem von Philosophen sowie klassischen und modernen Philologen Beiträge zur ethischen Ökonomie und ihrer Geschichte zusammengeführt sind. Es gliedert sich in zwei Teile. Der erste Teil – „Philosophische Quellen“ – enthält Studien zur ökonomischen Dimension im Denken Heraklits, Platons, der Stoa, Thomas von Aquins, Ockhams, Kants, Nietzsches, Thoreaus, Simone Weils; der zweite Teil – „Dichterische Quellen“ – versammelt entsprechende Untersuchungen zu Aischylos, zur Augusteischen Dichtung, zu Shakespeare, Ramuz, Pound und (...) Cummings. (shrink)

A growing number of decision theorists have, in recent years, defended the view that rationality is permissive under risk: Different rational agents may be more or less risk-averse or risk-inclined. This can result in them making different choices under risk even if they value outcomes in exactly the same way. One pressing question that arises once we grant such permissiveness is what attitude to risk we should implement when choosing on behalf of other people. Are we permitted to implement any (...) of the rationally permissible risk attitudes, is there some specific risk attitude that is required when choosing for others, or are we required to defer to the risk attitudes of the people on whose behalf we are choosing? This article elaborates on this question, explains its wider practical and theoretical significance, provides an overview of existing answers, and explores how to go about providing a more systematic account of how to choose on behalf of others in risky contexts. (shrink)

This paper defends revealed preference theory against a pervasive line of criticism, according to which revealed preference methodology relies on appealing to some mental states, in particular an agent’s beliefs, rendering the project incoherent or unmotivated. I argue that all that is established by these arguments is that revealed preference theorists must accept a limited mentalism in their account of the options an agent should be modelled as choosing between. This is consistent both with an essentially behavioural interpretation of preference (...) and with standard revealed preference methodology. And it does not undermine the core motivations of revealed preference theory. (shrink)

This article argues that Lara Buchak’s risk-weighted expected utility (REU) theory fails to offer a true alternative to expected utility theory. Under commonly held assumptions about dynamic choice and the framing of decision problems, rational agents are guided by their attitudes to temporally extended courses of action. If so, REU theory makes approximately the same recommendations as expected utility theory. Being more permissive about dynamic choice or framing, however, undermines the theory’s claim to capturing a steady choice disposition in the (...) face of risk. I argue that this poses a challenge to alternatives to expected utility theory more generally. (shrink)

"In einen Toten tritt man ein wie in eine offene Stadt" - so beginnt Thomäs Heidegger-Interpretation, und darin wird zugleich ihr Anspruch deutlich. Wenn Heidegger selbst seine Werke "Wege" nennt, so geht es Thomä darum, dessen philosophische Entwicklung als ein Netz solcher Wege zu erschließen - und zugleich zu fragen, wo Heideggers Irrwege, Abwege oder Auswege einsetzen.

Behavioural economics has taught us that human agents don't always display consistent, context-independent and stable preferences in their choice behaviour. Can we nevertheless do welfare economics...

In her Choosing Well, Chrisoula Andreou puts forth an account of instrumental rationality that is revisionary in two respects. First, it changes the goalpost or standard of instrumental rationality to include “categorial” appraisal responses, alongside preferences, which are relational. Second, her account is explicitly diachronic, applying to series of choices as well as isolated ones. Andreou takes both revisions to be necessary for dealing with problematic choice scenarios agents with disorderly preferences might find themselves in. Focusing on problem cases involving (...) cyclical preferences, I will first argue that her first revision is undermotivated once we accept the second. If we are willing to grant that there are diachronic rationality constraints, the preference-based picture can get us further than Andreou acknowledges. I will then turn to present additional grounds for rejecting the preference-based picture. However, these grounds also seem to undermine Andreou’s own appeal to categorial appraisal responses. (shrink)

Philosophy &Public Affairs, Volume 52, Issue 1, Page 5-41, Winter 2024.

Most philosophical decision theorists and philosophers of the social sciences believe that decision theory is and should be in the business of providing folk psychological explanations of choice behaviour, and that it can only do so if we understand the preferences, utilities and probabilities that feature in decision-theoretic models as ascriptions of mental states not reducible to choice. The behavioural interpretation of preference and related concepts, still common in economics, is consequently cast as misguided. This paper argues that even those (...) who strive to provide folk psychological explanations should side with the economists, and adopt a behavioural interpretation of the preferences featuring in decision-theoretic models. Under a mentalistic interpretation of preference, decision-theoretic models do not straightforwardly provide ordinary folk psychological explanations. Instead, they involve controversial enough commitments about the mental causes of choice to not only fail to adequately capture much unreflective decision-making, but also many intentional, reason-based and instrumentally rational choices. Satisfactory folk psychological explanation in fact only comes indirectly from inferring more fundamental conative attitudes from a pattern of decision-theoretic preferences. And the behavioural interpretation does a better job at facilitating such inferences. My argument extends to the related concepts of utility and probability. (shrink)

Judgementalism is an interpretation of normative decision theory according to which preferences are all-things-considered judgements of relative desirability, and the only attitudes that rationally constrain choice. The defence of judgementalism we find in Richard Bradley’s Decision Theory with a Human Face relies on a kind of internalism about the requirements of rationality, according to which they supervene on an agent’s mental states, and in particular those she can reason from. I argue that even if we grant such internalism, attitudes other (...) than preferences in the judgementalist sense rationally constrain choice. This ultimately supports a different interpretation of preference. (shrink)

Precautionary principles are frequently appealed to both in public policy and in discussions of individual decision-making. They prescribe omission or reduction of an activity, or taking precautionary measures whenever potential harmful effects of the activity surpass some threshold of likelihood and severity. One crucial appeal of precautionary principles has been that they seem to help guard against procrastinating on confronting certain kinds of risk. I raise a challenge for precautionary principles serving as effective action-guiding tools to guard against (policy) inaction, (...) procrastination, or recklessness. Since risks that are sufficiently harmful and sufficiently likely to fulfil the antecedent of a precautionary principle typically accumulate over time, precautionary principles are only effective if they constrain an agent’s decision-making over time. On the basis of this observation, I argue for two claims. First, to yield the verdicts proponents of precautionary principles would like to make, precautionary principles must be understood to be diachronic principles, which requires some added structure to how they are commonly formulated. Second, such diachronic precautionary principles invite policy procrastination and inaction in their own right, due to both the vagueness of thresholds, and because agents will often fail to abide by the principles if they ignore bygone risks. (shrink)

This article presents two related challenges to the idea that, to ensure policy evaluation is comprehensive, all costs and benefits should be aggregated into a single, equity-weighted wellbeing metric. The first is to point out how, even allowing for equity-weighting, the use of a single metric limits the extent to which we can take distributional concerns into account. The second challenge starts from the observation that in this and many other ways, aggregating diverse effects into a single metric of evaluation (...) necessarily involves settling many moral questions that reasonable people disagree about. This raises serious questions as to what role such a method of policy evaluation can and should play in informing policy-making in liberal democracies. Ultimately, to ensure comprehensiveness of policy evaluation in a wider sense, namely, that all the diverse effects that reasonable people might think matter are kept score of, we need multiple metrics as inputs to public deliberation. (shrink)

Where artificial agents are not liable to be ascribed true moral agency and responsibility in their own right, we can understand them as acting as proxies for human agents, as making decisions on their behalf. What I call the ‘Moral Proxy Problem’ arises because it is often not clear for whom a specific artificial agent is acting as a moral proxy. In particular, we need to decide whether artificial agents should be acting as proxies for low-level agents — e.g. individual (...) users of the artificial agents — or whether they should be moral proxies for high-level agents — e.g. designers, distributors or regulators, that is, those who can potentially control the choice behaviour of many artificial agents at once. Who we think an artificial agent is a moral proxy for determines from which agential perspective the choice problems artificial agents will be faced with should be framed: should we frame them like the individual choice scenarios previously faced by individual human agents? Or should we, rather, consider the expected aggregate effects of the many choices made by all the artificial agents of a particular type all at once? This paper looks at how artificial agents should be designed to make risky choices, and argues that the question of risky choice by artificial agents shows the moral proxy problem to be both practically relevant and difficult. (shrink)

Most papers in theoretical economics contain thought experiments. They take the form of more informal bits of reasoning that precede the presentation of the formal, mathematical models these papers are known for. These thought experiments differ from the formal models in various ways. In particular, they do not invoke the same idealized assumptions about the rationality, knowledge, and preferences of agents. The presence of thought experiments in papers that present formal models, and the fact that they differ from the formal (...) models in this way, is often ignored in debates on what, if anything, we can learn from formal models in theoretical economics. I show that paying due attention to thought experiments in theoretical economics has serious implications for this debate. Differences between thought experiments and formal models are especially problematic for Robert Sugden’s “credible worlds” account. (shrink)

The philosophy of Henri Maldiney has played an important role in the evolution of French philosophy, especially its phenomenological strand. Maldiney's ideas have to a large extent developed from a close study of psychopathology. In this article, I present some of the key principles of Maldineyan thought, which has found little recognition to date in Anglophone philosophy and psychopathology. My main purpose is to explain the psychopathological and therapeutic implications of these principles. First, I make a few observations about Maldiney's (...) life and then sum up some of the main concepts of Maldineyan thought, such as sensing, rhythm, and, most important, openness to the event. Based on these concepts... (shrink)

Am Leitfaden des Satzes "Jeder ist sich selbst der Fernste" wird die systematische Rage erörtert, wie die Revision personaler Identität bei Emerson und Nietzsche für eine Revision der Moral fruchtbar gemacht werden kann. Dabei geht es inbesondere um die Figur des "abandonment" oder der Selbstüberwindung, mit der die Person, die "werdende Seele" , ihre Vertrautheit mit sich verliert. Diese Erfahrung innerer Fermdheit oder "Ferne" eröffnet ein neues moralisches Verhältnis zu äußerer Fremdheit oder zum Anderen. Selbstbezug und Interaktion greifen ineinander. Neben (...) Emersons und Nietzsches Kritik des Mitleids und der Nächstenliebe tritt damit auch ein positives Verständnis der "Anteilnahme."Taking the phrase "each man is furthest from himself" as a guideline, this paper shows how Emerson's and Nietzsche's revised notion of personal identity eventually led to a revised notion of morality as well. The image of abandoning or overcoming the self is linked to situations in which a person or the "soul" that "becomes" loses one's self-acquaintance. This experience of internal strangeness or distance paves the way to a new moral relation to the external strangeness of the Other. Self-relation and interaction are intertwined. Hence Emerson and Nietzsche's critiques of pity and compassion are complemented by a positive understanding of sympathy. (shrink)

In the dynamic choice literature, temptations are usually understood as temporary shifts in an agent’s preferences. What has been puzzling about these cases is that, on the one hand, an agent seems to do better by her own lights if she does not give into the temptation, and does so without engaging in costly commitment strategies. This seems to indicate that it is instrumentally irrational for her to give into temptation. On the other hand, resisting temptation also requires her to (...) act contrary to the preferences she has at the time of temptation. But that seems to be instrumentally irrational as well. I here consider the two most prominent types of argument why resisting temptation could nevertheless be instrumentally rational, namely two-tier and intra-personal cooperation arguments. I establish that the arguments either fail or are redundant. In particular, the arguments fail under the pervasive assumption in both decision theory and the wider literature on practical rationality that the agent’s preferences over the objects of choice are themselves the standard of instrumental rationality. And they either still fail or they become redundant when we give up that assumption. (shrink)

The critical analysis of habit is regularly complemented by scenarios of how to defy it. Heidegger’s conceptual pairing for taking on this twofold task is “everydayness” and “authenticity.” In this paper, his account is put to test. By choosing an unusual line-up of authors – Heidegger, Hegel, and Diderot –, it identifies three different strategies for overcoming the danger of being ridden by a type. They appeal to authenticity, universality, or individuality. After discussing Hegel’s and Diderot’s accounts, the paper turns (...) to Heidegger’s confrontation between everydayness and authenticity and shows that it remains inconclusive. In order to create a bulwark against habit Heidegger establishes a link between authenticity and the anticipation of death which makes Dasein turn away from the “multiplicity of possibilities” and secures the “simplicity” of resoluteness. This total demolition of particularities and differences paves the way to a totalitarian conception of overcoming customs: The individual is prone to affirm a destiny marked by total homogeneity and equalization. The paper comes to the conclusion that, among the different readings of habit and its discontents, Diderot’s account is the most plausible. (shrink)

In Risk and Rationality, Lara Buchak advertised REU theory as able to recover the modal preferences in the Allais paradox. But we pointed out that REU theory only applies in the “grand world” setting, where it actually struggles with the modal Allais preferences. Buchak offers two replies. Here we enumerate technical and philosophical problems they face.

Music is a stimulus capable of triggering an array of basic and complex emotions. We investigated whether and how individuals employ music to induce specific emotional states in everyday situations for the purpose of emotion regulation. Furthermore, we wanted to examine whether specific emotion-regulation styles influence music selection in specific situations. Participants indicated how likely it would be that they would want to listen to various pieces of music (which are known to elicit specific emotions) in various emotional situations. Data (...) analyses by means of non-metric multidimensional scaling revealed a clear preference for pieces of music that were emotionally congruent with an emotional situation. In addition, we found that specific emotion-regulation styles might influence the selection of pieces of music characterised by specific emotions. Our findings demonstrate emotion-congruent music selection and highlight the important role of specific emotion-regulation styles in the selection of music in everyday situations. (shrink)

This paper argues that instrumental rationality is more permissive than expected utility theory. The most compelling instrumentalist argument in favour of separability, its core requirement, is that agents with non-separable preferences end up badly off by their own lights in some dynamic choice problems. I argue that once we focus on the question of whether agents’ attitudes to uncertain prospects help define their ends in their own right, or instead only assign instrumental value in virtue of the outcomes they may (...) lead to, we see that the argument must fail. Either attitudes to prospects assign non-instrumental value in their own right, in which case we cannot establish the irrationality of the dynamic choice behaviour of agents with non-separable preferences. Or they don’t, in which case agents with non-separable preferences can avoid the problematic choice behaviour without adopting separable preferences. (shrink)